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ABSTRACT 
 
The University of Manchester, Sarah K Davis - Doctor of Philosophy (PhD): 2012. 
Multidimensional pathways to adolescent resilience: The case for emotional intelligence 
 
Emotional intelligence (EI) has been reliably associated with better mental health 
(Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010) however the nature of this relationship in adolescence 
remains largely unexplored.  The small body of existing adolescent research is 
disproportionately focussed upon the ‘trait’ versus ‘ability’ EI perspective and the 
association with mood (versus behavioural) disorders in the form of simple, descriptive 
relationships that reveal little about the processes underpinning such adaptive outcomes. 
This research redresses this imbalance and advances the field by examining how (whether 
directly or indirectly linked to known stress-illness processes) and when (under which 
stress conditions) EI (in both ‘forms’) might be associated with better adolescent mental 
health, whilst simultaneously exploring the conceptualisation of EI within this 
developmental period.  
 
 Adult literature is equivocal on both fronts.  Firstly, evidence points to differential 
incremental contributions from ability and trait EI in the prediction of internalising versus 
externalising symptomatology beyond known correlates of performance, i.e., personality 
and cognitive ability (e.g., Gardner & Qualter, 2010; Peters, Kranzler, & Rossen, 2009). 
Secondly, whilst there is some evidence to suggest that trait EI may directly attenuate the 
effects of chronic and acute stressors to promote adaptation (e.g., Mikolajczak, Roy, 
Luminet, Fillée, & de Timary, 2007), the role of ability EI in this regard appears unclear 
(e.g., Matthews et al., 2006).  Indirect links to adjustment are also hinted at; coping 
mediates trait EI-health outcomes in youth though not all EI-influenced ‘adaptive’ coping 
styles (e.g., problem-focussed) appear to contribute to this effect (e.g., Downey, 
Johnston, Hansen, Birney, & Stough, 2010). Using cross-sectional, self-reported data from 
1,170 adolescents (mean age = 13.03 years; SD = 1.26) the present research aimed to 
address this lack of clarity.   
 
Preliminary regression analyses found that collectively, EI made a significant, 
incremental contribution to the prediction of depression and disruptive behaviour in 
youth beyond the influence of higher-order personality dimensions and general cognitive 
ability. However, of the two, trait EI appeared the stronger predictor. Structural equation 
modelling of conditional indirect effects found that whilst both forms of EI can buffer the 
effects of stressors (family dysfunction, negative life events, socio-economic adversity) on 
disorder, the mechanisms by which this beneficial effect operates differs substantially 
according to context - effects appear contingent on stressor, health outcome and level of 
EI.   For depression, ability EI influences the selection of avoidant coping when facing 
family dysfunction and negative life events, whilst trait EI modifies the effectiveness of 
active coping under family dysfunction only.  In contrast, EI directly attenuates the effects 
of stressors on disruptive behaviour. Nevertheless, the results of supplementary path 
analyses augur for the importance of both forms of EI in adaptational processes; actual 
emotional skill (as ability EI) appears dependent on perceived competency (trait EI) to 
realise advantageous outcomes.   Implications for the EI construct and related 
intervention programmes are discussed together with recommendations for progression 
of the field.  
Keywords: emotional intelligence; mental health; depression; disruptive behaviour; coping; 
stress; personality; adolescence; incremental validity; structural equation modelling; 
mediation; moderation 
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9. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of emotional intelligence (EI) - capturing individual differences in the 
perception, communication, regulation and understanding of self and other-relevant 
emotions (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2009) - has much theoretical appeal given 
potential links to psychological ‘adaptation’, which can be regarded as an individual’s 
adjustment to external circumstances in order to maximise benefits and minimise harm 
(Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002).  This, coupled with recent evidence suggesting 
that EI competencies can be improved via targeted training in adults (Nelis et al., 2011) 
and through school-based programmes in youth (Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & 
Schellinger, 2011) has intensified interest in the construct.   Empirically, research is 
emerging in support of an EI-adaptation link; EI appears to be inversely related to an array 
of disorders subsumed under the rubric of either internalising (e.g., Mikolajczak, Luminet, 
& Menil, 2006) or externalising symptomotology (e.g., Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004), 
yet positively associated with indices of wellbeing (e.g., Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007). 
Moreover, links between EI and known stressors (e.g., life events; Ciarrochi, Dean, & 
Anderson, 2002) and mediators of the stress-illness relationship (e.g., coping; Petrides, 
Perez-Gonzalez, & Furnham, 2007) are also evident, all of which hint at the possible 
involvement of the construct in established mechanisms of risk underpinning resilience 
processes.   
 
Resilience is not a static, individual quality (i.e., a specific trait) or outcome (e.g., 
absence of depression; achievement of developmental competency) but rather a dynamic 
process that involves an interaction between vulnerability and protective markers 
(internal or external to the individual) that serve to modify the effects of adversity 
(Luthar, Sawyer, & Brown, 2006; Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003; 
Rutter, 2006).  Thus, ‘resilient’ youth are those individuals who demonstrate positive 
adaptation despite exposure to adversity (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000). 
Consequently, investigation of resilience processes necessitates the assessment of both 
risk and protective markers; where ‘risk’ acts “to intensify an individual’s reaction to 
adversity (make more vulnerable) and a protective mechanism acts to ameliorate an 
individual’s response to adversity (make more resilient)” (Olsson et al., 2003, p.3).  That 
12 
 
said, risk markers are often bipolar in nature such that they have a positive pole 
associated with positive outcomes and vice versa (Masten, 2001).  Indeed, much 
contention exists in the literature regarding how best to conceptualise, operationally 
define and measure  markers of ‘risk’,  ‘protection’ and ‘adjustment’ outcomes, with the 
variation in methods making cross-study comparisons problematic (Kaufman, Cook, Arny, 
Jones, & Pittinsky, 1994; Luthar et al., 2000; Masten, 2001). To add to this complexity, 
analyses may be variable-focussed (large, whole-sample investigations of statistical links 
between markers; suited to uncovering specificity), person-focussed (comparison of 
processes within ‘resilient’ versus ‘vulnerable’ groups of individuals; valuable for 
developing intervention programmes) or a combination of the two (Masten, 2001; 
Masten & Obradovic, 2006).  Despite this lack of consensus, however, a ‘short-list’ of 
psychosocial markers have consistently emerged from the literature over recent years as 
being important correlates of early psychopathological outcomes, e.g., socio-economic 
disadvantage, family dysfunction etc (Rutter, 2000).  Nevertheless, understanding exactly 
how these markers are implicated within/contribute towards underlying risk modifying 
mechanisms remains a priority for resilience researchers (Grant et al., 2003; Grant et al., 
2006; Rutter, 2006) as does the continued search for further avenues of risk and 
protection to facilitate better understanding of the aetiology of youth psychopathology 
and develop optimal, evidence-based prevention programmes to promote healthy 
development (Masten, 2007).  Whilst protective systems are known to operate across 
individual (e.g., specific resources, competencies, skills), social (e.g., family, peers) and 
societal levels of functioning (e.g., school, community) (Masten & Obradovic, 2006; 
Werner, 1995), it has been noted that the most commonly identified risk/protective 
markers all appear to tap regulatory systems to some extent; be that directly (e.g., 
aspects of emotion regulation; behavioural regulation; executive functioning) or indirectly 
(e.g., parental regulation of emotion; attachment; peer social support) (Masten, 2004).   
 
Thus, contextualised within a resilience framework, it would seem plausible that 
EI, construed as an individual-level latent resource (indicative of emotion-related 
competencies including regulation), may represent an aspect of pronounced vulnerability 
(or protection) that operates within such dynamic pathways to adjustment.  Accordingly, 
EI should be able to make a valid contribution to the prediction, understanding and 
13 
 
ultimately, as the focus of prevention programmes, the attenuation of psychopathology 
in youth.  However, research into this ‘ideal’ is currently limited.  Investigation has not 
progressed far beyond uncovering simple descriptive associations between variables (e.g., 
EI – depression; EI – coping); complex analyses have rarely been undertaken to explore 
how EI might be linked to mental health and under which circumstances (when) such 
processes are operational, with a dearth of youth-focussed research further 
compounding this issue. Moreover, the current paucity of evidence has meant that 
various conceptual and methodological caveats continue to pervade the literature; 
differences in theoretical underpinnings (i.e., EI as a ‘trait’ versus ‘ability’) and 
measurement (both ‘type’ and breadth) have so far limited definitive interpretations and 
the generalisability of findings.  Specifically, the capacity of EI to incrementally predict 
adaptational outcomes beyond the influence of known predictors of performance allied 
to the construct (e.g., personality; general cognitive ability) remains vehemently debated 
(Brody, 2004; Fiori & Antonakis, 2011) and has not yet received attention with reference 
to adolescent mental health.   Ultimately, we still do not know whether EI is really useful 
for those who need it the most - youth exposed to stressors for whom EI may offer some 
form of protection to promote resilience.  Patently this is pivotal to establishing an 
adaptive account of EI, as Matthews et al., (2002) note, “not only must we show that EI is 
associated with individual differences in processing, but those processing differences 
must have significant consequences for real-world functioning” (p. 233). Building on 
existing EI literature and theoretical conjecture, the current work sets out to address 
these ‘gaps’ in the knowledge base by investigating how the construct contributes to 
adolescent wellbeing and under which circumstances.   
 
A preliminary aim of the work is to explore the conceptualisation of EI in 
adolescence, including the ‘dual-facetted’ nature of EI (i.e., distinction between ‘ability EI’ 
and ‘trait EI’) and possible sub-groups differences.  Additionally, it will be examined 
whether EI (in either form) relates to mental health (predictive validity) and whether 
these effects hold after controlling for the influence of related constructs (incremental 
validity).  This first aim will be addressed via the following research questions:  
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1. To what extent are ability EI and trait EI related in adolescents?  How does each 
‘type’ of EI vary according to age and sex?   
 
2. What is the nature of bivariate relationships between A/TEI and mental health 
(internalising [depression] and externalising [disruptive behaviour] 
symptomotology)? 
 
3. If significant associations between A/TEI and mental health exist, does each 
construct continue to make a significant predictive contribution with the influence 
of the ‘Big Five’ personality traits (Neuroticism; Extraversion; Openness; 
Conscientiousness; Agreeableness) and general cognitive ability (proxy indicator: 
academic attainment scores) held constant? 
 
The second (central) aim is to explore the processes underpinning the relationship 
between EI and adolescent mental health in an attempt to explain how and when EI 
operates.  It is posited that EI may influence adjustment via two potential pathways; 
directly buffering the effects of stressors on mental health (though emotional 
competencies e.g., perception, regulation) or indirectly, setting in motion ‘adaptive’ ways 
of coping when faced with adversity. In line with Grant et al., (2003), EI is considered here 
as a pre-existing personal resource that may modify the impact of stressors, whilst coping 
is conceived as a stressor-activated process that explains the association between stress 
and psychopathology.  Using a variable-focussed approach that builds on the framework 
proposed by Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2007), a series of moderated mediation models 
(adapted to the latent variable context) will be specified to address the following 
questions: 
 
4. Is EI best considered a ‘direct’ buffer of the effect of stressors on disorder 
(i.e., tested through a ‘direct effect’ moderation model)?  If so, is there 
specificity in this relationship according to ‘type’ of disorder (depression 
versus disruptive behaviour), stressor (e.g., poverty, family dysfunction, 
negative life events) and EI (ability versus trait)?  How does this effect differ 
according to level of EI?  
15 
 
5. Is an ‘indirect’ role for EI in stressor-health pathways plausible - does EI 
interact with stressors to affect ‘upstream’ choice of coping strategy (‘a’ 
path moderation model), or, does EI influence ‘downstream’ coping 
implementation to affect disorder (‘b’ path moderation model)?   How do 
these effects differ according to level of EI?  Specificity with respect to 
stressor, EI and outcome will be examined. 
 
Accordingly, the current work offers a significant and unique contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge and ongoing research efforts within the field of EI and, more 
broadly, resilience research. This is the first piece of research to examine the capacity of 
EI to predict adolescent mental health beyond higher-order personality dimensions and 
general cognitive ability and the first to examine links between multiple coping styles, EI 
and mental health in the context of stress in adolescence.  Hence, this evidence has both 
theoretical and applied importance; establishing the predictive validity and utility of the 
construct when situated in wider stress-health processes not only contributes towards 
building an ‘adaptive’ theoretical account of EI but also has practical relevance for 
optimising Social and Emotional Learning prevention programmes which have become a 
key feature of educational strategy both nationally (e.g., Department for Education and 
Employment, 1999) and internationally (e.g., Collaborative for Academic, Social and 
Emotional Learning, 2003).   
 
Following an introduction to the EI construct (chapter 10), ensuing discussion 
provides a review of theory linking EI to mental health (chapter 11) and evaluates the 
evidence base to date (chapter 12), simultaneously highlighting how the current research 
will enhance and develop this fledgling field.  The study methodology (sample, measures, 
procedure) and quantitative analyses are presented across chapters 13 and 14 
respectively, whilst the final chapter (15) presents a detailed interpretation of the findings 
and a review of the implications and limitations of the research.  Discussion closes by 
considering the future progression of the field. 
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10. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A DIVIDED FIELD 
 
Broadly defined, emotional intelligence (EI) captures individual differences in 
identifying, processing and regulating emotion (Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008).  
Originally conceived as a form of intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), EI spawns from 
the notion of ‘social’ intelligence (for review see Landy, 2005) and closely aligns with 
Gardner’s work on ‘multiple intelligences’ (e.g., Gardner, 1993), which argues for a 
broadening of the traditional taxonomy of human cognitive abilities (i.e., g: abstract, 
mechanical reasoning) to consider additional areas of competency; most pertinent to EI 
are the ‘interpersonal’ (ability to understand others and communicate effectively) and 
‘intrapersonal’ intelligences (capacity for self-reflection/introspection to understand own 
emotions, goals and motivations).  Since its inception, a variety of models of EI have come 
to the fore (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995; Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990; Schutte et al., 1998) each offering divergent perspectives on the relative 
components of EI and respective sampling domains upon which corresponding 
measurement instruments are predicated.  Indeed it has been suggested that EI traverses 
at least four existing explanatory constructs; temperament, information processing, 
emotional self-regulation, emotional knowledge and  skills (often termed emotional 
competence) (Matthews et al., 2002).  Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, theoretical 
accounts of EI together with rationalisations of its adaptational value, often ‘borrow’ from 
the comprehensive corpora of literature originating in each of these domains.  
 
Such discordance in content has served to strengthen support for a ‘dual-facetted’ 
conceptualisation of EI, labelled by some as a ‘schism’ in the field (Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2008).   The ability perspective (referred to hereafter as AEI) maintains the 
original stance that EI is a distinct form of intelligence for reasoning about emotion, 
represented by a set of interactive cognitive abilities specialised for complex emotional 
information processing (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008).   Specifically, Mayer & Salovey 
(1997) defined EI as “the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion...to 
access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought...to understand emotion and 
emotional knowledge and...regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual 
growth” (p.8).  Hence, their accompanying model of EI consists of four branches of 
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hierarchically ordered sets of primary mental abilities (perceiving; facilitating [using]; 
understanding; managing).  A distinction is made between relatively ‘basic’ or lower-order 
skills (such as simple identification of emotion in oneself) and the more complex self and 
other-regulatory capacities needed for successful affect management.  Importantly, each 
skill set is ordered according to a developmental timescale where “people high in 
emotional intelligence are expected to progress more quickly through the abilities 
designated and to master more of them” (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p.8).  Additionally, the 
ordering of the branches reflects the extent to which the particular ability set is 
integrated into the individual’s overarching psychological sub-systems, for instance 
personality.  In this respect, branch one abilities, which are concerned with perception of 
emotion, would be tied to the emotion system, whereas branch four, which addresses 
regulatory capacities, would be influenced by plans and goals  (Mayer, 2005; Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).  In contrast, proponents of the trait approach (hereafter, TEI) 
argue that EI is best represented as “a cluster of emotion-related self-perceptions and 
dispositions” partially determined by, yet sufficiently distinct from, existing higher-order 
personality dimensions, such as those described by the ‘Big Five’ or ‘Giant Three’ 
personality taxonomies (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007, p.273).  As our ‘emotional personality’, 
TEI (or emotional self-efficacy) is concerned with self-perceived emotional functioning, 
emotional preferences and qualities, exemplified through traits such as empathy, 
adaptability, emotional expression and assertiveness. Hence, conceptually and 
empirically, TEI aligns with mainstream personality theory and is considered a lower-level 
personality trait(s) unrelated to general cognitive ability (Petrides, 2011a).   
 
Consequently, each conceptualisation differentially keys into the aforementioned 
explanatory constructs; TEI taps dispositional self-regulation and temperament whilst AEI 
indexes emotional knowledge and skills (including self-regulation proficiency). As shall be 
seen in the following review, these theoretical distinctions (and convergences) carry 
important implications for the development of an adaptive account of EI, particularly with 
regard to mental health.  Moreover, the preferred conceptualisation of EI dictates a 
mutually exclusive method of assessment.  Whilst AEI lends itself to measures of maximal 
performance, akin to cognitive testing (i.e., capacity to pass mental tasks via external 
appraisal), TEI utilises self-report to evaluate typical performance (i.e., perceptions of 
18 
 
attributes via internal appraisal) in the vein of traditional personality testing (Zeidner et 
al., 2009).  The former is exemplified by the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT: Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) whilst TEI theory is operationalised 
through the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue: Petrides, 2009b)1.  
Recent empirical investigation with adults has corroborated the construct differentiation 
of EI, with negligible statistical associations reported between measures of AEI and TEI 
(e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Goldenberg, Matheson, & Mantler, 2006). Comparable 
research with youth is sparse owing to the limited availability of omnibus measures of AEI 
(the MSCEIT youth version, currently under development, is the only comprehensive 
option available).  However, in pre-adolescents (i.e., samples ≤ 11 years), correspondence 
between the MSCEIT and trait measures appears moderate at best (r ≤ .33) thus mirroring 
the adult trend (Barlow, Qualter, & Stylianou, 2010; Qualter, Gardner, Pope, Hutchinson, 
& Whiteley, 2012).   Moreover, studies utilising ‘proxy’ ability measures drawn from the 
wider emotion research literature (e.g., ACES: Schultz, Izard, & Bear, 2004; Ekman-60 
Faces Test: Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002) also report minimal 
concordance with TEI (Mavroveli, Petrides, Sangareau, & Furnham, 2009; Williams, Daley, 
Burnside, & Hammond-Rowley, 2009).    
 
Evidence for construct differentiation is further provided through the patterning 
of associations between EI and allied constructs; AEI is moderately associated (ordinarily 
to the magnitude of r ≤ .4) with measures of (predominantly crystallised) cognitive ability 
or proxies thereof, in both adult (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Farrelly & Austin, 2007) 
and youth samples (e.g., Peters et al., 2009). Conversely, relationships between AEI and 
measures of personality are typically negligible, with the strongest associations (r ≤ .3) 
generally found for trait agreeableness and openness (e.g., Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 
2010).  By contrast, TEI shares robust associations (r ≤ .5 contingent upon measurement 
                                                          
1
 Not all self-report measures map directly to trait EI theory; some questionnaires are theoretically derived 
from the ability model of EI (i.e., Mayer & Salovey, 1990, 1997) and/or purport to measure ‘abilities’ despite 
incorporating items assessing personality traits (e.g., Schutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence Inventory 
(SSREI), Schutte 1998; Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQi), Bar-On, 1997) which is contentious (see Zeidner 
et al., 2009). However it is argued that, irrelevant of labelling and origin, findings stemming from application 
of these ‘mixed’ measures are still valuable, if they are interpreted with reference to trait EI theory 
(Petrides, 2011). This will be adopted throughout the current review where the labels AEI and TEI will be 
used to demarcate assessment methodology.  
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model) with broadband personality dimensions, particularly trait Neuroticism and 
Extraversion, whilst is unrelated to cognitive ability in adults (Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 
2003) and youths (Ferrando et al., 2011; Mavroveli, Petrides, Shove, & Whitehead, 2008).  
Such empirical ‘dissociations’ are fully in-line with respective theoretical underpinnings 
and hence the emerging dichotomy between trait and ability perspectives appears 
persuasive.  Nevertheless, the field remains fraught with conceptual and methodological 
issues, some of which are ‘construct-specific’ (e.g., A/TEI sampling domains and 
instrumentation) and others ‘EI-generic’ (e.g., application of the construct: predictive and 
incremental validity). Thus, before moving forward to explore links between EI and 
mental health, the former are briefly reviewed, whilst the more ‘generic’ issues are 
highlighted in due course with specific application to the mental health literature.    
 
10.1 Challenges and controversies 
 
Whilst proponents of the ability perspective maintain that their construct satisfies 
established criteria for an ‘intelligence’ - i.e., reflects an aptitude; increases with age and 
experience; is positively associated with other abilities (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999)  - 
this status is challenged both conceptually and empirically. The representation of AEI as 
an ‘aptitude’ depends on whether it can be successfully operationalised as a skill set that 
is amenable to assessment through veridical scoring of performance-based tasks 
(Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004; Zeidner et al., 2008).   For instance, psychometric g 
is indexed via dichotomous assessment of performance on traditional IQ tests, where 
responses are adjudged according to the properties of ‘universal’ rule-based systems 
(e.g., reasoning = logic; spatial = geometry).  It is argued, however, that the subjective and 
highly contextualised nature of emotions/emotional processing nullifies any possibility of 
an ‘ability’ EI construct (Petrides, Furnham, & Mavroveli, 2007; Zeidner et al., 2009).  
Specifically, the ability perspective rests on the assumption that there exist universally-
accepted, ‘correct’ ways to feel that can be reliably measured in a social vacuum and 
evaluated in accordance with some independently-derived criteria.  Mayer and colleagues 
(see e.g., Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003) have attempted to address these 
issues by adopting expert and consensus methods of scoring for the MSCEIT. A weighted 
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proportional score is awarded based on the extent to which the response accords with 
the pooled consensus of expert or normative-sample opinion. Hence, in this way there 
are no absolute right or wrong answers, just varying proportions of ‘correctness’.    For 
example, the MSCEIT-YVR emotion facilitation branch asks adolescents to rate the extent 
to which feeling surprised is like feeling cold; energetic; quick; yellow using a 5-point scale 
(1: ‘Does not feel this way’ through to 5: ‘Definitely feels this way’).  If 19 out of the panel 
of 21 emotion experts agreed that energetic definitely felt like surprise, then a score of 
.90 (19 ÷ 21) would be awarded to those selecting option 5.   
 
However, as well as neglecting possible socio-cultural differences in emotional 
processing (Matthews et al., 2004) this methodology may also fail to identify extreme 
groups – a necessary requisite of all IQ-type tests (MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & 
Zeidner, 2004). For instance, the ‘right’ response to complex emotional scenarios may be 
unusual and hence only detected by a small number of gifted individuals; however, 
divergence from the ‘typical’ response set (effectively exhibiting a lack of EI) would result 
in a less-correct proportional score. Indeed, the MSCEIT-YVR validation process has 
served to further illuminate this issue;  it is now only possible to score adolescent 
responses via expert consensus since normative data analyses found that “the most 
frequently endorsed response by youth was clearly not the correct choice” 
(Papadogiannis, Logan, & Sitarenios, 2009, p.55).  For many, the prospect of an elite set of 
emotion ‘experts’ dictating veridical criteria for complex and subjective affect-regulation 
processes remains questionable (Locke, 2005; Petrides, 2009a) and, as noted here, this 
raises some specific issues for the assessment of developing versus established emotional 
competencies in youth populations.    
 
   Scoring issues aside, many critics have argued that at best ‘ability’ measures 
provide assessment of explicit emotional knowledge (or beliefs) rather than implicit skill 
or competency in emotional functioning (Brody, 2004; Matthews et al., 2004; van Heck & 
den Oudsten, 2008).  This, once again, sharply departs from traditional IQ testing where 
the mechanics of problem-solving are irrelevant; the response to the problem 
demonstrates level of competency.  To take an example from the ‘managing emotions’ 
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sub-branch of the MSCEIT-YVR: an adolescent may know that challenging a rude and 
offensive individual to a fight is ‘not at all helpful’ in facilitating feelings of ‘guilt and 
regret’ in the perpetrator, and instead asking ‘how he would feel if someone talked to him 
that way’ and telling him ‘he should be ashamed’ would theoretically be more helpful.  
However, when faced with a similar situation in reality, such ‘emotionally intelligent’ 
knowledge may not be put into practice owing to the variety of context-specific, situational 
and implicit factors at play.  Additionally, over and above the questionable ecological 
validity of paper-and-pencil vignette-based scenarios for rating hypothetical performance 
(Zeidner et al., 2008), the reliance on explicit, verbal report of emotional ‘skill’ raises 
issues concerning the potential confound of vocabulary proficiency (Wilhelm, 2005).  The 
verbal reasoning ability required for completion of the MSCEIT may explain the tendency 
for correlations to  be detected between AEI and crystallised versus fluid ability – and in 
particular, why this appears most robust for the emotional understanding (knowledge) 
branch (e.g., Austin, 2010; Farrelly & Austin, 2007).  Consequently,  the distinctiveness of 
this ‘new’ intelligence remains debated (MacCann, 2010; Wilhelm, 2005).    
 
Patently, further work is needed to strengthen the conceptual foundations of AEI 
and, in line with this, further refine current measurement vehicles.  Branch and full-scale 
scores derived from the adult MSCEIT have adequate levels of internal consistency (> .85; 
Mayer et al., 2002) and test re-test reliability  (.86;  Brackett & Mayer, 2003), however, 
individual task level reliabilities are considerably lower, particularly for tasks tapping the 
ability to use emotion (facilitation: .38 - .48) (Roberts et al., Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & 
Stough, 2005; 2006).  Moreover, correlations with established emotion ‘ability’ measures 
are also lower than expected - e.g., MSCEIT perceiving faces task/Japanese and Caucasian 
Brief Affect Recognition Test: r = .08 (Roberts et al., 2006) - and the original four-factor 
structure of the instrument is disputed; alternative one and two factor solutions have 
been recovered (e.g., Mayer et al., 2002; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008) and a recent 
meta-analytic factor analysis (N = 10,573) advocated an alternative three factor structure 
(perceiving, understanding; managing emotion only) (Fan, Jackson, Yang, Tang, & Zhang, 
2010). Additionally, little is known about the development of AEI with age and 
experience; in the absence of comprehensive longitudinal testing, findings from cross-
sectional studies have been equivocal. Whilst Mayer et al., (1999, study 2) report an adult 
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(17-70 years)  versus adolescent (12-16 years) advantage across sub-tasks of the MSCEITs 
predecessor, the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) (understanding ‘blends’; 
perceiving ‘faces’ and using ‘synaesthesia’), this instrument was designed exclusively for 
use with adults and only a sub-set of tasks were administered for comparison (i.e., no 
branch or total score trends).   Using the MSCEIT, Palmer et al., (2005) failed to find a 
significant correlation between age and total AEI in adults aged 18-79 years and negligible 
associations were recorded at branch level (age and skill in using: r = .16 and managing 
emotion: r = .12).   Age was similarly unrelated to total AEI scores in children (Barlow et 
al., 2010) yet curiously, robustly associated in a small group (N = 50) of adolescents (r = 
.46; though ‘perceiving’ non-significant) (Peters et al., 2009).   
 
Nevertheless, evidence of gender-specific sub-group differences have been more 
consistent and proffered as evidence to support the ‘distinctiveness’ of  domain-specific 
emotional ability (MacCann, 2010).  Studies of cognitive skill have found that whilst 
neither sex has an apparent advantage in general IQ (Colom, Juan-Espinosa, Abad, & 
Garcia, 2000), males dominate in certain types of numerical or spatial skill (Voyer, Voyer, 
& Bryden, 1995).  In stark contrast, the general trend supports a female AEI advantage in 
adult (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Farrelly & Austin, 2007; Goldenberg 
et al., 2006; Karim & Weisz, 2010; McIntyre, 2010) and adolescent populations (Qualter et 
al., 2012; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010) – though the latter study reported male 
superiority in perceiving emotion and these differences have not been detected in 
children (Qualter, Barlow, & Stylianou, 2011).  Adult studies reporting branch level data 
indicate that this difference could be largely attributed to skill in managing emotion 
(Farrelly & Austin, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2006; Karim & Weisz, 2010) however 
continued exploration of branch level differences in adolescents is required.  Doubtless 
multifarious methodological challenges continue to permeate discussion concerning AEI, 
nevertheless, interest in the construct continues to intensify and there is now a 
burgeoning evidence base linking AEI to a variety of adaptational outcomes (for recent 
review see Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2011).   Clearly, it is only through further rigorous 
research that these issues will be resolved, either to the eventual detriment or benefit of 
the construct.  
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In contrast to the conceptual controversies engulfing AEI, TEI theory would appear 
to offer a theoretically advantageous account of EI.  Conceived as a lower order 
personality trait, TEI clearly connects to models of differential psychology (i.e., personality 
theory), sidesteps the issue of measuring ‘abilities’ through unreliable (self-report) 
techniques, and could potentially offer a more nuanced understanding of the influence of 
emotion-related traits on functioning.  Indeed, researchers are actively exploring a 
possible expansion of the traditional personality sphere to accommodate the construct 
and applications thereof (e.g., Petrides, 2011b).  Perhaps the major conceptual objection 
levelled at the notion of TEI is whether it offers anything novel to the field of individual 
differences research or whether it is just “old wine in new bottles” (Matthews et al., 
2002, p.15). Whilst convergence with established personality traits is predicted, many 
argue that this (often substantial) overlap limits the predictive utility of the construct; for 
instance global TEI (indexed with the TEIQue) shares approximately 62% of its variance 
with the Big Five personality traits and 53% with the ‘Eysenkian Three’  (Petrides, Pita et 
al., 2007).  There is however, a growing body of evidence to support both the predictive 
application of TEI to aspects of organisational, health, educational and social functioning, 
and its capacity to add incrementally to these predictive outcomes beyond the effects of 
established personality dimensions (for review see, Petrides, 2011a).  Nevertheless, there 
are gaps in this literature and, arguably, the ‘all-encompassing’ vision of Petrides and 
colleagues (see e.g., Petrides, 2009a) to envelop all self-report instruments within TEI 
theory irrespective of theoretical origins and sampling domains, has served to ‘muddy the 
water’ and actually hinder progression of the field.  As shall be seen in the following 
discussion of mental health, this presents specific difficulties when attempting to 
assimilate findings and has significant consequences for theoretical interpretations.   
 
Psychometrically, the more popular self-report measures appear internally 
consistent and posses good test-retest reliability (see e.g., Bar-On, 2004; Petrides, 2009a; 
Schutte et al., 1998).  However, the theorised factor structures of some instruments have 
not always been recovered through empirical replication (e.g., the EQi: Matthews et al., 
2002; SSREI: Saklofske et al., 2003) -  although the TEIQue appears more promising in this 
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respect (Petrides, 2009a).  Similar to the MSCEIT, little is known about the development 
of TEI with maturity although some change is predicted over time assuming “people 
become less emotional and better socialised” (Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007, p.158). 
Personality theory traditionally assumes trait stability over time (John, Naumann, & Soto, 
2008) although a degree of personality change as a result of person x environment 
interactions is in accordance with recent evidence and current thinking (Shiner & Caspi, 
2003); for instance, a meta-analytic investigation reported only moderate correlations 
between traits measured in childhood, early adulthood (age 30) and again in later 
adulthood, with personality continuing to change over time before stabilising between 
age 50 and 70 (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).   As with AEI, longitudinal TEI research is 
markedly absent and very few cross-sectional studies have reported on age group trends 
(particularly in adolescence).  However, some research hints at the development of TEI 
with age, though the strength of this relationship appears stronger in children aged 8-11 
years (r = .32; Barlow et al., 2010) than adults (r = .19; Mikolajczak, Luminet, Leroy, & Roy, 
2007).    
 
Additionally, the literature is equivocal on the nature of any sex-specific sub-group 
differences in TEI. Allied literatures predict differences; for instance, males tend to self-
rate their general (d = .37), mathematical (d = .44) and spatial (d = .43) (though not 
verbal) abilities higher than females (Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2011) and gender 
differences have been consistently reported in the Big Five personality traits; females 
report higher N, E, A and C (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008).  Although some 
studies have reported a female TEI advantage (Farrelly & Austin, 2007, study 2; 
Goldenberg et al., 2006), others have reported higher scores for males (Petrides, 2009a), 
whilst others still have failed to detect significant differences (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).  
This inconsistency is mirrored in younger participants, where the majority of studies have 
reported non-significant differences (Mavroveli, Petrides, Rieffe, & Bakker, 2007; 
Mavroveli et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2009), although some point to a female advantage 
(Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001; Mavroveli & Sánchez-Ruiz, 2011; Qualter et al., 2012).  
Proponents of TEI suggest that these discrepancies arise largely because of the different 
levels of analysis (and TEI instruments) employed across studies; sex differences in lower 
level factors/facets are likely diluted or cancelled out through aggregation to result in 
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negligible differences at the global level (Mavroveli et al., 2009).  Indeed, using the 
TEIQue, Siegling, Saklofske, Vesely, & Nordstokke (2012) found that males had higher 
levels of trait ‘self-control’, whilst females scored higher on ‘wellbeing’ and ‘emotionality’, 
despite non-significant global differences.  Moreover, Petrides (2009a) found more fine-
grained differences at facet level; males scored higher in emotion management (others), 
assertiveness, emotion regulation (self), stress management, social awareness and self-
esteem whilst women perceived higher competencies in emotional expression, 
perception, relationships and trait empathy.   
 
Beyond this, remaining methodological criticisms of TEI tend centre of the validity 
of the self-report methodology per se.  For instance, it is widely accepted that the 
‘accuracy’ of self-reported skills, abilities and characteristics are prone to bias, particularly 
over-optimism, which can stem from personal misinformation (e.g., feedback shaped by 
intrinsic motivations for image maintenance etc) or a lack of information concerning 
actual performance (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004).  Additionally, the tautology of TEI 
assessments (i.e., measurement of self-awareness requires self-awareness) further 
complicates the matter; with below par levels of emotional self-awareness, those low in 
TEI may actually self-report high levels of competency (Zeidner et al., 2009).  Nonetheless, 
proponents of the approach suggest that perceptions of competency convey importance 
for functioning, irrespective of their relative accuracy - the impact of which may be best 
evaluated through objective outcomes (Petrides & Furnham, 2003).   
 
10.2 The future of EI 
 
Since its inception, EI has been met with equal measures of enthusiasm and 
opprobrium, and the construct remains debated at both conceptual and operational 
levels.   Nevertheless, there is growing theoretical and empirical consensus favouring a 
‘dual-facetted’ construct, represented by the ability and trait perspectives. Whilst each 
‘brand’ of EI has its stalwart of supporters and critics, many researchers recognise the 
potential contribution of both perspectives for understanding adaptational processes 
(Mikolajczak, 2009; Schutte, Malouff, & Hine, 2011).  Considering explicit socio-emotional 
26 
 
skill (AEI) may underpin but not necessarily translate into optimal ‘on-line’ functioning, 
which is influenced by implicit factors (e.g., self-efficacy, tapped by TEI), the two 
approaches could be viewed as complementary and mutually informative versus 
exclusive.  In other words, AEI can give an indication of maximal potential (i.e., what we 
could do) whereas TEI signals typical behaviour (i.e., what we usually do) (Mikolajczak, 
2009).    It would appear that there is value, therefore, in further pursuing empirical 
comparisons of both trait and ability EI with respect to adaptational outcomes.  Further 
exploration of the construct validity of both approaches will also serve to address many 
outstanding ‘grey’ areas (e.g., sub-group differences; age-related trends consistent with 
theory) and in particular the issue of conceptual redundancy.  Critics have argued that EI 
may be  unable to offer anything new to the prediction of key outcomes given close links 
to allied variables, particularly personality and general cognitive ability (Brody, 2004; 
Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004).  Thus, for many, advancement of the global construct 
depends on whether EI can account for a significant proportion of incremental and 
unique variance beyond known predictors of performance (Fiori & Antonakis, 2011; 
Wilhelm, 2005).   This will be addressed in the current research where the central goal is 
to extend current knowledge of the utility of each of these differing manifestations of EI, 
with specific application to adolescent mental health. It is to exploration of this field that 
discussion now turns. 
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11. THEORETICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EI AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
This chapter examines relevant theory to establish why, at a conceptual level at 
least, EI should be related to mental health.  Presenting the positions of both the trait and 
ability perspectives, discussion considers how the allied constructs of emotion regulation 
and personality provide a platform for EI-mental health research and engender specific 
predictions concerning a direct role for EI in psychological adaptation.  However, recent 
writings also suggest that both ‘forms’ of EI could operate indirectly to promote mental 
health via key coping processes.  Discussion concludes by summarising potential 
explanatory pathways for EI in the stressor-health framework and emphasises the need to 
establish an adaptive account of EI.  
 
EI shares obvious ‘face validity’ with clinical symptomotology; indeed, some form 
of ‘emotional dysfunction’ is a key hallmark of the majority of clinically recognised 
disorders (Hansen, Lloyd, & Stough, 2009).  For instance, internalising disorders (e.g., 
generalised anxiety disorder; major depression) are traditionally characterised by 
difficulties in the regulation of excessive negative affect, accompanied by a negative 
attentional or perceptual bias.  Similarly, externalising disorders (e.g.,  ADHD; conduct 
disorder) suggest difficulties in self-regulation (inhibition) of behavioural and emotional 
responses, often manifest through displays of enhanced negative emotional reactivity 
(e.g., irritability, hostility) in response to environmental events (Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007; 
Zeidner et al., 2009). As well as the maladaptive management of emotion, there are also 
clear parallels between clinical pathology and potential abnormalities in other facets of EI.  
For instance, it has been suggested that in youth-diagnosed conduct disorder 
characterised by reactive aggression (i.e., by defensive, behavioural responses to 
perceived provocation), deficits in emotion regulation may be underscored by difficulties 
in emotion recognition (identifying and understanding the socio-emotional cues of 
others), which ultimately leads to misinterpretation of environmental information (Mullin 
& Hinshaw, 2007). Indeed, Hessler & Katz (2010) reported the presence of significant 
concurrent and longitudinal associations between risky behaviours (hard drug use) and 
deficits in emotional awareness and expression of anger in a community sample of youth 
assessed at age 9 and again at age 16.  Moreover, a recent meta analysis found that a lack 
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of discrete emotion knowledge (the ability to accurately understand basic emotional cues 
in others - happiness, sadness, anger, fear etc - as they manifest in typical social contexts, 
e.g., via facial expressions, vocal intonation) was related to increased internalising (n = 19; 
r = -.17) and externalising disorder symptomotology (n = 34; r = -.17) in youth aged 
between 3 and 15 years (Trentacosta & Fine, 2010).   
 
These findings clearly resonate with EI.  Indeed, proponents of the construct 
emphasise that ‘intelligent’ utilisation of emotion-related knowledge and allied skills is 
imperative for successful adaptation (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  It is argued that 
‘emotionally intelligent’  individuals (i.e., high scorers on measures of EI) are better able 
to adapt to the demands of everyday life (Bar-On, 1997, 2006) and exhibit enhanced 
proficiency in perceiving, expressing, understanding and regulating emotions (Salovey, 
Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 1999) - skills and traits which should ensure better 
psychological (and physical) health compared to low scoring, ‘emotionally unintelligent’ 
individuals.  As Salovey & Mayer (1990) summarise from the perspective of AEI: 
 
“The person with emotional intelligence can be thought of as having attained 
at least a limited form of positive mental health.  These individuals are aware 
of their own feelings and those of others...are open to positive and negative 
aspects of internal experience, are able to label them, and when appropriate, 
communicate them.  Such awareness will often lead to the effective 
regulation of affect within themselves and others, and so contribute to well-
being” (p.201). 
 
Hence, within the ability perspective, proficiency in affect regulation (self and 
others) is identified as most crucial for mental health.  This skill is assumed to be 
supported by/contingent upon the lower level abilities of perceiving, using emotion to 
facilitate thinking and understanding emotion, which contribute to a fundamental 
‘emotional awareness’ necessary for adaptive emotion management.   Conversely, trait EI 
is considered linked to psychological adaptation given that, “our appraisal of our 
circumstances and our reactions to life events may be partly filtered through our 
perceptions of our emotional abilities” (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007, p. 285)  to such an 
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extent that, “...very low trait EI may have psychopathological consequences” (Petrides, 
Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, p.41).  In other words, beliefs about emotional style, 
dispositions and competencies could influence perception, interpretation and reactivity to 
emotion-laden situations, such that positive self-perceptions may be crucial to successful 
navigation of our social and emotional worlds.  Hence, consistent with divergent 
conceptualisations, each position appeals to a different, established theoretical construct 
to explain possible relationships with mental health; as an ‘extrinsic’, skills-based concept, 
AEI invokes the emotion regulation literature, whilst ‘intrinsic’, trait-based EI draws upon 
personality theory.  Nevertheless, beyond this, these descriptions tell us little about why 
EI should be linked to better mental health. In order to elucidate this rationale, it is 
necessary to understand how each body of established literature connects to 
psychopathology.  
 
11.1 Examining the nomological network (1): Ability EI, emotion regulation and mental 
health 
 
In response to early writings concerning the hierarchical structure of AEI, many 
researchers have emphasised the importance of the ‘management’ sub-branch over 
others (e.g., Joseph & Newman, 2010), with some even choosing to exclusively focus on 
establishing links between MSCEIT ‘emotion management’ performance and health-
related outcomes (e.g., Brackett, Palomera, Mojsa-Kaja, Reyes, & Salovey, 2010; Lopes et 
al., 2004).  However, linking ‘effective regulation of affect’ to mental health is certainly 
not a new concept.  Research efforts exploring links between emotion regulation 
processes and clinical pathology have been prolific and emotion regulation is now 
regarded by many as key to understanding the pathogenesis and cause of 
psychopathology (Kring & Sloan, 2010). Whilst there are myriad definitions and models of 
emotion regulation, Gross’ (1998) definition of emotion regulation - the processes by 
which individuals “influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how 
they experience and express them” (p.275) - is perhaps the most widely cited.  Indeed 
this, taken in concert with his process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007), has been identified as the preferential organising framework to best 
unify and guide research exploring emotion regulation in psychopathology (Bloch, Moran, 
30 
 
& Kring, 2010).  The model provides a temporal account of the emotion-generation cycle 
and permits identification of distinct regulation strategies that may be dysfunctional or 
absent at particular points in the process.  Such specificity permits fine-grained 
measurement of strategies and facilitates insight into potential treatments for differing 
forms of psychopathology (Bloch et al., 2010).  In brief, the model holds that emotion may 
be regulated at five time points (reflecting families of processes) across the emotion-
generative trajectory; situation selection (choosing whether to engage in a situation 
based on the likelihood that it will result in desirable emotions), situation modification 
(changing external, physical environments to alter emotional impact), attentional 
deployment (shifting internal or external attentional focus within the situation to 
influence emotion,  e.g., distraction; concentration), cognitive change (reappraisal of 
situation or self-efficacy to manage demands to change emotional impact), and response 
modulation (direct attempts to change behavioural, experiential, physiological responses 
e.g., suppression and avoidance) (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Corresponding 
to the first four points in the model, emotion may be regulated prior to the response, 
preceding activation of behavioural and physiological modulation (antecedent-focussed), 
or, can occur after the response and once the emotion tendency is underway (response-
focussed).   
 
Research indicates that the use of antecedent strategies such as reappraisal 
(restructuring thoughts about an emotion-eliciting situation to modify anticipated impact) 
are associated with better mental health outcomes than effortful, response-focussed 
strategies, such as suppression (i.e., inhibiting expressive behaviour, but not negative 
emotion, once the emotion state is in progress) (Gross & John, 2003).  A recent meta-
analysis of 114 studies has corroborated these trends; use of response-focussed 
strategies, including rumination, suppression and avoidance, were associated with 
increased psychopathology (depression, anxiety, eating disorder and substance use) 
whereas acceptance, reappraisal and problem-solving resulted in fewer 
psychopathological symptoms (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the strength of these relationships appears to vary according to type of 
disorder and strategy; internalising disorders were more consistently associated with 
specific strategies than externalising problems and, of these strategies, rumination 
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carried the largest effect size whilst reappraisal and acceptance represented only small to 
medium effects.  Similarly, in adolescents, Garnefski, Kraaij, & van Etten (2005) found that 
those with internalising problems were more likely to engage in self-blame and 
rumination compared to individuals with externalising problems and a control group.  
Moreover Neumann, van Lier, Gratz, & Koot (2009) found that total difficulties in emotion 
regulation were related to anxiety, delinquency, aggression and depression, explaining 
58%, 13%, 15% and 59% in each disorder respectively – again corroborating research 
suggesting a greater correspondence between internalising symptoms and emotion 
(dys)regulation.  The construct has also been found to play a role in the development and 
maintenance of disorder.  For instance, emotion regulation mediated the effect of 
maltreatment on psychopathology (both externalising and internalising symptoms) in 
children who displayed a pattern of insecure relatedness to their caregiver, suggesting 
that emotion regulation could be a potential vulnerability marker for disorder (Alink, 
Cicchetti, Kim, & Rogosch, 2009). Nevertheless, recent longitudinal research hints at 
specificity and complexity within such pathways; in a sample of maltreated children aged 
6-12 years, low levels of emotion regulation were linked to externalising symptomotology 
(at time one; baseline) contributing to peer rejection and higher levels of later 
externalising problems (at time two; one year later). Yet in the same sample, higher 
emotion regulation predicted greater peer acceptance, which in turn led to lower levels 
of internalising symptomotology (Kim & Cicchetti, 2010).  
 
Even from this cursory review of recent emotion regulation literature it can be 
seen that clear patterns of association have already emerged to support a link between 
emotion regulation and disorder in both adult and adolescent population groups – in 
particular between emotion regulation and mood disorders (see also Ehring, Tuschen-
Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010). Hence, by appealing exclusively to the ‘emotion 
management’ skill subsumed within ability EI to explain why emotionally intelligent 
individuals might enjoy better mental health, it could be argued that AEI has little to 
contribute beyond what is already established in this field. However, this view is perhaps 
misguided and premature; in their haste to map out an ‘adaptive’ roadmap for AEI, 
researchers have overlooked several fundamental differences between the traditional 
emotion regulation research and AEI which make one-to-one correspondence unlikely.  
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From a measurement perspective, the MSCEIT ‘managing emotions’   branch assesses the 
ability to “maintain emotions (e.g., preserving a good mood), repair emotions (e.g., 
calming down after feeling angry), and generate emotions appropriate for a given 
situation (e.g., motivating and supporting a co-worker before an important oral 
presentation)...[and] an individual’s ability to dampen an overly good mood when a 
reduction in level or intensity is appropriate” (Papadogiannis et al., 2009, p.46).  By 
measuring management of mood or an emotional episode this component taps more than 
just emotion regulation per se (i.e., up or down-regulation of emotion response 
tendencies) – moods are distinct from emotion in terms of initial trigger, course and 
duration (Gross, 1998). Additionally, by asking test-takers to decide upon the best course 
of action to make someone else feel better, rather than to make someone feel better to 
calm oneself down, items may actually assess ‘emotion regulating’ versus ‘emotion 
regulated’ processes (Kring & Sloan, 2010).  In other words, MSCEIT items principally 
measure one’s ability (or knowledge of strategies) to regulate the emotions of others for 
social outcomes, and not how other people influence one’s own regulatory processes to 
affect wellbeing, which is at odds with definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ emotion regulation 
found in the traditional literature (Gross, 1998, 1999; Gross & Thompson, 2007). In 
practice, high levels of proficiency in this ability could only ever make an indirect 
contribution to wellbeing, perhaps by triggering positive emotions through the 
happiness/sense of satisfaction that comes from helping others.   
 
This discordance in content has been borne out by recent research; MSCEIT 
‘emotion management’ scores were not significantly related to self-reported emotion 
regulation strategies in patients with Borderline Personality Disorder or a typically-
functioning group of adults (although total AEI was related to use of suppression in the 
clinical group) (Beblo et al., 2010).  Whilst the discrepancy between self-reported emotion 
regulation strategy style and emotion-related management skill (indexed by AEI) could be 
partially attributed to differences in measurement format (i.e., maximal knowledge of 
management differs from typical regulatory behaviours), the lack of correspondence in 
both population groups suggests that AEI does not provide a direct measure of emotion 
regulation capacity in the traditional sense.  Nevertheless, the fact that total AEI was 
related to use of suppression in the patient group indicates there is still partial evidence 
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of a link, albeit with qualifications (i.e., not via the assumed ‘management’ route).  
Scrutiny of the process model suggests that rather than direct assessment of emotion 
regulation proficiency (i.e., frequency/use of strategies), ability EI taps individual 
differences in pre-requisite skills underpinning successful emotion regulation.  For 
instance, antecedent situation selection (i.e., decision to approach or avoid a setting 
based on emotional impact) requires accurate perception and knowledge of emotion and 
emotional consequences, whilst cognitive change (i.e., appraisal of situation/response 
interpreted in line with personal goals and relevance) might draw upon emotion 
identification, knowledge and the ability to use emotion to facilitate thinking/problem-
solving to anticipate emotional consequences and select an appropriate course of action.  
Clearly, response-focussed modulation also requires emotional understanding, e.g., 
recognising the social advantages of response suppression.  Indeed, this shift in thinking 
has been recently endorsed by proponents of AEI; Wranik, Feldman Barrett & Salovey 
(2007) argue for the importance of all four branches of EI for generating emotion 
regulation strategies but note that skills in understanding emotion are “at the heart of 
intelligent regulation, influencing the other branches [perceiving, facilitating, managing] 
and acting as the driving force” (p.395).   
 
Taken together, the present analysis suggests that rather than attempting to 
uncover isolated connections between MSCEIT branch skills (particularly ‘managing’ 
emotion) and mental health, researchers should instead examine the importance of the 
global construct for adaptation (i.e., indexed via total MSCEIT scores).  Latterly, this 
position has been echoed by some commentators who have argued against the 
popularity of ‘carving up’ EI models into standalone facets, noting the difficulties this 
presents for theoretical integration, “There should be no doubt...that the mere re-
labelling of, say, ‘emotion perception’ as ‘emotional intelligence’ constitutes semantic 
wizardry, rather than scientific progress” (Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007, p.157).  Thus, 
for explaining links to disorder, AEI should be reconceptualised as a broad, holistic 
framework which subsumes multiple competencies required for emotion regulation.   
Collective consideration of AEI skills not only circumvents redundancy with the emotion 
regulation construct, but should offer a unique perspective for capturing individual 
differences in adaptive regulatory skills required for better mental health in general.  
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However, the adaptational primacy of emotional knowledge (Wranik et al., 2007), keyed 
strongly by the MSCEIT (Brody, 2004; Matthews et al., 2004) hints at the possibility of 
specificity in direct associations with disorders; it would seem plausible that AEI may be a 
more robust correlate of externalising symptomotology, where deficiencies in emotional 
understanding are considered central (Hessler & Katz, 2010; Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007). 
Association with internalising symptomotology should be less robust given this is strongly 
indicated by deficient use of specific emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Garnefski et al., 
2005; Neumann et al., 2009) – something only indirectly indexed via the MSCEIT.  
 
11.2 Examining the nomological network (2): Trait EI, personality and mental health 
 
  Clearly, successful (purposeful) emotion regulation is not determined by 
exemplary ‘skill’ alone; dispositional characteristics (e.g., impulsivity, assertiveness, 
effortful control etc) are equally important (Wranik et al., 2007) – some of which are 
tapped by TEI.  Early-emerging temperament2 and later-developing personality traits 
mediate environmental interactions, influencing attention and perception to salient cues, 
appraisal of environmental experiences and ultimately the selection/modification of 
social and non-social contexts (John et al., 2008).  Developmentally, temperament and 
emotion regulation are thus intrinsically linked.  Consisting of two core dimensions, self-
regulation and emotional reactivity, which encapsulate further fine-grained traits (e.g., 
negative emotionality, extraversion, effortful control, orienting) (Rothbart & Bates, 2006; 
Rothbart & Sheese, 2007), temperament influences initial reactivity to stressors and then 
directly constrains or facilitates the development of voluntary regulatory styles, impacting 
on the adoption of/preference for particular strategies over others (Bolger & Zuckerman, 
1995).  For instance, those characterised by high levels of reactivity in early life (i.e., 
increased motor, affective, physiological responses) and high trait Neuroticism in later 
life, present with higher levels of arousal (e.g., fear) in novel, potentially threatening 
situations.  In early development, this produces automatic regulatory responses, such as 
                                                          
2
 Here ‘temperament’ and ‘personality’ (which collectively refer to individual differences in emotional 
reactivity, cognitive and behavioural style) are used interchangeably, reflecting current opinion on the 
conceptual overlap and move towards integration of the constructs and their respective frameworks of 
investigation (see e.g., Shiner & Caspi, 2003).   
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avoidance, withdrawal, behavioural inhibition, which can consequently lead to later 
difficulties with volitional regulation strategies, such as emotional expression (Carver & 
Connor-Smith, 2010; Compas, Connor-Smith, & Jaser, 2004).   Evidently, effortful emotion 
regulation strategies that become established later in life are shaped by external, 
contextual influences beyond the effects of early temperament - successful emotion 
regulation requires more than inflexible, involuntary responding underpinned by high 
levels of (automatic) effortful control in early life (Rothbart & Sheese, 2007).  
Nevertheless, traits are highly instrumental in shaping emotion-related experiences, 
learning opportunities for the development of emotion knowledge, and ultimately, in 
governing the range of emotion regulation strategies acquired and used. As well as 
suggesting that traits play a primary role in affecting mental health, it is important to 
recognise that these developmental interactions carry important connotations for the 
roles of trait and ability EI; the inter-dependency of socio-emotional disposition (TEI) and 
knowledge (AEI) suggest that whilst distinct, both play a crucial role in supporting 
adaptation throughout development, converging with recent opinion in the field (Schutte 
et al., 2011) . 
  
A significant body of research supports the notion that traits impact mental health 
directly and confer risk for the development of many forms of psychopathology (Rettew, 
2008).  For instance, the Dunedin longitudinal studies mapped profiles of childhood 
inhibition (an early manifestation of trait Conscientiousness) to increased risk for 
depression, personality disorder and substance abuse in early adulthood (Caspi, 2000).   
Similarly, individuals classified as ‘resilient’ at age 30 (socially, academically competent 
and rule-abiding despite encountering significant adversity) were higher in 
Conscientiousness, Openness, Agreeableness and lower in Neuroticism in childhood (age 
10 years) and early adulthood (age 20 years), compared to those considered ‘maladapted’ 
in adulthood (greater antisocial behaviour, poor relationships, attainment and significant 
adversity) (Shiner & Masten, 2012).  Moreover, a recent meta analysis detected a 
qualitatively similar pattern of ‘maladaptive’ broadband personality traits across the full 
range of Axis I clinical disorders (e.g., social phobia, schizophrenia etc; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2005).  There was a 
general trend towards high levels of Neuroticism (N) accompanied by low levels of 
36 
 
Agreeableness (A), Extraversion (E), and Conscientiousness (C) (effect sizes for Openness 
(O) did not reach significance) in clinical versus comparison groups.  Markedly, this 
pattern remained consistent, only varying quantitatively, across broadband categories of 
disorder; whereas a diagnosis of Bipolar, Depression or SAD (i.e., ‘mood disorders’) were 
strongly indicated by high N, low E and low C, externalising disorders tended towards 
higher E, lower N and A – though effect sizes were strongest for mood disorders in all 
cases bar trait agreeableness  (Malouff et al., 2005).   
 
Research indicates that of the ‘Big Five’ dimensions, TEI (assessed via the TEIQue) 
is largely determined by trait Neuroticism, Extraversion and Conscientiousness, with the 
former most strongly keyed by six out of fifteen facets (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007; Vernon, 
Villani, Schermer, & Petrides, 2008).  However, there is some variation across TEI 
measurement models, for instance the EQi and SREIT both index trait Agreeableness to a 
much greater extent (e.g., Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 2005). Consequently, TEI would be 
expected to show direct links to mental disorders but particularly internalising disorders.  
Nevertheless, the construct should also be able to lend further clarification to these 
associations as a result of the inclusion of ‘finely-tuned’ primary-level facets concerning 
emotion-specific tendencies that contribute to additional variance that lies outside of 
traditional, secondary-level trait taxonomies (Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007; 
Zeidner et al., 2009).  Evidence appears to corroborate this supposition.  Whilst TEI 
derives from the combined effects of genetic heritability (approx. 40%) and non-shared 
environmental factors (approx. 60%) as per the ‘Big Five’ dimensions (Vernon, Petrides, 
Bratko, & Schermer, 2008), there remains a significant proportion of unexplained variance 
in the construct; only 41% of the variance in global TEI can be attributed to 
temperamental variables (i.e., effortful control; extraversion; orienting sensitivity, 
negative affect) (Gardner, Qualter, & Whiteley, 2011) and the ‘Big Five’ and ‘Eysenkian 3’ 
traits leave approximately 30-50% of the variance in total TEI unaccounted for (Petrides, 
Pita et al., 2007; Vernon, Villani et al., 2008). Thus, these studies highlight the related, yet 
distinct association between the two which may ultimately afford TEI greater explanatory 
power to further our understanding of associations between personality and mental 
health. 
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Summary: With appeal to established literatures, the preceding discussion has 
established that intrinsic, ‘emotional personality’ (TEI) and extrinsic ‘emotional ability’ 
(AEI) should share direct (inverse) links to disorder.  However, some divergence in these 
associations is predicted on the basis of underlying conceptual differences; AEI may be 
more robustly associated with externalising symptomotology, whilst TEI should strongly 
relate to internalising disorders.  The preceding discussion also suggests that a deficiency 
in A/TEI could confer risk for disorder. As alluded to previously, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (e.g., DSM-IV TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) distinguishes 
Axis I (i.e. the ‘diagnosis’ e.g., depression, schizophrenia etc) from Axis II disorders (‘stable 
traits’ that may not necessarily interfere with daily functioning but may predispose 
individuals to Axis I disorders, e.g., personality or developmental abnormalities), and it 
has been postulated that low EI (considered as a core latent trait or ability influencing 
behaviour, i.e., an Axis II disorder) might act as a diathesis in directly pre-disposing 
individuals to (more severe) disorder (i.e., Axis I) (Zeidner et al., 2009). In other words, 
A/TEI may be found to be specific marker of vulnerability, or in the case of high levels of 
competency, a protective resource - perhaps implicated in multiple disorders (Petrides, 
Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007).   Notably, this is in line with theorising about the influence of 
traits on mental health via the ‘vulnerability’ route (Nigg, 2006; Shiner & Caspi, 2003)3.  
However, it is cautioned that ‘low EI’ (in either form) is unlikely to be a ubiquitous, direct 
correlate of all disorders given the complex aetiological pathways implicated in the 
development and maintenance of mental illnesses (Matthews et al., 2002).  
Consequently, it has been suggested that EI might instead play a secondary, more indirect 
adaptive role in key vulnerability/protective processes governing the stress-illness 
relationship – specifically, EI could buffer stress by promoting positive ways of coping 
which could, in turn, lead to successful adaptation (Keefer, Parker, & Saklofske, 2009; 
Zeidner et al., 2009). Indeed,  some commentators have argued that “EI is of scientific 
                                                          
3 It is thought that traits may influence mental health via four major pathways.  As well as being 
conceptualised as vulnerability (or protective) markers for disorder, traits have been viewed as part of a 
continuum with psychopathological symptoms (‘spectrum’ hypothesis).  Alternatively, the ‘pathoplastic’ 
perspective suggests that trait(s) influence the development and course of disorder whilst inversely, the 
‘scar’ hypothesis maintains that occurrence of early disorder influences development of trait(s) (for reviews 
see Nigg, 2006; Shiner & Caspi, 2003).   
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interest largely depending on whether it can be identified as a coherent quality of the 
person that underpins adaptive coping” (Matthews et al., 2002, p.285).  Whilst space 
limitations preclude a thorough overview of literatures pertaining to stress and coping in 
the context of psychopathology, a brief synopsis of key concepts is warranted before 
attempting to theoretically locate EI within this milieu.  
 
11.3 Stressors, coping and psychopathology 
 
Stressors, defined here as “environmental or chronic conditions that objectively 
threaten the physical and/or psychological health or well-being of individuals of a 
particular age in a particular society” (Grant et al., 2003, p.449), can include both chronic 
adversity (e.g., abuse; poverty) and acute experiences (e.g., bereavement) of an 
environmental or interpersonal nature – all of which have been consistently linked at 
retrospective, concurrent and prospective levels of analysis to psychopathological 
symptoms across development. For instance, Kessler et al., (2010) explored associations 
between 12 retrospectively reported childhood adversities (e.g., parental maladjustment 
- criminality, mental illness; interpersonal loss - parental bereavement; maltreatment; 
physical illness and family economic adversity) and the onset of 20 DSM-IV Axis I disorders 
in data drawn from 51, 945 participants who were resident in one of 21 countries 
sampled as part of a World Health Organisation survey. Crucially, it was found that 
stressors tended to cluster together (e.g., family economic adversity with parental illness) 
and all were associated with increased risk for developing disorder, yet maladaptive 
family functioning conferred the greatest risk.  Patently, there are limitations associated 
with retrospective self-report, however, even when reviewing more stringent tests of 
such associations Grant, Compas, Thurm, McMahon, & Gipson (2004) found that 88% of 
some 60 prospective studies that had tracked symptomotology across the lifespan 
provided evidence in favour of a predictive relationship between stressors and both 
internalising/externalising symptoms. Moreover, converging with Kessler et al., (2010), 
the existence of bi-directional associations was confirmed; as well as stressors predicting 
the presence of psychopathology; psychopathology enhanced the likelihood of exposure 
to further stressors.    
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Despite the overwhelming evidence implicating environmental stressors in the 
aetiology and maintenance of disorders, it is clear that not all individuals exposed to such 
risk(s) go on to develop disorder.  Latterly, there has been a concerted shift in the 
research base to explore potential mediating (how) and moderating (when) processes 
that may mitigate the stressor-illness relationship and thus lead to ‘resilience’ in 
individuals (Mash & Dozois, 2003).  As noted in the introductory chapter, resilience is not 
a static, individual quality (e.g., a specific competence) or life outcome (e.g., positive 
adjustment as in absence of psychopathology), but rather a dynamic process that involves 
an interaction between vulnerability and protective markers (both internal and external 
to the individual) that serve to modify the effects of adversity (Luthar et al., 2006; Rutter, 
1985, 2006).   Such resilience processes (i.e., risk and protective mechanisms) can operate 
across three levels of functioning; at the level of the individual (e.g. specific resources, 
competencies, skills), social level (family, peers) and wider society (school, community) 
(Garmezy, 1991; Werner, 1995).  The search for consistent moderators (defined here in 
line with Grant et al., (2003) as pre-existing characteristics of the individual or 
environment that modify the impact of stressors) and mediators (stressor-activated 
processes that explain the association between stress and psychopathology) that operate 
within pathways to disorder remains work in progress and is often hampered by 
methodological ambiguity (Luthar et al., 2006).  Nevertheless, coping has emerged as a 
significant mediator of a variety of stressor-symptom relationships in youth populations, 
including violence, divorce and parental illness (for review see e.g., Grant et al., 2006).  
For instance, in an adolescent sample, Wadsworth & Compas (2002) found that objective 
socio-economic adversity was distally related to externalising and internalising symptoms 
through perceived socio-economic adversity and family conflict, however coping 
mediated the association between family conflict and disorder (with active coping leading 
to fewer symptoms).  Notably, evidence suggests the role of coping in mechanisms of risk 
may change over the course of development; whereby strategies may be activated or set 
in motion by stressors in childhood/adolescence to mediate outcomes, coping represents 
an established, dispositional response pattern (or fixed characteristic) in adulthood, 
moderating the stress-illness relationship (Wadsworth, Raviv, Compas, & Connor-Smith, 
2005).  This emphasises the importance of this enduring yet dynamic personal resource in 
establishing future patterns of adjustment.   
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It is important, however, to state from the outset that conceptualisations of 
coping vary significantly amongst theorists; some researchers elect to include both 
automatic and involuntary elements as well as conscious efforts to reduce threat, harm or 
loss within their theoretical expositions (e.g., Eisenberg, Fabes, & Guthrie, 1997) whilst 
others focus directly on conscious, purposeful efforts by the individual to reduce stress 
(Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Compas, Connor-Smith, Saltzman, Thomsen, & 
Wadsworth, 2001).  Acknowledging conscious/non-conscious and automatic/controlled 
processes share complex interrelationships in the development of coping, for clarity, the 
present discussion focuses on coping responses recognised by the person as engaging in 
them (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010).  Allied to this complexity, myriad coping definitions 
and dimensions abound (e.g. approach vs. avoidance; primary vs. secondary control 
coping etc).  In adult research, the theory and of Lazarus and Folkman (1984) remains 
most prominent.  According to this perspective, coping is described as a person-
environment transaction which involves,  “constantly changing cognitive and behavioural 
efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing 
or exceeding the resources of the person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p.141).  The theory 
classifies coping efforts as either problem-focussed (attempts to directly change, including 
evasion, removal or attenuation of, the stress-eliciting situation e.g., seeking information; 
problem solving) or emotion-focussed (attempts to circumvent or reduce the negative 
emotions evoked by the stressor, e.g., emotional expression, garnering support).  
 
However, such adult conceptualisations of the construct (which assume fully 
functional cognitive competencies, i.e. appraisal) together with broadband dimensions of 
coping (which may conceal diverse and distinct coping strategies associated with 
potentially disparate adjustment outcomes) have been found wanting when applied to 
youth populations (Compas et al., 2001).  Hence a developmental perspective on coping is 
adopted for the current work, where coping represents, “conscious volitional efforts to 
regulate emotion, cognition, behaviour, physiology, and the environment in response to 
stressful events or circumstances”  (Compas et al., 2001, p.89), whilst recognising such 
efforts as necessarily constrained by the developmental level of an individual (i.e., 
resource availability/type of strategy enacted). Moreover, strategies encompassed within 
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broadband ‘emotion-focussed’ and ‘problem-focussed’ dimensions will not be pre-
categorised as more or less inherently ‘adaptive’, given that the relative advantage 
conferred by a strategy is contingent upon the context (i.e., the nature and duration of 
the stressor - perceived as controllable/surmountable and suited to problem-
focussed/engagement strategies, or, deemed uncontrollable/insurmountable and  
appropriate for emotion-focussed/disengagement strategies), the individual (e.g., 
temperament, competencies, pre-existing symptomotology) and the ‘outcome’ 
(operationalisation of ‘successful adaptation’ in light of stressor type and duration) 
(Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Compas et al., 2001; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  
Notably, the dynamic nature of the coping process adds additional complexity as it is 
unlikely that single strategies are used to tackle stressors in isolation.  Strategies 
resembling ‘adaptive’ approaches utilised as part of initial engagement with a stressor 
may well become less effective and hence considered ‘maladaptive’ if inflexibly persisted 
with when faced with a rapidly changing situation (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, in the context of psychopathology, problem-focussed or 
engagement strategies (including e.g., problem solving, reappraisal etc) are reportedly 
advantageous over emotion-focussed or disengagement strategies, such as avoidance or 
wishful thinking (e.g., see Compas et al., 2001).   
 
Studying coping within a resilience framework (testing for the presence of 
moderating and mediating effects and specificity) offers the opportunity to address some 
of the aforementioned contextual issues inherent within coping research and has been 
called for repeatedly in the literature (e.g., Grant et al., 2003; Grant et al., 2006; 
McMahon, Grant, Compas, Thurm, & Ey, 2003). Within this paradigm it has been 
suggested that whilst coping reflects a key set of processes which lead to adaptational 
outcomes, these depend upon/draw from the (successful) operationalisation of key 
personal competencies or resources (Compas et al., 2001). This, therefore, begs the 
question: Could EI construed as either a skill set located at the intersection of cognition 
and emotion, or as our ‘emotional personality’ represent such personal resources that 
underscore such vital coping processes? 
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11.4 Building the nomological network: EI and coping processes 
 
Theoretically, links to coping are apparent in both ability and trait EI accounts, 
with descriptions once again drawing from the related fields of emotion regulation and 
personality to support each rationale.  Salovey et al., (1999) suggest that the ‘resilient 
person’ is distinct from an individual who copes poorly with stress-eliciting situations 
since, “[A]EI influences responses to emotional arousal and, as a result plays a significant 
role in the coping process” (p.141).  As before then, it is suggested that AEI affords an 
adaptive advantage to ‘emotionally intelligent’ individuals given superiority in affect 
regulation, which serves to attenuate emotional reactivity to stressors. Specifically, it is 
suggested proficiency in emotion management could underlie emotional coping (e.g., 
rumination: difficulties in flexibly engaging with and/or detaching from an emotion to 
facilitate repair) and support seeking coping (maintenance/use of rich social networks 
developed through success in regulating the emotions of others, e.g. cheering up a friend 
when sad) (Salovey et al., 1999).  These examples illustrate that by contributing to 
adaptive emotion regulation, AEI skills are assumed to underpin or precede effortful 
coping.   However, it is notable that differences between emotion regulation and coping 
are not made salient; this is important as the two are not necessarily interchangeable.  
Whilst both are considered part of the domain of self-regulation (Gross, 1999), emotion 
regulation is principally concerned with the everyday, immediate modulation of positive 
and negative affect, whereas coping is focussed on managing stress-induced (negative) 
emotional experience and extends to cognitive approaches to combat external stressors 
(problem-solving)  (John & Gross, 2007). Thus, despite appearing similar at the 
measurement level (e.g., coping scales usually encompass items assessing ‘positive 
reappraisal’, appearing similar to the process model ‘cognitive change’) most coping 
items focus on the consequences of encountering a stressful experience (e.g., personal 
growth) rather than assessing immediate modulation of an emotion eliciting event (John 
& Gross, 2007).    Nevertheless, these writings extend previous discussion - as well as 
representing individual differences in the skills underpinning adaptive regulation of 
emotional states per se, it is clear that AEI should also act as a resource for managing 
emotion under conditions of stress, with ramifications for emotional (internalised, e.g., 
rumination) and problem-based (externalised e.g., support seeking) coping ability.  
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Conversely, in line with the personality literature, TEI is viewed “as central to the 
development and implementation of successful coping mechanisms” (Petrides, Perez-
Gonzalez et al., 2007, p.29). In contrast to the ability perspective there is no specific 
emphasis of the importance of a single facet or function (i.e., perceived competency in 
emotion management) over others and no explicit, temporal distinction between coping 
and TEI. Critics have argued that relationships between TEI and stress-illness process 
variables are likely to be artificially inflated (and potentially confounded) by this 
‘centrality’ (Zeidner et al., 2009).  Many TEI instruments include facets and/or items that 
correspond directly to self-perceived competency in ‘stress management’, or 
characteristics associated with negative affect (e.g., items from the TEIQue-ASF include: “I 
find it hard to cope when things change in my life”; “I’m able to deal with stress”).  In fact, 
this is not a new issue; debate over the distinctiveness of the coping construct from 
personality has pervaded the literature for decades, with boundaries between research 
domains, theories, ensuing terminology and blurred. Earlier discussion has already 
articulated the conceptual overlap between effortful emotion regulation and personality 
(section 11.2) and between emotion regulation and coping (section 11.3).    As a result, 
critics have argued that coping should be considered part of personality processes (e.g., 
Vollrath, 2001).  Nevertheless, this position has been supplanted by research that 
indicates only a partial overlap exists between personality traits and coping styles.  A 
recent meta-analysis uncovered modest relationships between the ‘Big 5’ and coping 
dimensions; high levels of E (r = .15), C (r = .11) and O (r = .10) related to ‘engagement’ 
strategies including problem-solving, support seeking and cognitive restructuring, whilst 
N (r = .27), low C (r = -.15), and low A (r = -.13) were related to disengagement coping 
(e.g., wishful thinking, withdrawal, avoidance, denial) (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007). 
This, coupled with evidence that coping predicts adjustment outcomes more strongly 
than personality (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010), suggests that coping is more than a 
direct manifestation of personality (or an extension of trait continuums) – instead, coping 
“may represent important ways that temperamental characteristics  are put into action 
under conditions of heightened risk, specifically under conditions of stress” (Compas et 
al., 2004, p.27).   
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Hence, evidence emphasises the importance of investigating the role of traits and 
coping separately within stress-illness processes.  In terms of TEI, the indexing of the Big 5 
within measurement models would imply that high levels of TEI should relate positively to 
engagement strategies and negatively to disengagement coping. However, as a (nuanced) 
personality trait which additionally samples ‘unique’ facets of emotional self-competency 
(e.g., emotional expression, perception, etc) TEI also has the potential to uncover a 
degree of novel, predictive power in such relationships to further elucidate established 
links between personality and coping styles (Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007).     
 
11.5 EI and stress-illness processes: toward an adaptive account of EI 
  
At a theoretical level, links between EI and mental health are predicted and, 
despite the contrast between ‘skills’ and ‘traits’, similarities in outcome are expected for 
both conceptualisations (i.e., the suggestion that higher levels of TEI and AEI should 
contribute to better mental health).  Importantly, both perspectives suggest there are 
measurable, systematic individual differences in EI (be that skills or dispositional qualities) 
that should, in turn, lead to differences in effective action across individuals in emotional 
situations (Matthews et al., 2002).  Construed as a multi-facetted latent skill set 
specialised for emotion processing, AEI should reflect individual differences in adaptive 
emotion regulation which, if deficient, could confer direct vulnerability for disorder in 
general. Nevertheless, given the conceptual and measurement focus upon crystallized 
knowledge versus actual performance of emotional skill (e.g., recognition of emotional 
cues; understanding emotional meaning and the emotional consequences of managing 
other people’s emotions for social outcomes), it likely that AEI will be a more robust 
correlate of externalising versus internalising symptomotology, where deficiencies in 
emotional understanding are considered a primary feature (Hessler & Katz, 2010; Mullin 
& Hinshaw, 2007). Such differences in emotional skill/knowledge may directly modify the 
risk for experiencing stressors; inaccurate decoding of environmental cues and poor 
regulation of emotional states could lead to increased exposure to stressful 
circumstances and/or increased reactivity once stressors are encountered. Alternatively, 
AEI may best represent a key personal resource from which coping processes draw to 
facilitate advantageous outcomes (Compas et al., 2001). In other words, (knowledge of) 
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socio-emotional skill may extrinsically ‘power’ the selection of ‘adaptive’ coping strategies 
(e.g., support seeking, less emotional coping) when faced with stressors.    
 
Conversely, TEI maps to personality research, where it has been established that 
traits influence functioning via attentional/perceptual biases which affect initial selection 
of environments, the meaning extracted from environmental cues and reactions to this 
information (John et al., 2008), and specific patterns of traits confer direct vulnerability 
for disorder - in particular Neuroticism, Extraversion and Conscientiousness for mood 
disorders (Malouff et al., 2005).  Given the strong indexing of these traits by most TEI 
measurement models (e.g., Austin et al., 2005; Vernon, Villani et al., 2008), it is expected 
that links to internalising disorder will be more pronounced than for externalising 
disorder.  In line with the personality-stress framework proposed by Bolger & Zuckerman 
(1995), TEI may operate as a direct risk marker for disorder by influencing exposure to 
stressors (pre-disposing those with low TEI to preferentially select out/modify socio-
emotional environments to evoke stressors, e.g., via dispositional mood bias) or reactivity 
once exposed (impacting perception and understanding of environmental emotional 
cues).  In other words, TEI may directly moderate the effects of stress on disorder by 
increasing/reducing the number of stressful experiences encountered or reactivity to 
such events.  For instance, it has been shown that individuals with high levels of 
Neuroticism experience greater levels of interpersonal conflict which results in higher 
levels of depression and anger (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).   As with AEI, however, TEI 
may also operate indirectly to influence adaptation.  It is plausible that the adoption or 
poor implementation of a ‘maladaptive’ coping strategy (i.e., less engagement; more 
disengagement) when experiencing stressors might perpetuate psychological distress in 
those with low TEI. For instance, Bolger & Zuckerman (1995) reported that for individuals 
with low N, self-control coping in the face of interpersonal stressors led to lower levels of 
depression, although avoidant coping increased depression, whilst the reverse was true 
for those classified as high N. Thus, it is also clear that there should be specificity in these 
relationships, such that the ‘effectiveness’ of individual coping strategies is dependent 
upon the characteristics of the person (e.g., high vs. low TEI) and stressor-type (e.g., TEI 
may be optimal within the context of controllable, proximal stressors of a socio-emotional 
nature) (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Grant et al., 2003). 
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Hence to summarise, two potential pathways to better mental health are 
predicted for EI irrespective of the ‘form’; the first direct route suggests that EI could 
represent ‘upstream’ individual differences in the experience of stress (exposure; 
reactivity), and the second indirect route suggests EI may underpin flexible selection and 
implementation of ‘downstream’ effortful coping strategies.   In order for any form of 
adaptive account of EI to be realised, it must be demonstrated that EI does more than 
simply describe an individual’s propensity to experience stress, capacity to manage daily 
emotional states, or use of ‘adaptive’ coping strategies  – it must be established how 
(whether directly or indirectly linked to known stress-illness processes) and when (within 
which context) this happens (Zeidner et al., 2009).  Although some researchers have 
attempted to situate EI (as a coherent quality of the person) within known stress-illness 
transactional models (see e.g., Matthews et al., 2002; van Heck & den Oudsten, 2008), 
there has been very little empirical testing of these mechanistic pathways, and, as will 
become apparent across the following sections, even basic level correlational research 
investigating links between EI and key variables of interest is somewhat limited in scope.  
It is to a review of this research evidence that discussion now turns.  
12. EMPIRICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EI AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
Through a comprehensive review of available evidence, this chapter aims to 
elucidate the most probable pathway (either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’) that might best 
incorporate EI into stress-illness processes. With an initial focus on the correspondence 
between EI and mental health, discussion explores whether there are discernible trends in 
these associations that hold in the presence of allied constructs.  The second portion of the 
review examines whether EI can be directly equated with individual differences in the 
experience of stressors per se and whether such differences translate into real benefits for 
psychological adaptation.  Finally, evidence addressing the ‘indirect’ pathway is 
considered; the nature of basic associations between EI and coping are explored, before 
reviewing research that has simultaneously considered the effects of EI and coping on 
mental health outcomes when facing stressors.  The chapter closes with a summary of the 
current research including broad aims and research questions.  
 
Evidence attesting to the presence of significant, cross-sectional associations 
between EI and mental health has begun to emerge to support the theoretical conjecture. 
To date, the majority of investigations have focussed upon adult, non-clinical groups and, 
within this context, typically suggest the presence of positive associations with indicators 
of wellbeing, for both AEI (e.g., 'psychological wellbeing': Brackett & Mayer, 2003) and TEI 
(e.g., 'temporal satisfaction with life': Austin et al., 2005).  Similarly, negative associations 
have been documented between both forms of EI and psychological maladjustment, for 
example, depressive symptomotology (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez 
et al., 2007, studies 2 & 3), anxiety (Bastian, Burns, & Nettelbeck, 2005), personality 
disorder (Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, study 3), paranoid/psychotic 
symptomotology, obsessive-compulsive disorders (Mikolajczak et al., 2006, study one) and 
socially deviant behaviour (Brackett et al., 2004).  Whilst extant literature is 
disproportionately weighted toward examination of trait rather than ability EI, in general, 
associations with both positive and maladaptive outcomes appear more robust for the 
former; correlations involving AEI are often small in magnitude (e.g., Bastian et al., 2005 
report a correlation coefficient of .22 between AEI 'managing emotion' and satisfaction 
with life) and in some cases even non-significant (e.g., 'subjective wellbeing': Brackett & 
Mayer, 2003; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010).   
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These trends have been confirmed in two recent meta-analyses. The first 
conducted by Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & Rooke (2007) was based on 
literature published between 1995 and early 2006.  Analysis of the findings of 35 studies 
(N=7898; mean ages ranging 11-51 years) revealed a medium average effect size between 
mental health and EI (r = .29, collapsed across measures and weighted according to 
sample size), suggesting that around 8% of the variance in mental health might be 
accounted for by EI.  However, with adjustment for measurement type (either TEI or AEI), 
only the relationship between mental health and TEI remained significant and, of the 
three TEI instruments scrutinised (TMMS, EQi and SREIT), the EQi was found to share the 
highest effect size with mental health.  Whilst these relationships were not contingent on 
age, effect sizes were higher for studies that had examined single-sex groups (i.e., only 
males or females, not mixed participant groups).  Thus, findings from this initial synthesis 
of available literature partially corroborated the aforementioned theoretical links; EI 
(though not AEI) shared a significant, positive, association with mental health. However, 
this early analysis is somewhat limited by the range of TEI measures focussed upon, all 
three of which have been referred to as ‘first generation’ instruments that suffer from 
psychometric shortcomings (Zeidner et al., 2009).  For instance, the veracity of the EQi 
has been questioned over its differential sampling of the construct domain; whilst distinct 
‘EI’ facets such as competency in regulating and perceiving emotion are omitted, 
peripherally-related personal capacities and qualities (e.g., ‘self-actualisation’) and 
outcome evaluations (e.g. ‘self-regard’) are included.  Consequently, many consider the 
EQi a measure of general wellbeing or self-esteem rather than of EI and, patently, as the 
inverse of criterion measures of mental disorder (with high scores reflecting an absence 
of symptoms) any association between true ‘EI’ and psychopathology will be distorted 
(Perez, Petrides, & Furnham, 2005; Schutte et al., 2007; Zeidner et al., 2009).  Notably,  
consistently high correlations between the EQi and measures of psychopathology have 
been documented (e.g., sub-scale correlations reaching up to - .67 with the Beck 
Depression Inventory: Dawda & Hart, 2000).   The TMMS is similarly plagued by 
inadequate sampling of the EI domain, though this is principally owing to the fact that it 
was designed to assess proficiency in internal mood regulation rather than EI.  Designed 
to yield three separate scores (attention; clarity and emotional repair), the practice of 
deriving a composite ‘total TEI’ score by summing the three orthogonal scales in (as was 
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performed here by Schutte and colleagues) has been cautioned against in the literature 
(e.g., Perez et al., 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding these measurement limitations, the evidence base has continued 
to grow exponentially since 2006, prompting a more recent meta-analysis of EI-health 
relations to assess the stability of such trends. Building on the work of Schutte et al., 
(2007), Martins, Ramalho, & Morin (2010) performed a cumulative analysis capturing the 
previous studies (n = 34) plus newer studies published up until January 2010 (n = 46).  A 
total of 105 effect sizes were analysed (N = 19,815; mean ages ranging between 15 and 
53 years).  On this occasion, significant overall effect sizes with mental health were found 
for both AEI (r = .17) and TEI (r = .34), though this effect was clearly stronger in the case of 
the latter (small versus medium).  Markedly, the overall average association between EI 
and mental health (r = .36) was greater than the average association with psychosomatic 
(r = .33) and physical health (r =.27) – representing a clear increase in magnitude since the 
first meta-analysis.   With the inclusion of arguably, better-specified, second-generation 
measures of TEI, the TEIQue was found to share the most robust relationship with mental 
health (r = .53); analyses with the EQi (r = .44); SREIT (r = .28) and TMMS (r = .24) 
produced small to medium effects.  Echoing the findings of the 2007 analysis, no 
moderating effects of age were detected although a significant effect of gender (females 
reporting higher levels of TEI) was found with respect to some of the TEI instruments 
(EQi; SREIT). Moreover, supplementary analysis indicated that research establishing a 
descriptive link between EI and mental health has reached sufficiency (for AEI this was 
achieved in 2002; for TEI in 1997) and stability (reached in 2004 for AEI; TEI in 2000), 
suggesting that further basic research is both unnecessary and unlikely to alter these 
effects (Martins et al., 2010).   Nevertheless, a degree of caution should be exercised with 
respect to these findings; the inclusion criteria employed in this analysis deemed that only 
studies which had reported at least three components of EI should be included - whilst 
this is not especially problematic for TEI investigations given that the majority of 
measures provide a combined/global TEI score, within AEI investigations it is 
commonplace for individual ‘sub-skills’ (e.g. emotion management) or area scores (e.g., 
‘experiential EI’) to be reported, especially with respect to health outcomes (see e.g., Cha 
& Nock, 2009; Lopes et al., 2004). The practice of discounting these studies will have 
undoubtedly contributed to a bias in the estimation of effect sizes for AEI; an effect which 
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becomes amplified when one considers youth-based research where composite measures 
of AEI are only just becoming available (Papadogiannis et al., 2009).   
 
Whilst collectively these meta-analyses present a strong case for the existence of 
a broadband link between EI and mental health, such generalist summaries of the data 
(with analyses collapsed across disorder ‘types’ and population groups) tell us very little 
about the specificity of this relationship - something which must be established in order 
to fully validate the EI construct.  Additionally, this research does not consider the 
influence of conceptually-related variables (especially higher-order personality facets 
given their importance for health outcomes) and thus the importance of these 
associations cannot be established.  As noted in chapter 10, many consider it essential to 
assess whether EI can make an incrementally unique contribution to adaptation beyond 
known predictors of performance (Fiori & Antonakis, 2011; Zeidner et al., 2009).  Though 
presently this literature base is extremely limited, where such analyses have been 
undertaken, evidence would seem to point to distinct A/TEI trends in the prediction of 
mental health outcomes.   
 
12.1 Can EI offer a unique contribution to adult mental health? 
 
With the influence of personality (i.e., ‘Big 5’ or ‘Eysenkian 3’) and general 
cognitive ability (indexed by IQ assessments or proxies thereof, e.g. academic attainment) 
held constant, AEI does not appear predictive of psychological distress (combined index of 
sleep problems, anxiety, dysphoria, suicidal ideas), positive or negative affect, life 
satisfaction (Karim & Weisz, 2010) or psychological wellbeing (Rossen & Kranzler, 2009; 
Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010) – although in evaluating these effects in non-native 
English speakers, the findings of Karim & Weisz (2010) may be compromised by the cross-
linguistic transferability of potentially ‘abstract’ emotion terminology used in the MSCEIT.  
Notably, all three of the above cited studies found that personality facets  accounted for 
the largest proportions of variance in criterion variables, and in line personality literature, 
particularly Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Neuroticism (e.g., Malouff et al., 2005).  
As might be expected, much lower contributions were attributed to cognitive ability (e.g., 
explaining 3% of the variance in ‘psychological wellbeing’ - Rossen & Kranzler, 2009).  
Nevertheless, in a less stringent tests of incremental capacity (no control for cognitive 
ability), AEI predicted 1% additional variance in satisfaction with life and 4% of the 
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variance in psychological wellbeing over the Big Five personality traits (Extremera, Ruiz-
Aranda, Pineda-Galán, & Salguero, 2011).   Overall, this evidence indicates that the 
capacity of AEI to uniquely influence positive or negative internalised emotionality is 
limited; indeed the weaker associations found in basic tests of association (e.g., Bastien et 
al., 2005) may be attributed to shared conceptual overlap with (crystallised) cognitive 
ability.  Nevertheless, it would appear that an incremental contribution could be made to 
the prediction of disorders where externalising symptoms are a central feature (e.g., 
conduct disorder, disruptive behaviour, etc).  
 
Whilst studies employing standardised clinical measures are markedly absent, 
there is evidence to suggest AEI shares significant associations with (reduced levels of) 
maladaptive and (increased) adaptive social behaviours.   For instance, controlling for the 
influence of personality and cognitive ability, AEI significantly predicted reduced alcohol 
use (Brackett et al., 2004; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009), illegal drug use (Brackett et al., 2004) 
and deviant behaviour, defined here as recent vandalism and number of physical fights 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004).  Although it should be noted there has 
been some inconsistency in this pattern of findings (e.g., AEI was not predictive of alcohol 
and drug use in Brackett & Mayer, 2003) and the proportion of incremental variance 
explained by AEI across these studies was generally moderate in size, ranging between 4 
and 11% (e.g., alcohol use: ΔR2 = .04; social deviance: partial r = -.27 & r = -.20; drug use, 
partial r = -.34).  Additionally, Brackett et al., (2004) stress the importance of examining 
sub-group differences in these effects; in their study, AEI was found to predict social 
deviance in males only.  AEI also incrementally predicts variance in measures of adaptive 
social behaviours beyond personality and IQ, e.g., increased positive relations with others 
(Rossen & Kranzler, 2009), satisfaction with relationships (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003), 
quality of social interaction (Lopes et al., 2004), pro-social behaviour and interpersonal 
sensitivity (Lopes, Salovey, Cote, & Beers, 2005) (though in the latter three studies this 
applied to skill in ‘management’ of emotion only & in Lopes et al., 2003 there was no 
control for IQ). 
 
In contrast, studies testing the incremental capacity of TEI hint at enhanced 
prediction of internalising over externalising disorders.  Using total TEI (SREIT) scores, 
Saklofske et al., (2003) reported small yet significant incremental contributions in the 
prediction of happiness (ΔR2 = 1.3%), life satisfaction (ΔR2 = 2.8%), social/emotional 
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loneliness (ΔR2 = 1.2 - 1.4%) and depression (ΔR2 = 1.0%) over personality.  This was 
corroborated in part by Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez & Furnham (2007, study 2) who 
demonstrated that total TEIQue scores remained significant, independent predictors of 
depression and hostility with personality variables entered into predictive models.  
However, Petrides et al., (2007) found that despite the presence of inverse correlations, 
TEI was unable to predict variance in either physical, verbal aggression, or anger beyond 
the influence of personality.  Importantly, this was corroborated recently by Gardner and 
Qualter (2010) who found that none of three TEI measures employed (TEIQue, SREIT, 
MEIA) were able to incrementally predict aggression (physical or verbal) or anger beyond 
the effects of age, gender and personality in a mixed community/student sample.  
Nevertheless, in line with the earlier work of Saklofske et al., (2003) and Petrides et al., 
(2007), all three TEI measures did predict incremental variance in loneliness (ΔR2 = 3 - 
17%), hostility (ΔR2 = 3 - 8%), happiness (ΔR2 = 4 - 9%) and life satisfaction (ΔR2 = 7 - 17%) 
with the TEIQue accounting for the highest proportion of incremental variance across all 
outcomes. Hence, these findings would appear to support earlier, theoretically-derived 
predictions of the relationship between TEI and mood disorders; hostility (as feelings of 
opposition towards others, e.g., resentment, suspicion) depression (sadness), and anxiety 
(nervousness) are all linked via negative affect as indexed by the Big Five trait model 
('Neuroticism', Costa & McCrae, 1992) and its measurement instruments (see John et al., 
2008) and, as noted earlier, Neuroticism would appear to be the strongest determinant of 
TEI (e.g., Austin et al., 2005: SREIT r= -.47; EQi r= -.62; Vernon, Villani et al., 2008: TEIQue 
r= -.61).  Consequently, links to such markers of ‘dispositional’ (i.e., habitual, internal) 
emotionality are in line with expectations as is the lack of correspondence to aggression, 
which, as externalised anger, can be considered a ‘situational’ expression of emotion 
representing “purposeful, context-specific behaviour” (Petrides et al., 2007 p.34).  
 
 
Hence the internalising (TEI)/externalising (AEI) distinction would appear to hold. 
AEI can incrementally predict ‘purposeful’, discrete behaviours of a quantifiable nature 
(i.e., deviance as number of recent fights or frequency of drug use) suggesting that 
deficits in emotional skills (perhaps underlying emotion regulation capacity) may be 
critical.  Conversely, TEI is predictive of habitual emotional styles (i.e., feelings of 
depression, loneliness, etc) that may be intrinsically linked to lower levels of perceived 
emotional self-competence (perhaps reflective of ‘maladaptive’ emotional traits).   There 
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have, however, been some exceptions to this trend: firstly, Gardner and Qualter (2010) 
and Petrides et al., (2007) report that TEI did not incrementally predict anger beyond 
personality which runs contrary to theory (anger also reflects ‘negative affect’).  However, 
in both cases all TEI measures showed significant associations at a bivariate level and, 
arguably, the measure of anger utilised to examine these relationships (the AQ: Buss & 
Perry, 1992), preferentially taps expression of anger (e.g., “some of my friends think I'm a 
hothead”; “sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason”) rather than internalised 
anger control/suppression.  Secondly, total TEI scores have shown some incremental 
validity in predicting alcohol abuse (indexed via behavioural frequency) beyond 
personality (EQi: Brackett & Mayer, 2003; TEIQue: Gardner & Qualter, 2010) although in 
both cases, the contribution made (approx 2%) was lower than found with the MSCEIT 
(e.g., Brackett et al., 2004).    
 
In sum, it is remarkable that despite the variety of TEI measures employed across 
the adult literature base, there remains consistency in the pattern of prediction (type of 
disorder) and in the proportion of variance explained.  Furthermore, whilst evidence is 
emerging to support specificity in A/TEI-mental health relationships, the extent of the 
incremental validity afforded by the overall construct remains broadly consistent across 
the literature base (explaining moderate proportions of variance – up to 17% - in criterion 
variables). Therefore, despite being associated with different models and measurement 
methods, both make similar, beneficial contributions to health outcomes. However, 
although these trends appear persuasive, the EI-mental health evidence base is 
undoubtedly limited by an almost exclusive focus upon adult versus youth populations.  
To develop an overall ‘adaptive’ account of EI it must be consistently demonstrated that 
links found between EI and mental health in adulthood are similarly prevalent in 
child/adolescent populations.  Moreover, the fact that that there are enduring and 
debilitating trajectories associated with many early-onset mental health problems, 
including unemployment, unstable personal relationships and poorer self-reported health 
(Collishaw, Maughan, Goodman, & Pickles, 2004), makes the study of any ‘adaptive’ 
effects of EI within this age group particularly vital.  By definition, adolescence is a period 
characterised by rapid developmental transitions (including biological, social, emotional 
and cognitive change) which inherently presents complexity for researchers in 
interpreting findings (e.g., often direct mapping of constructs across adult/youth models 
is precluded). Indeed, as noted in chapter 10, it is theoretically assumed both forms of EI 
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should show some development with age (Mayer et al., 1999; Petrides, Furnham et al., 
2007), although longitudinal empirical examination is awaited.  However, if, as a first step, 
we are able to reliably detect ‘diagnostic’ continuities in EI-mental health relations, this 
would lend credence to the development of effective prevention and intervention 
programmes based on EI frameworks.  
 
12.2 EI and adolescent mental health 
 
Studies examining EI-mental health relationships in youth populations are sparse 
and the bias toward examination of the trait perspective is even more pronounced in this 
literature base (stemming in part from the lack of available composite measures of AEI 
suitable for use with youth) which presently precludes definitive interpretations from 
being drawn. Nevertheless, some AEI research has emerged in support of adult trends. 
The construct does not appear significantly related to measures of internalising disorders 
represented as depression or anxiety in children aged 10-11 years (Williams et al., 2009; 
Williams, Daley, Burnside, & Hammond-Rowley, 2010a), or suicidal ideation and suicide 
attempts in a small sample (N=54) of adolescents aged 12 – 19 years (Cha & Nock, 2009). 
However, only the latter study used a composite measure of AEI designed to explicitly 
concord with the Mayer & Salovey model (the MSCEIT-YV which is currently under 
development).  Williams and colleagues used a variety of standalone measures to tap 
independent aspects of this model (e.g., youth had to provide a written response to four 
socio-emotional dilemmas which were rated for emotional content with respect to ability 
to perceive, use and manage emotion). Hence any firm inferences and comparison with 
the foregoing adult evidence must be tempered.  Nevertheless, associations with 
externalising symptomotology or indicators of socially maladaptive behaviours have been 
uncovered; total AEI (indexed via the new MSCEIT-YV and specifically the sub-branches 
perceiving; using; understanding emotion) were found to share significant, inverse 
relationships with the number of school discipline referrals (ranging from minor 
behavioural problems to ‘interventions’) received within an academic year in students 
aged 11 and 18 years (Peters et al., 2009).  This association remained significant (r = -.45, 
p < .05) after controlling for cognitive ability.   Using clinical measures of externalising 
behaviour, Williams et al., (2009), reported the presence of significant, inverse 
associations between their measure of perceiving/using/managing emotion (described 
above) and anger (r = -.12, p < .01), disruptive behaviour (r = -.12, p < .01), and also 
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between scores obtained from a test of emotion recognition ability and disruptive 
behaviour (r = -.11, p < .01).  Notably, similar correlation coefficients (rs ranging between -
.10 to -.21) were documented for relationships between the same variables measured 
using the same instruments in a later study (Williams et al., 2010) though these were 
considered  non-significant owing to the adoption of a more stringent significance 
criterion (p < .001).  
 
Also in line with adult research, cross-sectional associations between TEI (global 
scores) and internalising disorders have been consistently reported in youth populations 
(despite instrument variation).  Higher levels of TEI are significantly linked to lower levels 
of depression (Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009), anxiety 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2001) and frequency of somatic complaints (Mavroveli et al., 2007) in 
adolescents (correlations ranging between r =-.40 somatic complaints to r = -.60 
depression) and depression and anxiety in children aged 10-11 years (Williams et al., 
2009, 2010a). Where facet-level analyses have been conducted, studies have shown a 
rather mixed pattern of associations, though this may be attributed to the diversity of 
measures employed.  Using the SUEIT in  sample of 11-13 year old adolescents, Downey, 
Johnston, Hansen, Birney, & Stough (2010) found that self-reported emotional 
recognition/expression (r = -.19, p < .05) and emotional management (r = -.42, p < .01) 
were significantly related to a composite measure of internalising symptomotology 
(feeling withdrawn; somatic; anxious; depressed).  However Siu (2009) found that of four 
factors derived from the SREIT, only ‘positive use of emotion’ predicted depression (5% of 
the variance in scores), whilst ‘self-management of emotion’ predicted 2% of the variance 
in anxiety as reported by a sample of adolescents in Hong Kong.  Notably, significant 
positive associations have also been documented between TEI and self-esteem; for 
instance, Ciarrochi et al., 2001 report a (SREIT) correlation coefficient of r =.41, p < .01 
and Williams et al., 2009 uncovered an even stronger relationship using the TEIQue-ASF (r 
= .63, p < .01).  Importantly, however, there is evidence to suggest that even with the 
influence of self-esteem controlled, TEI can incrementally predict both depression and 
anxiety; using the TMMS with a sample of youth aged 14-19 years, self-perceived 
competency in emotional repair explained an 11% of the variance in depression over self-
esteem and thought suppression (overall R2 = 29%), whilst both ‘repair’ and ‘clarity’  were 
significant predictors of anxiety (explaining  22% of the variance; overall R2 = 54%) beyond 
controls (Fernandez-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & Pizarro, 2006).   
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However, contrary to the adult literature and theoretical predictions, TEI appears 
to share significant associations with maladaptive expressive behaviours in youth samples 
(i.e., disruptive behaviour) as well as with measures of dispositional, intrinsic emotionality 
(anger, depression, anxiety).  For instance, Siu (2009) found that a factor derived from the 
SREIT ‘positive use of emotions’ could predict 6% of the variance in aggression and 5% in 
self-reported delinquent behaviours.    This was later corroborated by Williams et al., 
(2009) who, this time using global SREIT scores, found significant inverse associations 
between TEI and anger and disruptive behaviour (both r = -.31, p < .001), although 
stronger effects were found using the TEIQue-ASF total scores (anger r = -.56, p < .001; 
disruptive behaviour r = -.43, p < .001).  Moreover, employing a third TEI measure (the 
SUEIT), Downey et al., (2010) found that perceived competency to understand (r = -.18, p 
< .05), manage (r = -.29, p < .01) and  identify/express feelings (r = -.17, p < .05) was 
negatively related to self-reported rule breaking/aggressive behaviours.  To complicate 
this embryonic field further, preliminary evidence further suggests that TEIQue scores are 
related to objective measures of socially ‘maladaptive’ behaviours; Petrides, Frederickson, 
& Furnham (2004) found that total TEIQue-ASF scores significantly predicted 
unauthorised (not authorised) absence in adolescents with a mean age of 16.5 years (n = 
48) – a relationship which remained significant even when controlling for the effects of 
personality (Eysenckian three), accounting for 18% of the variance in this pattern of 
behaviour.  Consistent with this, Mavroveli, Petrides, Shove, & Whitehead (2008) found 
that boys aged 8-12 years who had been either internally excluded from class (n = 25), 
externally excluded from school (for a fixed term, n = 30), or who had unauthorised 
absences (n = 35) all had lower levels of TEI when compared to a control group (n = 98) 
with no record of unauthorised absence or exclusions. Both of the analyses are limited 
however by restricted sample sizes and more crucially, by the lack of statistical control of 
factors such as self-esteem, socio-economic status and also general cognitive ability that 
are known to significantly contribute to behavioural difficulties at school. Even without 
these controls in place, it is marked that the proportion of variance explained by TEI in 
unauthorised absence, whilst controlling for personality, is very similar to the relationship 
reported earlier between AEI and ‘discipline referrals’ with cognitive ability controlled 
(18% versus 20.25%) despite the variability in outcome measurement.    
 
57 
 
Summary: There is overwhelming evidence to suggest the existence of a general, 
broadband association between mental health and EI in both guises (e.g., Martins et al., 
2010). It might also be tentatively suggested, that within adulthood, deficits in ability EI 
are more strongly indicative of externalising behaviours rather than internalising 
symptoms whereas lower levels of trait EI are more strongly related to mood disorders.  
In both cases, EI can make significant, incremental contributions the prediction of these 
outcomes over personality and IQ.  In youths, whilst AEI relationships have so far 
replicated the adult trend, associations between TEI and mental health are equivocal, 
with the construct sharing significant inverse associations with both mood and 
behavioural disorders.  Evidently, however, a number of methodological caveats pervade 
the evidence base to preclude definitive qualification of the nature of this relationship.  
There has been a disproportionate emphasis on the examination of trait versus ability EI 
in relation to internalising rather than externalising symptomotology within adult as 
opposed to youth populations.  Clearly, in order to establish the utility of EI in predicting 
mental health (and as a potential avenue for interventions in the treatment of clinical 
disorders), research needs to target a broader array of clinical presentations and focus 
upon younger population groups to establish if and where EI can make a useful 
contribution.  Secondly, despite the need to identify the ‘pure’ influence of EI on mental 
health outcomes, only a small cluster of studies have so far examined the extent of any 
incremental validity afforded by EI over allied constructs (particularly personality and 
cognitive ability) and with the exception of Petrides et al., 2004, these have been 
exclusively concerned with adult participants. Future research must clearly address this to 
allay the critics (Zeidner et al., 2008). Thirdly, the sheer range of measures employed 
across studies (particularly TEI) limits the comparisons that can be drawn; as discussed 
earlier in relation to the EQi and TMMS, measures are based on a wide range of models 
which leads to differential sampling of the construct domain and complicates 
interpretation of any effects obtained (the consequences of which appear particularly 
pronounced within the youth domain).  Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly of all, 
these basic, cross-sectional associations do not permit any inferences to be made as to 
the underlying processes that might underpin any such relationship. As commentators 
have noted, simply identifying ‘emotionally unintelligent’ capacities, such as impaired 
emotion management or perception in those with (emotional) disorder amounts to little 
more than descriptive, circular reasoning (i.e., inferring low EI from symptoms) and yields 
very little explanatory power alone (Zeidner et al., 2009). As outlined in chapter 11, 
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theory dictates that both forms of EI should influence key individual difference processes 
that contribute to adaptive health outcomes across individuals – discussion will now 
consider how far extant evidence supports these suppositions. 
 
12.3 Direct pathways to adjustment: EI, stressors and mental health 
 
As noted earlier (section 11.3), there is now much evidence to implicate a wide 
range of stressors encompassing chronic adversity (e.g., childhood abuse; poverty) and 
acute experiences (e.g., negative life events) in the developmental course of 
psychopathological disorders (Grant et al., 2004; Rutter, 2000).  Whilst some stressors are 
known to exert proximal influences on disorder (e.g., maladaptive parenting styles; Ge et 
al., 1992) others operate more distally, exerting a multiplicative influence via intervening 
mediating and/or moderating variables that can operate at individual, family or 
environmental levels (Grant et al., 2006).  For instance, family socio-economic adversity 
represents a chronic stressor that has been consistently linked to both externalising and 
internalising symptomotology in youth (McMahon et al., 2003), but those from poorer 
families also experience a greater number of acute interpersonal and environmental 
stressors; for example, family bereavement, illness (Amone-P'Olack et al., 2009), 
overcrowding, poorer housing, noise, family turmoil, violence and separation (Evans & 
English, 2002).  Hence the effects of chronic adversity are two-fold; in depleting the 
resources available to an individual within the family setting (i.e., financial, social, 
emotional or cognitive) immediate vulnerability to disorder is directly increased, yet so 
too is the likelihood of encountering additional acute stressors such as injury, illness etc, 
which can in turn have cumulative detrimental effects on health outcomes (McLoyd, 
Jayaratne, Ceballo, & Borquez, 1994; Wadsworth et al., 2005).  Indeed, Grant et al., 
(2006) found that family-based variables (e.g., decreased parental warmth, 
harsh/inconsistent discipline, increased levels of conflict, reduced parental support) were 
most consistently implicated as mediators of the poverty-adjustment relationship but 
note that these (uncontrollable) family-level stressors may explain differences in 
additional individual-level variables (e.g., low self-esteem, maladaptive coping) which in 
turn link to poorer outcomes.  In other words, protective processes at the possible 
disposal of the individual (e.g., adaptive coping; support networks, etc) could be impacted 
as part of a complex chain of causality (Seiffge-Krenke, 2011).   Consequently, EI 
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(conceived as a pre-existing, individual-level resource) may be differentially related to 
stressors; stronger links to proximal stressors of an interpersonal nature are anticipated 
and, crucially, as an adaptive emotional trait or skill-set, those with higher levels of T/AEI 
should report experiencing fewer stressors. 
 
12.3.1 Does stressor exposure differ as a function of EI? 
 
A body of research has sought to explore the correspondence between EI and 
individual reports of stress symptoms as a marker of stressor exposure (Extremera, Duran, 
& Rey, 2007; Gohm, Corser, & Dalsky, 2005; Hunt & Evans, 2004; Pau & Croucher, 2003; 
Pau et al., 2007; Por, Barriball, Fitzpatrick, & Roberts, 2011; Sahin, Guler, & Basim, 2009; 
Velasco, Fernandez, Paez, & Campos, 2006).  Typically these studies require individuals to 
report the frequency with which they experience psychological distress (e.g., feelings of 
control over life events) and/or heightened physiological arousal (e.g., racing heart) 
across the recent past (usually within the previous month).  TEI reliably demonstrates an 
inverse relationship with stress symptoms and studies have been consistent in reporting 
moderate to large global correlation coefficients across instruments, e.g., (SREIT) r = -.29 
(Pau & Croucher, 2003; Pau et al., 2007 using the SSREI) to (EQi) r = -.40 (Por et al., 2011; 
Sahin et al., 2009 ).  By contrast, very few studies have reported on this relationship from 
an ability EI perspective (notable exceptions being, Fox, Bergquist, Casey, Hong, & Sinha, 
2010; Gohm et al., 2005) and existing findings point to non-significant (possibly indirect) 
relations. Collectively however, this body of research is severely limited by its 
operationalisation and measurement of ‘stress’; stress symptoms share much overlap 
with the features of psychological disorders; for instance, example items from the 
commonly employed ‘Perceived Stress Scale’ (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) 
include, “In the last month, how often have you been upset because of something that 
happened unexpectedly?” “...how often have you found that you could not cope with all 
the things that you had to do?”).  Hence on the basis of the aforementioned links 
between EI and mental health an inverse EI-stress symptoms relationship is not 
unexpected as this essentially represents a restatement of positive health (e.g., absence 
of depression).  Moreover, as the above examples illustrate, items measuring stress 
symptoms also clearly tap allied stress-related processes such as coping proficiency.  
Consequently, employing such ‘response-based’ approaches in the measurement of 
stressor exposure or reactivity has been cautioned against on the grounds of conceptual 
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clarity and empirical rigour, particularly when research aims to deconstruct stress 
processes by identifying potential moderating and mediating effects within stressor-
adjustment pathways (Grant et al., 2003).  Hence, this evidence base will not be further 
considered. 
 
In contrast, very little research has examined direct links between EI and identified 
stressors, and of the little evidence available, most has been based upon adult, 
retrospective self-reports of childhood adversities, with a predominant focus upon 
uncovering developmental influences on EI.  Nevertheless, findings have been relatively 
consistent across stressor-types.  With respect to the experience of chronic adversity, 
Brown & Schutte (2006) found the level of TEI (SREIT) did not differ between students 
who had or had not reported a history of verbal, physical, or sexual abuse (N=167, mean 
age 27.95 years).  Consistent with this, Gardner et al., (2011) found no associations 
between either TEI (SREIT) or AEI (MSCEIT) and the incidence of childhood physical 
abuse/neglect or emotional abuse/neglect in a group of students (N=97, mean age 22.29 
years).  Moreover, branch level correlations between AEI skills (MSCEIT) and history of 
sexual abuse did not reach significance in a community sample of adults (N=154, mean 
age 38.4 years)(Goldenberg, 2004).  However, within the same study, some small inverse 
relationships were detected between a composite measure of abuse ‘psychological & 
physical maltreatment’ and TEI (SREIT factors identified as ‘appraisal of emotion’ r = -.14, 
p < .05; ‘mood regulation’ r = -.19, p < .05; ‘experiencing/sharing emotion’ r = -.27, p < 
.001) and with AEI ‘management of emotion’ (r = .14, p < .05).  A small, positive 
association between AEI ‘using emotion’ and parental sexual abuse (r = .14, p < .05) was 
also reported.   Whilst the author interprets these findings as evidence that TEI (though 
not AEI) can be detrimentally impacted by chronic stressors, given that the stressor-EI 
relationship was not examined concurrently (i.e., in childhood) it is equally plausible that 
characteristics associated with ‘low’ TEI might have enhanced the likelihood of exposure 
to abuse (e.g., childhood difficulties in perceived emotion management may have 
affected behaviour, leading to ‘acting out’ etc).  Conversely, for those exposed to abuse, it 
would seem that the ability to effectively manage emotion (in the self and others) and 
use emotion to facilitate thought are skills that might become honed in the face of 
adversity, possibly as a result of the protective effect this might afford the individual 
within a risk context (i.e., control and regulation of negative emotion/using emotion to 
problem-solve).  Nevertheless, despite this speculation the effect sizes reported are 
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negligible, and, in comparison with the foregoing null findings, possibly a result of 
differing measurement techniques across studies (i.e., the use of a composite measure of 
‘general’ abuse which combines very different forms of physical and emotional abuse; 
associations detected at branch/factor level vs. global level in EI instruments).  It is 
notable, though, that whilst the aforementioned body of research is undoubtedly limited 
by a focus upon retrospective reports of adversity, the general trend of findings has been 
corroborated more recently with respect to AEI using a concurrent design; in a sample of 
young people (N = 54, mean age 17.3 years) self-reported sexual abuse and AEI (MSCEIT 
YV-R) were not significantly related (Cha & Nock, 2009). 
 
To date, there has been no formal examination of the links between another 
chronic stressor, socio-economic adversity, and EI in adolescence although two studies 
have investigated relationships between proxy indicators of socio-economic status and EI.  
In a sample of adolescents (N = 200, mean age 17.24 years), the first found that whilst 
total TEI (EQi) did not significantly differ according to self-reported family income or 
location of household (rural or urban), differences were detected according to level of 
parental education - as parental level of education increased (i.e., representing higher 
affluence) so did youth TEI (Harrod & Scheer, 2005).  However these findings are clearly 
limited by the reporting method - estimates of family wealth (i.e., parental education, 
occupation, household income) are typically unknown and inaccurately reported by youth 
(Currie, Elton, Todd, & Platt, 1997).  Perhaps more revealing are the contradictory findings 
of Kraus, Cote, & Keltner (2010, study one), who found that ability to perceive emotion in 
others (indexed via the MSCEIT) was poorer in adults with higher levels of education 
(degree versus high school) and this effect remained significant when controlling for 
gender and trait agreeableness.  The authors speculate that within a ‘risk context’, where 
there is a chronic lack of resources and increased likelihood of exposure to stressors of an 
uncontrollable nature, individuals are more likely to be externally focussed to maximise 
the detection of salient information from their environment.  Hence, enhanced abilities to 
perceive emotional cues in others would be a corollary of this. Despite its theoretical 
appeal, the study is limited by its focus upon a rather restricted sample (i.e., adults who 
had been in stable employment with a University for an average of 11 years), a restricted 
indicator of SES (a high-school level of education was classified as ‘lower social class’ from 
which ‘risk’ is inferred) and also a lack of consideration of the impact of general cognitive 
ability.  The somewhat narrow focus upon one aspect of AEI also limits the generalisability 
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of these findings to the preceding research base, although it is notable that the emerging 
‘theme’ compliments Goldenberg (2004); in addition to effective management and use of 
emotion, perception of emotion appears to be similarly enhanced in adults exposed to 
chronic stressors.  
 
However, contradictory evidence has been found in relation to measures of 
cumulative life events with  Ciarrochi et al., (2002) reporting non-significant associations 
between ability to perceive emotion (MEIS ‘stories’ subtest which requires identification 
of emotions in six vignettes) and daily hassles occurring over the past month (e.g., 
interpersonal conflicts) and also with major negative life events occurring over the past 6-
12 months (acute events e.g., death of loved one) in a sample of students (N = 232, mean 
age = 20.6 years).  Conversely, TEI ‘managing self emotion’ (though not ‘managing others’ 
emotions’ or ‘emotion perception’ as indexed via the SREIT) was significantly related to 
fewer daily hassles (r = -.15, p < .01), yet as with AEI, there were no significant 
associations with major negative life events.  However, the authors note the degree of 
overlap between items included within ‘managing self emotion’ and measures of 
dispositional optimism and general positive mood (e.g., “I expect good things to happen”) 
hence,  the extent to which this relationship reflects any unique contribution from TEI 
beyond general NA/PA cannot be determined.  Consistent with this, Day, Therrien, & 
Carroll, (2005) reported inverse relationships between sub facets of the EQi 
(‘adaptability’, ‘general mood’, ‘stress management’ and ‘intrapersonal’ TEI) and the 
experience of fewer academic-related daily hassles (rs ranging between -.44 to -.61, p < 
.001) in a sample of students (N = 133, mean age = 21.6 years).  However, as there is an 
explicit emphasis upon coping processes (i.e., adaptability; stress management) and 
PA/NA (i.e., happiness/optimism indexed by general mood), these associations are to be 
expected and the ‘pure’ nature of the TEI-stressor relationship cannot be discerned. 
Indeed, in line with Ciarrochi et al., (2002), all of these same components were highly 
correlated with a measure of Neuroticism (rs ranging between -.61 to -.68, p < .001); only 
‘interpersonal’ EI did not share a significant association with N and, markedly, this was 
not related to daily hassles.  Nevertheless, despite measurement differences (i.e., variable 
coverage of the TEI sampling domain across multiple instruments; lack of statistical 
control for higher-order personality traits) and an exclusive focus upon adult populations, 
there does appear to be some consistency across studies in detecting inverse 
relationships between TEI and daily hassles. 
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Similar limitations apply to the small body of literature addressing aspects of 
family functioning. Here, as with chronic adversity, researchers have largely focussed 
upon exploring how current levels of adult EI relate to retrospective perceptions of the 
early family environment.  In general, TEI would appear to relate to qualities that reflect 
positive family functioning, for instance, adults (N = 296, mean age 19.4 years) with 
higher total TEI (SREIT) reported having experienced higher levels of ‘conversation 
orientation’ (i.e., engagement in open interaction: sharing thoughts, feelings, ideas) (r = 
.49, p < .05), whilst the relationship between TEI and ‘conformity’ (i.e., obedience to 
rules/parental authority) did not reach significance (Keaten & Kelly, 2008).  In addition to 
communication patterns, Alegre & Benson (2010) found that TEI related positively to 
parental warmth/affection (TMMS attention: r = .22, p < .01; clarity: r = .20, p < .01) and 
negatively with harsh punishment (r = -.12, p < .05), though there was no significant 
relationship with discipline. Indeed, this study found that reduced ability to understand 
emotion (clarity) partially mediated the effect of parental warmth (lower levels) on 
internalising (higher levels) but not externalising disorder - providing tentative evidence 
to support the proposition that TEI may be implicated in multiply-determined, stressor-
disorder pathways of a proximal nature.   This also appears to fit with the pattern of 
predictive specificity gleaned from the literature thus far in that TEI did not predict 
externalising disorders.  However, as noted elsewhere, the full content domain of TEI is 
not sampled by this measure (e.g., ‘clarity’ does not extend to understanding emotion in 
others) and the lack of control for broadband personality precludes any firm conclusions.   
 
The importance of this latter point was emphasised by Ciarrochi et al. (2001) who 
found that initially significant bivariate associations between total (SREIT) TEI (r = .19, p < 
.05), managing self-relevant emotion (r = .23, p < .01), managing others’ emotion/social 
skills (r = .20, p < .05) and parental warmth were no longer significant after controlling for 
self-esteem and trait anxiety in a sample of adolescents (N =131, mean age 13.8 years).  
Furthermore, the impact of TEI measurement variability was highlighted recently by 
Gardner et al., (2011) who, in contrast to the foregoing literature, failed to find any 
significant associations between total TEI (SREIT) and measures of family cohesion, 
expressiveness or conflict in adults with a mean age of 22.29 years.  AEI was similarly 
unrelated to these measures.   However, whilst relationships failed to reach significance, 
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the direction of associations would appear to accord with earlier emerging themes; TEI 
was related to ‘adaptive’ qualities (less conflict and a more cohesive and expressive family 
environment) whilst higher total AEI was associated with stressor exposure (less conflict 
but reduced cohesiveness and expressiveness), suggesting once again that AEI skills might 
be more attuned in individuals faced with interpersonal discord. It is noteworthy that 
across this sample of research, TEI would appear to only share relationships with 
‘adaptive’ family attributes and not measures of ‘dysfunction’ (i.e. conflict, discipline) 
which perhaps serves to further underscore the influence of positive affect. However, 
despite offering a snapshot of relationships between EI and aspects of the family 
environment, comprehensive exploration of family functioning in its entirety is absent 
(i.e., aside from affective aspects, also roles; behaviours; problem-solving etc).  This is 
something which is sorely needed in order to further understand the association between 
this proximal stressor and EI in youth. 
 
Summary: Altogether, the lack of consistent, robust associations between ability EI 
and markers of both chronic and acute stressors suggests that level of emotional skill 
does not intrinsically influence exposure to adversity.  However, this does not rule out a 
moderating role for AEI in stressor-adaptational pathways, whether this be via direct 
modification of the stressor experience (here a perception x chronic stressor interaction 
has been hinted at) or indirectly (transmitting its effects via coping). Whilst AEI theory 
suggests that higher skill universally equates to adaptive outcomes (also hinted at by 
some of the evidence reviewed above, i.e., early detection of salient emotional cues may 
facilitate ‘adaptive’ regulatory processes, attenuating symptomotology), the nature of the 
current literature (a posteriori reasoning through the reporting of retrospective stress 
contexts; limited measures of stressors; no measure of adaptation) precludes definitive 
interpretations in this regard.  Indeed, it might be the case that instead of protection, 
higher AEI might amplify or pose increased risk for stressor reactivity (i.e., exaggerated 
stressor detection leading to increased reactivity and greater likelihood of disorder). This 
is particularly pertinent to the adolescent context, a period characterised by heightened 
sensitivity to social stressors – as established via objective markers of neuroendocrine 
and cardiovascular change (Stroud et al., 2009) and subjective assessment (Seiffge-
Krenke, 2011) - where adolescents from high risk backgrounds exposed to multiple 
stressors, may be especially vulnerable to the onset of disorder (Spear, 2009).  Clearly, 
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urgent attention must be given to further examine chronic and proximal stressor-T/AEI 
relations within adolescence and establish how these, in turn, relate to real-world mental 
health outcomes.   
 
Nevertheless, there is greater continuity in literature examining TEI-stressor 
relations; higher TEI is more robustly associated with reduced exposure to stressors of an 
interpersonal, proximal nature (e.g., fewer cumulative daily hassles and the experience of 
‘adaptive’ family environments: warm relationships, engaging communication styles) 
compared to chronic/distally related stressors (e.g., abuse, neglect, indicators of poverty).  
By indicating an intrinsic, direct role for TEI in stressor processes this provides preliminary 
support for the predictions derived from personality theory (e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 
1995).   However, the extent to which TEI offers a unique perspective on these relations is 
unclear; direct associations may represent a simple re-statement of the established 
effects of positive mood (e.g., optimism, happiness, high self-esteem) on the propensity 
to experience adversity (see e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2001). Clearly, incremental testing of 
associations in the presence of high-order personality traits is required.  Crucially, 
however, analysis of this self-report literature does not permit definitive qualification of 
the nature of any direct association between A/TEI and stressors; in order to assess 
whether variation in perceived or actual emotional ability underscores individual 
differences in stress reactivity and understand how this might occur (e.g., by influencing 
early perception and identification of emotional cues, or, once detected, management of 
emotional repercussions), scrutiny of experimental evidence is required.  A small body of 
research has examined whether EI can buffer the physiological and psychological effects 
induced by acute stressors within a controlled environment and it is to consideration of 
this literature that discussion now turns. 
 
12.3.2 Does stress reactivity differ as a function of EI? 
 
Two major approaches have been utilised to manipulate and measure stress 
reactivity within the EI research domain – mood induction and stressor-confrontation – 
both of which follow similar experimental procedures.  Following an initial measurement 
of emotional state (recorded either subjectively or objectively), individuals are then 
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subjected to a mood induction procedure (designed to elicit a positive or negative mood) 
or exposed to an acute situational stressor within the laboratory setting, immediately 
after which a second measurement of emotional state is recorded to gauge reactivity.  
Stressors contain a ‘performance’ element and, to date, have assumed a variety of forms 
including ‘failure’ experiences (generated through non-completion of cognitive tasks 
under time constraints, i.e., impossible anagrams, difficult items from non-verbal IQ tests 
etc), social evaluation (delivering a speech to an audience after limited preparation time 
followed by a timed cognitive task) and completion of demanding (i.e., complex working 
memory) or fatiguing (attentional vigilance) cognitive tasks.  Participants are randomly 
assigned to either a ‘stress’ or ‘control’ condition – where the latter typically involves 
reading a magazine article or watching a neutrally valenced documentary (e.g., natural 
history).  Mood induction procedures are similarly varied but, in contrast to stressors, all 
are ‘passive’ in nature and present no perceived threat to the individual; for instance, 
participants watch positively (e.g., a comedy sketch) or negatively valenced film clips (e.g. 
documentaries relating to the Holocaust; dying from cancer) and then read positively or 
negatively phrased statements concerning personal self-worth and mood (the Velten 
method), or asked to recall a negative event from memory (e.g., a past poor decision).  
Thus in line with the overall goals of each intervention, stressor studies typically measure 
reactivity in terms of changes in negative affect (NA), whereas mood induction studies 
often report changes in both NA and positive affect (PA), or sometimes a composite index 
of the two (subtracting NA from PA or vice versa).  Despite these underlying differences in 
procedure and the variation in dependent variables, both methodologies have 
demonstrated that emotionally intelligent individuals differ in their response to stressors. 
 
Turning first to subjective changes in emotional reactivity through mood 
induction, Petrides and Furnham (2003, study 2) found that those with higher levels of 
global TEI (TEIQue) reported more anxiety, anger and reduced vigour after watching a 
distressing film (and reduced confusion following an amusing film) compared to those 
with lower TEI.  This was corroborated by Fernandez-Berrocal and Extremera (2006) who 
reported that global negative affect increased in response to a film clip selected to induce 
anger (but not sadness) for those high in TMMS clarity with baseline levels of NA and PA 
held constant.  However, changes in positive affect following positive induction did not 
differ according to level of TEI.    Additionally, Sevdalis, Petrides, & Harvey (2007, study 1) 
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found that, whilst all participants reported lower PA and higher NA after recalling a 
personal negative memory (a decision that led to intense negative affect), for those with 
higher TEI (TEIQue) these effects were more pronounced (i.e., a greater increase in NA 
and greater decrease in PA).  Hence, all of these studies suggest that TEI relates to 
heightened reactivity to emotional stimuli, particularly material of a negative valence.     
Nevertheless, there have been some exceptions to this trend. Schutte, Malouff, Simunek, 
McKenley and Hollander, (2002, study 3) found that those with higher levels of TEI (SREIT) 
encountered less of a decrease in global PA following negative induction, however, it is 
unclear why changes in PA were reported rather than NA when the focus was on negative 
induction. Additionally, in direct contrast to Fernandez-Berrocal and Extremera (2006), 
Ramos, Fernandez-Berrocal and  Extremera (2007) found that higher TMMS clarity related 
to reduced feelings of depression and fatigue in a sample of women following negative 
mood induction – although there was no control for baseline mood state (i.e., prior to 
induction).  Nevertheless, Schutte et al., (2002, study 3) also found that higher TEI related 
to greater increase in PA after positive induction and therefore still offers partial 
corroboration for the ‘enhanced reactivity’ trend.  Importantly, this literature indicates 
that TEI can reliably distinguish differences in emotional reactivity across individuals and 
hints that high TEI might not have universally adaptive consequences (i.e., experiencing 
increased mood deterioration is not necessarily useful or appropriate across all situations 
e.g., interpersonal conflict versus personal bereavement).  Similar conclusions cannot be 
drawn with respect to AEI; only one study thus far has examined reactivity via mood 
induction and found that this did not differ according to level of AEI in response to 
positive mood induction – both high and low AEI individuals reported similar reductions in 
NA in comparison to post-induction affect levels for neutral stimuli (Ciarrochi, Chan, & 
Caputi, 2000).  However, as highlighted earlier with reference to the TEI research base, 
the use of an incongruent measure of affect (i.e., NA to measure changes in positivity) is 
not ideal, and even more problematic in this case given that mood was treated as a uni-
dimensional construct by combining self-reported sadness, unhappiness, cheerfulness, 
negativity, feeling tense and positivity into a single index.   
 
Aside from differences in the recording of emotional reactivity across such studies, 
the mood induction evidence base is collectively limited by a number of key 
methodological issues which prevent generalisability.  As noted above, particularly 
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problematic is the absence of statistical control for the influence of baseline mood state 
mood in analyses (e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Ramos et al., 
2007; Sevdalis et al., 2007), especially given that individuals with high TEI universally 
reported more positive mood states prior to testing in the studies discussed above.  
Clearly, any post-induction changes in emotional reactivity may well be contaminated by 
these underlying differences in dispositional mood state.  Indeed, Fernandez-Berrocal & 
Extremera (2006) found that pre-existing mood state accounted for between 20-40% of 
the variance in PA and NA post-induction – an effect which is likely amplified with respect 
to TEI when measures of mood and TEI (with shared method variance) are recorded in the 
same session (e.g., Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Schutte et al., 2002; Sevdalis et al., 2007).   
A similar ‘contamination’ problem may also stem from the use of repeated measures 
designs, and this could be the root cause of the somewhat equivocal findings pertaining 
to positive induction; in subjecting the same group of participants to negative followed by 
positive mood induction, any changes in PA post-positive induction might be a reflection 
of regulation following exposure to the earlier negative stimuli, rather enhanced 
‘reactivity’ to positive material (e.g., Schutte et al., 2002).   
 
Nevertheless, researchers have addressed some of these limitations through the 
examination of EI and emotional reactivity in response to situational stressors.  In 
comparison to the foregoing mood induction research, this body of literature has yielded 
more consistent findings and also extended investigation to measure both subjective and 
objective changes in stress reactivity as a function of EI.  With respect to TEI and 
subjective reactivity, the work of Mikolajczak and colleagues has been particularly 
influential; using the TEIQue with adult populations, studies have converged to show that 
individuals with higher TEI experience smaller increases in negative affect (i.e., less mood 
deterioration) following exposure to stressors compared to those with lower-levels of TEI 
–  an effect which has held across different stressor ‘types’, including a failure experience 
(Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans, & Luminet, 2009, 
study 1 & 2; Mikolajczak, Roy, Verstrynge, & Luminet, 2009) and social evaluation task 
(Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans et al., 2009, study 3) and when subjective reactivity is 
measured via ‘traditional’ instruments (i.e., positive and negative affect scale) as well as 
self-reported reactivity symptoms such as bodily sensations; action tendencies 
(Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007).  However, presently it remains unclear which TEI 
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facets might best afford such a protective effect amidst stress; where factor level analysis 
has been conducted ‘self-control’ (regulation of own emotion; impulse control and low 
impulsiveness) and ‘sociability’ (management of others emotion; assertiveness; social 
competence) have been most consistently implicated to attenuate emotional reactivity in 
response to failure experience (Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 
2009), which hints that competencies located within ‘emotionality’ (emotion perception - 
self and others; expression; empathy) might be implicated to a lesser extent in TEI-
stressor reactivity relationships than emotion management capacities.  Indeed this was 
borne out by the findings of a ‘pooled sample analysis’ conducted by Mikolajczak, 
Petrides, Coumans et al. (2009) who, in combining the responses of participants exposed 
to both types of stressor across three studies, found that whilst all TEI factors moderated 
the effect of stress on reactivity, ‘sociability’ had the largest effect and ‘emotionality’ the 
weakest.  Altogether, the moderating effects on post-stressor NA appear consistent and it 
is encouraging to note that this effect appears to persist with personality and social 
desirability controlled (Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans 
et al., 2009, study 3).  However, some degree of caution should still be exercised with 
respect to these findings; although in some cases measures of mood and TEI were taken 
in separate testing sessions, the effects of baseline mood state have not always been 
statistically controlled (e.g., Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2009, study 2).  Moreover, the ability 
of TEI to modify changes in positive affect under stress have been less pronounced 
(converging somewhat with the mood induction literature) with some studies finding that 
individuals with high TEI show a smaller decrease in PA when faced with stress 
(Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans et al., 2009, study 2) yet others reporting a non-
significant moderating effect (Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans et al., 2009, study 3). 
 
Importantly, the moderating effect of TEI on stress reactivity has been 
corroborated using objective indices.  Much of this research has measured levels of 
salivary cortisol which represent hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activation in 
response to physiological or psychological stress.  Early work with the TMMS suggested 
that increased understanding of one’s own emotions (clarity) was related to lower 
baseline levels of cortisol secretion and (with control for baseline levels) predicted lower 
overall secretion when confronted by a series of performance-based stressors presented 
over consecutive sessions (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002, study 2).  Moreover, 
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higher attention to one’s emotions was found to be similarly predictive of attenuated 
cortisol secretion and also reduced cardiovascular reactivity (decreased systolic blood 
pressure) when participating in a single stressful task (Salovey et al., 2002, study 3).   
Nevertheless, these studies only show a predictive association between certain TEI facets 
and physiological reactivity; the lack of control groups and subsequent testing for 
interaction effects tells us little about whether these facets might offer any protection 
against the effects of stress.  However, work with the TEIQue has begun to address this.  
In line with the earlier findings, Mikolajczak, Roy, Luminet, Fillée, & de Timary, (2007) 
found that global TEI moderated mood deterioration following exposure to a social 
evaluation stressor task (such that those with higher TEI experienced less decrease in PA 
and less of an increase in NA) however, TEI also moderated cortisol secretion (such that 
those with higher TEI secreted less cortisol in the stress condition compared to their low 
TEI counterparts).  Nevertheless consistent with associations reported in Salovey et al., 
(2002, study 2) further analyses revealed that this effect could be attributed to baseline 
differences in secretion; those with low TEI showed a stress-anticipatory effect, secreting 
higher levels of cortisol before the task began which maintained throughout the 
experimental session.  This hints that low TEI could confer vulnerability for deleterious 
health outcomes via enhanced reactivity to perceived as well as actual stressors.  Notably, 
this effect held across all TEI factors and after controlling for personality (traits N, A, O) 
and alexithymia (which were also inversely associated with cortisol secretion).  
 
Similar effects have been reported in more recent work by a separate research 
team (Laborde, Brüll, Weber, & Anders, 2011).  Here, heart rate variability was indexed 
via the LF/HF ratio which, in representing the balance between the 
sympathetic/parasympathetic systems, is expected to increase in response to stress.   
Heart rate was monitored in a group of male, German athletes both prior and following 
exposure to a sports-based stressor which involved listening to audio of negative self-
referent statements (e.g., “motivation is leaving you”) coupled with the noise of a booing 
crowd to simulate performance anxiety and lowered self-confidence in a competitive 
setting.  Whilst heart rate variability increased in all participants after exposure to the 
stressor, the increase was higher for those with lower TEI (TEIQue) indicating greater 
susceptibility to stress.  Yet in contrast to the foregoing literature, TEI ‘emotionality’ was 
found to be the most prominent predictor of the change in heart rate variability (with 
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‘self-control’ n.s) - although this perhaps reflects differences in the nature of the stressor 
(audio presentation of negative imagery might link to perception and expression of 
emotion).  However, these findings can only be considered preliminary given that 
baseline heart rate (which was inversely related to TEI ‘wellbeing’) and personality facets 
were not controlled within these analyses and, most crucially, heart rate changes were 
not compared to a control group/control task. 
 
Before leaving discussion of the TEI-reactivity literature, it is worth noting that this 
research represents a very preliminary examination of the link between EI and stress 
reactivity; there are clearly many different sub-processes that collectively contribute to 
‘reactivity’ and researchers have begun to turn their attention towards examination of 
the impact of EI on some of these sub-processes in an attempt to deconstruct the 
underlying EI-stress reactivity relationship. For instance, Mikolajczak, Roy et al., (2009, 
study 2) examined whether early attentional processes were modified by level of TEI 
(TEIQue).  Following exposure to an experimental stressor (failure experience) or control 
condition (reading magazine) participants completed a visual dot probe task which 
required participants to respond to the direction of a probe appearing in a position 
previously occupied by a neutrally, positively or negatively valenced word.  Faster 
reaction times to an ‘incongruent’ probe position (i.e., where probe replaces a neutral 
word instead of emotive) indicate less attentional bias to emotional ‘concern-related’ 
material.  Specifically, it was expected that in those exposed to stress, high levels of TEI 
would confer a bias towards negative stimuli (i.e., slower responses to incongruent 
probes following negatively valenced material) given the adaptive advantage afforded by 
early threat detection (i.e., facilitation of a quicker physiological/psychological response).  
Interestingly, only TEI ‘self-control’ was found to influence early attentional processes; 
within the control condition, those with higher self-control responded more quickly to 
incongruent probes (under normal conditions, less focus was afforded to emotional 
material), whereas the opposite was true for those with low self-control (diverted more 
attention to emotional words).  Yet under stress, higher levels of self-control represented 
a bias in favour of emotional information (i.e., slower reaction times to incongruent 
positions), whilst those lower in self-control reduced their focus on emotional stimuli.  
Importantly, these effects held beyond the influence of personality and self-reported 
levels of depression and anxiety.  
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Hence, Mikolajczak, Roy et al., (2009) argue that this supports the ‘adaptive’ 
nature of high TEI – attention to emotional content under stress should enable 
downstream regulatory processes (e.g., explicit coping strategies) to come into effect 
more quickly to combat stressors vs. those with low TEI who disengage from emotional 
information.  However, in actuality, this study only partly accords with this notion – these 
analyses found a general biasing effect for emotional content per se (i.e., attention 
directed towards/away from both positive and negative stimuli).  To demonstrate a truly 
‘adaptive’ effect, TEI should show specificity in negative emotional processing under 
stress. Moreover, the nature of this experimental design (involved attentional processing 
post-stressor), meant that low TEI might actually have reflected an adaptive response to 
stress – as those with lower self-control also reported higher levels of negative affect 
prior to commencement of the attentional task, disengagement from potentially 
distressing content might have conferred protection (automatic avoidance from 
uncontrollable stressor).  Clearly, further examination of the moderating effect of TEI on 
early attentional processes is necessary, with a focus upon health outcomes and direct 
testing under stress, to determine the ‘adaptive’ nature of such effects.  Nevertheless, 
this evidence suggests that there may be some early attentional processing differences as 
a function of TEI which may go some way to explaining how TEI attenuates psychological 
and physiological emotional reactivity under stress. 
 
Before concluding, it is notable that, as with all other lines of enquiry, there has 
been less emphasis on exploring the relationship between AEI and experimental stressor 
reactivity – indeed, to the author’s knowledge, only one study to date has investigated 
this relationship and with reference to subjective reactivity only (Matthews et al., 2006).  
With random assignment to one of four conditions (control or one of three stressor tasks: 
impossible anagrams; complex working memory; attentional vigilance) participants 
recorded pre and post-task levels of distress and worry.  Across the whole sample, global 
AEI (MSCEIT without ‘using emotions’) predicted reduced pre-task distress and worry over 
the effects of personality (adding 2.5% and 5.2% incremental variance respectively) 
suggesting that those with higher AEI came to the experimental session in a more positive 
mood state than those with lower AEI.  Controlling for this pre-task state, AEI and 
neuroticism were both predictive of post-task distress (together accounting for 3.7% 
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additional variance beyond mood and condition), however, contrary to predictions, 
higher AEI was linked to increased distress (as was high N). Furthermore, in contrast to 
the TEI literature base, AEI did not moderate the effect of stress on emotional reactivity 
(distress or worry).   Therefore, despite those with higher AEI reporting a better 
subjective mood state initially (less distress, worry) this did not confer an advantage in 
the face of stressors; instead, AEI skills amplified reactivity and did not offer protection 
against task stress. 
 
Summary: Notwithstanding aforementioned methodological limitations inherent 
in this literature base (including small sample sizes and an exclusive focus upon adult 
populations), evidence from both mood induction and situational stress studies suggest 
that emotional reactivity does indeed differ according to emotional intelligence – though 
presently, this would appear to apply most definitively to TEI. Whilst those with higher 
levels of TEI appear more reactive to emotional stimuli when presented passively 
(particularly information of a negative nature), when faced with tangible threat, high TEI 
affords an adaptive advantage by minimising mood deterioration and physiological 
reactions (e.g., reduced heart rate variation and cortisol release).  Indeed, this latter body 
of research also hints that high TEI might even underscore differences in reactivity to 
perceived as well as actual stressors.  This effect is captured by global TEI, although TEI 
facets may differentially contribute depending upon the type of stressor faced, e.g., 
emotion regulatory facets appear to afford particular advantages for stressors requiring 
an individual performance element. Additionally, preliminary attempts to further 
deconstruct the overall stress reactivity process have suggested that TEI could moderate 
early attention processes when confronted with stressors – something which awaits 
exploration with respect to AEI.   Indeed, extant literature pertaining to AEI is much less 
consistent; people with higher levels of AEI appear no more or less sensitive to emotional 
stimuli and emotional skill does not appear to confer a protective effect in the face of 
situational stressors.  Indeed, contrasting with the tenets of AEI theory (and predictive 
links derived from emotion regulation research), higher levels of AEI would appear to 
predict greater negative emotional reactivity. Hence, this review suggests that whilst high 
levels of TEI confer stress resistance, high levels of AEI predict outcomes associated with 
stress maladaptation.  Nevertheless, the ecological validity of this research base is limited 
by the study of artificial, acute ‘stressors’ within the laboratory.  To lend credence to 
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these emergent findings, similar effects must be demonstrated in response to naturally 
occurring, chronic stressors that are known to be implicated in the onset and 
maintenance of disorder (e.g. interpersonal conflict, socio-economic adversity) and these 
differences linked to better mental health.   Presently, there are very few studies that 
have investigated such associations and most have been conducted with adult 
populations.  However, before reaching a final conclusion concerning the plausibility of 
direct influences from EI upon pathways to adjustment, this evidence base will be 
explored. 
 
12.3.3 Can EI buffer the impact of stressors to promote adaptation? 
 
Before exploring the small body of literature that has been concerned with EI-
chronic stressor interactions, it is worth noting the findings of two studies which have 
attempted to assess the impact of EI on emotional reactivity when faced with normative, 
stressful events (examinations and school transition).  First Mikolajczak et al., (2006, study 
2) measured psychological and physical symptoms in a sample of students (N = 75; mean 
age 18.36 years)  prior to (baseline) and during an examination period three months later 
(time two).   Importantly, both physical and psychological symptoms increased at time 
two, signalling that as expected the students experienced greater stress reactivity during 
this period.  TEI (TEIQue) was related to both baseline and mid-exam symptomotology, 
however crucially, when controlling for baseline differences, higher levels of TEI ‘self-
control’ were predictive of reduced psychological distress and physical illness during the 
stressful period, with ‘sociability’ also predictive of fewer physical complaints.  Therefore, 
competency in managing one’s own emotions and the emotions of others would appear 
advantageous qualities for combating emotional reactivity to natural as well as acute 
stressors (e.g., Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2009).  However, the nature of the study design 
make it equally possible that intervening variables influenced this effect (e.g., those with 
high TEI may have engaged in more extensive preparations prior to the exams to alleviate 
negative symptoms).  Assessing reactivity at the height of its occurrence (i.e., closer to the 
exam event) and corroborating subjective with objective measures of stress state (e.g., 
cortisol release) would have provided more robust results, although convergence with the 
experimental literature represents an important advancement for the TEI construct.    
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Nevertheless, it is unclear whether these effects extend to other academic-related 
stressors in younger populations.  In children aged 10-11 years (N=274) Williams et 
al.,(2010a) measured self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger and disruptive behaviour 
symptomotology immediately prior to school transition (i.e., from primary to secondary 
school) and again 6 months later once children had begun their new schools (time two).  
With the effects of gender and socio-economic status held constant, total TEI (TEIQue-
ASF) was predictive of time two positive self-concept (explaining 23% variance) and 
reduced symptomotology (explaining 9-13% variance) except for disruptive behaviour. 
However, in contrast to Mikolajczak et al., (2006, study 2) TEI failed to predict state 
change (i.e., when the influence of time one symptoms were controlled).  Moreover, the 
issue of TEI measurement specific-effects was apparent; TEI indexed via the SREIT was 
unable to significantly predict any variance in health outcomes at time two, even before 
the effects of baseline state were controlled. Whilst these findings appear to contrast 
sharply with the earlier work of Mikolajczak and colleagues, there are important 
methodological differences which might limit comparisons; principally, across the 6 
month period there would seem to have been little change in criterion scores - indeed 
mean scores indicate that contrary to predictions, mental health actually improved across 
this transitional period rather than worsened, although the statistical significance of these 
changes are not reported. Therefore, these findings are perhaps unsurprising given that 
there would have been little variability left for EI to explain within each predictive model. 
Clearly, it would have been preferable to assess post-transition reactivity much closer to 
the event as per Mikolajczak et al., (2006, study 2) (i.e., within one or two weeks of 
beginning the new school rather than after several months).     
 
Whilst illuminating, the nature of the stressors investigated in both of the 
preceding works (implied vs. direct measurement) precludes more precise estimation of a 
moderating role of EI in stressor-health relations.  To date, only three studies have 
explored possible interactive relationships and the first two have been concerned with 
establishing whether EI buffers the effects of cumulative negative life events and/or daily 
hassles on mental health outcomes in adults.   Firstly, within a sample of university 
students (N = 232; mean age 20.6 years), Ciarrochi, Deane & Anderson (2002) found that 
depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation were positively associated with daily 
hassles and negative life events, but contrary to predictions, neither AEI emotion 
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perception (MEIS: stories) or TEI (SREIT) factors ‘emotion perception’; ‘managing others 
emotions’ moderated the effect of major life events in predicting disorder.   However, 
daily hassles were associated with higher reported depression, hopelessness and suicidal 
ideation in those with higher scores on AEI perception.  In contrast, higher levels of self-
perceived skill in managing the emotions of others was related to less suicidal ideation in 
those experiencing high levels of daily hassles (though this did not moderate, despite 
predicting, the effects of daily hassles on depression or hopelessness).  Notably, TEI 
emotion perception did not yield any significant predictive or interactive effects.  These 
findings once again hint at differential roles for AEI and TEI within stressor-health 
relations; in the case of AEI, rather than affording protection, increased proficiency to 
perceive emotion appears to amplify sensitivity to stressors to increase the risk for 
internalising disorder.  Notably, this converges with research discussed earlier reporting 
higher levels of AEI perception in adults from disadvantaged backgrounds (Kraus et al., 
2010, study one) and how total AEI predicted increased distress in response to an acute 
stressor (Matthews et al., 2006).  Conversely, skill at managing the emotions of others 
appears to confer protection against the effects of daily hassles and lead to better mental 
health, which, as well as making theoretical sense (i.e., better social skills would be useful 
for dealing with daily hassles of an interpersonal nature e.g.,  ‘troublesome neighbours’; 
‘difficulty with friends’ etc), lends credence to the experimental evidence base where TEI 
‘sociability’ has been found to buffer the effects of acute stressors (e.g., Mikolajczak, 
Petrides, Coumans et al., 2009).  However, generalisation to the global EI construct 
domain is precluded given the absence of analysis with total AEI and TEI. 
 
By contrast, Day, Therrian and Carroll (2005) reported conflicting findings with 
respect to the capacity of TEI to modulate the relationship between daily hassles and 
health.   With the focus again upon a group of young adult students (N = 114, mean age: 
21.6 years) daily hassles were predictive of reduced wellbeing (life satisfaction), increased 
physical/psychological strain symptoms and burnout (three components: personal 
effectiveness; cynicism; emotional exhaustion) and, when controlling for the influence of 
hassles, TEI (EQi) was a direct predictor of all health outcomes.  However, with additional 
controls for personality (Big Five) and type A behaviour pattern, TEI failed to 
incrementally predict any of the negative health outcomes (i.e., strain symptoms, 
cynicism or emotional exhaustion), although the ‘general mood’ component of this 
measure continued to predict 6% of the variance in wellbeing (total R2 = 62%) and 7% 
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additional variance in personal effectiveness (total R2 = 45%).  Furthermore, TEI failed to 
moderate the effects of daily hassles on any of the five health outcomes (with or without 
control for personality variables).   The implication that TEI neither affords protection nor 
enhances risk represents a sharp departure from the previous body of research relating to 
TEI-stress relationships and the research of Ciarrochi et al., (2002).  Nevertheless, it is 
likely that these null findings are a result of measurement inconsistencies; whereas 
Ciarrochi et al., (2002) used measures of psychopathology as outcomes, Day et al., (2005) 
selected an array of non-clinical health indices and a much narrower measure of daily 
hassles (covering student-related hassles, e.g., academic deadlines etc).  However, most 
marked are the differences in TEI instrumentation; as noted previously the EQi has 
received much criticism from proponents of both the trait and ability EI perspectives and 
its status as a measure of TEI vs. general wellbeing/self-esteem is questionable  (e.g., 
Mayer, Salovey et al., 2008; Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007).  Indeed, it is notable that 
significant predictive variance contributions could only be attributed to the ‘general 
mood’ subscale of the EQi which is construed as an ‘enabler’ rather than a central 
‘component’ of EI within the model.  In light of such limitations, Day et al., (2005) 
recommend that these findings should only be applied to research with the EQi and 
advise against further generalisation to the broader TEI domain.  
 
However, more encouraging findings have been reported in relation to AEI and 
chronic stress in youth.  In adolescents aged 12 to 19 years (N = 54), Cha and Nock (2009) 
examined whether emotion-related abilities could moderate the impact of self-reported 
child sexual abuse on suicidal behaviour (indexed separately via frequency of suicidal 
ideation and actual attempts within past year).    As predicted, sexual abuse was 
significantly related to both suicide ideation and attempts.  However, AEI (total scores) 
significantly moderated this relationship, such that for individuals with low AEI, child 
sexual abuse was strongly associated with suicidal behaviour whereas this relationship 
was weaker for those with average EI scores, and completely absent for those with high 
EI scores (with the overall interaction explaining 9.6% in suicidal ideation and 7.1%  in 
attempts).  Area-level AEI analysis found that this effect could be attributed to 
competency in ‘strategic’ (ability to understand and manage emotion), but not 
‘experiential’ skills (perceiving and using emotion).   This suggests that AEI might operate 
differentially within groups of ‘at-risk’ individuals; in this case, strategic EI acted as a 
protective resource to improve outcomes – those that were better able to manage and 
78 
 
understand emotions reported fewer suicide attempts and lower levels of suicide 
ideation despite experiencing chronic stress.  However, the absence of a significant 
moderating effect for experiential AEI would appear at odds with the findings of Ciarrochi 
et al., (2002) who noted that ability to perceive emotion constituted vulnerability for 
suicidal ideation.  In stark contrast, Cha and Nock (2009) found non-significant, inverse 
associations between experiential AEI and both suicidal ideation and attempts, which 
indicates potential protection rather than vulnerability.   Nevertheless, across these 
studies two very different stressors were examined within different population groups; 
the adolescent sample in Cha & Nock (2009) all had a history of self-injurious behaviour 
vs. the group of healthy, adult participants studied in Ciarrochi et al., (2002).  Moreover, 
there are differences in the two AEI measures utilised; firstly, Ciarrochi and colleagues did 
not investigate the full AEI domain covered by the adult MEIS, thus it is possible that 
strategic capacities might have differentially impacted the daily hassles-suicidal ideation 
association and, secondly, the measure of perceiving emotion within the MEIS is not 
directly comparable to the MSCEIT-YV used by Cha & Nock (2009) (perception of emotion 
identified through vignettes vs. facial emotion).  In order to elucidate the role of AEI in 
stress-health relationships there is clearly an urgent need for further exploration of these 
effects within typical youth populations and with reference to a broader range of chronic, 
environmental stressors. 
 
12.3.4 A direct role for EI in stressor- mental health processes: The state of the field 
 
EI is reliably associated with better mental health but the mechanisms 
underpinning this adaptive relationship are largely unknown.  It is plausible that EI acts 
directly to buffer stressors, cushioning the individual from prolonged adverse reactions to 
lessen the risk of developing psychological disorder.  So far this review has shown that 
exposure to (interpersonal) stressors may differ according to trait EI and high levels of 
perceived emotional competency confer an intrinsic advantage when faced with stressors 
- TEI buffers acute stress by attenuating subjective and physiological reactivity and can 
moderate the impact of chronic stressors (at least of a proximal, interpersonal nature) to 
lead to better mental health (although these effects may be TEI measurement-
contingent). In contrast, ability EI does not appear to influence exposure to stressors and 
whilst AEI relates to individual differences in mood management proficiency, this does 
not translate to reduced susceptibility to acute stressors – increased emotional skill 
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predicts amplified reactivity. Whilst some evidence suggests that AEI might protect 
against chronic stressors, so far this has only been found in ‘at-risk’ populations (i.e., 
those who self-harm) - in ‘typical’ populations exposed to stressors, there is evidence to 
suggest that high levels of AEI (perception) might actually increase risk for disorder.   
Thus, the literature suggests divergent roles for trait and ability EI within stress processes; 
consistent with personality theory and research (e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; John et 
al., 2008) it would appear probable that TEI assumes a more centralised role, directly 
modifying the experience of stressors to impact health outcomes, whilst AEI may operate 
indirectly, influencing adaptation through additional personal competencies. However, 
these conclusions remain speculative owing to the limitations inherent in the research 
base; there is a dearth of research examining effects with respect to AEI, youth 
populations and EI-chronic stressor interactions. Furthermore, with the exception of the 
work of Day et al., (2005), there has been a lack of consideration of the influence of 
conceptually related variables (e.g. personality, IQ) upon these effects.   It is also apparent 
that we are some way from disentangling the complexities of these relations; the effects 
of EI may be stressor and outcome specific (e.g., neither AEI or TEI moderated the 
influence of major life events on health and so far effects have only been noted with 
respect to internalising disorders).  The current study will attempt to address some of 
these gaps by examining the moderating effect of TEI and AEI on a range of pertinent 
chronic stressors (including socioeconomic adversity, family dysfunction, negative life 
events) in relation to both internalising and externalising symptomotology in healthy 
youth.   
 
Given the rather moderate effect sizes obtained for stressor-EI interactions, it 
remains equally possible that both forms of EI could confer indirect adaptive advantages 
by influencing other proximal, personal resources which are known to underscore 
pathways to adaptation.  As noted in section 11.4, collectively, EI theory predicts links to 
coping, an established mediator of stress-illness processes and research reviewed thus far 
hints at the possibilities of links between the two constructs.  For instance, TEI 
competency in managing the emotions of others has been consistently implicated as a 
buffer of both acute and chronic stress, hinting that TEI could also relate to an increased 
capacity or willingness to engage in support seeking coping behaviours as part of the 
overall stress resistance process.   Whilst emotional skills are conceptually distinct from 
and should mobilise or drive coping processes, our emotional personality is described as 
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integral to coping.  In this sense, low levels of AEI could link to ineffective selection of 
coping strategies in response to stressors whereas TEI may influence later 
implementation.  As with the previous body of literature addressing the ‘direct’ pathway, 
research exploring links between EI and coping within the stress context is still at an 
embryonic stage and similarly hampered by many of the aforementioned methodological 
caveats – nevertheless, the available evidence will be reviewed next to assess the veracity 
of these theoretical predictions before drawing to a close and explicating the aims of the 
present research. 
 
12.4 Indirect pathways to adjustment: EI, coping and mental health  
 
Basic cross-sectional associations between coping and TEI have been quite 
extensively investigated in adults.  However, synthesis of the findings from this research 
base is doubly complicated by variations in both the measurement of TEI and coping; 
there are often extensive differences across the coping models/strategies examined, with 
some researchers reporting associations with broadband coping dimensions (e.g., 
emotion-focussed vs. problem-focussed etc), others with specific strategies and others 
still elect to explore associations with idiosyncratic coping ‘factors’.   For instance, a 
particularly uninformative (and potentially misleading) analysis was conducted by Bastian 
et al., (2005) who claimed that TEI (total SREIT and a summed score presenting the 
TMMS) predicted ‘coping’ beyond the effects of IQ and personality (whilst AEI was not 
significantly related). However, since coping was represented by a single, total score 
which represented the combined use of all ‘adaptive’ and ‘maladaptive’ coping styles 
together, this analysis tells us nothing about the nature of these associations - ‘more 
coping’ is not necessarily advantageous. Similar difficulties are inherent in the work of 
Goldenberg et al., (2006) who factor analysed thirteen strategies representing traditional 
dimensions of problem-focussed, emotion-focussed and avoidance into ‘problem solving’ 
(positive loadings from ‘approach’ strategies but also negative loadings from ‘avoidance’, 
e.g. behavioural disengagement), ‘social support/emotional expression’ (included 
venting) and ‘cognition/restraint’.  TEI (SREIT total and sub-factors) shared significant, 
positive associations with all coping factors (with the exception of social 
support/expression and TEI regulation of emotion) in the range of r = .23 to .54, with the 
strongest associations found for ‘problem-focussed’ coping and the weakest for ‘social 
support seeking/emotional expression’.  However, once again, the lack of sensitivity of 
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this analysis limits the interpretations that can be drawn, for instance it might be 
expected that those higher in TEI would engage more frequently in support seeking but 
not emotional venting as a result of superior regulatory and social skills, yet the overall 
positive association here with ‘social support/emotional expression’ precludes this 
conclusion.   
 
Indeed, when exploring links with traditional broadband coping dimensions more 
modest associations have been reported; Saklofske, Austin, Galloway, and Davidson 
(2007) found that higher total TEI (SREIT) was positively related to rational coping (r = .38) 
and inversely to emotional coping (r = -.26).  Moreover, at a sub-scale level of analysis 
these effects become yet further diluted and more complex; whilst modestly associated 
with problem-solving (rs = .18 to .38) and positive reappraisal (rs = .18 to .30), the SREIT 
has been found unrelated to emotional support seeking/confrontation (with perceived 
competency in ‘using’ emotions completely unrelated to any style of coping) and only 
weakly associated with less avoidance (emotion regulation: r = -.16) and greater 
distancing (emotion regulation: r = .14) (Shah & Thingujam, 2008).  Thus, it would appear 
that TEI as indexed via the SREIT is most closely linked to increased use of problem-
oriented strategies (where this relationship is strongest for self-perceived skill in 
managing and understanding emotions), however associations with emotional forms of 
coping are inconsistent – although inversely associated with broadband emotional coping, 
the literature suggests this cannot be attributed to ‘externalised’ emotional coping (i.e., 
support seeking; confrontation). Speculatively, this effect may instead constitute reduced 
engagement in strategies concerned with the internal regulation of emotional experience, 
e.g., rumination.  Notably, avoidant strategies share only weak direct associations with 
the SREIT.  
 
Similar measurement ambiguities have plagued research examining relations 
between the TMMS and coping.  For instance, Velasco et al., (2006) derived two factors 
from the TMMS and a measure of alexithymia and found the first factor (comprising low 
self-perceived proficiency in mood repair/clarity and difficulty describing and identifying 
emotion) correlated with increased emotional coping (inhibition), avoidance (denial), 
detachment (distancing) and with reduced ‘active’ coping (problem solving; social 
support; positive re-appraisal; confronting).  Conversely, those who paid less attention to 
emotion and engaged in high levels of externally oriented thinking were less likely to 
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vent, behaviourally/cognitively disengage or accept their circumstances.  In contrast to 
research employing the SREIT, these associations were smaller in size (rs from .10 to .28), 
though comparably, the strongest correlation was found for problem-solving. However, 
using a ‘pure’ measure of the TMMS, Montes-Berges and Augusto (2007) clarified these 
associations; whereas attention was once again linked to increased emotional coping 
(venting), this attribute was also positively linked to support seeking, confrontation and 
reappraisal (where repair and clarity were unrelated).  Moreover, in sharp contrast to 
Velasco et al. (2006), all three components (attention, clarity and repair) were unrelated 
to problem-focussed coping (i.e., including problem-solving), and only clarity was 
inversely related to avoidance (i.e., not repair).  Hence, differences across TEI 
measurement models (i.e., SREIT vs. the TMMS) lead to distinctive trends in coping 
associations; here self-perceived ability to perceive and understand self-relevant emotion 
are predominantly linked to greater us of emotional coping vs. problem-focussed styles, 
whilst managing emotion appears less central to these processes. 
 
Fortunately, research administering the TEIQue and EQi to adult groups has 
converged on a clearer patterning of relationships.  Using total TEI scores, both 
instruments have shown consistent, negative associations with broad dimensions of 
emotional coping and positive associations with both rational and detached coping 
(Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, study 1 & 2; Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).  However, 
associations with avoidant coping have been less consistent; some evidence points to the 
existence of weaker, though significant negative relationships with both TEI measures 
(Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007), however other studies have found the TEIQue to 
be unrelated  (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007) and relationships with the EQi non-significant 
with control for the Big Five personality dimensions (Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, 
study 1).  Moreover, it would seem TEIQue-detached coping associations do not hold in 
the presence of the Eysenkian three and Big Five (with the ‘wellbeing’ component of the 
TEIQue removed) (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).  Hence, this evidence would point to more 
robust (and potentially unique) relationships between TEI and increased problem-
focussed and reduced emotional coping.  Encouragingly, these links persist at TEI facet 
and/or coping-style level; Mikolajczak, Nelis, Hansenne and Quoidbach, (2008) found that 
higher TEIQue wellbeing, emotionality, sociability and self-control related to increased 
use of adaptive, problem-oriented coping styles (‘positive refocus’, ‘planning’, ‘positive 
reappraisal’ and ‘putting in perspective’ though not ‘acceptance’) and less use of 
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emotional coping styles, rumination, self-blame and catastrophisation (although this only 
extended to wellbeing & self-control and there were no significant links to ‘blaming 
others’). Overall, associations were stronger for problem-oriented vs. emotional coping 
styles and within this, self-perceived ability to manage self-relevant emotions showed the 
most consistent links whilst perceiving and expressing emotions appeared least 
influential.  Similar patterns have been found at a sub-scale levels of analysis with the EQi;  
whilst all components have been found positively related to ‘task-oriented’ coping, 
relationships with emotion-focussed coping have been inverse but of smaller average 
magnitude, and weaker associations have been found for avoidant coping styles (though 
where significant - intrapersonal and interpersonal components have been found 
positively related to social diversion and negatively to distraction) (Austin, Saklofske, & 
Mastoras, 2010; Saklofske, Austin, Mastoras, Beaton, & Osborne, 2011). 
 
Altogether it would appear that with the exception of the TMMS, research using a 
variety of TEI measurement models has converged to reliably indicate that those with 
higher levels of TEI engage more frequently in problem-oriented coping and less often in 
emotion-focussed approaches to combat stressors, and, of all TEI components, 
differences in self-perceived ability to manage self-relevant emotion appear to contribute 
to this relationship.  However, associations with emotional coping are generally less 
robust and intriguingly, preliminary findings hint that this might be attributed to reduced 
engagement in internally-directed regulation of emotional experience (e.g., rumination, 
self-blame) rather than increased use of externally-oriented regulatory approaches (e.g., 
venting emotion, seeking support).   In contrast, where significant associations with 
avoidant and detached forms of coping have been found, these have tended to be 
negligible and/or inconsistent.   
 
A much smaller pool of studies have examined coping and TEI in youth 
populations, however, so far these have corroborated the adult trend. In younger 
adolescents (N = 282; mean age = 13.75 years) Mavroveli et al., (2007) found that total 
TEI (TEIQue-ASF) related to more problem-focussed (‘problem confrontation’) and less 
emotional (‘depressive’) coping,  though a positive association was also found for social 
support. Moreover, there were differences according to gender; girls with higher TEI 
engaged less frequently in emotional expression and were more likely to reappraise 
stressful situations in an optimistic manner, whereas boys were less likely to employ 
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avoidant strategies (though this was only a weak association r = -.20).    Importantly, this 
pattern has been replicated with reference to broader coping dimensions using different 
TEI measures at both total and sub-scale levels of analysis; in older adolescents (N = 490; 
mean age = 16.65 years) total TEI (TEIQue-ASF) was robustly associated with more 
rational (r = .46) and less emotional coping (r = -.53) and, in line with the adult literature, 
to a lesser extent with increased detached (r =  .37) and less avoidant coping (r = -.26) 
(Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009).  In younger adolescents (N = 145, mean age = 
12.02 years) higher self-perceived emotional competency in all areas (except using 
emotion to direct thinking) was related to increased problem solving coping (r range .25 
to .32) and to decreased ‘non-productive’ emotional/avoidant coping (r range -.22 to -.34, 
though understanding emotion n.s.) (Downey et al., 2010).  Interestingly, this latter study 
also found that TEI was unrelated to support seeking for problem solving purposes.  
Hence, whilst youth based research has yet to simultaneously examine specific coping-
strategy/TEI factor relationships (or examine the TEI contributions beyond higher-order 
personality dimensions), current evidence proposes that higher levels of TEI relate most 
clearly to increased problem-focussed and decreased emotional coping (of an internal 
regulatory nature), although in younger populations it appears emotional (but not 
information-oriented) support seeking might be employed more frequently by those with 
higher self-perceived emotional competency.  Concurring with adults, avoidant coping 
shares only weak, inverse associations with such competencies. 
 
Fewer studies have investigated links between AEI and coping, however, to date 
findings have revealed a relatively consistent pattern of associations that appear distinct 
from TEI.  In adults, Gohm et al., (2005) found that whilst emotionally intelligent 
individuals relied less upon avoidant coping styles (total AEI &  behavioural 
disengagement r = -.23; drug disengagement, r = -.17; denial, r = -.29 – significant across 
all abilities bar perceiving emotion), they were not significantly more likely to engage in 
traditionally adaptive coping styles (either active coping; positive reinterpretation; 
planning).   However, ability to manage emotion related positively to support seeking (for 
both emotional, r = .25 and informational purposes, r = .23).  This was partially 
corroborated by Goldenberg et al., (2006) who found significant associations between 
ability to manage and perceive emotions and less use of behavioural/mental 
disengagement and denial (in both cases r = -.21).  However, contrary to Gohm et al., 
(2005), those who were better able to understand emotions also engaged less in 
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meaning-focussed coping (e.g., acceptance; positive reinterpretation/growth, r = -.20) 
and higher skill in emotion management was weakly related to more problem-focussed 
coping (active; planning, r = .14) whilst collectively AEI was unrelated to ‘social 
support/emotional expression’.  Although comparisons are limited owing to the differing 
strategy vs. factor-level coping analyses performed across these two studies, work by 
MacCann, Fogarty, Zeidner and Roberts (2011) has recently attempted to clarify these 
emerging trends; here students with higher emotional abilities were less likely to use both 
emotion-focussed styles such as self-blame, worry, venting (r range: -.22 to -.36 - weakest 
perception) and avoidant coping (r range: -.25 to -.26 – perception n.s.) when faced with 
academic stress.  Moreover, in line with Goldenberg et al., (2006), greater use of a 
problem-focussed approach (include planning, problem-solving) was only found to 
significantly relate to higher competency in managing emotion (r = .22).   
 
It is notable that only one study has so far investigated these associations in 
adolescents, although has reported a similar coping profile.  Using the MSCEIT-YV Peters 
et al., (2009) found that students (N = 50, mean age = 14.3 years) who were better able to 
perceive (r = -.50) and understand (r = -.48) emotions were less likely to employ an 
emotion-focussed coping style to combat stress, however AEI was unrelated to problem-
focussed and, contrary to the adult literature, avoidant coping.  Hence, in contrast to the 
TEI literature base, AEI appears to relate most strongly to reduced use of ‘maladaptive’ 
coping strategies (avoidance and emotional styles) rather than to increased use of 
‘adaptive’ styles, although further differentiation of these trends (i.e., whether associated 
with external or internal emotion regulatory coping) is precluded given the dearth of 
strategy-level coping analyses with AEI.  Nevertheless, skill in managing emotion (in self 
and others) has been most consistently linked with coping styles whilst perceiving 
emotion appears to be the least influential skill, being only weakly associated with 
emotional coping (although its influence might be more pronounced in youth rather than 
adults).   
 
Summary: In general, taking an engaged, problem-oriented approach to dealing 
with stressors leads to better health outcomes; in a review of 63 studies published across 
1988 to 2001, Compas et al. (2001) found that strategies classified as either ‘problem-
focussed’ (i.e., direct attempts to ameliorate the source of the stress) or ‘engagement’ 
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(attempts to manage the source of stress and/or emotional reactions) were related to 
fewer internalising and externalising symptoms in youth and, of all approaches, the use of 
problem-solving, cognitive restructuring and positive reappraisal were most consistently 
implicated.  Conversely, ‘emotion-focussed’ (i.e., directly concerned with the 
management of ensuing negative emotionality) or ‘disengagement’  (i.e., actively avoiding 
the problem and/or emotions) from stressors was associated with greater 
symptomotology, particularly venting, wishful thinking, self-blame, cognitive/behavioural 
avoidance and social withdrawal (Compas et al., 2001).  Both styles of coping are 
considered unhelpful long-term strategies for reducing distress; an excessive focus upon 
negative emotions, e.g., self-blame, can promote intrusive thoughts whilst 
disengagement (particularly of a behavioural nature via drug/alcohol use) can promote 
extended health problems (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010).  Nevertheless, as noted earlier, 
these outcomes are necessarily context specific - where stressors are of an uncontrollable 
nature (e.g., parental illness, sexual abuse) the use of disengagement/emotional coping 
has been associated with fewer symptoms and engagement/problem-focussed strategies 
with greater levels of symptomotology in youth (Compas et al., 2001; Seiffge-Krenke, 
2011).  For instance, Clarke (2006) found that active coping was only associated with 
lower levels of externalising behaviours when endorsed by young people faced with 
controllable but not uncontrollable interpersonal stressors (argument with peer vs. 
parental conflict).   
 
The preceding review of cross-sectional research cannot shed light on the 
‘adaptive’ nature of EI-coping associations (i.e., in the absence of stressors and measures 
of adjustment).  However, despite methodological issues, distinctive ‘coping’ profiles for 
TEI and AEI have emerged and the magnitude of these relationships (small to moderate 
depending upon the sensitivity of the analysis performed) argues against conceptual 
redundancy, such that EI construed as either emotional skills or emotional personality has 
the potential to underpin rather than converge with coping processes to modify stress 
processes.  Importantly, the patterning of associations can be accommodated within the 
specificity of the EI-stressor buffering effects reviewed earlier; being less avoidant (AEI), 
less emotionally-focussed (AEI & TEI) and more problem-orientated (TEI) are potentially 
disadvantageous if faced with uncontrollable stressors, which may explain why both 
forms of EI were unable to offer protection against major negative life events (e.g., 
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bereavement, illness, job redundancy etc) (Ciarrochi et al., 2002). Moreover, the 
tendency of those high in emotional self-competency to adopt problem-oriented coping 
styles would explain the TEI-buffering effects found for controllable stressors (i.e., both 
daily hassles and acute, situational lab-based stress).  Following initial reactivity, both 
situations are amenable to an active coping approach to directly address the source of 
stress and ameliorate the stress reaction, whether that be via task-focussed problem-
solving or changing interpersonal relationships to avoid repeated conflict.  In contrast, the 
‘stress amplification effect’ reported by Ciarrochi et al., (2002) might also be explained 
with reference to the AEI-coping profile; those with enhanced ability to perceive emotion 
may well use this efficiently to detect sources of stress but once detected, inappropriate 
coping strategies are selected for dealing with stressors (in this instance, emotional 
coping – to which perceiving emotion was most strongly associated with - would very 
likely exacerbate negative feelings stemming from interpersonal conflict).  Thus, in this 
context, emotional skills are not used to best effect to mobilise the most appropriate 
responses. Altogether, then, it appears quite plausible that EI may impact indirectly on 
stress processes to preferentially set in motion ‘downstream’ coping efforts that may be 
more or less adaptive for mental health depending upon the characteristics of the 
stressor faced.   However, in order to corroborate this conjecture it must be shown that 
firstly, EI-coping profiles are linked to adaptive health outcomes and secondly, that these 
associations are operational when faced with stress.  The next section reviews evidence 
exploring the first proposition; namely whether choice of coping style can explain the link 
between EI and better mental health. 
 
12.4.1 Does ‘emotionally intelligent’ coping lead to better mental health? 
 
Few studies have explored mediating links between EI, coping and mental health 
and all of the research to date has explored these relationships from a trait rather than 
ability perspective.  In contrast to other areas of investigation, however, the majority of 
mediation studies have targeted youth over adult populations.  Nevertheless, the overall 
trend is remarkably convergent across population groups, indicating that the effect of TEI-
influenced coping choice on health is largely developmentally invariant.   In adults 
(N=223; aged 18-83 years), Goldenberg (2004) found that lower TEI (SREIT: ‘mood 
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regulation’ and ‘experiencing/sharing emotion’) was linked to greater use of avoidant 
coping and less use of problem-focussed and cognition/restraint styles which in turn 
related to poorer general mental health (higher incidence of depression, anxiety, 
somatisation, obsessive compulsiveness, somatisation symptomotology).  Avoidant 
coping appeared to be the strongest partial mediator of the EI-health link (although the 
authors failed to conduct formal statistical testing of this effect, e.g., the Sobel test), 
whilst ‘social support/emotional expression’ coping was unrelated to health.  
Additionally, TEI competencies were significant independent predictors of health beyond 
the effects of coping, once again establishing the distinctiveness of the two constructs.  
Two studies have since employed the SREIT with youth populations to explore 
meditational relations using latent variable modelling.  First, Chan (2005) found that social 
coping mediated the effect of TEI on psychological distress (including sleep problems, 
anxiety, dysphoria, suicidal ideas) to explain 52% of the variance in health in a sample of 
gifted Chinese students (N = 624, mean age 12.98 years); specifically avoidant coping 
mediated the effect of low ‘self-relevant’ TEI (perceived competency in managing and 
using emotion) on increased distress, whereas social interaction coping (helping others 
and peer acceptance) explained the link between higher levels of ‘other-relevant’ TEI 
(‘empathy’, ‘social skills’) and decreased distress.  However, in contrast to Goldenberg 
(2004), there was no direct effect of TEI on distress.   
 
This was corroborated by Campbell and Ntobedzi (2007) who again found no 
direct relationship between ‘emotional competence’ (comprising the SREIT scales and a 
measure of self-awareness) and general psychological distress in a small sample of older, 
Australian adolescents (N = 85; mean age 16.76 years).  Nevertheless, composite 
emotional competence was related to fewer symptoms through increased ‘adaptive’ 
emotional coping (‘stoicism’; ‘social support’ and ‘self-care’), although there was no 
relationship with maladaptive emotional coping (‘acting out’; ‘rumination’) and this in 
turn shared a stronger (inverse) association with symptomotology (with the model overall 
accounting for 41% of the variance in distress).  This null finding appears to run contrary 
to previously discussed literature (e.g., Mavroveli et al., 2007) however, the combination 
of two very specific and divergent maladaptive emotional strategies (externally vs. 
internally oriented) together with the use of a composite measure of ‘emotional 
competence’ within this analysis limits the generalisations that can be drawn from this 
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work, above and beyond the difficulties associated with the small sample size.   Indeed, it 
is very difficult to synthesise the findings of these latter studies given their focus upon 
selective coping strategies (i.e. of a social or emotional focus only and the exclusion of 
traditional ‘problem-focussed’ styles).  However, it is clear that utilising others as a means 
of coping adaptively to reduce symptomotology is more prominent in youth vs. adult 
populations, thus concurring with earlier discussion.  Moreover, in both adults and youth, 
lower levels of self-competency in emotion regulation enhances the likelihood of 
employing avoidant coping which contributes to poorer outcomes.  Nevertheless, these 
conclusions are tentative, particularly as all three studies tested associations with global 
measures of general health (with a predominant focus upon internalising rather than 
externalising symptomotology).   
 
Analyses targeting specific and dimensional health outcomes have revealed more 
consistent trends. Employing the TEIQue–ASF with youth (N= 490), aged 16-20 years 
Mikolajczak, Petrides and Hurry (2009) found that 27% of students reported having 
recently self-harmed (the majority of which was of a non-suicidal nature) and lower levels 
of total TEI were significantly associated with higher likelihood to engage in these 
behaviours (r = -.25, p < .001) – a relationship which held even after controlling for the 
influence of depression.  Importantly, this association could be explained by choice of 
coping style; increased use of emotional (rumination, self-blame, expression, emotional 
support seeking) and avoidant (behavioural/cognitive disengagement and denial) coping 
(though not decreased use of rational and detached styles) both independently 
accounted for this association, however further analysis revealed that emotional coping 
was the primary mediator of this relationship (where the model overall accounted for 
14% of the variance in self-harm). Hence, it appears that lower overall emotional self-
competency predicts the use of ineffective coping strategies (which do not ameliorate 
either the negative affect or source of stress) which, in turn, promote self-harming 
behaviour.  This was corroborated more recently with reference to internalising and 
externalising symptomotology; Downey et al., (2010) found that ‘non-productive’ coping 
(worry, wishful thinking, tension reduction, ignoring the problem, self-blame, keeping to 
oneself) mediated the link between self-perceived ability to manage/control emotion 
(measured via the SUEIT) and both forms of disorder in a sample of young adolescents (N 
= 145; mean age = 12.02 years).  Hence in line with Mikolajczak et al., (2009), those who 
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were less confident in their emotional abilities (though regulation only and not 
recognition, expression, understanding or using emotions) were more likely to use 
avoidant and emotional coping styles which in turn related to poorer health outcomes.   
Similarly, the use of problem-focussed (‘solving the problem’) and social support 
(‘reference to others’ for problem solving) were not central to this association.   
 
The current evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Compas et al., 2001), engagement in traditionally maladaptive emotional and 
avoidant coping strategies has deleterious health consequences, yet crucially, the 
propensity to select such strategies can be partially attributed to deficiencies in TEI 
(particularly self-perceived ability to manage emotions). Moreover, the modest effect 
sizes reported are in line with personality research (e.g., Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010).   
Conversely, it would appear that the robust bivariate associations between TEI and 
problem-focussed coping may have limited impact on adjustment outcomes.  This also 
carries implications for AEI; although no direct testing of mediating pathways has yet 
been conducted with respect to mental health, as the preceding discussion showed, AEI is 
most closely associated with avoidant and emotional coping rather than problem-
focussed, so it remains plausible that this association may translate to better mental 
health.  However, whilst evidence suggests that EI might underscore choice of coping 
strategy, for this to be construed as truly beneficial for adaptation it must be 
demonstrated that this relationship persists when faced with adversity – in other words, 
when faced with stressors, EI must influence appropriate selection of coping styles (i.e., 
suitable to the stressor faced), which must in turn be effective in reducing 
symptomotology.  As noted earlier, engagement in reduced emotional and avoidant 
coping might not necessarily be effective under all stress conditions.  Literature examining 
EI-coping profiles under stress is particularly scant, however, it is to this evidence 
discussion now turns before finally drawing to a close and explicating the aims of the 
current research.  
 
12.4.2 Does EI promote coping under stress to foster adaptation?  
 
Two studies have investigated whether TEI predicts specific coping styles when 
faced with experimental stressors.  In the first of these, Salovey et al., (2002, study 2) 
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assessed coping (‘active’: planning, concentration, focusing on time, positive self 
statements vs. ‘passive’: denial, distraction, acceptance, giving up, self-blame) 
immediately prior to and post stressor exposure (timed cognitive tasks) in small group of 
women (N = 60; aged 30-45 years). It was found that those with higher competency in 
regulating emotions (TMMS ‘repair’) used less passive coping generally (r = -.31, p < .05) 
but, importantly, also less passive coping when completing the stressful task (r = -.34, p < 
.05).  Active coping was not significantly related to TEI.  This would appear somewhat 
counter-intuitive given the type of (controllable) experimental stressor faced; although 
reduced use of ‘passive’ emotional-avoidant styles would confer some secondary benefits 
(minimise unhelpful feelings and actions), taking an active, problem-focussed approach 
would appear to be the optimal strategy in this context.  Nevertheless, this does accord 
with previous literature confirming links between TEI and reduced use of emotional and, 
to a lesser extent, avoidant coping (both featured within the ‘passive’ coping dimension 
employed here). However, the design of this study is particularly limiting; without a 
control group/measure of coping post control condition, it is not possible to ascertain 
whether the TEI-coping profile differed as a function of stress. Indeed, similar difficulties 
are inherent in the design of the second study.   
 
On this occasion, a group of women (N = 144; mean age 19.5 years) were exposed 
to a stressful video scene depicting a sexual assault and 48 hours post-exposure they 
reported on the extent of intrusive thoughts they had experienced during the intervening 
period (akin to ruminative coping) (Ramos et al., 2007).  Once again, higher levels of 
TMMS ‘repair’ (but not clarity or attention to emotion) significantly predicted lower 
rumination ( = -.23, p < .05) and higher clarity related to a reduction in negative affect 
(depression and fatigue) immediately post-exposure.  However, ruminative coping 
mediated between repair and negative affect (depression and anger) following re-
exposure to the same imagery, such that those with higher self-perceived ability to 
regulate their emotions were better able to control maladaptive emotionality and less 
likely to ruminate over the stressful scene, resulting in less emotional reactivity following 
the second viewing.  This suggests that repair may underscore benefits for adaptation to 
repeated stressors over time, reducing the likelihood of accumulating negative affect and 
preventing maladaptive emotional coping, which fully supports research reporting the 
longer-term health benefits associated with this TEI facet (e.g., less self-harming and less 
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internalising disorder).   However, these findings are undoubtedly limited by the nature of 
the sample recruited (all adult women) and the restrictive style of coping studied (i.e., a 
single emotional strategy).  Moreover, both Salovey et al., (2002) and Ramos et al., (2007) 
failed to consider whether these associations held in the presence of personality. 
 
Nevertheless, two recent studies have attempted to remedy many of these 
limitations using more complex analyses with reference to AEI.  Firstly, Matthews et al., 
(2006) investigated whether total AEI (MSCEIT) was able to buffer stress and promote 
coping beyond the effects of the Big Five personality dimensions, when faced with a 
range of situational stressors.  Following completion of one of four conditions (three of 
which involved stressful, timed cognitive performance tasks and one control condition – 
reading magazines) participants (N= 132; mean age 19.7 years) reported how they coped 
with the task.  As expected, those exposed to stressors used more coping in general 
(emotional, avoidant and problem-focussed) however, consistent with the nature of the 
stressors (controllable), problem-focussed coping was engaged most frequently of all.  
Concordant with previously discussed trends, AEI related to reduced use of ‘maladaptive’ 
strategies only - emotional (r = -.37, p < .01) and avoidant coping (r = -.36, p < .01) - and 
predicted 1.8% of the variance in avoidant coping beyond personality (where, in fact, 
personality was not a significant predictor this form of coping).   However, this effect was 
localised to the control group only and, subsequently, AEI did not significantly moderate 
the effects of stress condition on coping – in other words, contrary to theoretical 
predictions, AEI did not influence choice of coping under situational stress.  It is notable 
however, that whilst trait Neuroticism was found to be a significant predictor of greater 
emotional coping within two out of three stress conditions, it too failed to moderate 
choice of coping under stress.  Nonetheless, coping was found to be the strongest 
predictor of post-task reactivity (i.e., worry, distress and task engagement) accounting for 
between 10-28% of the variance over EI and N (which together predicted increased 
distress only: 4% variance).  Furthermore, emotional coping fully mediated the effect of 
high trait Neuroticism on distress (where the mediation of EI on negative affect by coping 
was not significant).  Hence, this research converges with established stressor literature in 
suggesting that coping is a consistent mediator of health outcomes (Grant et al., 2006) 
and, within this, can explain the effects of pre-existing individual differences (particularly 
N) on health (e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).  Consequently, it appears that coping 
93 
 
should be primary to both forms of EI within adjustment pathways and perhaps share 
stronger links to trait rather than ability EI.  However, despite the lack of moderating 
effects found for AEI, high levels of emotional skill still clearly represent a reliable 
predictor of avoidant coping and even though this was not related to coping choice (or 
health) within a performance-based stress context, it remains plausible that adaptive 
benefits might be conferred in more ecologically valid contexts (i.e., perhaps when faced 
with chronic stressors of an interpersonal nature). 
 
In fact research supporting this hypothesis has begun to emerge. Using an ability-
based measure of EI developed for use within the Chinese context (Wong’s Emotional 
Intelligence Scale) Peng, Wong and Che (2010) found that (total) AEI moderated the effect 
of self-reported emotional demands (an occupational stressor - the extent to which 
employees in customer-facing roles must maintain appropriate emotional ‘display rules’ 
in challenging circumstances) on emotional coping which in turn impacted physical 
exhaustion (a component of burnout) in a sample of adult insurance brokers (N = 418).  
Specifically, it was found that under high stress, those with higher emotional abilities 
tended to use more ‘deep’ acting coping (modify underlying feelings to promote ‘true’ 
expression,  = .10, p < .05) and, contrary to predictions, more ‘surface’ acting coping 
(superficial management of emotional expression, e.g., suppression,  = .16, p < .01).  
However, whilst in the former case this was considered adaptive such that deep acting 
coping explaining attenuated levels of exhaustion (overall model explaining 20% of the 
variance), greater surface acting coping was linked to higher levels of exhaustion and thus 
poorer physical health (accounting for 25% variance in health).   Unfortunately, as each 
model was tested independently it is not possible to determine conclusively which 
mediated pathway constituted the greatest effect on health (i.e., maladaptive or adaptive 
– or even if these effects remained mutually significant in a combined model) hence these 
findings are equivocal regarding the status of AEI as a moderator of this pathway.  
However, it is notable that the maladaptive pathway did explain a greater proportion of 
overall variance (albeit moderate), thus, this would suggest, once again, that high levels 
of AEI are not universally adaptive when faced with stressors and may serve to amplify 
reactivity, particularly when faced with controllable, interpersonal stress (e.g., in line with 
Ciarrochi et al., 2002).  Under these circumstances, this effect is transmitted indirectly via 
choice of ‘maladaptive’ coping styles (in contrast with Matthews et al., 2006). However, 
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this research is clearly restricted by the specificity of the variables under scrutiny (i.e., 
only nuanced emotional coping with a job-related stressor in relation to physical rather 
than mental health outcomes).  Moreover, the measure of (A)EI employed diverges 
significantly from the ability model proposed by Mayer and colleagues (e.g., Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997) and the dominant AEI measurement instrument (i.e., the MSCEIT) in terms 
of content coverage (only partial assessment of strategic and experiential skills pertaining 
to self and others) and methodology (limited response options).  Nevertheless, this 
research represents a positive step forward in exploring the role of EI in more complex 
adjustment pathways.  
 
12.4.3 An indirect role for EI in stressor- mental health processes: The state of the field 
 
There is a dearth of evidence addressing more complex indirect relationships 
between stressors, EI, coping, and mental health.  However, emergent research suggests 
that this is a viable pathway within which EI might operate to affect health outcomes.    
Evidence from youth and adult populations show AEI and TEI share direct and distinct 
relationships with coping dimensions; both are related to decreased use of emotional and 
avoidant coping styles whilst the latter also shares links to more frequent use of problem-
focussed styles.  Actual or self-perceived proficiency in managing emotion appears to 
underpin these associations, though further pinpointing of specific coping style-EI facet 
links is precluded owing to the lack of research examining more fine-grained associations 
(particularly in youth populations).   Nonetheless, it would appear that the link between 
EI and better mental health might be partially explained with reference to coping; 
specifically those with high TEI (particularly higher self-competency to manage own 
emotions) engage less often in ‘maladaptive’ emotional and avoidant strategies and this is 
linked to lower levels of psychological ill-health, both internalising and externalising 
symptomotology.  So far, associations remain unexplored with reference to AEI. The 
inverse relationship between TEI and maladaptive coping persists in the context of acute, 
lab-based stressors however research with AEI has progressed further; emotional ability 
influences the choice of coping strategy when facing high levels of chronic, interpersonal 
(though not acute) stress, which in turn affects health, although findings are equivocal as 
to whether this contributes to ‘adaptive’ outcomes. Complex testing of the moderating 
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effect of TEI on coping under stress (either acute or chronic) and the impact on health 
remains, as yet, unexplored. 
 
12.5 The present study 
 
This review has shown that both TEI and AEI are associated with better mental 
health (Martins et al., 2010; Schutte et al., 2007).  In adults, TEI appears to be most 
strongly predictive of reduced internalising rather than externalising symptomotology 
(e.g., Gardner & Qualter, 2010) whilst the reverse pattern holds true for AEI in both adult 
(e.g., Brackett et al., 2004; Karim & Weisz, 2010) and youth populations (e.g., Williams et 
al., 2009).  By contrast, TEI appears equally predictive of mood and behavioural disorders 
in youth (e.g., Downey et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, there is a paucity of research 
examining the association between AEI and mental health in adolescents using clinical 
measures of health outcomes and an omnibus measure of AEI to facilitate comparison 
with the adult research base (i.e., MSCEIT).  Whilst in adults, these EI-mental health 
trends appear to hold beyond the influence of related constructs (i.e., personality and 
general cognitive ability), testing for incremental validity in youth populations has 
received little attention (with the exception of Petrides et al., 2004).  The current study 
aims to address these existing gaps in the literature.  However, demonstrating a reliable 
association between EI and health does not permit claims to be made about the 
‘adaptive’ nature of EI – it must be established how EI contributes to wellbeing and under 
what circumstances.  Theoretical conjecture suggests that EI (conceived as a pre-existing, 
individual-level resource) may operate within known risk trajectories to affect mental 
health.  Perhaps buffering the effects of stress on health directly (though intrinsic 
emotional competencies e.g., perception, regulation) or indirectly, setting in motion 
‘adaptive’ ways of coping when faced with adversity.  The preceding review found 
tentative support for both pathways.  TEI would appear suited to a direct role in stress 
processes; higher perceived emotional competency has been shown to attenuate 
subjective and physiological reactivity when exposed to stressors of an acute 
(controllable) nature (e.g., Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2007) and, importantly, acts to reduce 
the impact of chronic (interpersonal) stressors to lead to better mental health (Ciarrochi 
et al., 2002).   Conversely, AEI does not appear to afford direct protection against acute or 
chronic stressors in ‘typical’ populations and may even exacerbate the effects of stress on 
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health (Ciarrochi et al., 2002; Matthews et al., 2006), although in ‘at-risk’ populations 
there is some evidence to suggest that low levels of strategic AEI might represent 
vulnerability to chronic stressors (Cha & Nock, 2009).  An indirect route for AEI appears 
plausible; whilst both AEI and TEI are related to coping styles, higher levels of actual 
emotional proficiency have been shown to moderate chronic (interpersonal) stress to 
impact choice of coping style and, in turn, health (Peng et al., 2010).  This awaits testing 
with reference to TEI. 
 
These conclusions are, nevertheless, made on the basis of limited literature; so far 
only two pieces of research have attempted to examine comprehensive models of 
association and no study has yet examined how EI-stressor interactions relate to both 
internalising and externalising symptomotology in typical adolescents.  Moreover, the 
adult literature hints at specificity in these relationships – EI does not universally buffer 
against all stressors (e.g., major life events and daily hassles have been examined, with 
moderating effects found only in relation to the latter) and not all EI-influenced forms of 
coping appear to explain differences in health outcomes.  Thus, a range of chronic and 
acute environmental stressors, identified from reviews of the literature as known 
correlates of psychopathology, will be examined in the current study to further extend 
this field of research.  Importantly, by exploring both direct and indirect pathways to 
adjustment, this will be the first piece of research to examine links between multiple 
coping styles and EI within the context of stressors and disorder in youth.   
 
Aims and research questions: This study will examine the relationship between EI 
and mental health across two distinct phases.   The first (subsidiary) aim of the research is 
to further explore the conceptualisation of EI in adolescence.  Specifically, the ‘dual-
facetted’ nature of EI (i.e., distinction between ‘ability EI’ and ‘trait EI’) will be explored, 
alongside possible sub-groups differences.  It will be examined whether EI (in either form) 
relates to mental health (predictive validity) and whether these effects hold after 
controlling for the influence of related constructs (incremental validity).  This preliminary 
aim will be operationalised via the following research questions:  
 
1. To what extent are ability EI and trait EI related in adolescents?  How does each 
‘type’ of EI vary according to age and sex?   
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2. What is the nature of bivariate relationships between A/TEI and mental health 
(internalising [depression] and externalising [disruptive behaviour] 
symptomotology)? 
 
3. If significant associations between A/TEI and mental health exist, does each 
construct continue to make a significant predictive contribution with the influence 
of the ‘Big Five’ personality traits (Neuroticism; Extraversion; Openness; 
Conscientiousness; Agreeableness) and general cognitive ability (proxy indicator: 
academic attainment scores) held constant? 
 
The second (central) aim of the work is to explore the processes underpinning the 
relationship between EI and mental health in an attempt to explain how and when EI 
operates.  Specifically, analyses will examine whether EI can impact known stressor-
health processes by moderating the effect of stressors on disorder, either directly or 
indirectly through coping.  In line with Grant et al., (2003), EI is considered here as a pre-
existing personal resource that may modify the impact of stressors, whilst coping is 
conceived as a stressor-activated process that explains the association between stress 
and psychopathology (see Figure 1 for conceptual model).  Using the framework 
proposed by Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2007), a series of moderated mediation models 
will be specified to address the following questions: 
 
4. Is EI best considered a ‘direct’ buffer of the effect of stressors on disorder (i.e., 
tested through the ‘direct effect’ moderation model)?  If so, is there specificity in 
this relationship according to ‘type’ of disorder (depression versus disruptive 
behaviour), stressor (e.g., poverty, family dysfunction, negative life events) and EI 
(ability versus trait)?  How does this effect differ according to level of EI?  
 
5. Is an ‘indirect’ role for EI in stressor-health pathways plausible - does EI interact 
with stressors to affect ‘upstream’ choice of coping strategy (‘a’ path moderation 
model), or, does EI influence ‘downstream’ coping implementation to affect 
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‘a’ path moderation ‘b’ path moderation 
Direct effect moderation 
disorder (‘b’ path moderation model)?   How do these effects differ according to 
level of EI?  Specificity with respect to stressor, EI and outcome will be examined. 
 
Importantly, the ‘b path’ moderation hypothesis has been alluded to within 
personality research (e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010) but 
has not yet received attention within the EI arena.  Given that successful coping depends 
on both choice and use of a given strategy, coping efforts may be ultimately ineffective in 
decreasing symptoms owing to poor implementation or poor selection.  For instance, 
those with lower levels of TEI may attempt active coping when faced with a controllable 
stressor (adaptive choice), but a lack of confidence in socio-emotional skill may 
undermine eventual implementation of the strategy, exacerbating negative emotionality 
and leading to increased disorder. Similarly, high levels of emotion skill/knowledge may 
underpin initial choice or successful execution of strategies (e.g., interpersonal skill 
required to enact support seeking coping). It is probable, therefore, that emotional 
competency could contribute to ‘upstream’ or ‘downstream’ coping processes; hence this 
will be operationalised through the testing of ‘a’ and ‘b’ path models and, in doing so, will 
offer a novel contribution to the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: General conceptual model.  The effects of stressors (X = socio-economic adversity: SEA; family 
dysfunction: FD; negative life events: NLE) on disorder (Y = depression: DEP; disruptive behaviour: DRB) 
moderated by emotional intelligence (Z = trait EI; ability EI) directly or indirectly through coping (M = 
support seeking: SUP; active: ACT; avoidant: AVD).  Note: Emotional intelligence (A/TEI) is hypothesised to 
moderate pathways from X to M (‘a’ path), M to Y (‘b’ path) or the direct effect of X on Y.  For simplicity, the 
underlying measurement model, additional regression paths and covariances are omitted here (see Fig. 9 
and 10 for fully specified models).
Emotional Intelligence (Z) 
(AEI; TEI) 
Coping (M) 
(ACT; SUP; AVD) 
Stressor (X) 
(SEA; FD; NLE) 
Disorder (Y) 
(DEP; DB) 
 
13. METHOD  
 
13.1 Design 
 
A cross-sectional, comparative study design was utilised to collect self-report data.  
Masten (e.g., 2001; 2004) has identified three ‘waves’ of research underpinning research 
efforts in the field of resilience; early work in ‘wave one’ identifies and describes risk 
markers and predictors of positive adaptation; ‘wave two’ focuses on resilience 
processes, examining underlying risk mechanisms involving possible mediators and 
moderators of positive adjustment; whilst efforts in ‘wave three’ are concerned with 
designing and operationalising interventions to test resilience ‘hypotheses’ through 
experimental manipulation.  By exploring the processes underpinning key risk (i.e., 
stressors) and protective markers (i.e., coping) and recognising the role of EI as a ‘risk 
modifier’ of these pathways, the current design represents a combination of first and 
second wave resilience research.  Moreover, examining how mediated and moderated 
processes work conjointly to impact developmental outcomes is essential for establishing 
the conditions under which  effects may be generalisable – something which has been 
acknowledged as crucial for the progression of resilience research (Appleyard, Yang, & 
Runyan, 2010; Morgan-Lopez & Mackinnon, 2006).  Although the use of cross-sectional 
data does not permit direct testing of causality and change (Rutter, 2000), this design is 
suited to the current study given the aims and complexity of analyses which necessitate a 
large sample of data to be obtained from a representative sample of adolescents, thus 
enabling sufficient statistical power to detect effects.  Moreover, this approach has been 
recognised by others as being preferable as an initial step in establishing which causal 
processes are implausible and which more likely (Ford, Goodman, & Meltzer, 2004; 
McKim & Turner, 1997) – important when seeking to develop an ‘adaptive’ account of EI. 
 
13.2 Participants 
 
Following Hancock (2006), an a-priori power analysis suggested that a minimum 
sample N = 893 was necessary to achieve .80 probability to reject a null hypothesis of 
unacceptable model fit (RMSEA ≥ .05), given a conservative level of true data-model fit in 
the population (RMSEA = .04) with df = 89 (minimum number of parameters to be tested 
per conditional indirect effects model).  Consequently, 1170 adolescents (612 males; 558 
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females) aged 11 to 16 years (M = 13.03; SD = 1.26) were recruited from seven schools 
located across the West Midlands and North Yorkshire, UK. Educational establishments 
were selected via opportunity sampling from an initial pool of ninety-two schools 
contacted on the basis of location criteria (i.e., all community, foundation, voluntary 
aided schools and academies within a ten mile radius of a major city in the West 
Midlands/large town in North Yorkshire).  During April 2010, letters (in hard copy and 
electronic form) were sent to respective headteachers/principals inviting schools to take 
part in the research (see Appendix A).  In participating schools, individual student 
involvement was contingent upon both parental consent and student assent (see 
Appendix B for study information sheets and opt-out consent form). In six of the seven 
schools, the level of free school meal eligibility exceeded the national average of 15.9% 
(Department for Education, 2011).  Collectively, student ethnic backgrounds were diverse; 
41.6% were White/White European, 39.8% Asian/Asian British, 10% Black or Black British, 
4.5% were of mixed background, 1.4% belonged to other ethnic groups and 1% were 
Chinese (with 1.8% refusing to provide information). This is fully representative of the 
trends found in the wider UK population from which the overall sample was drawn (see 
e.g., Office for National Statistics, 2002).   
 
13.3 Measures  
 
Risk markers were initially identified from recent reviews of the literature base 
(e.g., Grant et al., 2006; Rutter, 2000) and large-scale population-level surveys (e.g., 
Green, McGinnity, Meltzer, Ford, & Goodman, 2005) attesting to the viability of shared 
prospective associations with adolescent psychopathology.  Final selection was 
contingent upon the plausibility of theoretical and empirical connections to EI, as outlined 
in the introductory section, with reference to pertinent selection criteria outlined in the 
literature; Luthar et al. (2006) maintain that markers must be salient (in the particular life 
context), malleable (amenable to change via intervention), enduring (continue to exert a 
positive or negative effect  over time) and generative (they must set in action other 
protective processes).  All variables eventually selected for inclusion in the current 
research satisfied these criteria.   
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To capture data representative of these markers, adolescent self-report scales 
were utilised for two primary reasons: a) they represent the most cost-effective and 
efficient method of obtaining data from a large, cross-sectional sample and b) compared 
to alternative methods (e.g., interview) the anonymity afforded by the self-report 
response format  encourages greater disclosure of potentially sensitive information (e.g., 
negative life events) (Grant et al., 2004). This approach is also particularly advantageous 
when attempting to ascertain the extent of internalising symptomotology (i.e., 
depression, anxiety, social withdrawal, somatic complaints) which, as ‘secret illnesses’, 
are often difficult to detect using other methods, such as teacher/ parental reports; 
observation (Merrell, 2008; Sandler, Reynolds, Kliewer, & Ramirez, 1992).   All tools were 
identified from detailed reviews of the domains of interest (e.g., for coping: Compas et 
al., 2001; Grant et al., 2004) to ensure theoretical compatibility with the construct 
definitions adopted by the research and that reliable measures validated for use in an 
adolescent context were selected.   For brevity, standardised, short-form versions of 
scales were employed over longer versions where available.  The following sections 
provide an overview of the instrumentation; whilst copyright restrictions prevent the 
reproduction of the MSCEIT-YVR (ability EI) and BYI II (depression; disruptive behaviour) 
copies of all remaining measures are located in Appendix C. 
 
13.3.1 Coping 
 
The Children’s Coping Strategies Checklist, First Revision (CCSC-R1; Ayers, Sandler, 
West, & Roosa, 1996) is a self-report, multidimensional measure of coping style which 
allows young people to describe how they typically cope with stressors across situations.  
Although generalist ‘trait’ approaches have been criticised for oversimplifying the 
contextualised nature of coping (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004), it is argued that measures 
of aggregated coping styles are more suitable for exploration of relationships between 
broadband stressors (e.g., cumulative negative life events) and adaptive outcomes (e.g., 
mental health) (Ayers et al., 1996). Accordingly, the CCSC has been successfully used to 
illuminate associations between coping dimensions and mental health in youth exposed 
to a range of stressors e.g., the indirect effect of negative life events on anxiety, 
depression and conduct problems through avoidant coping in children of divorce 
(Sandler, Tein, & West, 1994); the moderating effects of avoidant and support seeking 
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coping on daily hassles and internalising symptomotology in low income adolescents 
(Grant et al., 2000).  The CCSC has undergone a rigorous programme of empirical testing 
(Program for Prevention Research, 1999) having been initially developed from items 
pooled from a review of coping literature/existing instruments, supplemented by content 
analysis of semi-structured interview responses from children of divorced families 
(Sandler et al., 1994).   Additionally, as a multidimensional classification  system, the CCSC 
is preferable to the more simplistic dual-facetted systems (e.g., ‘approach’ versus 
‘avoidant’ coping styles) upon which popular, alternative measures are based (e.g., 
Coping Responses Inventory - Youth:  Moos, 1993).  Attempting to classify multiple coping 
strategies into one of two broadband dimensions on the basis of a single feature (i.e., for 
approach/avoidance: orientation to stressor) leads to conceptual ambiguity; for instance, 
turning to others for help and advice as ‘support seeking’, can represent avoidance as 
well as approach (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Consequently, the CCSC has 
been acknowledged as an optimal, multi-dimensional classification system of youth 
coping (Compas et al., 2001; Skinner et al., 2003). 
 
The CCSC-R1 asks adolescents to describe their coping efforts with regard to a 
general stressor occurring in the past month by rating 60 brief statements using a 4-point 
scale (“never” [1] through to “most of the time” [4]) to indicate the frequency of the 
behaviour described.  Items are intermittently prefaced by the phrase “When I had 
problems I....” to serve as a reminder that responses should be based on what would be 
typical when encountering a stressor and not what would be typical as part of general, 
everyday behaviour. Collectively, items represent 13 individual coping dimensions (see 
Table 1 for complete descriptions and example items) when scores for items representing 
each dimension are averaged (possible range = 1-4).  Adequate levels of internal 
consistency have been reported for the 13 coping dimensions, e.g., α= .55 to .69 
(Gaylord-Harden, Gipson, Mance, & Grant, 2008) together with one-week test-retest 
reliability coefficients in the range of .49 to .73 (Program for Prevention Research, 1999).  
As can be seen in Table 1, these moderate levels of internal consistency were replicated 
in the current sample (α = .51 [distracting actions] to .77 [support for problem-
solving/feelings]). Four super-ordinate coping styles are derived from the summed 
averages of dimensions as follows: Active coping comprises cognitive decision making; 
direct problem solving; seeking understanding; control; positivity; optimism; Avoidant 
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coping encompasses avoidant actions; repression, wishful thinking, Distraction represents 
distracting actions; physical release of emotions, and finally, Support Seeking coping is the 
summed average of both emotional and problem-oriented efforts with reference to 
peers, siblings, parents and other adults.   
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Table 1: CCSC-R1 coping dimensions (with alpha reliabilities), descriptions and example items  
Coping dimension (α reliability) Description Example item (no. of items comprising dimension) 
Cognitive decision making (.71) Thinking about ways to solve the problem, i.e., options, methods, 
consequences (but not execution of this) 
I thought about what would happen before I decided what to do (4) 
Direct problem solving (.66) Actual efforts to alter the problem situation; self or environment I did something to solve the problem (4) 
Seeking understanding (.65) Attempting to find meaning in the problem situation I tried to understand it better by thinking more about it (4) 
Positivity (.68) Focussing thoughts on positive events that have occurred  I reminded myself that overall things are pretty good for me (4) 
Optimism (.70) Focussing thoughts on possible future positive events  I told myself that things would get better (4) 
Control (.66) Self-assurance of capability to deal with/handle the problem  I reminded myself that I knew what to do (4) 
Physical release of emotion (.64)  Efforts to work off feelings via some form of physical exertion  I did some exercise (4) 
Distracting actions (.51) Using activities to avoid thinking about the problem situation I listened to music (4) 
Avoidant actions (.58) Actual behavioural efforts to avoid the problem I tried to stay away from the problem  (4) 
Repression (.62) Avoid thinking about the problem situation I tried to ignore it  (4) 
Wishful thinking (.67) Imagine that the problem situation was better I wished that bad things wouldn’t happen   (4) 
Support for problem solving (.77) Seeking advice or direct assistance from others to problem-solve  I asked my mother/ father for help in figuring out what to do  (7) 
Support for feelings (.77) Using others to provide emotional support (i.e. listening to 
feelings; providing understanding) 
I told my friends about what made me feel the way I did (7) 
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Whilst confirmatory factor analyses of the scale have identified the intended four 
factor solution (e.g., Ayers et al., 1996), an alternative three factor solution has also been 
recovered (Gaylord-Harden et al., 2008).  Here, distraction is omitted from the model, 
removing the often low-loading physical release of emotions and allowing distracting 
actions to load instead onto avoidant coping.  More recently, a five factor model has also 
demonstrated a good fit to data drawn from a sample of 437 Dutch adolescents aged 9-
12 years  (de Boo & Wicherts, 2009).  In this scenario, three of the six active coping 
dimensions (control, positivity, optimism) form an ancillary factor termed ‘positive 
cognitive restructuring’.  To identify the optimal model in the current data, confirmatory 
factor analyses of the three, four and five factor solutions were conducted using robust 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLR)  in MPlus version 6.12 (Muthen & Muthen, 2010). 
In each case, scaling was established by fixing factor variances to 1.0; all factor loadings, 
residual variances and factor co-variances were freely estimated. The results of model fit 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Fit indices of CCSC-R1 confirmatory factor analyses 
Model 
 
MLR X2 
(df) 
Factor 
loading (λ) 
range 
Factor 
correlation 
(r) range 
Incremental fit 
indices 
Absolute fit indices 
 
Parsimony 
corrected 
fit 
  min Max Min max CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA  
(90% CI) 
AIC 
3 
factor 
230.02* 
(51) 
.56 .89 .54 .72 .96 .95 .03 .06  
(.05-.07) 
22628.66 
4 
factor 
264.76* 
(58) 
.48 .89 .51 .70 .96 .94 .04 .06  
(.05 - .07) 
24795.09 
5 
factor 
204.76* 
(55) 
.48 .89 .51 .92 .97 .96 .03 .05 
(.04 - .06) 
24729.25 
Note: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI= Tucker-Lewis Index; SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Square Residual; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 
AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. Standardised parameter estimates are presented.  
* p < .001 
 
Given the widely acknowledged sensitivity of the likelihood ratio (X2) statistic to 
sample size (Byrne, 2012), probabilities below .001 are to be anticipated and are thus not 
solely relied upon when adjudging model fit.  Ideally, measures of incremental fit, e.g., 
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CFI/TLI, should exceed .95 and absolute fit indices, e.g., RMSEA, should be less than .6 to 
signify a well-fitting model  (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Although it is argued that CFI values > 
.90 and RMSEA values up to .08 can still indicate a moderate level of fit (Marsh, Hau, & 
Wen, 2004). In line with these criteria, table 2 suggests that the 5 factor model appears 
marginally superior to the 3 and 4 factor solutions. However, scrutiny of the standardised 
factor loadings indicate that physical release of emotions had a particularly low loading (λ 
= .48) in models 4 and 5; considerably lower than all other dimensions (λ ≥ .60).  
Moreover, model 5 also evidenced an uncomfortably high intercorrelation between the 
new latent factor, positive cognitive restructuring and active coping (r = .92, p < .001) 
suggesting that with 85% shared variance these dimensions essentially tap the same 
underlying latent construct (i.e., active coping).  Hence, model three provided a superior 
fit to the data (also suggested by the reduced AIC value) and consequently active (α = 
.90), avoidant (α = .75), and support seeking (α = .93) coping styles were retained for 
subsequent analysis. Appendix D contains a schematic representation of the final 
measurement model (figure 2). 
 
13.3.2 Emotional intelligence: Ability 
 
The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test-Youth Version, Research 
Edition (MSCEIT-YV R; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, in press) is a performance-based 
measure of EI suitable for youth aged between 10 and 18 years of age.  It is currently the 
only omnibus assessment of AEI available for use with this age group.  The measure 
comprises 101 items in total, 97 of which variously assess skill in experiential (perceiving 
emotion; using emotion to facilitate thought) and strategic (understanding; managing 
emotion in self and others) emotional information processing - see Table 3 for content 
description, together with example items and response options.  Item responses are 
scored by the test publishers (Multi-Health Systems) and assigned a scaled value between 
0 (less correct) and 2 (more correct) to represent the degree of concordance with expert 
consensus opinion. Higher scores indicate higher agreement, hence higher AEI skill.  
Averaged item scores create branch scores (i.e., perceiving, using, understanding; 
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managing), from which average experiential and strategic area scores are derived, the 
mean of which yields a total AEI score (where standardised values: M = 100, SD = 15).   
 
The MSCEIT-YVR is still under development and, as such, comprehensive 
psychometric testing is awaited. However preliminary analyses with the tool (N = 2000, 
mean age = 13.22 years) have yielded adequate split-half reliabilities;  .67 perceiving 
emotion;  .81 using/managing emotion; .86 understanding emotion; .90 for total AEI 
(Papadogiannis et al., 2009) 4.  These authors also reported the presence of moderate yet 
significant branch-level associations, ranging from r = .34 for perceiving/managing, to r = 
.67 for understanding/managing (D. Logan, personal communication May 19 2011).  In 
the present sample, a similar pattern of moderate intercorrelations were found (average r 
= .33) and all branches were significantly associated with the total score (range r = .41 - 
.84; see Table 8).  Confirmatory factor analyses of AEI using branch-level, sub-scale scores 
as indicators, represented a reasonable fit to the data: MLR X2 (2) = 17.36, p < .001, CFI = 
.98, TLI = .93, SRMR = .03, RMSEA =.08 [CI = 0.05–0.13] (see Appendix D, figure 3 for 
graphical depiction).  Whilst managing and understanding emotion both exhibited strong, 
significant loadings on latent AEI (which accounted for 58-62% of the variance in each 
sub-skill respectively), loadings for using (.47) and perceiving emotion (.32) were 
somewhat lower, although still significant.  Markedly, the same patterning of loadings has 
been recently recovered in MSCEIT-YVR data obtained from a younger sample  (N = 413; 
aged 10-11 years) (Qualter et al., 2012) which may signify the need for modification to 
the final instrument.  Nevertheless, the fidelity of the present research was safeguarded 
by focussing analyses on the global AEI construct (as manifest ‘total AEI’ scores and latent 
AEI as detailed above). This ensured that predictive and explanatory inferences 
contrasting TEI and AEI were based on analyses at the same level/bandwidth (see 10.2.3 
for TEI), maximising measurement reliability (Gardner & Qualter, 2010) and the likelihood 
of future replication, whilst simultaneously minimising the number of (complex) analyses 
required (i.e., reducing Type I error).  
                                                          
4 As the MSCEIT-YV is still undergoing final validation, test publishers were unable to release 
scored item-level data hence sample-specific, split-half reliabilities could not be directly computed. 
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Table 3: MSCEIT-YVR branch descriptions, example items and response options  
Branch Level Description Response Options Example Item  
Perceiving emotions Assesses the 
ability to accurately identify 
emotions in others drawing upon 
skills in attending to and decoding 
emotional signals.   
 
Using emotions Tests the ability to 
harness emotion to aid cognitive 
processing, e.g., reasoning, 
problem-solving, socio- 
communication etc.  
 
 
Understanding emotions Assesses 
emotional knowledge relating to 
self/ others: including emotional 
vocabulary; knowledge of how 
emotions combine and transition.  
 
Managing emotions Assesses how 
well participants are able to 
regulate their own 
moods/emotional episodes, and 
those of others.  
Item parcel format: Participants rate 
the emotional content of a set of 8 
faces using a 5-point scale 
 
 
 
Item parcel format: Participants 
match sensory experiences (colour, 
temperature, speed) to 6 different 
emotions using a 5-point scale across 
24 items. 
 
 
Individual item multiple choice: 
participants circle 1 of 5 options 
across 23 items 
 
 
 
Item parcel format: participants rate 
the usefulness of actions for 
attaining a target feeling (either in 
self or others) using a 5-point scale 
across 6 vignettes. 
How much of each feeling below do you see in this face (circle an answer for each emotion)? 
  None at all A little feeling A medium 
feeling 
A strong feeling A very strong 
feeling 
 1.surprise 1 2 3 4 5 
 2.sadness 1 2 3 4 5 
 3.happiness 1 2 3 4 5 
 4.disgust 1 2 3 4 5 
Imagine that you like someone.  How much is this feeling of liking someone like each of the following (circle an 
answer for each emotion)? 
 Does not feel 
this way 
Feels a little this 
way 
Feels somewhat 
this way 
Feels this way Definitely feels 
this way 
1.warm 1 2 3 4 5 
2.soft 1 2 3 4 5 
3.light 1 2 3 4 5 
4.pink 1 2 3 4 5 
When you have something really nice, and then you lose it, you end up feeling (choose one answer):  
1. Happy 
2. Afraid 
3. Jealous 
4. Sad        
5. Disgusted 
A boy received some very sad news.  He wants to feel happy before going to a fun party.  How helpful would 
each of the following be in getting the boy to feel happy (circle an answer for each action)?  
1. Action: the boy watches a sad movie 
Not at all helpful   A little helpful   Somewhat helpful Moderately helpful  Very helpful 
2. Action: The boy reads a good book 
Not at all helpful   A little helpful   Somewhat helpful Moderately helpful  Very helpful 
3. Action: The boy plays a game with his best friend 
Not at all helpful   A little helpful   Somewhat helpful Moderately helpful  Very helpful 
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13.3.3 Emotional intelligence: Trait 
 
As a self-report assessment of individual differences in adolescent emotional self-
efficacy, the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Adolescent Short Form (TEIQue-
ASF; Petrides, 2009b) is one of a family of age appropriate long and short form measures 
(e.g. TEIQue-CF; TEIQue, TEIQue-SF, TEIQue-AFF) based on the TEI model of EI. Originally 
developed from a content analysis of existing EI frameworks and related constructs, such 
as alexithymia and empathy (Petrides & Furnham, 2001), TEIQue forms have followed a 
rigorous programme of validation (see below) and have been endorsed as superior to 
alternative, ‘first generation’ mixed-model measures such as the EQi (Bar-On, 1997) and 
SREIT (Schutte et al., 1998) which attempt to assess actual emotional skill via self-report 
(Zeidner et al., 2009).  In contrast, TEI theory conceives the construct as a finer-grained 
personality trait(s), some facets of which are subsumed within traditional higher-order 
personality dimensions, and hence sets out to measure emotional self-perceptions and 
dispositions rather than ‘skill’ or ‘ability’ (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).   Items for the 
TEIQue-ASF were adapted from the adult short form to represent age-appropriate 
wording and grammatical complexity and it has been used successfully with youth aged 
10 to highlight relationships between TEI and psychopathology (Williams et al., 2009).  
The instrument consists of 30 brief statements to which participants respond using a 
seven-point scale; strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  Items represent 15 
individual TEI facets which together tap four dimensions: sociability, emotionality, self-
control and well-being (see Table 4 for descriptions and example items).  Following 
reversals, a global score (possible range 30–210), together with scores for each of the 
four TEI factors, can be derived from summed item responses; higher scores signal higher 
levels of TEI.   
 
The adult version of the TEIQue has demonstrated excellent psychometric 
properties including 12-month test-retest reliability (global TEI: r = 0.78, p < .001) and 
robust levels of internal consistency at facet (average α = .77), factor (α = .78 
[emotionality] to .83 [wellbeing]) and global levels (α = .90) (Petrides, 2009b).  The 
adolescent short form is not designed to yield facet scores and factor level reliability is 
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expected to be lower than values found for the full form (Petrides, 2009b).  However, in 
the current data α levels were in fact moderate; ranging between .50 (emotionality) and 
.79 (wellbeing).  Full-scale internal consistency for the TEIQue-ASF global score is typically 
very good and holds cross-culturally e.g., in a group of British adolescents (N = 490; aged 
16 – 19 years), α = 0.83 (Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009) and in Dutch adolescents 
(N = 282; mean age 13.75 years) α = 0.81  (Mavroveli et al., 2007).  This trend was 
corroborated in the present sample: α = .84.  To the authors’ knowledge, there are 
currently no published confirmatory factor analyses based on the TEIQue-ASF, however, 
the four-factor TEI model has been recovered in adult data (e.g., Freudenthaler, 
Neubauer, Gabler, Scherl, & Rindermann, 2008).  In light of the multidimensional, a-priori 
structure of the TEI model and the presence of internally consistent ‘factors’ in the 
current data (Kishton & Widaman, 1994), the fit of wellbeing, sociability, emotionality, 
and self-control subscales indicated by global TEI was tested via CFA.  Importantly, this 
approach also has precedence in the literature (e.g., Frederickson, Petrides, & Simmonds, 
2012).  With the latent factor variance constrained to 1 to establish scaling, a single-factor 
model was found to offer a reasonable fit to the data: MLR X2 (2) = 15.37, p < .001, CFI = 
.98, TLI = .93, SRMR = .02, RMSEA =.08 [CI = 0.05–0.12]; where all λ ≥ .58 (see Appendix D, 
figure 4 for graphical depiction).  Consequently, all subsequent structural equation 
modelling is based on global TEI derived from this measurement model. 
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Table 4: The trait emotional intelligence model with example items from the TEIQue-ASF 
 Factor Description Facets Example items from TEIQue-ASF 
Global 
TEI 
Emotionality  
Describes perceived emotion-
related competencies necessary for 
development of strong personal 
relationships 
Self-control  
Perceived capability in controlling 
internal urges and external pressure 
or stress 
Sociability 
Describes how an individual typically 
feels and behave in a social context 
(e.g. perceived skills in negotiation, 
networking etc) 
Well-being 
Allows description of degree of 
satisfaction with life based on past 
and future events or expectations 
 
 Relationships  
 Emotional expression 
 Emotional perception: self & others 
 Empathy  
 
 Emotional regulation – self  
 Impulsiveness (low) 
 Stress management 
 
 Emotional management - others 
 Assertiveness 
 Social awareness 
 
 
 Optimism  
 Happiness  
 Self-esteem 
 
Auxiliary facets (not keyed to any factor):  
 Self-motivation 
 Adaptability 
 
It’s easy for me to talk about  my feelings to other people 
I’m able to ‘get into someone’s shoes’ and feel their emotions 
 
 
I can control my anger when I want to 
I’m able to deal with stress 
 
 
I can make other people feel better when I want to 
Sometimes, I get involved in things I later wish I could get out of 
 
 
 
I believe things will work out fine in my life 
My life is not enjoyable 
 
 
 
I find it hard to keep myself motivated 
I’m able to cope well in new environments 
Source: Petrides (2009b).
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13.3.4 Family dysfunction 
 
The general functioning subscale of the McMaster Family Assessment Device (FAD; 
Epstein, Baldwin, & Bishop, 1983) provides a global index of the ‘health’ vs. ‘pathology’ of 
a family as perceived by the respondent. Derived from the clinically orientated McMaster 
Model of family functioning, the full-form FAD comprises 60 self-report items tapping six 
family dimensions, indexed by seven subscales: problem solving (resolution of issues 
inside and outside the family), communication (clarity and specificity of verbal 
interaction), roles (established response patterns for everyday tasks), affective 
responsiveness (emotionality in reaction to environmental events), affective involvement 
(extent of involvement/interest in other family members), behaviour control  (existence 
of rules or standards for behaviour), and general functioning (Byles, Byrne, Boyle, & 
Offord, 1988; Epstein et al., 1983).  However, the latter general functioning subscale 
(FAD-GF), is considered to be a brief yet robust version of the full-form FAD;  early 
analyses suggested that with FAD-GF scale scores held constant, partial correlations 
between the remaining scales approach zero (range: r = 0.01 to r = 0.23) (Epstein et al., 
1983) - a finding which has been more recently corroborated via exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses (Ridenour, Daley, & Reich, 1999). Consequently, only the 
FAD-GF was administered to participants.  Importantly, family functioning as measured by 
the FAD-GF, has been linked to a number of adjustment outcomes; for instance, as part of 
a large scale population-level survey in the UK, lower parental-report scores on the FAD-
GF were associated with greater levels of internalising and externalising disorder in youth 
aged 5-15 years (Meltzer, Gatward, Goodman, & Ford, 2000), and in particular 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Conduct Disorder (Ford et al., 2004). Moreover, 
Martin, Bergen, Richardson, Roeger, & Allison (2004) found that family functioning 
mediated the association between sexual abuse and suicidality as reported by an 
Australian sample of 2,485 adolescents aged between 13 and 16 years.   
 
The FAD-GF comprises 12 short statements, e.g., “In times of crisis we can turn to 
each other for support”, to which participants indicate the extent of their agreement 
using a 4-point scale; strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (4).  Six items are phrased to 
113 
 
reflect healthy functioning (as in the example above), whilst the remaining six screen for 
unhealthy characteristics (e.g., “we don’t get along well together”) - see Appendix C for a 
complete copy of the instrument.  A higher mean scale score (possible range 1.0 – 4.0) 
indicates greater levels of family pathology, with scores > 2.0 reflective of clinically 
unhealthy functioning (Miller, Epstein, Bishop, & Keitner, 1985).  Internal consistency of 
the FAD-GF is good (e.g., N = 503; α = 0.92), as is test-retest reliability over a 7 day period 
(r =.71), and FAD scores have successfully differentiated between  clinical and nonclinical 
families (see Epstein et al., 1983; Miller et al., 1985).   In the current sample, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .85.  
 
Previous research has confirmed the unidimensionality of the FAD-GF (e.g., Evans, 
Cowlishaw, Forbes, Parslow, & Lewis, 2010) and this was verified with the current data.  
Exploratory factor analysis with oblique (geomin) rotation indicated a strong primary 
factor; loadings ranged between .53 to .71 and the ratio of eigenvalues for the first factor 
(5.32) to the second factor (1.43) was 3.72:1 - far exceeding the recommended criterion 
of 2.5:1 necessary to obtain consistent parameter estimates from item parcels (Hall, Snell, 
& Foust, 1999). Given the unidimensional nature of the scale, items were randomly 
assigned to one of four, 3 item-averaged parcels to form indicators of the latent variable 
‘family dysfunction’ for the basis of subsequent structural equation modelling.  Whilst the 
efficacy of item parcelling continues to be debated, the technique has been advocated 
when the primary goal of research is to investigate structural relations amongst latent 
variables (vs. indicator-level relations); in reducing the ratio of manifest indicators to 
latent constructs, and hence the number of parameters to be estimated, sample size 
requirements are reduced and the likelihood of obtaining an adequate model fit is 
increased (Hall et al., 1999; Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002).   Moreover, 
measurement reliability and distributional assumptions are often improved through the 
use of aggregated data (Little et al., 2002).  Importantly, this approach has precedence in 
the literature with FAD-GF items (Evans et al., 2010) and in the present data, a CFA of the 
single-factor model with four parcelled indicators provided an excellent fit to the data: 
MLM X2 (2) = 4.95, p = .08, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, SRMR = .01, RMSEA =.04 [CI = .00–.07], 
average standardised factor loading = .76 – see Appendix D, figure 5. 
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13.3.5 General cognitive ability 
 
Key Stage 2 average points scores (APS) were collected from school records and 
used as a proxy measure for general cognitive ability (GCA).  APS are computed from 
National Curriculum levels which range from ‘W’ (working towards) to ‘8’ (to be attained 
at the end of Key Stage 3).  Each level has a point equivalence as follows: W = 3, level 1 = 
9, level 2 = 15, level 3 = 21, level 4 = 27, level 5 = 33, level 6 = 39, level 7 = 45 and level 8 = 
51 points.  Hence, the difference between each level is represented by a 6-point 
increment, where a single point represents progress per term.  The APS per student is 
calculated as the mean of the total scores gained in English, Mathematics and Science, 
which, at Key Stage 2, represents achievement at age 11 assessed via national testing.  
For instance, an APS of 35 would indicate the student is mainly achieving Level 5 or 6 
across the curriculum (Department for Education, 2010a).   APS can range between 3 and 
58 and at Key Stage 2 students are expected to attain level 4 (i.e., 27 points).  The current 
sample average APS of 30.25 (SD = 3.47, range: 16.20 – 37.00) accords well with this. 
Whilst the shortcomings of using proxy measures in place of standardised measures of 
psychometric g have been duly noted (Rossen & Kranzler, 2009), this was unavoidable 
given sampling constraints.  As objective, nationally available data, APS represent a viable 
proxy and this approach has precedence in the EI construct validation literature (e.g., 
Brackett & Mayer, 2003). 
 
13.3.6 Mental health 
 
Depression and disruptive behaviour symptomotology were measured with 
respective scales from the Beck Youth Inventories of Emotional and Social Impairment, 
2nd Edition (BYI II; Beck, Beck, Jolly, & Steer, 2005). The depression inventory indexes 
feelings of sadness, hopelessness, negative thoughts about the world or self and 
physiological symptoms (e.g., “I want to be alone”; “I feel like crying”).  In contrast, 
adolescent experiences of disruptive behaviour are tapped through items measuring 
thoughts, feelings or behaviours associated with conduct/oppositional defiant disorder 
including, aggression toward people/animals; destruction of property; arguing with and 
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defying adults; blaming others (e.g., “I break into cars, houses, or other places”; “I like 
being mean to others”).   Each scale contains 20 items to which participants indicate how 
often each statement has been true for them recently by means of a 4-point scale; never 
(0) through to always (3).  In both cases, higher summed item values (range 0 - 60), 
represent higher levels of disorder.  
 
The brevity (five minutes completion per scale) yet specificity of the assessment 
afforded by each of the BYI II scales (20 items tailored to depression) make the 
instrument advantageous over similar measures; for instance, the Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 2001) which taps general ‘emotional symptoms’ 
using only 5 items, or the Youth Self-Report (Achenbach, 1991) which at 112 items is 
considerably lengthier. Moreover, the BYI have been used comprehensively with youth 
populations and have consistently demonstrated robust psychometric properties (see 
e.g., Kumar, Steer, & Gulab, 2010; Williams et al., 2010a).  Normative standardisation of 
the BYI II (N = 1,000; aged 7-18 years), yielded high levels of internal consistency across 
three age bandings (depression inventory: α = 0.90-0.95; disruptive behaviour: α = 0.86-
0.91) and 7-day test-retest reliability produced coefficients ≥ 0.73  (Beck et al., 2005). In 
the current sample internal consistency was α = .93 (depression) and α =.89 (disruptive 
behaviour).  Whilst the authors assert that each of the five BYI II scales are 
unidimensional in nature, there has been little work exploring the underlying structure of 
individual scales vs. the collective instrument (five inventories in total).  Nevertheless, 
using data drawn from the BYI I, support for unidimensionality has been documented in a 
Danish sample (N = 1116, 7-14 years) (Thastum, Ravn, Sommer, & Trillingsgaard, 2009), a 
clinical sample (N = 300, 7-12 years) (Steer, Kumar, Beck, & Beck, 2005), and for the 
depression inventory specifically, in an all female sample (N = 859, aged 9-13 years) 
(Stapleton, Sander, & Stark, 2007). In light of the foregoing research, confirmation of the 
unidimensionality of the BYI II items was sought.  Exploratory factor analysis with oblique 
(geomin) rotation indicated the presence of a dominant single factor within both sets of 
items; first to second factor eigenvalue ratios (depression = 11.20:1.15; disruptive 
behaviour = 10.14:1.60) were substantially greater than 2.5:1, and collectively, the 
minimum rotated factor loading was .53.  Hence, with unidimensionality established, 
116 
 
items were randomly assigned to one of four, 5 item-summed parcels to form indicators 
for subsequent latent variable modelling.  CFA found both of the single-factor models 
with parcelled indicators to offer good fits to the data; depression = MLM X2 (2) = 2.41, p 
= .30, CFI = .99, TLI = .99, SRMR = .01, RMSEA =.01 [CI = .00–.06], average standardised 
factor loading = .85; disruptive behaviour =  MLM X2 (2) = 13.79, p < .01, CFI = .99, TLI = 
.97, SRMR = .02, RMSEA =.07 [CI = .04–.11], average standardised factor loading = .80 – 
see Appendix D, figures 5 and 6. 
 
13.3.7 Negative life events 
 
The Adolescent Perceived Events Scale-Short Form (APES-SF; Compas, Davis, 
Forsythe, & Wagner, 1987) is a cumulative checklist measure of 90 items relating to 
normative and non-normative major and daily life events - see Appendix C for a full copy 
of the measure.  Importantly, indices of cumulative events have been found to capture 
more variance in outcomes than measures of ‘independent’ risk markers  (see e.g., E. 
Flouri & Kallis, 2007), and are thus particularly useful for initial explorations of broadband 
associations between stressors and psychopathology.  Originally generated from open-
ended questionnaire responses (N = 658, aged 12 -20 years), items target adolescent 
experiences across a variety of contexts (Compas et al., 1987; Wagner & Compas, 1990); 
network events occurring in the lives of others in the adolescent’s social network (e.g., 
“parent loses job” – 25 items), family events (e.g., “not spending enough time with family 
members” – 19 items), romantic events (e.g., “breaking up with or being rejected by a 
boyfriend/girlfriend” – 8 items), peer events (e.g., “feeling pressured by friends” – 15 
items), and academic events (e.g., “doing poorly on a test or exam” – 14 items).   In line 
with recent guidelines for ‘best practice’ when employing cumulative stressor checklists 
(Grant et al., 2004),  seven items were removed from the instrument to minimise possible 
criterion contamination (e.g., “emotional worries”).  Participants were invited to endorse 
events that had occurred within the past four months and to indicate the desirability of 
the event using a 9-point scale; extremely bad (-4) through to extremely good (+4).   A 
weighted sum of negative events can be computed - total and/or sub-types (e.g., Wagner 
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& Compas, 1990); in all cases, higher scores reflect higher levels of experienced stressful 
life events.    
 
As the APES is a checklist measure of potentially non-related life events, 
computation of internal consistency (appropriate for scales addressing a single underlying 
construct) is not recommended nor deemed necessary, as Fergusson & Horwood (1986) 
summarise, “The model underlying both the split half and coefficient alpha-measures 
assumes that each observed item zi is a fallible estimate of  a common underlying trait  
measured by the items.  This is clearly incorrect for life event items which do not measure 
a common underlying trait but rather a set of heterogeneous items grouped together 
because they are assumed to have a common effect rather than arising from a common 
source” (p.54).  A clear example of this is given by the author of the APES, “It cannot be 
assumed that all events relevant to a particular domain of a youngster’s life (e.g., family 
or school) are likely to occur contemporaneously...the events ‘parent getting a new job’ 
and ‘change in parents’ financial status’ are likely to occur together, while ‘increase in 
number of arguments with parents’ and ‘parent getting a new job’ will not necessarily co-
occur. Thus, internal consistency reliability will be less important to determine than test-
retest reliability” (Compas, 1987, p. 283).   The APES has demonstrated excellent test-
retest reliability over a two week period (r = .74 to .89 for weighted negative events) and 
inter-rater reliability (self vs. close friend) in older adolescents was 97% concordant 
(Compas et al., 1987).  Indeed, demonstration of such robust psychometric properties 
represents a relative strength of the APES over many other adolescent checklist 
measures, which lack documented empirical validation (e.g., Tolor, Murphy, Wilson, & 
Clayton, 1983; Yeaworth, York, Hussey, Ingle, & Goodwin, 1980).  For the purposes of 
later structural equation modelling, CFA of a single-factor ‘negative life events’ model, 
indicated by five continuous scale scores (network, romantic, family, peer, academic) was 
tested.  With the latent factor variance constrained to 1 to establish scaling, the model 
was found to offer an excellent fit to the data: MLR X2 (5) = 17.67, p < .01, CFI = .99, TLI = 
.99, SRMR = .02, RMSEA =.05 [CI = .03–.08]; where all λ ≥ .57 (see Appendix D, figure 8 for 
the full measurement model).   
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13.3.8 Personality 
 
The Big Five Inventory-Adolescent Form (BFI-44-A; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) 
consists of 44 short statements that tap prototypical traits considered central to the ‘Big 
Five’ taxonomy of higher-order, individual differences in Neuroticism (N); Extraversion (E); 
Openness (O); Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C) (see John & Srivastava, 1999 
for historical overview of the development of the 'Big Five').  The BFI-44-A was 
particularly well-suited to the aims and design of the current study owing to its brevity (5-
10 minute completion), composition (short statements vs. adjectives to aid 
comprehension) and scope (measurement of broadband dimensions vs. differentiated 
facets), qualities which set it apart from possible alternative measures, e.g., NEO Five 
Factor Inventories (Costa & McCrae, 1992); Trait Descriptive Adjectives (Goldberg, 1992) 
and its abbreviated ‘mini-markers’ form (Saucier, 1994).   Table 5 provides further 
description of the five dimensions together with example items from the scale (a full copy 
of which is located in Appendix C).  In each case, statements are prefaced by the phrase “I 
see myself as someone who...” and participants indicate the extent of their agreement by 
means of a five-point scale: strongly disagree (1) through to strongly agree (5).  Following 
reversals, computation of item averages yields dimensional scores (n items per dimension 
range from 8-10).  The adult form of the BFI has shown excellent levels of internal 
consistency across dimensions (mean α > 0.82) and test-retest reliability over an eight-
week period (mean α = 0.83) (Rammstedt & John, 2007).  Convergent and discriminant 
validity with alternative Big Five measures, e.g., NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992); Trait Descriptive Adjectives (Goldberg, 1992) is also good (see John et al., 
2008). Administering the adolescent form to 230,000 youth aged between 10-20 years, 
Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter (2008) reported adequate levels of internal consistency (α 
range: .57 [O] to .76 [A; C])  and a robust factor structure for the dimensions across 
development (even at age 11, coefficients were at least .91 with 86% of the items loading 
on the intended dimension).  An average Cronbach’s alpha value = .71 was achieved in 
the present data (Table 5).  
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Table 5: Personality dimensions (with alpha reliabilities), descriptions and example items from the BFI-44-A 
Dimension (alpha) Description Example traits Example items (n items per dimension) 
Neuroticism (N)  
(α = .70) 
Extent of emotional stability, evidenced 
through feelings of anxiousness, 
nervousness, sadness  
 moody vs. stable 
 anxious vs. calm 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Worries a lot 
 Is emotionally stable (R) 
       (8) 
Extraversion (E) 
 (α = .71) 
An energetic approach toward the social and 
material world  
 
 assertive vs. quiet  
 outgoing vs. withdrawn 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Takes charge 
 Is sometimes shy, inhibited (R) 
       (8) 
Openness (O) 
 (α = .73) 
Measures attributes associated with the 
individual’s mental and experiential life 
 
 wide vs. narrow interests 
 imaginative vs. shallow 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Is creative and inventive 
 Doesn’t like artistic things (e.g., plays, movies) (R) 
       (10) 
Agreeableness (A)  
(α = .67) 
A pro-social or communal orientation toward 
others, as oppose to and antagonistic 
outlook/approach 
 kind, altruistic vs. cold, hostile 
 trusting vs. unfriendly 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Is helpful and unselfish with others 
 Tends to find fault with others (R) 
       (8) 
Conscientiousness (C) 
 (α = .75) 
Addresses socially prescribed impulse control 
exemplified through high levels of 
organisation; a methodical/planful approach 
to tasks; delaying gratification 
 organised, vs. disorderly 
 thorough vs. careless 
I see myself as someone who... 
 Does things carefully and completely 
 Tends to be disorganised (reversed) 
       (10) 
Sources: John & Srivastava,(1999); John, Naumann, & Soto, (2008). 
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13.3.9 Socio-economic adversity  
 
Traditional indices of socio-economic status utilised in adult research (e.g. level of 
occupation; education; income) have proven problematic to employ in an adolescent 
context; young people either lack knowledge of or are unwilling to report this type of 
information with respect to their caregivers (Currie et al., 2008).  For instance, using data 
from a sample of 1,824 UK adolescents, Wardle, Robb & Johnson (2002) reported high 
levels of non-response for parental occupation (46.4% non-completion for fathers and 
45.95% for mothers).  This issue is exacerbated by a documented bias in non-responding; 
those from lower socio-economic groupings show higher levels of non-response to 
traditional socio-economic status items (Currie et al., 2008; Wardle et al., 2004).  In an 
effort to overcome these difficulties the Family Affluence Scale (FAS) was developed, 
originally for use as part the World Health Organisation’s four-yearly youth self-report 
survey - the Health Behaviour of School-Aged Children (Currie et al., 1997). The second 
revision of the scale - the FASII (Currie et al., 2004) – was utilised in the present study (see 
Table 6 for details).  Developed from the work of Carstairs and Morris (1991) and 
Townsend (1987), the FASII consists of four accessible, non-sensitive self-report items 
representative of family expenditure and consumption (e.g., “Does your family own a car, 
van or truck?”) to which categorical responses are assigned a value (e.g., no = 2; yes, one 
= 1; yes, more than one = 0).  Item responses can be summed and categorised to reflect 
low, moderate and high affluence status groups to mirror traditional socio-economic 
schemes (e.g., Boyce, Torsheim, Currie, & Zambon, 2006), however, in the current study, 
items formed a composite indicator of family material affluence/deprivation – an 
approach common in other studies with a focus upon health gradients (e.g., Torsheim et 
al., 2004).  Consequently, participant FASII scores had a possible range of 0 (most 
affluent) to 9 (most deprived); with the standard FASII scoring key being reversed to 
facilitate interpretation of the variable (higher scores = greater exposure to adversity).  
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Table 6: FASII items, response codes and scoring key 
 
FASII item Response code Scoring key 
Does your family own a car, van or truck? No 
Yes, one car or van 
Yes, more than one car or van 
 
2 
1 
0 
Do you have your own bedroom for yourself? No  
Yes 
1 
0 
 
During the past 12 months, how many times have 
you travelled away on holiday with your family? 
Not at all 
Once  
Twice 
More than twice 
 
3 
2 
1 
0 
 
How many computers does your family own? (do 
not include Playstation, Xbox or other computers 
used only for games) 
None 
One  
Two  
More than two 
3 
2 
1 
0 
(Source: Currie et al., 2008) 
 
 
Excellent completion rates have been reported in studies utilising FAS items (for 
instance, Wardle et al., (2002) report only 2% missing data for computer and car items) 
and in the current study this was replicated, with 100% completion across all items.  
Adolescent responses have shown good rates of concordance with parentally-reported 
FAS data (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008) and positive associations with traditional indicators 
of SES, e.g., maternal level of education (r = .19, p < .001) and family structure (r = .16, p < 
.001) (Boudreau & Poulin, 2009). Substantial three-week test-retest reliability has been 
documented (N=95, 11-15 years: item intraclass correlations ranging from .76 [holiday] to 
.95 [bedroom] and scale score = .88) (Liu et al., 2011).  However, levels of internal 
consistency have fluctuated across culturally diverse adolescent populations (range: α .35 
to .60) (Lin, 2011; Veselska et al., 2009) and in the present data, scale-level Cronbach’s 
alpha was low (.43).  Nevertheless, this is consistent with the conceptualisation of socio-
economic adversity (SEA) assumed in this research.  Here, items are regarded as relatively 
independent, ‘objective’ measures of discrete exposures to adversity that can be usefully 
tallied; not as interchangeable, standalone measures of this multidimensional construct 
(Wardle et al., 2002).  Accordingly, FASII inter-item correlations are typically moderate 
though significant (e.g., average r = .28 (Liu et al., 2011); r = .12 (Lin, 2011)) and this was 
corroborated in the current data (average r = .17, p < .05).  Whilst the FAS has been used 
widely to investigate associations with a range of adolescent health inequalities including 
122 
 
mental health and well-being (e.g., Giannakopoulos, Mihas, Dimitrakaki, & Tountas, 2009) 
the authors accept that items may be susceptible to bias; for instance car ownership and 
bedroom occupancy items could both be influenced by factors associated with 
urban/rural living.  Consequently, it has been suggested that additions/omissions and 
review of FAS items should be ongoing to ensure markers optimally capture material 
affluence  (Currie et al., 2008).    With this in mind, data referencing student free school 
meal eligibility (FSM) were obtained from school records (coded non-eligible: 0; eligible: 
1) to be included as an additional measure of family SEA.   
 
As a means-tested benefit directly linked to caregiver income, FSM has been 
widely employed in the literature as a measure of income deprivation (see e.g., Guerra, 
Huesmann, Tolan, Van Acker, & Eron, 1995; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002).  Moreover, 
self-reported FSM has been included in the Home Affluence Scale, a measure similar to 
the FAS that has been recently developed in the UK (Wardle et al., 2002).  Qualifying 
criteria are subject to change however currently, caregivers can apply for student free 
school meals if they are in receipt of various benefits (including income support; income 
based job-seekers allowance; child tax credit with an income less than £16,190; State 
Pension Credit, guarantee element) (Department for Education, 2010b).  Students are 
officially recorded as being ‘eligible’ once they have applied for and are in receipt of a free 
school meal, or the appropriate documentation has been checked and is in the process of 
authorisation.  Clearly these criteria do not sufficiently capture true ‘eligibility’ in terms of 
economic deprivation; not all families with youth who are eligible will apply and 
subsequently take up FSM and/or youth in ‘low income’ families who are not in receipt of 
benefits may be ineligible for FSM. Hitherto, it has been argued that FSM is a “very coarse 
index of economic disadvantage”(Kounali, Robinson, Goldstein, & Lauder, 2008, p.14).  
Nevertheless, as part of their analysis of household and child data drawn from the Family 
Resources Survey (2001/2 & 2004/5), Hobbs & Vignoles (2010) concluded that although 
FSM is an imperfect proxy for family income, it still has utility;  analyses found that 
children registered as eligible for FSM were most likely to live in the lowest income 
families.   
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In the present data, FSM and the FASII scale score shared only a moderate 
proportion of variance (r =.12, p<.001), though this is fully consistent with previous 
research;  in addition to a bivariate correlation of r = .20, p<.001, Kehoe and O’Hare 
(2010) report findings from an exploratory factor analysis in which the FASII items loaded 
on a related (r = .29, p < .05) yet distinct factor to FSM, thereby affirming the ability of all 
five proxy items to capture relatively unique aspects of SEA.   The use of cumulative 
indices of adversity has historical precedence in the literature (e.g., Luthar, 1991) and 
whilst unique contributions from individual indicators are obscured by this practice, 
statistical power is maximised - useful in complex models and when structural relations 
between constructs are the primary focus of investigations (Burchinal, Roberts, Hooper, & 
Zeisel, 2000).  Consequently, the summation of FSM and FASII items created a broadband 
measure of SEA with a possible range of 0 to 10 (higher scores indicative of higher levels 
of adversity). 
 
13.4 Procedure and ethical considerations 
 
Following the recruitment procedure outlined previously (section 13.2) data 
collection took place in participating schools between May 2010 and July 2011.  Pilot 
work (n = 145) conducted in May 2010 established that completion of the measurement 
package was both feasible and acceptable (i.e., with respect to length, content and 
format).  Across participating schools, the researcher liaised closely with teaching staff to 
ensure minimal disruption to curriculum delivery and that data collection sessions took 
place at a time convenient to individual class teachers (i.e., where possible, during 
registration or enrichment periods versus curriculum time).  At the beginning of each 
session, students were given verbal and written instructions before individually 
completing counterbalanced questionnaire booklets within the whole-class setting.  
Assurances were given regarding confidentiality and students were advised of their right 
to withdraw from the research, at any time, without detriment. Questionnaire booklets 
were completed anonymously; each student was assigned a unique ID number which was 
also included on individual information sheets.  Students were advised that they should 
use this (rather than other identifiable information e.g., name) in any subsequent contact 
with the researcher.  The researcher and/or class tutor were present for the duration of 
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sessions to provide support where required (e.g., to provide completion instructions; 
clarify the purpose of the study, etc) and ensure independence of responding.  
Additionally, psychological risk was monitored by an ongoing procedure of consent 
checking; participants were advised that if they were unwilling, unable or uncomfortable 
answering particular items for whatever reason, these could be left blank.  Average 
completion time was 1 hour.  At the end of each session, students were collectively 
debriefed; ‘coping with stress’ factsheets issued by the Royal College of Psychiatrists were 
distributed (Appendix E) and students were encouraged to email the researcher direct if 
they required any further information, or wished to withdraw from the study at a later 
date.  Reports containing aggregated school-level data trends (according to age and sex) 
were produced as bespoke feedback for participating schools. Data (both in hard copy 
and electronic format) were stored securely with restricted access (researcher only; 
password protected).  The research was fully compliant with the BPS Code of Ethics and 
Conduct (British Psychological Society, 2009) and received full internal ethical clearance 
from the University Research Ethics Committee prior to commencement (Appendix F). 
125 
 
14. RESULTS 
 
This chapter is divided into three major sections; following presentation of 
descriptive statistics, the predictive and incremental validity of EI with respect to 
adolescent mental health is examined through bivariate correlations and hierarchical 
regression analyses.  The final section presents findings from latent variable modelling of 
conditional indirect effects between stressors, coping, mental health and EI.      
 
14.1 Screening and descriptive statistics 
 
Preliminary analysis of study variables highlighted five univariate outliers 
(detached from the distribution with z-scores ± 3.29 SD from the mean) and six 
multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance greater than X2 (20) = 45.315, p < .001) which 
were subsequently deleted from the data set (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  This yielded a 
final total sample N of 1159 adolescents (554 females; 605 males; mean age = 13.30, SD = 
1.26). Time restrictions and unpredictable classroom circumstances (e.g., late arrivals to 
class, discipline issues) meant that some students were unable to complete all measures 
(see section 13.3).  However, administration was counterbalanced to minimise order 
effects and prevent single-measure repeat omissions; accordingly, missing data was found 
to be distributed randomly throughout the dataset (Little’s MCAR test: X2 = 812.018 (758) 
p = .085). Tables 2 and 4 describe n per variable.   
 
The data indicated non-normality; both mental health variables (depression; 
disruptive behaviour) and negative life events evidenced a degree of positive skew and 
kurtosis, with respective z-values exceeding 1.96, p < .05 (see tables 8 and 11). Whilst this 
trend is expected in research involving non-clinical populations (e.g., Stapleton et al., 
2007), to adjust for non-normality, all main analyses were conducted using robust 
estimation procedures (FIML with robust standard errors: MLR) in Mplus (version 6.11, 
Muthen & Muthen, 2010) following recommendations in the literature (Byrne, 2012; 
Yuan & Bentler, 2000). Importantly, this method of estimation is also recommended for 
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samples with incomplete data considered missing at random (Schafer & Graham, 2002) – 
applicable to the current analysis.  As it is not possible to conduct hierarchical regression 
in Mplus, this was conducted in SPSS version 15.0 (IBM, 2006) using pairwise data.  
However, any possible bias arising from missing observations and non-normality in the 
mental health variables was investigated through supplementary hierarchical regression 
analyses - the first involving complete cases only (i.e., no missing data) and the second 
based on (square root) transformed variables (see tables 9b and 9c in Appendix G).  All 
three analyses yielded comparable results, hence for clarity, findings from the pairwise, 
untransformed data are reported in the passages that follow.  
  
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics for the study variables according to gender. 
Whole-sample descriptive statistics are located in tables 8 and 11.  Turning first to mental 
health, comparison with normative data suggests that depression and disruptive 
behaviour scores in the current sample were not restricted in range – in both cases, t-
score conversions of the data range indicate the presence of “average” through to 
“extremely elevated” levels of disorder (Beck et al., 2005).  Moreover, the percentages of 
adolescents reporting sub-clinical (i.e., “moderately elevated” and above) levels of 
symptomotology compared well with national trends (Green et al., 2005) – for disruptive 
behaviour this applied to between 5 - 6% of the sample (6.6% nationally) and for 
depression this was 7 - 9% (5% nationally).  Compared to males, females reported 
significantly higher levels of depression, whilst the reverse was true for disruptive 
behaviour, with both findings representing small to medium effects.  Depression was not 
significantly associated with age, however there was a tendency for older adolescents to 
report higher levels of disruptive behaviour (r = .12, p < .001).  With regard to emotional 
intelligence, there were no significant gender differences in trait EI, however, females 
outperformed males in ability EI; this trend applied to all skill domains bar perceiving 
emotion (n.s.) but appeared most pronounced with respect to proficiency in managing 
emotion (where d = .30, representing a small to medium effect). AEI also appeared to 
increase with age (total AEI r = .27, p < .001) although not universally so; whereas skill in 
perceiving (r = .12, p < .001), understanding (r = .35, p < .001), and managing emotion (r = 
.21, p < .001) all increase with maturity, it would seem the ability to use emotion to 
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facilitate thinking does not (r = .04, p = .21). Conversely, age was unrelated to TEI (r = -.01, 
p = .92). 
 
Significant gender differences were also observed with respect to personality, 
where females exhibited higher levels of trait Conscientiousness (C); Openness (O); 
Agreeableness (A) and Neuroticism (N), the latter of which constituted the largest effect 
(d = .41).  Age related differentially to C and N; whilst younger adolescents appeared 
more conscientious (r = -.14, p < .001), older adolescents reported higher levels of trait 
Neuroticism (r = .09, p < .01). Compared to their male counterparts, females were also 
more frequent endorsers of avoidant and support seeking coping strategies, although use 
of the latter decreases with maturity (r = -.14, p < .001).  In general, experience of 
stressors (negative life events: NLE; family dysfunction: FD) did not differ according to sex, 
although females tended to report higher levels of socio-economic adversity (d = .22). 
Nevertheless, there were some age-related trends; experience of NLE and FD was 
greatest in older adolescents (NLE: r = .07, p < .05; FD: r = .07, p < .05), whilst the 
youngest adolescents were amongst the poorest in the sample (SEA r = -.18, p < .001).   
With the exception of the relationship between age and AEI, all significant correlations 
reported here represent small effect sizes,  r < .30  (Cohen, 1992).   
 
As a result of the presence of significant age and sex related trends in the data, 
the influence of both variables were controlled in all main analyses. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for study variables by sex 
 Males  Females  t d 
Variables M (SD) Range  M (SD) Range    
1. Coping         
Active  2.35  
(.57) 
1.00 - 4.00  2.41 
(.56) 
1.00-4.00  -1.78 .11 
Avoidant 2.33 
 (.52) 
1.00-3.81  2.45 
(.53) 
1.06- 4.00  -3.63*** .23 
Support seeking 1.91 
(.60) 
1.00 - 4.00  2.14 
.63) 
1.00- 4.00  -5.89*** .39 
2. Emotional intelligence (EI)         
Ability EI: Total 95.24 
(15.81) 
55.37- 125.60  98.93 
(13.90) 
57.02-126.58  -3.93*** .25 
Ability EI: Perceiving  89.11 
(16.73) 
28.57 – 122.65  90.28 
(17.62) 
28.57 – 126.35  -1.10 .07 
Ability EI: Using  100.34  
(17.40) 
56.60 – 137.65  102.77 
(15.74) 
50.36 – 136.61  -2.37* .15 
Ability EI: Understanding 99.43 
(15.45) 
56.88 – 126.39  101.87 
(13.37) 
60.19 – 126.39  -2.72** .17 
Ability EI: Managing 92.98 
(14.44) 
64.54 – 124.06  97.33 
(14.34) 
62.59 – 124.06  -4.81*** .30 
Trait  EI 133.51 
(21.61) 
62.00 – 203.00  131.69 
(21.03) 
78.00 – 203.00  1.37 .09 
3. General cognitive ability          
KS2 average points score  29.99 
(3.56) 
16.20 – 37.00  30.52 
(3.37) 
17.60 – 36.50   -1.73 .15 
4. Mental health         
Depression  10.43 
(9.37) 
.00 – 52.00  12.72 
(9.57) 
0.00 – 49.00  -4.08*** .24 
Disruptive behaviour  8.27 
(7.48) 
.00 – 41.00  6.12 
(6.10) 
0.00 – 41.00  5.33*** .32 
5. Personality         
Neuroticism  2.70 
(.65) 
1.00 - 4.88  2.97 
(.68) 
1.00 – 5.00  -6.37*** .41 
Extraversion  3.37 
(.66) 
1.25 – 4.88  3.42 
(.68) 
1.25 – 5.00  -1.09 .06 
Openness  3.55 
(.60) 
1.40 – 4.90  3.70 
(.62) 
1.80 – 5.00  -4.02*** .25 
Conscientiousness 3.23 
(.65) 
1.33 – 5.00  3.36 
(.68) 
1.44 – 5.00  -3.11** .20 
Agreeableness 3.46 
(.64) 
1.00 – 5.00  3.61 
(.61) 
1.50 – 5.00  -4.06*** .24 
6. Stressors         
Family dysfunction 1.96 
(.50) 
1.00 – 4.00  1.90 
(.51) 
1.00 –3.83  1.82 .12 
Total negative life events 32.88 
(31.79) 
.00 – 182.00  34.17 
(33.84) 
.00 – 88.00  -.61 .04 
Socio-economic adversity  3.09 
(1.87) 
.00 – 8.00  3.52 
(2.05) 
.00 –  
9.00 
 -3.73*** .22 
Note: Self-report data: male ns varied from 505-605; female ns varied from 468-554. School obtained data 
(GCA): male n = 263; female n = 254.   Standardised scores for ability EI (M = 100; SD = 15) are presented. 
Effect sizes (d) correspond to tests of mean difference (t) between male and female scores; values of 0.2, 
0.5, and 0.8 represent small, medium, large effects respectively (J. Cohen, 1988).                                                   
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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14.2 EI and mental health in adolescence: Predictive and incremental validity 
 
To establish the nature of relationships between EI, internalising and externalising 
disorder in adolescence and examine how both ‘types’ of EI relate to allied constructs 
(i.e., the ‘Big Five’ personality traits; general cognitive ability), bivariate intercorrelations 
were produced (see table 8)5. As expected, measures of AEI and TEI were only weakly 
related.  Overall, EI was inversely associated with symptomotology; however, whilst 
higher TEI was significantly associated with fewer depressive symptoms and less 
disruptive behaviour, higher levels of AEI were significantly linked to the latter only. In 
both cases, TEI shared more robust associations with mental health than AEI, with 
correlations representing medium r > .30 (disruptive behaviour) and large r > .5 
(depression) effects (Cohen, 1992).  TEI was significantly associated with all higher-order 
personality dimensions, sharing a negative association with Neuroticism (N) and positive 
relations with Conscientiousness (C), Agreeableness (A), Extraversion (E) and Openness to 
experience (O).  With the exception of the latter, all effects were medium to large.  
Notably, mental health variables shared a similar patterning of association with 
personality, although depression was unrelated to O, and disruptive behaviour was 
unrelated to E.  In contrast to TEI, AEI was only moderately associated with Openness and 
associations with Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were negligible 
(Neuroticism n.s.).    General cognitive ability was more strongly associated with AEI 
(particularly understanding emotion) than TEI and only weakly associated with mental 
health. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 As noted in section 13.3.2 in order to ensure the fidelity of the present analysis (where the predictive 
‘performance’ of AEI versus TEI was to be compared at the level of manifest variables), total AEI scores from 
participants were utilised to enable comparisons at the same level/bandwidth; mitigating the effects of 
measurement asymmetry and maximising measurement reliability (Gardner & Qualter, 2010).  
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Table 8: Correlations and whole-sample descriptive statistics for EI, mental health, personality and general cognitive ability 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. DEP  -              
2. DRB .48*** -             
3. N .50*** .19*** -            
4. E -.19*** -.04 -.30*** -           
5. O .01 -.09** -.04 .33*** -          
6. C -.23*** -.31*** -.30*** .16*** .28*** -         
7. A -.22*** -.46*** -.35*** .08* .28*** .49*** -        
8. GCA -.14** -.12** -.07 .16** .31*** .07 .18*** -       
9. TEI  -.55*** -.35*** -.55*** .36*** .25*** .42*** .41*** .20*** -      
10. AEI: Total  -.05 -.16*** .06 .10** .37*** .09** .20*** .39*** .17*** -     
11. AEI: PER -.06* -.09** .00 -.01 .05 -.01 .01 .03 .06 .41*** -    
12. AEI: USE -.05 -.13*** .03 .11*** .30*** .12*** .16*** .29*** .10** .67*** .07* -   
13. AEI: UND -.04 -.12*** .06* .07* .31*** .02 .13*** .43*** .17*** .83*** .31*** .36*** -  
14. AEI: MAN -.02 -.15*** .05 .08* .30*** .11** .21*** .24*** .14*** .84*** .23*** .39*** .59*** - 
N 1148 1144 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 517 1034 1011 1065 1062 1050 1016 
Mean         
(SD) 
11.52 
(9.53) 
7.25 
(6.91) 
2.83   
(.68) 
3.39  
(.67) 
3.62     
(.62) 
3.29  
(.66) 
3.53  
(.63) 
30.25  
(3.47) 
132.64 
(21.33) 
96.98 
(15.04) 
89.66 
(17.16) 
101.48 
(16.68) 
100.58 
(14.54) 
95.04 
(14.55) 
Range .00  – 
52.00 
.00 – 
41.00 
1.00 – 
5.00 
1.25 -
5.00 
1.40 – 
5.00 
1.33 – 
5.00 
1.00 – 
5.00 
16.20 – 
37.00 
62.00 – 
203.00 
55.37–
126.58 
28.57 –  
126.35 
50.36– 
137.65 
50.36 – 
137.65 
62.59 –  
124.06 
Skew 1.07 1.56 .09 -.13 -.23 .12 -.05 -.81 .20 -.52 -.67 -.31 -.55 -.20 
Kurtosis 1.11 3.14 .22 .05 -.30 .02 .07 1.15 .08 -.39 .52 -.34 -.40 -.98 
Note:  DEP = Depression; DRB = Disruptive behaviour; N = Neuroticism; E = Extraversion; O = Openness; C = Conscientiousness; A = Agreeableness; TEI = Trait emotional intelligence; AEI = 
Ability emotional intelligence; PER = perceiving emotion; USE = using emotion; UND = understanding emotion; MAN = managing emotion.  Standardised scores for ability emotional 
intelligence (M = 100; SD = 15) are presented. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
131 
 
14.2.1 Incremental validity of EI to predict mental health beyond personality and 
general cognitive ability 
 
Given the presence of significant intercorrelations between EI, personality, 
general cognitive ability (GCA) and mental health, it is important to establish whether 
both TEI and AEI can contribute meaningfully to the prediction of depression and 
disruptive behaviour after controlling for the influence of these allied constructs. 
Consequently, four hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess the incremental 
contribution of AEI and TEI in this regard.  Depression and disruptive behaviour scores 
were each separately regressed on gender and age (step 1), GCA (step 2), the Big Five 
personality dimensions (step 3) and EI (step 4).  Table 9a presents regression statistics.  
Importantly, none of the regression models appeared to be adversely affected by 
multicollinearity amongst predictor variables (r <.9; variance inflation factors < 1.8; 
tolerance > .2). 
   
Models predicting depression were significant; for AEI: F (9, 431) = 18.72, p < 
0.001; R2adj = .27 and TEI: F (9, 451) = 30.74, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .37.  However, only TEI 
significantly contributed to the final step of the model, accounting for 10% of the variance 
in depression. Significant models for disruptive behaviour were also realised; for AEI: F (9, 
431) = 16.50, p < 0.001; R2adj = .24, and TEI: F (9, 451) = 19.52, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .27.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to depression, both AEI and TEI made significant incremental 
contributions to the prediction of externalising symptoms on the final step of the model, 
adding 1% and 4% respectively.  Markedly, the Big Five personality dimensions accounted 
for the largest proportion of variance overall (depression: ΔR2 = .24; disruptive behaviour: 
ΔR2 = .20), whilst contributions from GCA at step 2 of the model were negligible 
(depression: ΔR2 =.02 and disruptive behaviour: ΔR2 =.01).   
 
 
132 
 
Table 9a: Hierarchical regression of mental health on sex, age, general cognitive ability, personality and emotional intelligence 
 Depression  Disruptive behaviour 
Variable  SE t R
2 ΔR2 ΔF   SE t R
2 ΔR2 ΔF 
Step 1    .02 .02 4.19*     .04 .04 8.76*** 
Sex .12 .89 2.68**     -.15 .64 -3.20**    
Age  .06 .35 1.30     .11 .25 2.45*    
Step 2    .04 .02 10.62**     .05 .01 5.98* 
GCA -.15 .13 -3.26**     -.11 .09 -2.44*    
Step 3    .28 .24 29.53***     .25 .20 23.49*** 
Extraversion -.07 .64 -1.65     .01 .47 .13    
Agreeableness -.04 .74 -.78     -.39 .55 -7.68***    
Conscientiousness -.11 .68 -2.22*     -.11 .51 -2.21*    
Neuroticism .41 .67 8.69***     .04 .49 .87    
Openness .13 .72 2.69**     .07 .54 1.52    
Step 4    .28 .00 2.69     .26 .01 6.28* 
Ability EI -.08 .03 -1.64     -.13 .02 -2.51*    
Step 4    .38 .10 75.40***     .28 .04 21.92*** 
Trait EI -.43 .02 -8.68***     -.25 .02 -4.68***    
Note: For each model, variables across steps 1-3 remain the same with only variables on Step 4 changing (i.e., type of EI). Thus, results for Steps 1-3 are presented for 
each outcome only once.  
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 
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14.3 Conditional indirect effects: EI, stressors, coping and mental health 
 
Having established a robust, predictive link between EI and mental health, this 
final section explores how and when EI may be associated with better adolescent mental 
health, through an examination of the interrelationships between stressors (family 
dysfunction; negative life events, socio-economic adversity), EI (TEI; AEI) and coping styles 
(active, avoidant, support seeking) with reference to both internalising (depression) and 
externalising (disruptive behaviour) disorder. Specifically, analyses explore whether EI (in 
either form) can impact stressor-health pathways by moderating the indirect effect of 
stressors on disorder via coping.  Put simply, the extent to which ‘adaptive’ coping 
depends on perceived or actual competency in emotional processing is examined.   
Following an initial overview of the techniques to be employed, preliminary descriptive 
trends relating to both observed and latent variables are presented.  The final two 
sections document the testing of conditional indirect effects in relation to depression and 
disruptive behaviour.     
 
14.3.1 Analysis methodology 
 
Relationships between latent constructs were estimated via structural equation 
modelling (SEM) using MPlus version 6.12 (Muthen & Muthen, 2010).  Compared with 
‘traditional’ manifest regression techniques, SEM permits the modelling of measurement 
error (unreliability) in observed variables, thus leading to more efficient, unbiased 
parameter estimates (Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004).  Nevertheless, EI researchers have been 
slow to adopt this methodology, despite repeated calls in the literature (e.g., Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011).  Hence much of the EI research base is limited in this regard, especially 
given that measurement error is known to have a particularly detrimental effect on any 
nonlinear (e.g., interaction) terms included in manifest models (Moosbrugger, 
Schermelleh-Engel, Kelava, & Klein, 2009).  The current design addresses these 
limitations.  Another central feature of the present analysis concerns the testing of 
multiple vs. simple mediation effects through coping.  It is widely acknowledged that 
‘real-world’ coping requires the flexible deployment of multiple strategies to combat 
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stressors; for instance, both avoidant (escape from negative emotionality) and active 
(problem-oriented towards future plans) styles may be appropriate for dealing with the 
death of a family member (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).  Indeed, the simultaneous effect 
of coping strategies on internalising symptomotology has been documented recently in 
an adolescent sample (Gaylord-Harden, Cunningham, Holmbeck, & Grant, 2010).  
Consequently, the practice of testing simple mediation effects involving isolated coping 
styles could be theoretically misleading. Moreover, from a methodological standpoint, 
modelling complex mediation is preferable; parameter bias arising from individual testing 
of intercorrelated mediators is reduced and by contrasting the relative magnitudes of 
significant specific effects, the technique can illuminate the unique contribution of a 
particular mediator (i.e., coping strategy) over others (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). However, 
despite the merits of this approach, there is currently a dearth of EI research 
deconstructing stressor-health processes in the context of multiple coping strategies; 
examining separate links between constructs has so far been the norm.  The current 
analysis seeks to remedy this shortcoming. 
 
To test for the presence of conditional (i.e., moderated) indirect effects, the Latent 
Moderated Structural Equations (LMS) approach (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000)  is used. 
Whilst a variety of methods for estimating non-linear effects in latent models have been 
proposed, including ‘constrained’ (Joreskog & Yang, 1996) and ‘unconstrained’ (Marsh, 
Wen et al., 2004) approaches, the LMS distribution analytic technique differs by directly 
utilising the first-order variance of the latent predictors to estimate the latent interaction.  
Hence, the construction of observed product indicators and complex model constraints to 
specify error variances/factor loadings for a nonlinear measurement model are not 
required, and relationships between the latent interaction and other latent predictors are 
not estimated (Kelava et al., 2011; Moosbrugger et al., 2009).  Instead, the joint 
distribution of the interaction effect (vector XY) represents the weighted sum of a mixture 
distribution (means, variances, covariances) of the observed predictor variables, 
conditioned on the latent criterion (given that the latent predictor and moderator 
approximate a normal distribution) (Kelava et al., 2011).  In this way the LMS method is 
advantageous over product indicator approaches reliant upon normal theory; no 
distributional assumptions are imposed on the interaction effect (product indicators and 
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criterion indicators) which is known to be non-normal in nonlinear models (Moosbrugger, 
Schermelleh-Engel, & Klein, 1997). Importantly for the current analyses, LMS has been 
shown to outperform un/constrained approaches in terms of estimation efficiency (less 
bias in the standard errors of latent variances/covariances) and greater power to detect 
interaction effects in complex models with correlated linear predictors under increasing 
multicollinearity (Kelava, Moosbrugger, Dimitruk, & Schermelleh-Engel, 2008; Kelava et 
al., 2011; Moosbrugger et al., 2009).  
 
Model specification follows guidelines for testing conditional indirect effects 
proposed by Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2007), adapted to the latent modelling context.  
Within this framework, it is possible to operationalise each the three research questions 
outlined in section 12.5 via the testing of a series of structural equation models 
represented in figures 9 and 10.  Figure 9 addresses whether EI interacts with stressors at 
an early ‘upstream’ stage to either affect mental health directly, or, mobilise adaptive 
coping to indirectly impact mental health (via ‘a’ paths).  Conversely, figure 10 explores 
whether EI is implicated further ‘downstream’ to play a role in coping implementation (‘b’ 
paths); rather than drive selection of coping strategies, the success of coping efforts 
indexed via reduced symptomotology could depend on EI. The LMS method in Mplus uses 
adaptive numerical integration with a default of 15 integration points per dimension; 
here, ‘a’ path models contain 2 dimensions of integration whilst ‘b’ path models comprise 
4.  The computational burden for estimation involving 3-4 dimensions of integration is 
described as heavy (Muthen & Muthen, 2010) and models with more than 4 dimensions 
are currently not recommended given numerical instability (L. Muthen, personal 
communication 15 February 2012).  Consequently, this precluded the estimation of 
nested model comparisons using the Loglikelihood ratio (i.e., -2 * loglikelihood 
difference), given that the combined, fully constrained model would necessitate 5 
dimensions of integration.  Instead, in line with recent recommendations (Kelava et al., 
2011; Lee & Song, 2008), the current analysis adjudged non-nested model fit using the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in concert with guidelines proposed by Raferty 
(1995) for interpreting Bayes factors (and ΔBIC). 
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Figure 9: Conditional indirect effects model testing the effect of stressors (family dysfunction; negative life events; socio-economic 
adversity) on disorder (depression; disruptive behaviour) through coping (active, avoidant, support seeking) moderated by EI 
acting on the ‘a’ pathways (stressor x EI).  
Note: Interaction denoted by filled circle.  Dotted line represents the direct effect of the interaction on disorder and double 
headed arrows represent covariances. For ease of interpretation the full measurement model is not shown (see Appendix D).  All 
latent variables were regressed onto control variables (age, sex).  
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Figure 10: Conditional indirect effects model testing the effect of stressors (family dysfunction; negative life events; socio-
economic adversity) on disorder (depression; disruptive behaviour) through coping (active, avoidant, support seeking) moderated 
by EI acting on the ‘b’ pathways (coping x EI).  
Note: Interactions denoted by filled circles; double headed arrows represent covariances. For ease of interpretation the full 
measurement model is not shown (see Appendix D).  All latent variables were regressed onto control variables (age, sex).  
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14.3.2 Model construction and descriptive statistics 
 
As before, sample N = 1159 with preliminary data screening outlined previously in 
section 14.1. Construction of individual latent variable measurement models representing 
active, avoidant, support seeking coping, AEI, TEI, family dysfunction, depression, 
disruptive behaviour and negative life events are described across sections 13.3.1 – 13.3.4 
and 13.3.6 – 13.3.7, with corresponding figures located in Appendix D.  Latent socio-
economic adversity (SEA) was indicated by the single, manifest SEA scale score, with 
residual variance fixed to 2.203 to reflect measurement reliability.6  A series of basic 
measurement models (with all latent covariances estimated) were run to ascertain the 
overall fit of each of the 12 combinations of predictors and outcomes that would form the 
basis of subsequent nonlinear modelling. Predictor scaling and model identification was 
achieved by fixing factor variances to 1, with all indicator loadings and residual variances 
freely estimated. To facilitate interpretation of interaction effects, latent depression and 
disruptive behaviour were scaled by constraining one of the four indicator loadings to 1. 
As Table 10 shows, these basic CFA models fitted the data very well; all RMSEA/SRMR 
values  .6 and CFI values > .90, with the majority ≥ .95.  Moreover, all factor loadings 
remained statistically significant (p < .001).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 computed as (1 – reliability) * sample variance 
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Table 10: Measurement model fit indices  
Model MLR X2 (df) Absolute fit indices Incremental fit indices 
RMSEA [90% CI] SRMR CFI TFI 
AEI, NLE, DEP 763.154* (260) .04 [.03-.04] .04 .95 .95 
AEI, NLE, DRB 741.618* (260) .04 [.03-.04] .04 .95 .95 
AEI, SEA, DEP 511.463* (175) .04 [.04-.05] .04 .96 .95 
AEI, SEA, DRB 499.534* (175) .04 [.03-.04] .03 .96 .95 
AEI, FD, DEP 650.679* (237) .04 [.03-.04] .04 .96 .95 
AEI, FD, DRB 636.461* (237) .04 [.03-.04] .04 .96 .95 
TEI, FD, DEP 733.455* (237) .04 [.04-.05] .04 .95 .95 
TEI, FD, DRB 741.048* (237) .04 [.04-.05] .04 .95 .94 
TEI, NLE, DEP 889.277* (260) .05 [.04-.05] .04 .94 .94 
TEI, NLE, DRB 883.038* (260) .05 [.04-.05] .04 .94 .93 
TEI, SEA, DEP 606.462* (175) .05 [.04-.05] .04 .95 .94 
TEI, SEA, DRB 607.977* (175) .05 [.04-.05] .04 .95 .93 
Notes: AEI = ability emotional intelligence; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; NLE = negative life events; SEA 
= socio-economic adversity; FD = family dysfunction; DEP = depression; DRB = disruptive behaviour; df = 
degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI= Tucker-Lewis Index; SRMR = Standardised Root Mean 
Square Residual; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.  All estimated models included the 
latent variables active, avoidant and support seeking coping. CFI/TLI values >.95 and RMSEA/SRMR values  
.6 signify a well-fitting model  (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  CFI values in excess of  .90 and RMSEA values up to .08 
indicate a moderate level of fit (Marsh, Hau et al., 2004). * p < .001 
 
Latent correlations are displayed in the upper portion of Table 11, together with 
descriptive statistics and correlations between manifest variables (descriptive statistics, 
including skew/kurtosis values for the latent indicators, can be found in the relevant 
sections of Appendix D)7.  As expected, correlations between latent variables tended to 
be larger than those between respective manifest variables, given the attenuation due to 
measurement error. Depression was inversely associated with active coping and TEI 
(though AEI n.s.), whilst shared positive relationships with avoidant coping, family 
                                                          
7
 With the exception of NLE, skew and kurtosis values for predictor variables were acceptable. Whilst is has 
been suggested that highly non-normal predictor distributions can lead to Type I error when utilising ML-
based approaches to  nonlinear effects modelling (Marsh, Wen et al., 2004), the LMS method employs an 
expectation-maximisation algorithm with MLR estimation which generates robust standard errors for 
parameter estimates.  Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure, analyses were re-run with log-
transformed NLE.  Substantive conclusions did not differ from analyses based on non-transformed NLE 
hence, for simplicity, the latter is reported hereafter. 
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dysfunction and negative life events.  Conversely, a higher level of disruptive behaviour 
symptomotology was associated with less coping per se (i.e., across all three styles), in 
addition to lower EI and higher levels of family dysfunction and negative life events.  
Whilst socio-economic adversity was unrelated to symptomotology and coping, poverty 
was inversely linked to both forms of EI, as were negative life events and family 
dysfunction (with correlations representing medium to large effects).   Those high in trait 
and ability EI more frequently engaged in active and support seeking strategies which 
were in turn linked to lower levels of family dysfunction.  In contrast, avoidant coping was 
unrelated to all stressors and only weakly associated with lower TEI (AEI n.s.). 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the absence of an initial ‘total’ 
effect of a predictor variable on the criterion (e.g., between socio-economic adversity and 
disorder) does not preclude the examination of indirect effects;  measurement precision, 
sample size and ultimately the relative power of a and b paths (stronger) compared to the 
total effect of X on Y (weaker), make the detection of significant indirect effects in the 
presence of a non-significant total effect possible (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 
2011).  Indeed, as a total effect essentially represents the ‘end-product’ of numerous 
paths of influence (be that indirect or direct, either present or absent in the final model) it 
is plausible that multiple indirect effects may exert opposing intermediate influences on 
the criterion, cancelling each other out, to produce a non-significant total effect (Hayes, 
2009).  With this in mind, analysis now turns to detection of such effects.
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Table 11: Correlations and whole-sample descriptive statistics for EI, mental health, coping and stressors 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. DEP  - N/A -.08* .18*** -.06 -.68*** -.05 .43*** .27*** .06 
2. DRB .48*** - -.17*** -.11** -.15*** -.44*** -.18*** .40*** .31*** .01 
3. ACTIVE -.07* -.16*** - .72*** .64*** .30*** .14*** -.26*** -.04 -.07 
4. AVOID .14*** -.07* .59*** - .55*** -.10* .03 .01 .04 .08 
5. SUPPORT -.06 -.14*** .62*** .48*** - .21*** .14*** -.27*** -.02 .06 
6. TEI -.55*** -.35*** .23*** -.09** .17*** - N/A -.58*** -.31*** -.19*** 
7. AEI (Tot) -.05 -.16*** .10** .01 .12*** .17*** - -.27*** -.14*** -.31*** 
8. FD .42*** .38*** -.22*** .02 -.24*** -.48*** -.24*** - N/A N/A 
9. NLE .26*** .27*** -.03 .05 .02 -.24*** -.13*** .23*** - N/A 
10. SEA .04 .02 -.05 .06 .03 -.11*** -.16*** .08* .04 - 
N 1148 1144 1015 1015 1015 1034 1011 1115 973 1159 
Mean  
(SD) 
11.52 
(9.53) 
7.25 
(6.91) 
2.38 
(.57) 
2.38 
(.53) 
2.02 
(.63) 
132.64 
(21.33) 
96.98 
(15.04) 
1.93 
(.50) 
33.50 
(32.78) 
3.30 
(1.97) 
Range .00 –  
52.00 
.00 –  
41.00 
1.00 –  
4.00 
1.00 – 
4.00 
1.00 –  
4.00 
62.00 –  
203.00 
55.37 –  
126.58 
1.00 – 
4.00 
.00 – 
188 
.00 9.00 
Skew 1.07 1.56 .16 .05 .48 .20 -.52 .27 1.71 .23 
Kurtosis 1.11 3.14 .01 .03 -.16 .08 -.39 .07 3.30 -.50 
 
Note:  DEP = Depression; DRB = Disruptive behaviour; ACTIVE = active coping; AVOID = avoidant coping; SUPPORT = support seeking coping; TEI = trait emotional intelligence; AEI = ability 
emotional intelligence; FD = family dysfunction; NLE = total negative life events; SEA = socio-economic adversity. Manifest correlations appear below the diagonal; average latent 
correlations from baseline measurement models are presented above the diagonal (N/A = not applicable: latent correlation not estimated). Standardised manifest scores for ability 
emotional intelligence (M = 100; SD = 15) are displayed.  
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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14.3.3 The indirect effect of stressors on depression conditional on EI 
 
Six groups of non-nested models were specified to test the effects of each of the 
three stressors (family dysfunction, negative life events, socio-economic adversity) on 
depression symptomotology, moderated by EI (either trait or ability).  To address whether 
EI exerted an effect directly or indirectly (via coping), each of the groups comprised a set 
of four competing sub-models.  Serving as a reference point, model 1 included the 
baseline measurement model plus the structural paths depicted in figures 9 and 10 
(excluding coping on EI), with all interaction terms omitted.  Across models 2 - 4, 
interaction terms were systematically introduced; model 2 tested for moderation of the 
direct effect (i.e., stressor x EI on depression), model 3 examined moderation of the 
indirect effect through coping via the ‘a’ paths (i.e., stressor x EI on active, avoidant and 
support seeking coping) and finally, model 4 tested for conditional indirect effects via the 
‘b’ paths (i.e., each coping style x EI on depression).  In models containing significant 
interaction parameters, information criteria were used to establish preferential model fit.  
Lower Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) values signify better fit, 
however Raferty (1995) proposed specific guidelines for interpreting relative ‘effect sizes’ 
for ΔBIC derived from pairwise comparisons (i.e., BIC model 2 – BIC model 1); values 
greater than 0 indicate no support for model 2; -2 < ΔBIC < 0 = weak support; -6 < ΔBIC < -
2 = positive support; -10 < ΔBIC < -6 = strong support; ΔBIC < -10  represents decisive 
support for model 2.  Hence, these criteria were used when adjudging model fit 
throughout.            
 
Table 12 presents results for TEI.  At baseline (i.e., model 1) no significant 
unconditional indirect effects were detected, however, as Preacher et al., (2007) noted 
these are not a necessary requirement for exploring conditional indirect effects.  Model 2 
estimations revealed significant ‘direct’ interactions involving two of the three stressors, 
suggesting that TEI attenuates the effects of both family dysfunction and negative life 
events on depression.  However, results for model 4 indicated that this effect could be 
explained with reference to coping; whilst there was no support for the presence of 
conditional indirect effects via the ‘a’ pathways (i.e., coping mobilisation: model 3), TEI 
significantly moderated the effect of family dysfunction on depression via the ‘b’ 
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pathways (i.e., coping implementation: model 4).  Here, statistically significant 
interactions implied a protective effect; for those with higher TEI, the effect of active 
coping on depression is larger (B = .98, SE =.36, p = .005) and the effect of avoidant coping 
smaller (B = -1.24, SE =.36, p = .001) than for those with lower perceived emotional 
competency (see Appendix H, figure 11 for full structural diagram with parameter 
estimates).  Following established procedures (Aiken & West, 1991; Preacher et al., 2007), 
conditional indirect effects were estimated at high (+3 SD from the mean) through to low 
levels (-3 SD from the mean) of TEI.  Analyses found that whilst simple slopes involving 
both active and avoidant coping do change as a function of TEI, only the conditional 
indirect effect through active coping was detectably different from zero.  At mean levels 
of TEI, a single unit change in family dysfunction triggers an increase of .19 in depression, 
per a decrease of .27 in active coping. However, as figure 12 illustrates, the indirect effect 
becomes negative at high levels of TEI; hence, the active coping efforts of adolescents 
with higher perceived emotional competency (TEI levels ≥ +2 SD from the mean, scoring 
177.30 or more) are more effective in reducing depression (B = - .61, SE =.16, p < .001) 
when faced with family dysfunction, relative to those with lower self-competency (B = 
.99, SE =.53, p = .06) for whom depression increases.   
 
Although conditional indirect effects were not significant in models predicting 
depression from negative life events and socio-economic adversity, all three ‘b’ path 
models offered superior fits of the data when compared to corresponding ‘baseline’ (ΔBIC 
FD: - 90.07; NLE: - 77.42; SEA: - 80.41), ‘direct effect’ (ΔBIC FD: - 47.27; NLE: - 65.53; SEA: - 
78.92) and ‘a path’ models (ΔBIC FD: - 105.33; NLE: - 93.59; SEA: - 82.47) , with effect sizes 
suggesting  very strong support for these models.  AIC values were similarly lower for all 
‘b’ path models. 
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Table 12: Conditional indirect effects for stressors on depression moderated by trait emotional intelligence  
Model 
 
AIC/BIC 
(n parameters) 
Stressor x 
TEI on 
disorder 
Stressor x TEI on coping Coping x TEI on disorder Conditional indirect effects at level of TEI (+/-3 SD from M) 
Active Avoid Support Active Avoid Support  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Family 
dysfunction 
 
1. 58431.88 
    58932.36 (99) 
- - - - - - - Active .99 .72 .46 .19 -.08 -.34* -.61*** 
2. 58373.91  
    58879.44 (100) 
-.36*** - - - - - - Avoid .06 .04 .03 .01 -.00 -.02 -.03 
3. 58431.98 
    58947.62 (102) 
- .00 .07 .01 - - - Support -.04 -.02 -.01 .01 .02 .03 .05 
4. 58326.64 
    58842.29 (102) 
- - - - .98** -1.24** -.05         
Negative life 
events 
1.  83610.49 
     84126.13 (102) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 83593.54  
    84114.24 (103) 
-.28*** - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 83611.49 
    84142.30 (105) 
- .09 .04 .04 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 83517.90 
    84048.71 (105) 
- - - - 1.03* -1.27* -.02         
Socio-economic 
adversity 
1. 57032.06 
    57481.98 (89) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 57025.51 
    57480.48 (90) 
-.33 - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 57018.94 
    57484.03 (92) 
- .00 .20* .14* - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 56936.47 
    57401.56 (92) 
- - - - 1.04* -1.27* -.03         
Notes: AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; Active = active coping; Avoid = avoidant coping; Support = support seeking coping; TEI= trait emotional 
intelligence. Model 1: baseline measurement model with regression coefficients; Model 2: direct effect interaction only; Model 3: ‘a’ path interactions only; Model 4: ‘b’ path interactions 
only. Models highlighted in bold type have significant conditional indirect effects - point estimates displayed in column 6. Unstandardised estimates presented throughout; latent 
variables standardised via scaling prior to analysis.  *** p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05
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Figure 12: A plot of the specific indirect effect of family dysfunction on depression through active coping 
versus the moderator trait EI with confidence bands.  
Notes: The horizontal line indicates a specific indirect effect of zero; the vertical line represents the 
boundary of the region of significance, highlighted within the shaded area (trait EI ≥ 2SD from the mean). 
Confidence interval estimates derived from Monte Carlo re-sampling with 20,000 repetitions (Selig & 
Preacher, 2008).  
 
Table 13 displays results for conditional indirect effects on depression involving 
AEI.  Significant (unconditional) indirect effects were present in baseline models 
predicting depression from family dysfunction (total indirect effect = .13, SE = .05, p = 
.004) and negative life events (total indirect effect = .08, SE = .04, p = .018).  Model 
estimation suggested that AEI directly moderated the effect of negative life events, but 
not family dysfunction or socio-economical adversity, on depression.  However, AEI also 
significantly interacted with negative life events (B = .15, SE =.05, p = .002) and family 
dysfunction (B = .14, SE =.05, p = .007) to predict use of avoidant coping (model 3), which, 
with post-hoc probing at high (+3 SD) to low levels (-3 SD) of AEI, resulted in significant 
negative conditional indirect effects in both models (see Appendix H, figures 13 and 14 
for full path diagrams).  Specifically, for every single unit change in family dysfunction, 
depression should decrease by .38, as avoidant coping decreases by .61, conditioned on 
mean AEI.  Similarly, for a single unit change in negative life events, depression reduces by 
.59, per a reduction of .62 in avoidant coping given average levels of AEI.   As figures 15 
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and 16 illustrate, both effects were stronger at lower levels of AEI; hence, individuals with 
emotional ability scores ≤ +2 SD from the mean (i.e., 127.06 and below) use less avoidant 
coping, thereby reducing depression when faced with family dysfunction (B = - .63, SE 
=.28, p = .023) and negative life events (B = - 1.04, SE = .41, p = .011) compared to those 
with extremely high emotional capabilities (FD: B = -.13, SE = .08, p = .105; NLE: B = -.15, 
SE = .10, p = .130).  Both models offered a preferential fit to the data compared to 
corresponding baseline (ΔBIC FD: - 11.27; NLE: -11.26) and direct effect models (ΔBIC FD: - 
18.31; NLE: -14.27) with effect sizes indicating decisive support for these ‘a’ path 
explanations.  Notably, there were no significant conditional effects in models examining 
the effect of coping implementation on depression (‘b’ paths), or in any models exploring 
the effect of socio-economic adversity on depression.   
 
Summary: Results suggest that adolescents with higher TEI are more effective at 
implementing active coping to reduce depression, but this is only beneficial when facing 
family dysfunction, not negative life events or socio-economic adversity.  Conversely, 
adolescents with lower AEI choose avoidant styles less often to reduce depression but 
again, this effect is context-specific; a reduction in avoidant coping and depression is 
manifest only when facing negative life events and family dysfunction, not socio-
economic adversity.  
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Table 13: Conditional indirect effects for stressors on depression moderated by ability emotional intelligence  
Model 
 
AIC/BIC 
(n parameters) 
Stressor x 
AEI on 
disorder 
Stressor x AEI on coping Coping x AEI on disorder Conditional indirect effects at level of AEI (+/-3 SD from M) 
Active Avoid Support Active Avoid Support  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Family 
dysfunction 
 
1. 82042.67 
    82543.15 (99) 
- - - - - - - Active -.05 -.03 -.01 .01 .03 .05 .07 
2. 82044.66 
    82550.19 (100) 
.01 - - - - - - Avoid -.63* -.55* -.46* -.38* -.29* -.21 -.13 
3. 82016.24 
    82531.88 (102) 
- -.05 .14** -.09 - - - Support .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00 -.00 
4. 82044.10 
    82559.74 (102) 
- - - - .23 -.37 .02         
Negative life 
events 
1. 107196.59 
    107712.24 (102) 
- - - - - - - Active .20 .18 .15 .13 .11 .08 .06 
2. 107184.44 
    107715.25 (103) 
.28*** - - - - - - Avoid -1.04* -.89* -.74* -.59* -.45* -.30* -.15 
3. 107180.24 
    107700.98 (105) 
- .03 .15** .02 - - - Support .03 .03 .03 .02 .02 .02 .01 
4. 107194.93 
    107725.74 (105) 
- - - - .23 -.42 -.00         
Socio-economic 
adversity 
1. 80604.23 
    81054.15 (89) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 80604.02 
    81059.00 (90) 
-.17 - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 80589.41 
    81054.50 (92) 
- -.09 .07 .08 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 80604.71 
    81069.80 (92) 
- - - - .23 -.34 -.05         
Notes: AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; Active = active coping; Avoid = avoidant coping; Support = support seeking coping; AEI= ability emotional 
intelligence. Model 1: baseline measurement model with regression coefficients; Model 2: direct effect interaction only; Model 3: ‘a’ path interactions only; Model 4: ‘b’ path interactions 
only. Models highlighted in bold type have significant conditional indirect effects - point estimates displayed in column 6. Unstandardised estimates presented throughout; latent 
variables standardised via scaling prior to analysis. *** p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05 
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Figure 15: A plot of the specific indirect effect of family dysfunction on depression through avoidant coping 
versus the moderator ability EI with confidence bands. Notes: The horizontal line indicates a specific 
indirect effect of zero; the vertical line represents the boundary of the region of significance, highlighted 
within the shaded area (ability EI ≤ 2SD from the mean). Confidence interval estimates derived from Monte 
Carlo re-sampling; 20,000 repetitions (Selig & Preacher, 2008).
 
Figure 16: A plot of the specific indirect effect of negative life events on depression through avoidant coping 
versus the moderator ability EI with confidence bands. Notes: The horizontal line indicates a specific 
indirect effect of zero; the vertical line represents the boundary of the region of significance, highlighted 
within the shaded area (ability EI ≤ 2SD from the mean). Confidence interval estimates derived from Monte 
Carlo re-sampling; 20,000 repetitions (Selig & Preacher, 2008).  
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14.3.4 The indirect effect of stressors on disruptive behaviour conditional on EI 
 
A further six groups of non-nested models were specified to test the effects of 
each of the three stressors (family dysfunction, negative life events, socio-economic 
adversity) on disruptive behaviour, moderated by EI (either trait or ability).  As before, 
each of the groups comprised a set of four competing sub-models to facilitate comparison 
of direct and indirect effects via coping.  
 
Table 14 displays results for TEI.  Significant (unconditional) indirect effects were 
present in the baseline model predicting disruptive behaviour from family dysfunction 
(total indirect effect = -.10, SE = .03, p = .004).  Nevertheless, subsequent model 
estimation indicated that relationships between each of the three stressors and 
disruptive behaviour were modified directly by TEI; there were no detectable, indirect 
influences on either the selection (despite significant ‘a’ path interactions) or 
implementation of coping styles to impact externalising symptomotology in the context 
of stressors. Indeed, pairwise comparison of BIC values indicted decisive support for 
direct effect models when compared with ‘a’ path explanations (ΔBIC FD: - 15.36; NLE: -
14.38, SEA: -107.46). The strength of supporting evidence differed with reference to 
baseline models; whilst direct effect models predicting disruptive behaviour from socio-
economic adversity (ΔBIC = - 111.45) and family dysfunction (ΔBIC = - 7.52) could be 
considered ‘decisive’ and ‘very strong’, only ‘weak’ support was found for the negative 
life events model.   
 
Each effect was probed at conditional values of TEI (-3 to +3 SD from the mean 
with centred predictor variables: latent mean = 0, variance set to 1). As figure 17A 
illustrates, the TEI x family dysfunction interaction was ordinal within the possible range 
of values of the stressor; simple regression lines would cross at 3.75 SD below the mean 
of family dysfunction.  Consequently, those with high perceived emotional competency 
reported less disruptive behaviour at high levels of FD (B = -.43, SE = .16 p < .001) relative 
to those with low levels of perceived emotional competency (B = .43, SE = .16, p < .001).  
A similar, ordinal interaction was found for the effect of TEI x negative life events on 
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disruptive behaviour (figure 17B), with the point of intersection occurring at - 3.51 SD 
from the mean of negative life events. Once again, higher TEI was related to fewer 
externalising symptoms at higher levels of NLE (B = -.44, SE = .21 p < .05), in comparison 
to those with lower TEI (B = .44, SE = .21 p < .05).  This trend is continued in Figure 17C; 
TEI was also protective against the effects of poverty on disruptive behaviour at high (B = 
-1.57, SE = .11, p < .001) relative to low (B = 1.57, SE = .11, p < .001) levels of competency. 
Here, the crossing point occurs at 1.25 SD below the mean of socio-economic adversity.  
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Table 14: Conditional indirect effects for stressors on disruptive behaviour moderated by trait emotional intelligence  
Model 
 
AIC/BIC 
(n parameters) 
Stressor x 
TEI on 
disorder 
Stressor x TEI on coping Coping x TEI on disorder Conditional indirect effects at level of TEI (+/-3 SD from M) 
Active Avoid Support Active Avoid Support  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Family 
dysfunction 
 
1. 56657.33 
    57157.81 (99) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 56644.76 
    57150.29 (100) 
-.14** - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 56650.01 
    57165.65 (102) 
- .03 .12** .02 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 56654.72 
    57170.36 (102) 
- - - - -.08 .22 -.01         
Negative life 
events 
1. 81822.11 
    82337.75 (102) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 81815.38 
    82336.08 (103) 
-.15* - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 81819.65 
    82350.46 (105) 
- .12* .10 .04 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 81810.97 
    82341.77 (105) 
- - - - -.18 .32 .05         
Socio-economic 
adversity 
1. 55269.51 
    55719.43 (89) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 55153.00 
    55607.98 (90) 
-.52*** - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 55250.35 
    55715.44 (92) 
- -.04 .25** .10 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 55261.14 
    55726.23 (92) 
- - - - -.09 .27 .01         
Notes: AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; Active = active coping; Avoid = avoidant coping; Support = support seeking coping; TEI= trait emotional 
intelligence. Model 1: baseline measurement model with regression coefficients; Model 2: direct effect interaction only; Model 3: ‘a’ path interactions only; Model 4: ‘b’ path interactions 
only. Models highlighted in bold type have significant conditional indirect effects – point estimates displayed in column 6. Unstandardised estimates presented throughout; latent 
variables standardised via scaling prior to analysis. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Figure 17: Data plots of ‘direct effect’ simple slope interactions for (A) trait emotional intelligence (TEI) x 
family dysfunction (B) TEI x negative life events and (C) TEI x socio economic adversity (SEA) on disruptive 
behaviour. 
 
-1 1 
-1 1 
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Finally, Table 15 displays results for conditional indirect effects on disruptive 
behaviour involving AEI. No significant (unconditional) indirect effects were detected 
initially in baseline models.  Subsequent model estimation suggested that AEI directly 
attenuated the effects of socio-economic adversity on externalising symptomotology (B = 
-.42, SE = .12, p < .001), with pairwise BIC contrasts finding model 2 preferable to baseline 
(ΔBIC = -32.25), ‘a’ (ΔBIC = -29.03) and ‘b’ path (ΔBIC = -9.64) models. Figure 18 illustrates 
post-hoc probing of this effect at conditional values of AEI (-3 to +3 SD from the mean 
onto standardised latent predictors).   Those with high emotional ability reported less 
disruptive behaviour at high levels of adversity (B = -1.25, SE = .35 p < .001) relative to 
those with low emotional skill (B = 1.25, SE = .35, p < .001), with simple regression lines 
expected to cross at 3.02 SD below the mean of socio-economic adversity.  Conversely, 
there were no direct effects in models predicting externalising symptoms from family 
dysfunction or negative life events, with pairwise BIC contrasts favouring ‘b’ path models.  
However, whilst AEI significantly interacted with family dysfunction and negative life 
events to influence the selection of avoidant coping (model 3) and the implementation of 
both active and avoidant coping (model 4), none of these effects produced significant 
conditional indirect effects that were detectably different from zero within the plausible 
range of AEI skill (i.e., -3 to +3 SD from the mean).   
 
 
Figure 18: Data plot of the ‘direct effect’ simple slope interaction for ability emotional intelligence x socio- 
economic adversity (SEA) on disruptive behaviour. 
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Table 15: Conditional indirect effects for stressors on disruptive behaviour moderated by ability emotional intelligence  
Model 
 
AIC/BIC 
(n parameters) 
Stressor 
x AEI on 
disorder 
Stressor x AEI on coping Coping x AEI on disorder Conditional indirect effects at level of AEI (+/-3 SD from M) 
Active Avoid Support Active Avoid Support  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Family 
dysfunction 
 
1. 80084.57 
    80585.05 (99) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 80079.04 
    80584.57 (100) 
-.12 - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 80053.15 
    80568.79(102) 
- -.05 .16** -.09 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 80036.77 
    80552.41 (102) 
- - - - -.53** .81*** -.09         
Negative life 
events 
1. 105183.55 
    105699.19 (102) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 105181.81        
    105702.51 (103) 
-.09 - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 105177.14 
    105707.95 (105) 
- .04 .13** .02 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 105146.74 
    105677.55 (105) 
- - - - -.49** .74*** -.14         
Socio-
economic 
adversity 
1. 78603.92 
    79053.84 (89) 
- - - - - - - Active - - - - - - - 
2. 78566.14 
    79021.59 (90) 
-.42*** - - - - - - Avoid - - - - - - - 
3. 78585.53 
    79050.62 (92) 
- -.10 .09 .07 - - - Support - - - - - - - 
4. 78566.61 
    79031.23 (92) 
- - - - -.47* .80*** -.19         
Notes: AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; Active = active coping; Avoid = avoidant coping; Support = support seeking coping; AEI= ability emotional 
intelligence. Model 1: baseline measurement model with regression coefficients; Model 2: direct effect interaction only; Model 3: ‘a’ path interactions only; Model 4: ‘b’ path interactions 
only. Models highlighted in bold type have significant conditional indirect effects - point estimates displayed in column 6. Unstandardised estimates presented throughout; latent viable 
standardised via scaling prior to analysis. ** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Summary: In contrast to models predicting depression, TEI does not operate 
indirectly via coping to influence disruptive behaviour symptomotology. However, a 
widespread protective effect was still detected; a higher level of perceived emotional 
competency directly reduces disruptive behaviour with exposure to all three stressors.  
Subsequent analyses found this effect replicated (in part) with respect to AEI; here, higher 
levels of emotional skill directly reduce disruptive behaviour, however, this is only 
apparent when facing socio-economic adversity and not family dysfunction or negative 
life events. 
 
14.3.5 Supplementary analysis 
 
The preceding analyses suggested that trait and ability EI act differentially to 
influence indirect pathways from stressors to disorder via coping.  In models predicting 
depression, AEI acted on ‘a’ paths to influence coping choice, whereas TEI operated via ‘b’ 
paths to influence coping effectiveness. Whilst disruptive behaviour was explained 
through a series of direct effects models, there were, nevertheless, significant AEI x 
coping interactions (i.e., ‘b’ paths) and each of the stressors interacted with TEI (‘a’ 
paths).  Moreover, results hint that different levels of trait and ability EI may be desirable 
within particular contexts, e.g., lower ability yet higher trait EI yielded advantageous 
effects with respect to family dysfunction and depression.  Hence, it is plausible that both 
types of EI might exert a combined effect on stressor-health processes to simultaneously 
influence both the selection and implementation of coping to impact adaptation (i.e., 
dual moderation of the ‘a’ and ‘b’ paths).  
 
The specification and testing of such effects via the latent variable approach 
employed thus far is not appropriate given the computational burden and possibility of 
numerical instability (i.e., models estimating 4 interaction effects based on 6 dimensions 
of integration).  However, this can be tested via path analysis at the level of manifest 
variables.  Whilst this type of analysis does not explicitly model measurement error, and 
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therefore has reduced power to detect significant effects, this was deemed sufficient for 
the purposes of initial, exploratory analyses.  Consequently, 12 path models were 
specified to model the effects of each of the three stressors (family dysfunction, negative 
life events, socio-economic adversity) on depression and disruptive behaviour.  Six 
models estimated conditional indirect effects when ability EI moderated the ‘a’ paths (i.e., 
stressor x AEI) and trait EI influenced the ‘b’ paths (coping x TEI), whilst the remaining six 
models tested the reverse pattern (i.e., ‘a’ paths moderated by TEI; ‘b’ path interactions 
involving AEI).  All predictor variables were mean-centred with analyses based on robust 
estimation of complete cases only.   
 
As expected, none of the models predicting disruptive behaviour from stressors 
contained significant conditional indirect effects (with T/AEI acting on either ‘a’ or ‘b’ 
paths).  However, the impact of all three stressors on depression could be explained with 
reference to indirect pathways through coping, conditional on AEI moderating the ‘a’ path 
and TEI the ‘b’ path (modelling the reverse positions yielded n.s. findings).  Between 33-
38% of the variance in depression could be explained by individual models (FD: F (10, 796) 
= 48.42, p < 0.001; R2 = .38; NLE: F (10, 740) = 41.13, p < 0.001; R
2
 = .36; SEA: F (10, 814) = 
40.86, p < 0.001; R2 = .33).  As Table 16 shows, pathways involving avoidant coping were 
significantly influenced by AEI (predicting selection of avoidant coping with exposure to 
stressors) and TEI (effects of avoidant coping reduce as a function of TEI across all 
models).  Whilst TEI also amplified the effects of active coping on depression (in all 
models) and AEI influenced the selection of support seeking coping under family 
dysfunction, only the specific conditional indirect effect through avoidant coping was 
detectably different from zero, conditioned on both TEI and AEI.   
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Table 16: Parameter estimates for significant indirect effects models predicting depression 
conditional on ability and trait EI  
Mod.  Active coping Avoidant coping Support seeking 
coping 
Depression 
Predictor Estimate 
(parameter) 
SE Estimate 
(parameter) 
SE Estimate 
(parameter) 
SE Estimate 
(parameter) 
SE 
FD Active - - - - - - .29 (b1) .71 
 Avoidant - - - - - - 1.19 (b2) .68 
 Support - - - - - - .32  (b3) .58 
 FD -.21*** (a1) .04 .05 (a2) .04 -.29*** (a3) .04 4.63*** .63 
 AEI .00 .01 -.00 .00 -.01*** .01 - - 
 FD x AEI -.01 (a7) .01 .01* (a8) .01 -.01 ** (a9) .01 - - 
 TEI - - - - - - -.21*** .02 
 TEI x Active - - - - - - .08*  (b5) .03 
 TEI x Avoid - - - - - - -.11*** (b6) .03 
 TEI x Support - - - - - - .01 (b7) .03 
 Age .04* .02 -.02 .02 -.10** .02 .50* .23 
 Sex .04 .04 .12* .04 .34** .07 2.08** .57 
          
NLE Active - - - - - - -.06 (b1) .75 
 Avoidant - - - - - - 1.45* (b2) .72 
 Support - - - - - - -.07 (b3) .62 
 NLE -.00 (a1) .00 .01* (a2) .01 .00 (a3) .00 .04** .01 
 AEI .00 .00 -.00 .00 -.01** .01 - - 
 NLE x AEI .00 (a7) .00 .01* (a8) .01 .00 (a9) .00 - - 
 TEI - - - - - - -.24*** .02 
 TEI x Active - - - - - - .07* (b5) .03 
 TEI x Avoid - - - - - - -.08** (b6) .03 
 TEI x Support - - - - - - .02 (b7) .03 
 Age .04 .04 -.03 .02 -.04 .02 .43  .25 
 Sex .07 .07 .12* .04 .20*** .05 1.56** .60 
          
SEA Active - - - - - - -.18 (b1) .73 
 Avoidant - - - - - - 1.74* (b2) .69 
 Support - - - - - - -.11 (b3) .59 
 SEA -.01 (a1) .01 .01 (a2) .01 -.01 (a3) .01 .42** .08 
 AEI .00 .00 -.00 .00 -.01** .00 - - 
 SEA x AEI -.00 (a7) .00 .01* (a8) .01 .00 (a9) .00 - - 
 TEI - - - - - - -.25*** .01 
 TEI x Active - - - - - - .08** (b5) .03 
 TEI x Avoid - - - - - - -.09** (b6) .03 
 TEI x Support - - - - - - .01 (b7) .03 
 Age .01 .02 -.01 .02 -.04* .02 .57* .24 
 Sex .04 .04 .11* .04 .22*** .04 1.72** .58 
 
Notes: FD = family dysfunction; NLE = negative life events; SEA = socio-economic adversity; Active = active 
coping; Avoid = avoidant coping; Support = support seeking coping; TEI= trait emotional intelligence; AEI = 
ability emotional intelligence. N =751 (NLE); 807 (FD); 825 (SEA).  Parameter labels correspond to regression 
paths denoted in figures 9 and 10. Unstandardised estimates presented; predictor variables standardised 
prior to analysis. 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Each of the specific indirect effects of stressors on depression via avoidant coping 
were estimated at high (95th percentile) through to low (10th percentile) values of AEI and 
TEI.  Percentile values were selected to ensure that these exploratory effects were 
estimated within the range of the sample data.  The direct effect of family dysfunction on 
depression was .46 (SE = .63, p < .001) where at mean levels of EI (i.e., 50th percentile), a 
single unit change in family dysfunction triggers an increase of .08 in depression, per a 
increase of .05 in avoidant coping. However, as figure 19A illustrates, the indirect effect 
significantly differentiates at above average levels of AEI (≥ 75th percentile), becoming 
negative in individuals with extremely high levels of TEI (90th percentile = -.22, SE = .18, 
[95% CI: -.69, -.02]), but remaining positive in those with low to average levels of TEI (10th 
percentile = .53, SE = .28, [95% CI: .13, 1.33]).  This suggests that high levels of trait EI 
(scores ≥ 160) coupled with above average to extremely high levels of ability EI (scores of 
108.67 or more) are beneficial in reducing the impact of family dysfunction on depression 
via avoidant coping.  Yet at lower levels of TEI, outcomes are poorer despite above 
average levels of emotional skill, and crucially, this effect is stronger. Although not 
detectably different from zero, it is notable that indirect effects reversed with decreasing 
AEI, transitioning at the 25th percentile (for the bottom 10% of AEI/TEI scorers: 
conditional effect = - .22, SE = .28 [95% CI: -.86, .27]).  
 
Similar patterns of findings were detected for both negative life events (direct 
effect = .04, SE = .01, p < .001) and socio-economic adversity (direct effect = -.11, SE = .15, 
p = .48), though both were of a lesser magnitude.  For every single unit change in negative 
life events and socio-economic adversity, depression is expected to increase by .003 and 
.02 respectively, per an increase of .01 in avoidant coping at average levels of trait and 
ability EI.  Again, figures 19B and 19C depict how, in both cases, the indirect effect 
changes at higher levels of AEI.  When facing stressful life events, average to extremely 
high levels of AEI (scores ≥ 99.44/50th percentile) coupled with low to average levels of 
TEI (scores ≤ 131.50) results in an increase in depression, with the strongest effect seen in 
individuals with extremely high emotional ability (top 10% of scorers) yet extremely low 
emotional self-efficacy (bottom 10%); conditional effect = .01, SE = .01, [95% CI: .004, 
.03].  Specific indirect effects were not detectably different from zero at low to average 
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levels of AEI (i.e., below the 50th percentile), or in those with above average to extremely 
high levels of TEI (75th percentile and above).  Likewise, exposure to socio-economic 
adversity teamed with extremely high levels of AEI (scores ≥ 115.12/90th percentile) but 
extremely low levels of TEI (scores ≤ 108.00/10th percentile) results in the largest increase 
in depression through avoidant coping (conditional effect = .13, SE = .01, [95% CI: .004, 
.03]).    Once again, indirect effects were not detectably different from zero at low to 
average levels of AEI (i.e., below the 75th percentile) or in those with above average to 
extremely high levels of TEI (75th percentile and above). 
 
Summary: Preliminary analyses suggest that trait and ability EI exert combined yet 
differential influences on the indirect effect of stressors on depression via avoidant 
coping.  Possessing an emotionally ‘intelligent’ skill-set is, by itself, insufficient for 
successful adaptation; indeed, a profile of high emotional skill coupled with low 
emotional self-confidence is deleterious under stress (particularly with exposure to family 
dysfunction and socio-economic adversity).  Adolescents with finely-tuned emotional 
capabilities are more likely to choose avoidant strategies and without the emotional self-
confidence to implement these effectively, depression increases.   However, the corollary 
of this potentially sub-optimal choice can be lessened with increasing self-confidence 
(and completely overridden through extremely high TEI in the context of family 
dysfunction); adolescents with high emotional skill and increasing levels of emotional self-
efficacy do better. These adolescents believe they can accurately perceive, understand, 
control and express emotion to positively impact on their situation, such that any 
negative emotion arising from the implementation of cognitive and behavioural 
avoidance is mitigated.  In other words, TEI acts as a protective buffer once avoidant 
coping is enacted at high levels of AEI.   Notably, conditional indirect effects were not 
significant at lower levels of AEI and did not extend to models predicting disruptive 
behaviour.  Whilst TEI amplified the positive effects of active coping on depression, this 
effect was not conditional on AEI mobilising an active style under stress.   
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Figure 19: Data plots of the specific indirect effect of (A) family dysfunction (FD) (B) negative life events 
(NLE) and (C) socio-economic adversity (SEA) on depression through avoidant coping versus the 
moderators, ability EI (AEI) and trait EI (TEI).  
Notes:  In each case, the vertical line represents the boundary of the region of significance highlighted 
within the shaded area.
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14.4 On the relationship between EI and mental health: Key findings 
 
This chapter explored the predictive and incremental validity of both trait and 
ability EI regarding mental health and examined how and when EI might contribute to 
adaptational processes.  The following key points emerged: 
 
 Age and sex effects were detected for AEI but not TEI.  There was only weak 
correspondence between the two ‘forms’ of EI, indexed via performance-based and 
self-report assessment. 
 
 Whilst TEI was inversely related to both internalising and externalising 
symptomotology, higher AEI was related to a decrease in the latter only.   
 
 TEI shared medium to large associations with low trait Neuroticism, high trait 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Extraversion and Openness, but was negligibly 
related to general cognitive ability.  The reverse pattern was found for relationships 
involving AEI.   
 
 In spite of these associations, both forms of EI contributed incrementally to the 
prediction of disorder beyond personality and general cognitive ability.  TEI explained 
an additional 10% of the variance in depression, whilst the prediction of disruptive 
behaviour was enhanced by both TEI and AEI, accounting for 4% and 1% incremental 
variance respectively. 
 
 The predictive relationship between EI and mental health can be explained with 
reference to direct and indirect processes.  The indirect effect of stressors on 
depression is contingent on EI; AEI influences the selection of avoidant coping when 
facing family dysfunction and negative life events, whilst TEI modifies the 
effectiveness of active coping under family dysfunction.  In contrast, EI directly 
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attenuates the effects of stressors on disruptive behaviour (though the ‘widespread’ 
effects found for TEI were not replicated for AEI, which directly protects against socio-
economic adversity only).  
 
 Preliminary evidence suggests that trait and ability EI work in tandem to modify the 
selection and efficacy of avoidant coping, influencing the indirect effect of stressors 
on depression but not disruptive behaviour.  High levels of AEI are not always 
universally adaptive; higher levels of skill may be harmful when coupled with low 
emotional self-competency. 
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15. DISCUSSION 
 
 
This research set out to examine why, how and when EI might be associated with 
better adolescent mental health and simultaneously explored the conceptualisation of EI 
within this developmental period.   Findings are mixed; there is clear support for the 
construct differentiation of trait and ability EI (in line with theory and prior research) and 
evidence that both can make a unique contribution to the prediction of disorder beyond 
the ‘Big 5’ personality dimensions and general cognitive ability.  However, qualifications 
regarding the ‘adaptive’ nature of each construct are warranted.  It would appear that 
whilst emotional personality and emotional processing skill do confer protection when 
faced with stressors, the mechanisms by which these operate differ substantially, with 
effects contingent on stressor context, health outcome and level of EI.  Nevertheless, 
preliminary evidence augurs for the importance of both in adaptational processes; actual 
emotional skill appears dependent on perceived competency to realise advantageous 
outcomes.   This chapter presents a detailed analysis of these findings across three key 
sections before reviewing the implications and limitations of the research.  Discussion 
closes by considering the future progression of the field.  
 
15.1 The nature of EI in adolescence 
 
Findings from the present research lend credence to the construct differentiation 
of EI, extended to adolescence.  At a basic level, trait and ability EI scores were negligibly 
related (r = .17, p < .001;  3% shared variance) which replicates the pattern found in 
adults (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Goldenberg et al., 2006), pre-adolescents (Barlow et 
al., 2010; Qualter et al., 2012) and is in line with two recent meta-analyses reporting 
average corrected correlations of r = .12 (for ‘ability’ based trait measures), r = .26 
(‘mixed’ trait measures) (Joseph & Newman, 2010) and r =  .14  (overall TEI, irrespective 
of model) (Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005).  Importantly, these meta-analytical 
findings point to potential variation in the magnitude of the AEI-TEI relationship according 
to differences in TEI instrument sampling domains.  Indeed, the current research suggests 
that even within ‘type’ (e.g., across ‘mixed’ trait instruments) there could be substantial 
variation in associations; for instance, in youth populations, MSCEIT and EQi scores 
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appear to share 13-18% variance (Peters et al., 2009; Windingstad, McCallum, Bell, & 
Dunn, 2011) which is substantially greater than the proportion found here between the 
TEIQue and MSCEIT. This could, however, be attributed to differential sampling of facets 
relating to higher order personality dimensions; despite both instruments being classified 
as ‘mixed’ trait EI measures, the EQi taps trait Agreeableness to a greater extent than the 
TEIQue (e.g., Austin et al., 2005; Petrides, Pita et al., 2007) which, as will discussed below, 
is one of two higher-order dimensions indexed by the MSCEIT. 
 
As a form of intelligence specialised for reasoning about emotion, AEI should only 
weakly relate to personality but share positive associations, of at least moderate 
magnitude, with general cognitive ability (Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer, Roberts et al., 2008). 
With respect to the latter, previous research predicts a relationship in the range of r = .25 
to .40, depending on whether a ‘pure’ measure of IQ (Austin, 2010; Farrelly & Austin, 
2007; Joseph & Newman, 2010; Van Rooy et al., 2005) or a proxy (such as grade point 
average) is used (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003; MacCann et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2009).  
More robust correlations are typically found with proxy indicators and this was 
corroborated in the current research (r = .39, p < .001).  Whilst the use of a proxy 
precludes firm inferences concerning the relative distinctiveness of AEI from 
fluid/crystallised ability (Austin, 2010; MacCann, 2010; Wilhelm, 2005), it is notable that 
all three branches that draw heavily on crystallised, verbal ability for task completion (i.e., 
understanding; using; managing emotion) made significant contributions to this 
association, whilst non-verbal skill in perceiving emotion was unrelated.  Markedly, this 
replicates the pattern found in recent adolescent research where coefficients with IQ and 
proxy measures of general cognitive ability have been reported (Peters et al., 2009; 
Qualter et al., 2012) and accords with an AEI-IQ only meta-analysis (Joseph & Newman, 
2010) – in all cases, understanding emotion consistently presents as one of the strongest 
contributors to this association, with perceiving emotion the least influential.  
 
By contrast, the current data found (total) AEI negligibly related to Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness and unrelated to Neuroticism.  However, stronger associations were 
detected for trait Openness (r = .37) and Agreeableness (r = .20), as recovered previously 
(e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Van Rooy et al., 2005; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010).  
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Notably, with the exception of Agreeableness, the magnitude of relationships indicated 
by the current data appear very similar to those documented for general cognitive ability 
and personality traits (Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007).  Whilst such reasoning 
by analogy would appear to lend further support the conceptualisation of ability EI as an 
‘intelligence’, this  patterning once again calls into question the distinctiveness of this 
‘new’ ability (MacCann, 2010).  Nevertheless, sub-branch analyses appear largely in line 
with theoretical predictions. Mayer and colleagues maintain that within their hierarchical 
framework, higher-level abilities should be increasingly integrated within psychological 
(e.g., personality) sub-systems, given the influence of context-dependent, motivational 
factors on behaviour,  whereas skills sub-serving lower-level abilities (i.e., emotion 
perception) should predominately relate to the emotion system (Mayer, 2005; Mayer et 
al., 2004).  The current data provides tentative support for these predictions; perceiving 
emotion was unrelated to any of the higher-order personality dimensions whereas using, 
understanding and managing contributed equally to trait Openness.  However, this trend 
appears less clear-cut in adult samples (Joseph & Newman, 2010), perhaps hinting at 
developmentally-contingent relationships. Comprehensive longitudinal studies charting 
the inter-relationships between personality and ability EI will be necessary to better 
understand these complexities. 
 
Turning to TEI, the expected associations with higher-order personality 
dimensions and general cognitive ability were also confirmed.  Reflecting emotional 
personality, TEI taps lower-level, affect-related self-perceptions and dispositions that are 
partially determined by higher-order dimensions (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).  Hence, in 
line with personality theory, relationships with the Big 5 traits are anticipated, as are 
negligible relations with cognitive ability (Petrides, 2011a).  Here, TEI was associated with 
all personality traits, most notably with Neuroticism (r = -.55, p < .001) but less so with 
Openness to experience (r = .25, p < .001) which is fully in line with adult TEIQue research 
(Petrides, Pita et al., 2007; Vernon, Villani et al., 2008) and, importantly, represents the 
mirror-image of associations found for AEI and personality. Effect sizes also compare 
favourably with Ferrando et al., (2011) who detected significant associations with 
Extraversion (r = .39) and trait Anxiety (r = .46) in a sample of pre-adolescents. However, 
in contrast to the adult research base, in the current adolescent sample trait 
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Agreeableness shared a higher proportion of overlap with TEI (approx 17% versus 6.2 – 
10.2% in the adult studies).  As this is the first piece of research to document how the Big 
5 relate to TEI (TEIQue scores) in adolescents, comparisons with other developmentally-
equivalent samples cannot be made and the use of short-form measures precluded 
factor/facet level analyses to determine the source of this discrepancy. Clearly, it will be 
of interest to replicate this research and formally examine whether the location of the 
TEIQue in Big 5 factor space (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007) is consistent across adult and 
adolescent samples, e.g., it is possible that facets other than ‘assertiveness’ and 
‘relationships’ key into Agreeableness (or to a greater or lesser extent) at this 
developmental stage.  Irrespective of instrumentation and sample characteristics it is 
notable, however, that the magnitude of coefficients obtained here  (medium to large) 
accord with those found in a recent meta-analysis of ‘mixed’ TEI measures and 
personality (Joseph & Newman, 2010). Consequently, demonstrating the capacity of TEI 
to predict meaningful outcomes above and beyond the effects of these higher-order 
dimensions would appear similarly critical for adolescent research. 
 
By contrast, as predicted, a weaker association was detected between TEI and 
general cognitive ability (r = .20, p < .001) – notably, half the size of the coefficient found 
for AEI.  Typically non-significant or negligible relations have been reported between TEI 
and performance on tests of ‘pure’ IQ in adults, adolescents and children (Bastian et al., 
2005; Farrelly & Austin, 2007; Ferrando et al., 2011; Frederickson et al., 2012; Mavroveli 
et al., 2008; Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Qualter et al., 2012; Saklofske et al., 2003).  
However, the strength of these associations would again appear dependent upon 
measurement instrument and sample characteristics; for instance, more robust 
associations with IQ have been reported for the EQi (r > .28) over the TEIQue (r > .18)  in 
adolescents (Frederickson et al., 2012; Qualter et al., 2012) whilst both share non-
significant associations with IQ in adults (Farrelly & Austin, 2007, study 2; Mikolajczak, 
Luminet et al., 2007).  However, when proxy measures of general cognitive ability are 
used, this association can become inflated in both adult (e.g., O'Connor & Little, 2003) 
and youth samples (Ferrando et al., 2011; Mavroveli et al., 2009; Mavroveli et al., 2008; 
Mavroveli & Sánchez-Ruiz, 2011; Parker et al., 2004; Peters et al., 2009; Qualter et al., 
2012) with correlations reaching up to r = .33, convergent with the current findings.  
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Whilst associations are inconsistent across subject-specific proxy indicators (e.g., TEI has 
been related to Maths achievement (Mavroveli et al., 2009; Mavroveli & Sánchez-Ruiz, 
2011) yet elsewhere, English and spelling ability but not Maths or Science achievement 
(Mavroveli et al., 2008; Qualter et al., 2012)), the presence of any significant correlations 
would appear to contradict theoretical predictions.  However, evidence suggests that this 
can be attributed to the combined contributions of higher-order personality dimensions 
and ‘pure’ cognitive ability on academic achievement – in other words, personality (and 
by extension TEI) may be related to academic achievement as a result of shared links with 
IQ (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2006). Specifically, trait Extraversion, Neuroticism 
and Openness are known correlates of IQ (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) and the latter, 
together with trait Conscientiousness, contribute to academic achievement (Poropat, 
2009).   Therefore, with IQ controlled, relationships between TEI (which keys N, E and C in 
particular) and academic achievement should become negligible. Whilst the absence of a 
formal measure of IQ precluded analysis in the current data, this has been borne out by 
other studies (Ferrando et al., 2011; Mavroveli et al., 2009; Mavroveli et al., 2008).  
Moreover, this shared overlap with personality offers a plausible explanation for the 
differences found in the meta-analysed coefficients obtained for ability versus 
personality-based TEI  instruments and IQ, where the latter is reportedly of larger 
magnitude (Joseph & Newman, 2010).   
 
Altogether then, the expected empirical ‘dissociations’ with allied constructs were 
recovered for both trait and ability EI in the current data, lending support to a ‘dual-
facetted’ EI in adolescence. Nevertheless, some convergence across the two 
conceptualisations was expected in relation to sex differences and age-related trends.   
 
15.1.1 Sex differences and age-related trends 
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, theoretically, sex differences are anticipated 
for both constructs.  Studies of cognitive ability suggest that males have higher levels of 
actual numerical or spatial skill (Voyer et al., 1995) and perceived proficiency in general, 
mathematical and spatial (though not verbal) skill (Syzmanowicz & Furnham, 2011), yet 
females report higher levels of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness and 
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Conscientiousness (Schmitt et al., 2008).  Moreover, emotion research points to a female 
advantage in facial and non-verbal emotional expression (J. A. Hall, 1984; LaFrance, 
Hecht, & Levy Paluck, 2003), emotional decoding (McClure, 2000) and in complex 
emotional knowledge (Ciarrochi, Hynes, & Crittenden, 2005).  Importantly, gender 
differences in emotional processing have been explained with reference to the impact of 
socialisation (Eagly & Wood, 1999) – a theme which has also permeated theorising 
concerning the developmental origins of EI (e.g., 'Investment Theory' of Matthews et al., 
2002); specifically, whilst females are socialised towards nurturing roles, intimacy motives 
and interdependence, males are traditionally socialised to be ‘providers’, fostering control 
motives and independence (Cross & Madson, 1997).  Nevertheless, it is widely 
acknowledged that emotional processing is necessarily context-dependent, influenced by 
proximal (feedback from ‘online’ social interactions; consistency with individual ‘identity’, 
goals, motivations, expectations) and distal factors (temperament, gendered interactions 
with family/peers, socio-cultural stereotypes), hence inconsistencies in the patterning of 
emotion-related sex differences are also expected (Brody & Hall, 2010).    
 
In line with these theoretical predictions, sex differences were detected in AEI, 
with females exhibiting higher levels of emotional skill -  corroborating previous adult 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Farrelly & Austin, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 
2006; Karim & Weisz, 2010; McIntyre, 2010) adolescent (Barlow et al., 2010; Qualter et 
al., 2012; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010) and meta-analytic research (Joseph & 
Newman, 2010). Indeed females outperformed males in all areas (bar perceiving emotion 
which did not reach significance) but particularly in emotion management proficiency, 
corroborating the trend in recent research (Farrelly & Austin, 2007, study 2; Goldenberg 
et al., 2006; Qualter et al., 2012; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010).  The non-significant 
findings relating to perceptual ability are also consistent with the mixed picture that has 
emerged with respect to sex effects in ‘lower level’ MSCEIT sub-skills, which may 
ultimately reflect developmental or cultural differences manifest within the various distal 
and proximal influences noted above. For instance, in a group of older Israeli adolescents, 
males were significantly better than females at perceiving emotion (Zeidner & Olnick-
Shemesh, 2010), whilst Pakistani adult females outperformed their male counterparts in 
perceiving and using emotion - a difference which did not extend to French adults (Karim 
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& Weisz, 2010).  Moreover in British children, global level differences in emotion-related 
skill have not always been found (Qualter et al., 2011).  It should also be noted that the 
magnitude of effects in the current data were small (d ≤ .30) compared to previous 
research (e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007; Qualter et al., 2012; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 
2010) where medium to large effects have been documented (d ≤ .77), although much of 
the previous research has featured smaller groups of participants.   That said, the 
continued detection of a reliable sex-based, sub-group difference in AEI converges with 
allied emotion processing/cognitive ability research to perhaps further verify the status of 
the construct as an index of emotional aptitude, which could be distinct from measures of 
spatial/numerical ability (MacCann, 2010).   
 
By contrast, no discernible sex differences were detected for TEI which is in line 
with previous adult (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003) and adolescent research (e.g., 
Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mavroveli et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2009). Indeed, the lack of 
detectable sex differences appears to be one trend that does not appear contingent on 
TEI instrument type (Joseph & Newman, 2010).  Nevertheless, this appears to run 
contrary to established personality research where the Big five dimensions that dominate 
the TEI sampling domain (particularly Neuroticism) are known to differ across genders 
(Schmitt et al., 2008).  However, some studies have reported significantly higher TEI levels 
in females (Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Farrelly & Austin, 2007, study 2; Goldenberg et al., 2006; 
Mavroveli & Sánchez-Ruiz, 2011; Qualter et al., 2012) or males (Petrides, 2009a) and it is 
notable that the trend in the current study was towards the latter.  Since sex-differences 
were probed only at the global level, it is quite plausible that lower-level facet/factor 
differences were present yet diluted through aggregation, as suggested by proponents of 
the construct (Mavroveli et al., 2009).  For instance, factor level differences in trait ‘self-
control’ have been found for males yet higher perceived ‘wellbeing’ and ‘emotionality’ for 
females, despite non-significant global differences (Siegling et al., 2012).  Similarly, at the 
facet level, males self-rate their competency in emotion management (others), 
assertiveness, emotion regulation (self), stress management, social awareness and self-
esteem more highly than females who report higher competency in emotional 
expression, perception, relationships and trait empathy (Petrides, 2009a). Interestingly, 
the pattern of sex-related trait facets detected in this work would appear broadly 
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consistent with the independent (i.e., self-control, self-esteem etc) versus interdependent 
(i.e., relationships, trait empathy) socialised identities described earlier.   Indeed, Siegling 
et al., (2012) suggest that the inherently ‘intrapersonal’ nature of the TEIQue versus the 
predominantly ‘interpersonal’ MSCEIT (i.e., assessing management of others emotions; 
perception of emotion in others) are both uniquely positioned to capture these divergent 
qualities.  As a next step, it will be important to clarify these lower-level TEI sex 
differences in adolescents using a long-form measure. 
 
 A final point of divergence for the ability and trait perspectives was found in their 
associations with age.  AEI should show progression across development if it is 
representative of a true ability, yet whilst some early data (based on a now defunct AEI 
instrument) suggested adult versus adolescent differences in specific tasks tapping 
perceiving, understanding and managing emotion (Mayer et al., 1999, study 2), more 
recent correlational research has been less conclusive; non-significant relationships 
between age and total MSCEIT scores have been documented in children and adults 
(Barlow et al., 2010; Palmer et al., 2005), yet elsewhere a positive correspondence has 
been reported in  adults (Goldenberg et al., 2006) and a small group of adolescents 
(Peters et al., 2009). Moreover, in contrast to the earlier work of Mayer et al., (1999) 
none of these studies found an association between age and ability to perceive emotion, 
although proficiency in managing emotion appeared to increase with age across all 
groups (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Palmer at al., 2005; Peters et al., 2009).  The current 
research does little to clarify this literature base; whilst total AEI was positively related to 
age (r = .27) this appeared attributable to the development of strategic emotional skill 
(i.e., understanding and managing emotion) rather than experiential ability (ability to use 
emotion was unrelated to age and perceiving emotion negligibly so, r = .12).  Clearly, 
definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from simple cross-sectional analyses of age 
trends.  However, whilst the lack of an association with age could be justified in adult 
samples on the basis of reaching ‘mature’ ability, the absence of an association in children 
together with the sporadic links found for experiential skills in adolescents are potentially 
problematic for a construct which is predicated on acquisition of developmentally-
sensitive emotion-related skills (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  It is possible however that 
these inconsistent findings are a result of limitations in the sampling domain of the 
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MSCEIT-YV (used here and in Barlow et al., 2010 & Peters et al., 2009) which is still under 
validation.  For instance, whilst the adult MSCEIT provides assessment of ability to 
perceive emotion in faces and pictures (landscapes; abstract designs), the youth version 
assesses only the former.  Hence, it is plausible that this restricted content range may not 
be sensitive to the developmental change occurring from pre-adolescence up to 18 years 
of age.  Detailed longitudinal investigation is required to help resolve these outstanding 
issues.   
 
Patently, this is also a necessary next step for TEI research.  Perceived emotional 
competence was unrelated to age in the current group of adolescents which would 
appear inconsistent with longitudinal research documenting changes in the Big 5 traits 
across development (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) and recent theorising (Shiner & Caspi, 
2003).  Moreover, even proponents of TEI forecast some degree of change as  a result of 
improved socialisation and reduced emotional lability (Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007). 
Indeed, when plotting age-related changes in TEI across a group of adults aged 19 to 84 
years, Derksen, Kramer, and Katzko (2002) found that (EQi) scores  followed a curvilinear 
relationship, reaching a peak between ages 35 and 44 years before decreasing again. 
Notably, this is broadly in line with the aforementioned Big 5 research in which trait 
stability was reached between ages 50-70 years (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).   To date 
however, very few researchers have documented correlations between age and TEI, and 
findings are inconclusive across those cross-sectional studies that have; for instance,  
positive associations between TEI and age have been reported in children (Barlow et al., 
2010) and some adult groups (Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Petrides & Furnham, 
2006) but not others (Goldenberg et al., 2006), or in adolescents aged 13 to 15 years 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2001).   It is possible that fine grained examination of lower level TEI 
factors across a wider age range (e.g., 10-18 years) would reveal differences otherwise 
obscured through aggregation, however, as noted earlier, longitudinal tracking of TEI 
from childhood into adulthood is urgently required. 
 
Summary:  The construct differentiation of EI in adolescence has been supported 
by the current data.  Trait and ability EI scores were negligibly related in line with previous 
adult and pre-adolescent research (e.g., Barlow et al., 2010; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; 
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Goldenberg et al., 2006; Qualter et al., 2012). Additionally, both conceptualisations were 
associated with allied constructs as anticipated; TEI was more robustly associated with 
the Big 5 personality dimensions (particularly Neuroticism; less so Openness) than general 
cognitive ability, whilst the reverse pattern was found for AEI (unrelated to Neuroticism; 
stronger associations with Openness) corroborating earlier findings (Brackett & Mayer, 
2003; Peters et al., 2009; Petrides, Pita et al., 2007; Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010).  
The present analysis also hints at further divergence with respect to age and sex effects; 
both were found for ability but not trait EI.  Nevertheless, questions regarding the status 
and nature of EI remain.  Whilst the current patterning of relationships found for AEI 
lends support to its ‘ability’ status, the holistic nature of this aptitude in adolescence 
remains unclear.  Contrary to other sub-skills, competency in perceiving emotion 
appeared orthogonal to allied constructs, did not differentiate between males/females 
and was negligibly associated with age.   These patterns are not supported by summative 
adult data (Joseph & Newman, 2010) which points to developmental specificity and/or 
the potential insensitivity of the MSCEIT-YVR to capture age-appropriate performance, 
both of which carry important implications for applied adolescent research using AEI.  
Moreover, the distinctiveness of this ‘new’ ability remains unresolved; AEI and IQ appear 
similarly associated with personality dimensions and the robust relationship between 
verbally-loaded AEI skills (particularly emotional understanding) and general cognitive 
ability implies shared overlap with crystallised ability (MacCann, 2010). This requires 
further examination utilising ‘pure’ measures of cognitive ability in adolescents. Potential 
variation in TEI is also hinted at; strong associations with trait Agreeableness coupled with 
a lack of sex and age effects in adolescence, appear at odds with adult TEI research. 
Nevertheless, the latter findings may be an artefact of the aggregated, global level 
analyses conducted.  Comprehensive longitudinal research with the fully-validated 
MSCEIT-YV and long form TEIQue-AF is warranted to clarify these issues and further 
examine developmental and cultural sensitivity. Measurement issues aside, however, the 
detection of medium to large correlations between A/TEI and respective allied constructs 
clearly signals substantial overlap as many critics have highlighted (e.g., Schulte et al., 
2004) and emphasises the need for personality and general cognitive ability to be 
controlled when adjudging the capacity of EI to predict meaningful, adaptational 
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outcomes.  The discussion now turns to consider the repercussions of doing so with 
respect to mental health in adolescence.  
 
15.2 Can EI predict adolescent mental health? 
 
Consistent with EI theory (Bar-On, 1997; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007; 
Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and a wealth of adult-based research in this field (e.g., Bastian et 
al., 2005; Brackett et al., 2004; Goldenberg et al., 2006; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 
2007), higher levels of EI were linked to lower levels of disorder in adolescents.  However, 
the strength of these direct associations varied according to type of EI and the nature of 
symptomotology.  TEI was more robustly associated with both internalising (r = -.55, p < 
.001) and externalising disorder (r = -.35, p < .001) compared to AEI, which was weakly 
related to disruptive behaviour (r = -.16, p < .001) and unrelated to depression (r = -.05, p 
> .05).  Notably this replicates the trend detected in two recent meta-analyses of EI-
general mental health relationships, where medium average effect sizes were 
documented for TEI, versus small or non-significant effects for AEI (Martins et al., 2010; 
Schutte et al., 2007).   Additionally, the more robust correlations found here between TEI 
and depression, as opposed to disruptive behaviour, converge with recent adult (TEIQue) 
research reporting weaker or non-significant correlations for aggression compared to 
internalising symptoms (Gardner & Qualter, 2010; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, 
study 2).  Moreover, research employing the TEIQue in youth samples has reported a 
similar trend.  Global-level coefficients with depressive symptomotology have ranged 
between r = -.48 to -.59 (Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009; 
Williams et al., 2009, 2010a) yet between r = -.28 and -.43 for disruptive behaviour 
(Williams et al., 2009, 2010a).  Nevertheless, this trend could be contingent on the 
measurement model adopted.  When alternative, ‘ability-based’ trait EI measures are 
used, the magnitude of coefficients appears significantly reduced such that TEI appears to 
be an equally moderate predictor of both internalising and externalising disorders; for 
instance total SREIT scores correlate similarly with depression and disruptive behaviour in 
the range of r = -.10 to -.31 (Williams et al., 2009, 2010a) and sub-branch scores from the 
SUEIT correlate up to r =-.29 with rule breaking/aggressive behaviours (Downey et al., 
2010).  Indeed, in line with this, Martins et al., (2010) reported that the TEIQue shared the 
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strongest association with overall mental health compared with the EQi (another ‘trait’ 
measure), the ability-based SREIT and the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS).  These 
differences are likely due to variations in the sampling domain of TEI models and, in 
particular, the proportion of shared overlap with higher-order personality dimensions, 
which, in turn, are related to mental disorders.   
 
As noted earlier, TEIQue scores shared a large, inverse relationship with trait 
Neuroticism in the current sample (r = -.55), followed by Conscientiousness (r = .42), 
Agreeableness (r = .41), Extraversion (r = .36) and Openness (r = .25) and a large body of 
literature links these traits to the development and maintenance of psychopathology.  For 
instance, childhood inhibitory control is associated with the development of depression 
and substance abuse (Caspi, 2000) and higher Conscientiousness, Openness and 
Agreeableness coupled with lower Neuroticism in childhood, differentiates ‘resilient’, 
rule-abiding individuals from ‘maladapted’ young adults (Shiner & Masten, 2012).  
Importantly, the Big 5 dimensions share specific patterns of association with internalising 
and externalising disorders; whilst high levels of Neuroticism, low Extraversion and low 
Conscientiousness are hallmarks of mood disorders, behavioural disorders relate 
positively to Extraversion, to comparably lower levels of Neuroticism and low 
Agreeableness (Malouff et al., 2005).   Indeed, this patterning was largely consistent with 
coefficients obtained from the current data – depression, but less so disruptive 
behaviour, was strongly related to higher Neuroticism (r = .50 versus r = .19) whilst 
Agreeableness appeared the strongest correlate of  disruptive behaviour but not 
depression (r = -.46 and -.22 respectively).  Also consistent with Malouff et al., (2005), 
depression was related to less Extraversion and Conscientiousness although, contrary to 
predictions, the former was unrelated to disruptive behaviour. Thus, on the basis of the 
strength of direct associations found in the current data, TEI, as emotional personality, 
would be expected to be a stronger predictor of depression - indeed, it is notable that TEI 
correlated identically with both depression and Neuroticism (r = -.55, p < .001). 
 
It is similarly plausible that shared links to personality might account for the 
disorder-based trends noted for AEI.  As noted in section 15.1, AEI was unrelated to the 
strongest determinant of depression, trait Neuroticism, however, significant associations 
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were detected with correlates of disruptive behaviour, most notably trait Agreeableness 
(r = .20, p < .001).   Hence, these associations would immediately make a relationship 
between AEI and disruptive behaviour most likely.  Links to externalising rather than 
internalising disorder also concur with the previous theoretical analysis which concluded 
that AEI should be considered representative of pre-requisite emotional skills that 
potentially underpin adaptive emotion regulation (Wranik et al., 2007).  Given the 
measurement focus on assessment of emotional knowledge versus actual emotional 
performance (which permeates all sub-skills tapped by the MSCEIT, i.e., labelling 
emotion; defining emotion; understanding the consequences of managing others 
emotions for social outcomes), AEI should indicate deficiencies in emotional 
understanding that are considered a central feature of externalising but less so mood 
disorders (Hessler & Katz, 2010; Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007). Indeed, the fact that all sub-
skills significantly related to disruptive behaviour in the current sample supports this 
perspective. Whilst comparable literature is sparse, existing research converges with the 
internalising/externalising distinction for AEI.  In adults, negligible associations with 
internalising symptomotology have been detected (Bastian et al., 2005; Goldenberg et al., 
2006) and in younger age groups, this appears non-significant (Cha & Nock, 2009; 
Williams et al., 2009, 2010a).  However, AEI has been more consistently linked to reduced 
maladaptive (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009) and 
increased adaptive social behaviours in adults (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes et al., 2005; 
Lopes et al., 2003).  Moreover, in youth, Williams et al., (2009) reported inverse 
associations between a composite measure of perceiving, using and managing emotion 
and self-reported anger (r = -.12, p < .01), disruptive behaviour (r = -.12, p < .01), and 
between a measure of emotion recognition ability and disruptive behaviour (r = -.11, p < 
.01) – relationships which were later replicated in Williams et al., (2010). Markedly, 
similar findings were documented using an objective indicator of socially maladaptive 
behaviours in youth; the MSCEIT-YV sub-branches of perceiving (r = -.60, p < .05), using (r 
= -. 47, p < .05) and understanding emotion (r = -.33, p < .05) were all inversely linked to 
number of school discipline referrals in a small sample of 50 adolescents (Peters et al., 
2009).  Hence, the magnitude of coefficients detected in the current research (rs ranging 
from -.09 [perceiving] to -.15 [managing emotion]) compares favourably with other 
research based on self-reported clinical symptoms.   
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Nevertheless, it is notable that general cognitive ability related weakly, though 
significantly, to both depression (r = - .14) and disruptive behaviour (r = - .12).  Whilst this 
is expected in light of research suggesting that cognitive ability is a likely risk factor for 
internalising and externalising disorder (Mortensen, Sorensen, Jensen, Reinisch, & 
Mednick, 2005; Zammit et al., 2004),  this indicates that beyond the influence of 
Agreeableness, the direct relationship between AEI and disruptive behaviour might also 
be artificially inflated as a result of shared links with general cognitive ability. As the 
previous discussion explored, this should be less of an issue for TEI relations, particularly 
given evidence suggests associations between proxy measures of cognitive ability and TEI 
arise largely from the shared overlap with personality (e.g., Mavroveli et al., 2009). 
Nonetheless, the potential for theoretical redundancy in both types of EI is patent given 
shared relationships with both personality and cognitive ability domains.  Thus, in an 
effort to establish the ‘pure’ contributions of A/TEI to mental health and address critics of 
the field (Matthews et al., 2004; Schulte et al., 2004; Wilhelm, 2005) the current analyses 
examined whether these trends would hold after partialling out the influence of general 
cognitive ability and higher-order personality dimensions.   
 
15.2.1 Predicting adolescent mental health: The incremental validity of EI 
 
Crucially, in spite of these associations, it would appear that both forms of EI can 
make a significant, incremental contribution to the prediction of mental health in 
adolescence, although this appeared more convincing for trait than ability EI.  As 
anticipated, the Big 5 dimensions accounted for the largest proportion of variance in 
depression (ΔR2 = .24) and disruptive behaviour (ΔR2 = .20), with trait Neuroticism and 
Agreeableness particularly influential.  Contributions from general cognitive ability were 
much smaller - adding 2% to the prediction of depression and 1% to disruptive behaviour 
– which is fully in line with similar, adult-based research predicting ‘psychological 
wellbeing’ (Rossen & Kranzler, 2009).  Importantly however, beyond these influences, the 
earlier-detected trends for EI held; perceived emotional competency was a broader 
predictor and accounted for more unique variance in disorder (semi-partial r depression = 
-. 32; disruptive behaviour = -.19) than actual emotional skill which contributed to 
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disruptive behaviour only (semi-partial r disruptive behaviour = -.10).  The effect of TEI on 
depression was of medium magnitude whilst both AEI and TEI had small effects on 
disruptive behaviour. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that since focal variables within 
predictive models in the Social Sciences are often inherently inter-related, semi-partial 
correlations in the range of .15 to .20 on the third step of a regression can be considered 
meaningful (Hunsley & Meyer, 2003). Thus, given the stringent nature of the current 
analysis (i.e., multiple control variables) the smaller incremental contribution from AEI 
also represents an important influence in the prediction of adaptation.  
 
Whilst it is possible that common method variance (e.g., Likert scale response 
format; single-respondent; single-occasion) artificially inflated TEI-outcome relationships, 
post-hoc exploration of personality, TEI and health variables using Harman’s single-factor 
test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) suggests that analyses were not unduly affected by bias 
arising from shared methodology - multiple factors (25 with Eigenvalues > 1) emerged in 
the data, the first of which accounted for only 14% of the total variance.  Additionally, 
recent work indicates that TEI-mental health associations are robust against socially 
desirable responding (Choi, Kluemper, & Sauley, 2011) and criterion contamination – 
relationships between scores on the Beck Youth Inventories and TEIQue-ASF remained 
stable in pre-adolescents, even after the removal of 16 out of 30 TEI scale items (Williams, 
Daley, Burnside, & Hammond-Rowley, 2010b).  Nonetheless, it is notable that the latter 
research retained the TEI ‘wellbeing’ factor in this analysis which includes items tapping 
trait optimism, happiness and self–esteem which would appear to overlap substantially 
with items measuring health outcomes (e.g., the inverse of depression symptoms).  
Indeed Zeidner, Matthews and Roberts (2011) found that TEI wellbeing was the only 
significant factor-level predictor of general mental health with personality controlled.  
Clearly, it will be important for future research to establish how each TEI factor uniquely 
contributes to depression and disruptive behaviour in adolescence with control for the 
Big 5. 
 
Importantly, these findings extend the embryonic EI-mental health evidence base 
in adolescence and, as the first study to examine incremental contributions beyond 
personality dimensions and cognitive ability, they represent a significant contribution to 
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knowledge.   Notably, in the absence of youth-based research, findings corroborate the 
trend found in studies of adult incremental validity.  As noted earlier, some significant 
relationships between AEI and internalising symptoms have been found previously (e.g., 
Bastian et al., 2005; Goldenberg et al., 2006) however, with control for personality and IQ, 
associations are typically non-significant (Karim & Weisz, 2010; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009; 
Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010).  Hence caution should be exercised where less 
stringent controls (i.e., personality only) are implemented; the proportion of variance 
accounted for by AEI in the prediction of psychological wellbeing (4%) and satisfaction 
with life (1%)  (Extremera et al., 2011) appears to correspond with that accounted for by 
general cognitive ability, as found in the current study and elsewhere (Rossen & Kranzler, 
2009). By contrast however, AEI remains a significant predictor of maladaptive social 
behaviours beyond allied variables, explaining between 4 and 11.5% additional variance 
in (reduced) alcohol use, drug abuse and less frequent deviant behaviour (Brackett & 
Mayer, 2003; Brackett et al., 2004; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009).  AEI also remains predictive 
of more positive relationships with others, satisfaction with relationships, pro-social 
behaviour and interpersonal sensitivity, explaining up to 11% additional variance (Lopes 
et al., 2004; Lopes et al., 2005; Rossen & Kranzler, 2009). Perhaps unremarkably, with 
control for IQ only, associations between AEI and the number of discipline referrals in 
adolescents also remains significant (Peters et al., 2009).  Whilst the percentage of 
variance detected in the current study (1%) sits in the lower range of previously 
significant findings, this is the first study to employ an omnibus AEI instrument (MSCEIT-
YVR) and clinical outcome measure to assess relationships – prior to this investigations 
have examined association with discrete measures of social ‘maladaptation’ (e.g., number 
of physical fights, amount of alcohol consumed, etc) or objective indicators (e.g., number 
of discipline referrals) which do not capture the full range of clinical symptoms.  Hence, 
whilst these measures may be more reliable (i.e., not clouded by the limitations of self-
report methodology), they provide limited information. 
 
Adult research also supports the fact that ‘stripped-down’, TEI can explain more 
variance in dispositional, internalised emotional outcomes compared to markers of 
situational, behaviourally-based emotional expression, explaining 1 - 17% of the variance 
in depression, hostility, loneliness, happiness and life satisfaction but no additional 
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variance in physical, verbal aggression or anger beyond the effects of personality 
(Gardner & Qualter, 2010; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007; Saklofske et al., 2003).  
Nevertheless, there have been some exceptions to this; for instance TEI predicted 
approximately 2% of the variance in alcohol abuse (SREIT: Brackett & Mayer, 2003; 
TEIQue: Gardner & Qualter, 2010) and 18% of the variance in the number of unauthorised 
absences in adolescents beyond the Eysenkian 3 (Petrides et al., 2004).  However, these 
proportions are less than those linked to AEI and importantly, with the exception of 
Brackett and Mayer (2003) these studies represent less stringent tests of predictive 
validity – in contrast to the aforementioned AEI research, the influence of cognitive ability 
on relationships was not accounted for, which would be particularly pertinent to the 
prediction of broad, school-based markers of adolescent delinquency (e.g., unauthorised 
absence).   Additionally, the prediction of alcohol use beyond the influence of personality 
dimensions has not been found consistently across all TEI measures e.g., the SREIT did not 
contribute significantly in Gardner and Qualter (2010) yet did in Brackett and Mayer 
(2003).  This may reflect differences in the sensitivity of outcome measures utilised across 
studies; whereas a 35-item alcoholism screening test was used in the former study, only 
5-9 behavioural frequency items were used in the latter (e.g., number of bottles of beer 
owned). That said these earlier findings accord well with the pattern and proportion of 
incremental variance attributed to adolescent TEI in the present study which represent 
valuable evidence of the predictive utility of the construct.    
 
Nevertheless, it will be necessary to expand investigation to consider a broader 
range of representative disorders in future A/TEI research and, in particular, investigate 
the capacity of TEI to predict specific types of internalising disorder in adolescence.  
Individuals with depression and anxiety disorders would be expected to obtain similarly 
low scores on measures of TEI given that excessive negative affect (NA) is common 
underlying feature of both.  However, each disorder is unique in its onset, course, 
treatment requirements and underlying symptomotology; depression is associated with 
anhedonia whilst anxiety with physiological hyperarousal (Clark & Watson, 1991).  Hence, 
it will be important to demonstrate that TEI can distinguish between these mood 
disorders.  Recent research hints that this could be possible; whilst mood disorders relate 
non-specifically to individual differences in NA (i.e., as keyed by Neuroticism: fear, 
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sadness, guilt, hostility), low levels of positive affect, indexed as joviality (happiness, 
enthusiasm), self-assurance (confidence) and attentiveness (alertness, concentration), 
relate more specifically to depressive over anxiety disorders (Watson, Clark, & Stasik, 
2011; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2010).  Importantly, as well as NA, TEI indexes key 
elements of PA - particularly joviality which has been found specific to depression.  
Therefore, the potential for TEI to distinguish depression more strongly than other mood 
disorders remains possible and augurs for diagnostic utility.   Whilst comprehensive 
testing in adolescence (with adequate controls) is awaited, it is notable that TEI has been 
found more strongly related to depression than anxiety in pre-adolescents (Williams et 
al., 2009).   
 
Summary: Converging with prior literature and theory, higher EI was linked to 
lower levels of psychopathology. Importantly, both ability and trait EI can make 
meaningful incremental contributions to the prediction of disorder beyond the effects of 
personality dimensions and cognitive ability.  However, perceived emotional competency 
appears a stronger, direct predictor of depression and disruptive behaviour compared to 
actual emotional skill – with the latter contributing to externalising symptomotology only.  
This is fully in line however with predictions from allied literatures that suggest intrinsic 
emotional personality and extrinsic emotional ability should show divergence as a result 
of underlying conceptual differences. Demonstrating that TEI explains approximately 10% 
additional variance in depression is especially valuable evidence for the advancement of 
the construct.  Despite being partially determined by personality (particularly trait 
Neuroticism - an established predictor of mood disorders), the unique variance captured 
by the finer-grained, emotion-related facets included within the TEI sampling domain 
would appear to safeguard the explanatory and incremental capacity of the construct 
(Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).  However, future investigation might additionally control for 
possible criterion contamination (e.g., self-esteem) and examine contributions from 
constituent TEI factors using a long-form measure.  This research has also gone some way 
to address critics who have argued that a ‘blanket’ vulnerability account for EI (e.g., low EI 
= poor mental health) is unhelpful for furthering understanding, diagnosis and treatment 
of psychopathology given the sheer range of disorders that implicate emotional 
deficiencies as diagnostic symptomotology (Matthews et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2011).  
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Findings illustrate clear divergence in the strength and nature of relations between A/TEI 
and externalising/internalising disorder.  Nevertheless, it will be necessary to expand 
investigation to consider a broader range of representative disorders in future research 
and, in particular, investigate the capacity of TEI to predict specific types of internalising 
disorder in adolescence.   Additionally, the magnitude of effects obtained in the current 
findings (i.e., absent or small to medium) indicate that both AEI and TEI could be 
implicated in complex, multiply determined pathways to adjustment. Thus, whilst 
valuable, the basic predictive and incremental associations established here tell us very 
little about the underlying processes underpinning EI-mental health relationships.  Hence, 
the next section of the analysis sought to determine how (whether directly or indirectly 
linked to known stress-illness processes) and when (within which context) EI influences 
adaptation.  
 
15.3 Explaining the EI-mental health relationship with reference to wider stressor-
health processes 
 
Consistent with existing literature examining concurrent and prospective 
associations between psychosocial risk and disorders, both depression and disruptive 
behaviour symptoms were positively related to family dysfunction and negative life 
events in the current adolescent sample (Briggs-Gowan et al., 2010; Flouri & Kallis, 2011; 
Grant et al., 2004; Kessler et al., 2010; McMahon et al., 2003; Rutter, 2000; Sternberg, 
Baradaran, Abbott, Lamb, & Guterman, 2006).  Indeed, the basic cross-sectional analysis 
reported here found 7 – 18% shared variance between stressors and outcomes, 
concurring with Grant et al.’s (2004) review of prospective links between stressors and 
psychopathology which, with control for prior levels of symptomotology, reported small 
to moderate effects (1 - 21%). Of the two stressors, family dysfunction was most strongly 
linked to disorder which converges with the work of Kessler et al., (2010) who found that 
of 12 retrospectively reported childhood adversities (e.g., parental maladjustment; 
interpersonal loss; maltreatment; physical illness; family economic adversity) maladaptive 
family functioning conferred the greatest risk for the onset of Axis I disorders in adults.  
Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that psychosocial stressors that involve disruption to 
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relationships (e.g., functioning of the family, maltreatment, negative interpersonal life 
events) are central to the development of depression and behavioural disorders (Briggs-
Gowan et al., 2010; Sanchez, Lambert, & Ialongo, 2012; Thapar, Collishaw, Pine, & Thapar, 
2012) - Sternberg et al., (2006) reported that children who experienced and witnessed 
violence were  2.57 times more likely to develop severe internalizing problems and at 
2.91 times greater risk for developing severe externalizing problems than children not 
subject to violence at home.  By contrast, socio-economic adversity was not directly 
related to disorder, however this pattern is consistent with research suggesting that this 
distal stressor is linked to adjustment through a complex chain of proximal intervening 
variables (Grant et al., 2006; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002). For instance, uncontrollable, 
environmental life events (e.g., parental job loss) have been shown to mediate between 
socio-economic status and internalising and externalising disorder, with stronger effects 
for the former (Amone-P'Olak et al., 2009).  Additionally, maternal warmth and harsh 
parenting have been identified as mediators of this association, though for the prediction 
of externalising disorder only (Gonzales et al., 2011).  The possibility that socio-economic 
adversity might be implicated in complex, indirect pathways to disorder was further 
suggested by the presence of weak, inverse associations with both forms of EI.  This 
converges with previous research that has uncovered negligible (inverse) or non-
significant direct associations between A/TEI and indices of other forms of chronic 
adversity (i.e., physical, emotional, sexual abuse) in adults (Brown & Schutte, 2006; 
Gardner et al., 2011; Goldenberg, 2004) and adolescents (Cha & Nock, 2009).   Whilst 
there have been some exceptions to this trend for AEI – i.e., skills in using and managing 
emotion have been found positively related to chronic abuse in adults (Goldenberg et al., 
2004) and the ability to perceive emotion enhanced in those with lower socio-economic 
status (Kraus et al., 2010, study one) – these studies focussed on isolated sub-branch 
analyses rather than the global AEI construct (as in the current data) and used somewhat 
idiosyncratic outcome measures of ‘stressors’ (e.g., in the latter study a high-school level 
of education was classified as ‘lower social class’ from which risk was inferred in a group 
of adults who had, nevertheless, been in stable University employment for an average of 
11 years).  
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 In contrast, both forms of EI were associated with attenuated experience of 
proximal, interpersonal stressors - negative life events and family dysfunction - with 
effects most robust for the latter.  This contrasts with adult literature that failed to detect 
a direct relationship between AEI (perceiving emotion) and either major life events or 
daily hassles (Ciarrochi et al., 2002) although converges with prior evidence of inverse 
relationships between subcomponents of trait EI and fewer daily hassles (Ciarrochi et al., 
2002; Day et al., 2005).  Again, these anomalies could be due to measurement 
inconsistencies across studies; for instance, previous analyses of TEI were restricted to 
examination of subcomponents of the EQi and SREIT, rather than global level (TEIQue) 
scores, as reported here, and only partial sub-branch analysis involving the MSCEIT.   
Moreover, there is considerable variability across outcome measures; whilst a cumulative 
measure combining both hassles and acute major life events was used in the current 
study, previous research has employed separate indices of each and, in some cases, items 
have been specifically tailored to the focal participant demographic thus limiting 
applicability (e.g., academic-related hassles for a student sample: Day et al., 2005).  In a 
similar vein, as this is the first study to comprehensively assess global family functioning 
(i.e., including affect, roles, behaviours, problem-solving) from a concurrent/adolescent 
versus retrospective/adult self-report perspective, comparison with directly compatible 
findings is limited.  Nevertheless, on balance, most related research does suggest that 
higher TEI (indexed either via the SREIT; TMMS) is positively related to ‘adaptive’ family 
qualities, e.g., conversation orientation (not conformity), parental warmth and affection 
(not discipline) and negatively linked to ‘maladaptive’ aspects, e.g., harsh punishment 
(Alegre & Benson, 2010; Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Keaten & Kelly, 2008).  That said, 
associations between both A/TEI (SREIT) and a measure of family cohesion, 
expressiveness and conflict did not reach significance in adults, although the general 
pattern for TEI relations was in the direction noted above (Gardner et al., 2011).  Again, 
measurement inconsistencies (particularly the discrete aspects of family functioning 
combined with the retrospective nature of this study) may offer a reason for this 
discrepancy.  Thus, taken together, this first, basic scrutiny of stressor-EI associations in 
the current data suggested that those with higher actual and perceived emotional 
competency do experience fewer stressors and (with the exception of TEI-family 
dysfunction) the presence of small coefficients augured for the involvement of both as 
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potential moderators in adjustment pathways (be that directly through interaction with 
the stressor or indirectly via coping).   
 
Before turning to evaluate these possibilities in light of the current analysis, it is 
noteworthy that the expected patterning of associations between disorders and coping 
styles were detected; consistent with a recent review of the literature (Compas et al., 
2001) both were related to less active (e.g., positive cognitive restructuring; direct 
problem-solving etc) and support seeking coping (though the latter did not reach 
significance for depression), with increased use of avoidance coping (e.g., behavioural 
avoidance; distraction; wishful thinking; repression) linked to greater levels of depression.   
Perhaps counter-intuitively, however, use of avoidance coping appeared linked to lower 
levels of disruptive behaviour.  Without appropriate context (i.e., situating this link with 
control for other forms of coping within the wider stressor-adjustment process) reliable 
interpretation of this finding is precluded, although it is widely held that avoidance 
strategies can be advantageous in some situations, particularly when faced with 
uncontrollable stressors (e.g., parental discord, sexual abuse) (Clarke, 2006; Compas et 
al., 2001; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Seiffge-Krenke, 2011).  Notably, in the current 
study, all three stressors contained elements of uncontrollability hence further detailed 
analysis would serve to clarify this.   It is marked however, that the magnitude of effects 
found here (small: r = .07 to .16) concur with the earlier comprehensive review which 
documented effects in the range of .10 to .40 (Compas et al., 2001).  Basic associations 
between A/TEI and coping also appeared ‘adaptive’ in nature.  Converging with previous 
adult (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2008; Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 
2007, study 1 & 2; Petrides, Pita et al., 2007; Shah & Thingujam, 2008) and adolescent 
research (Downey et al., 2010; Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 
2009), higher TEI was most strongly linked to greater use of active strategies (e.g., 
problem-focussed), to a lesser extent support seeking coping and only weakly related to 
(less frequent) avoidance coping. This consistency is remarkable given the range of 
‘ability’ and ‘trait’ based TEI instruments employed across studies (e.g., above cited 
include the SREIT, TEIQue, EQi and SUEIT) coupled with differences in coping 
measurement (i.e., bandwidth and content).   
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Conversely, research examining AEI-coping links is scarce and the current findings 
appear to contrast with available literature; in adolescents, higher emotional skill related 
to greater use of active and support seeking coping but was not significantly associated 
with avoidant styles. The consensus from adult research supports direct (inverse) links 
with avoidant coping, with findings equivocal with respect to support seeking and active 
coping (Gohm et al., 2005; Goldenberg et al., 2006; MacCann et al., 2011) – indeed, 
where significant associations with the latter two styles have been detected, these have 
been restricted to isolated sub-skills (particularly the ability to manage emotions) rather 
than total AEI.  These discrepancies perhaps reflect developmental differences between 
the populations – evidence from a small adolescent sample (N = 50) would appear to lend 
partial support to this notion; in contrast with the adult literature and in line with the 
current findings, AEI was unrelated to avoidant coping (though also to problem-focussed 
strategies) (Peters et al., 2009). 
 
Clearly, simple analysis of isolated links between coping styles and EI tells us very 
little about the adaptive utility of these associations with reference to wider stress 
processes or whether this is reflective of ‘real-life’ coping, where multiple strategies can 
be used to combat stressors  (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004) – both of which will be 
explored below in light of the final, more detailed set of analyses.  However, it is 
important to note from this initial examination of coping and EI that the magnitude of 
correlations documented here (r range .09 to .23) argues against conceptual redundancy; 
EI construed as either emotional skill or emotional personality shares little overlap with 
coping styles and thus has the potential to underpin rather than converge with coping 
processes in adjustment pathways.  This is particularly pertinent to TEI in the context of 
the wider personality/coping debate (e.g., Vollrath, 2001) alluded to in earlier chapters – 
here the view is taken that coping is distinct from/more than a direct manifestation of 
personality traits and, as such, represents the way in which personality (and by extension 
TEI as our emotional temperament) operates under stress (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; 
Compas et al., 2004; Matthews et al., 2002). This position runs contrary to some existing 
TEI research with the EQi in which, following the detection of particularly high 
correlations between TEI and coping (e.g., up to r = .58), the two have been merged to 
create composite factors implicated in the prediction of key outcomes, including 
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perceived stress, academic achievement and life satisfaction (e.g., Austin et al., 2010; 
Saklofske et al., 2011). However, this once again, serves to highlight the variability across 
TEI measurement models and perhaps questions the legitimacy of interpreting all self-
report-based EI research with reference to TEI theory – at the very least there is a need 
for caution when assimilating findings.  
 
Summary:  Basic bivariate associations between stressors, coping, depression, 
disruptive behaviour and EI were broadly consistent with prior literature.  Proximal 
stressors (family dysfunction and negative life events) were associated with poorer 
mental health and lower ability and trait EI.  Consistent with research suggesting that 
poverty is linked to adjustment through a complex chain of intervening variables (Grant et 
al., 2006; Wadsworth & Compas, 2002) socio-economic adversity was unrelated to 
disorder and only weakly correlated with both forms of EI.  More frequent active coping 
was related to less depression, disruptive behaviour and higher levels of both A/TEI.  With 
the exception of depression, the same pattern was found for support seeking coping. 
Conversely, avoidance coping was associated with increased depression but lower levels 
of disruptive behaviour and TEI.    However, the adaptive value of EI, in either guise, 
cannot be inferred from this evidence alone.  In order to elucidate the role of EI in 
pathways to adjustment, the main analysis tested if/how these variables operate 
collectively.  These findings will be explored next. 
 
15.3.1 Pathways to disorder: The role of trait EI 
 
Models testing direct and indirect pathways between stressors and disorder 
revealed that TEI does play an adaptive role in adjustment but its mechanism of influence 
differs according to outcome and stress context.  For depression, TEI is implicated 
indirectly, supporting the implementation of coping processes to buffer the effects of 
stressors.  Specifically, adolescents with high levels of TEI are more effective at executing 
an active coping style (in the context of avoidant and support seeking coping) to reduce 
internalising symptoms.  However, this most clearly manifests when faced with family 
dysfunction, not negative life events or socio-economic adversity (where conditional 
indirect effects were not detectably different from zero).  Moreover, in the current 
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sample, this protective effect was only operational in those with TEI scores greater than 
177.30, which equated to 2.3% of the sample.  In contrast, TEI directly attenuated the 
effects of all three stressors (although effects were most conclusive for socio-economic 
adversity and family dysfunction) on behavioural problems.  Notably, the pattern of direct 
effect interactions supports a ‘diathesis-stress’ (i.e., lower TEI results in poorer outcomes 
at higher risk) rather than a ‘differential susceptibility’ account, where vulnerability (i.e., 
low TEI) can lead to better outcomes in individuals exposed to more favourable contexts 
(Belsky & Pluess, 2009).  All bar one of these interactions were ordinal (non-crossover) in 
the plausible range of stressors (i.e., -3 to +3 SD from the mean) and all represented 
contrastive effects – where the sign of the association between independent and 
dependent variables reverses at high vs. low levels of the moderator (Roisman et al., 
2012).  Notably, even though the interaction involving socio-economic adversity and TEI 
was disordinal, 97.84% of the sample experienced increasing levels of adversity yet better 
outcomes with higher TEI.   Roisman et al., (2012) suggest that for differential 
susceptibility to be assumed (i.e., that as well as decreasing risk, EI increasing positive 
outcomes) more than 16% of the sample should fall below the crossing point.  
 
Turning first to examine effects associated with depression, it would seem that in 
a multidimensional coping context, TEI supports downstream coping processes, such that 
the active coping efforts of adolescents with high TEI reduce depression. Theoretically, 
this finding concurs with commentators who view TEI as “central to the development and 
implementation of successful coping mechanisms” (Petrides, Perez-Gonzalez et al., 2007, 
p.29) and adaptive coping as “emotional intelligence in action” (Matthews et al., 2002, 
p.287).  As this is the first study to provide a comprehensive analysis of EI-coping links 
with mental health under adversity, very little comparable research exists to aid 
interpretation of the findings.  Nevertheless, simple mediation studies have suggested 
that lower TEI could be linked to higher levels of internalising symptomotology via 
increased use of avoidant or emotional coping (Chan, 2005; Goldenberg, 2004; 
Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009) and less problem-focussed or social interaction 
coping (Chan, 2005; Goldenberg, 2004).  Additionally, higher TEI appears linked to lower 
levels of general psychological distress through increased ‘stoicism’, ‘social support’ and 
‘self-care’ (Campbell & Ntobedzi, 2007).  However, in three of these studies (Campbell & 
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Ntobedzi, 2007; Goldenberg, 2004; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009), it was the 
‘maladaptive’ emotional coping strategies (e.g., rumination) that had the greatest impact 
on symptomotology and not adaptive, active coping as in the current study.   Indeed, this 
trend was further corroborated in the only study so far to examine externalising as well as 
internalising symptoms; Downey and colleagues (2010) found that ‘non-productive’ 
coping (as a blend of avoidant and emotional strategies) and  not problem-focussed or 
support seeking styles, explained the association between lower perceived competency in 
emotion management (SUEIT) and higher levels of both behavioural and mood problems 
in adolescents.  Additionally, two studies employing the TMMS in a lab-based context 
found that individuals with higher TEI (perceived ability to repair emotion) engaged in less 
‘passive’ (emotional and avoidant coping) but not more ‘active’ coping when faced with 
an acute, situational stressor (timed cognitive task) and less rumination leading to lower 
levels of depression and fatigue following exposure to a stressful video (Ramos et al., 
2007; Salovey et al., 2002).  This evidence, implying that the propensity to select 
‘maladaptive’ coping styles may be driven by deficiencies in TEI, clearly contrasts with the 
current findings where TEI did not influence initial choice but interacted with ‘adaptive’ 
coping to promote efficacy.  However, none of this pre-existing research systematically 
tested for moderating effects or deconstructed how EI impacted mental health in the 
context of multiple coping strategies; examination of isolated links between particular 
coping styles, EI and mental health has so far been the norm which, as noted earlier, is a 
practice which is both theoretically and methodologically inadequate (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004; Gaylord-Harden et al., 2010; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Rucker et al., 
2011).  It would seem that within an ecologically valid, ‘real-life’ context, incorporating 
assessment of chronic and acute psychosocial stressors,  those who feel more 
‘emotionally confident’, who consider themselves able to process the (negative) emotion 
arising from contact with a stressor, can use this self-belief to optimally implement an 
active approach, without fear of negative consequences, to improve mental health 
outcomes.   
 
In order to explore why this might be the case, and indeed, why this effect was so 
selective (i.e., depression not disruptive behaviour; only family dysfunction), findings 
must be interpreted through the lens of personality theory and allied processes.  As noted 
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earlier, traits influence functioning via attentional/perceptual biases which in turn affect 
initial environment selection together with ongoing appraisal processes and reactivity to 
environmental cues (John et al., 2008).  Hence, traits can represent latent vulnerability to 
disorder (Malouff et al., 2005),  influencing exposure to stressors (preferentially 
selecting/modifying environments to evoke stressors through dispositional mood bias) 
and/or reactivity once exposed (appraisal processes can constrain or promote effortful 
coping) (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).   In line with this, evidence suggests that traits 
influence coping strategy selection; for instance, Neuroticism is linked to anger through 
active coping  (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995) whilst higher reward sensitivity (Extraversion) 
promotes reduced levels of delinquency through greater problem-focussed coping 
(Hasking, 2007).  Indeed, a recent meta-analysis found that high levels of Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness and Openness related to engagement strategies (e.g., problem-solving, 
support-seeking, cognitive restructuring) whereas Neuroticism, low Conscientiousness 
and low Agreeableness related to disengagement coping (e.g., wishful thinking, 
withdrawal, avoidance) (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007).  Whilst relationships were 
modest (up to r = .27), it is notable that traits keyed by TEI shared the most robust 
associations with coping dimensions (i.e., Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism).   
Of central import to the current findings, however, is evidence that the Big Five may also 
facilitate or interfere with strategy implementation as well as selection.  It is hypothesised 
that high levels of Extraversion and Agreeableness should confer intrinsic skill  for eliciting 
but also utilising social support (Vollrath, 2001) whilst highly conscientious individuals 
may be more likely to engage and persist in problem-solving coping (Carver & Connor-
Smith, 2010) to increase the likelihood of beneficial outcomes.  
 
Whilst most research has focussed on Neuroticism, findings support the 
involvement of traits in coping efficacy.   For instance, when facing interpersonal stress, 
those with lower levels of Neuroticism are effective in reducing depression through 
problem-focussed rather than avoidant coping, whilst the reverse is true of those high in 
Neuroticism (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995).  In other words, higher levels of unregulated 
distress appear to impede active efforts to cope with interpersonal stress.   Similarly, the 
problem-focussed coping efforts of those characterised by high (but not low) levels of 
self-critical perfectionism (a lower level trait affiliated with Neuroticism) are ineffective in 
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promoting positive affect and these individuals appear more vulnerable to increased 
negative affect with the experience of achievement-related stress, social hassles and 
criticism (Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2003).  This also transfers to the experience of 
acute, situational stress; a disengaged coping style (e.g., denial, wishful thinking, 
avoidance) had beneficial effects on health outcomes for individuals exhibiting an 
involuntary, lab-induced, stress response (Connor-Smith & Compas, 2004). Thus, 
personality theory predicts specificity in coping processes according to characteristics of 
the person (e.g., high versus low N) and stressor-type (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; 
Grant et al., 2003).   This lends support to the current findings where the level of TEI (i.e., 
representing an amplified or reduced ‘pro-social’ trait profile: low Neuroticism, high 
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) determined skill in using adaptive 
coping (in this case an active rather than avoidant approach) when facing interpersonal 
stressors.  Importantly, even though those with lower TEI adopted the same style, their 
attempts to use these strategies were poorer in that depression was perpetuated. In 
other words, individual differences in personality can also result in the same coping 
response impacting depression differentially (Compas et al., 2004).  In accordance with 
personality theory, therefore, successful implementation could stem from an increased 
intrinsic capability to cope actively, such that confidence in socio-emotional capabilities 
might promote a desire to better understand and then change/improve a stressful 
situation, drawing on enhanced interpersonal skills to do so, whilst safe in the knowledge 
that any negative emotion can be identified, understood and managed effectively. 
However, TEI may also determine willingness to engage in active coping (i.e., individuals 
may be more motivated to cope and thus expend greater effort in doing so).   
 
This latter explanation is plausible when one considers the conceptual 
underpinnings of the construct.  As the earlier incremental analysis demonstrated, TEI is 
more than a direct manifestation of higher-order personality dimensions.  Indeed, factor 
analysis with adult TEIQue data (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007) has shown that empathy, 
social awareness (skills/networking), relationships (maintenance), emotion management 
(others), expression (communication) and perception (identifying feelings in self and 
others) represent ‘novel’ TEI facets.  This has led some to conclude that once personality 
is stripped away, TEI essentially represents ‘emotional self-regard’ (Zeidner et al., 2009) 
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or ‘emotional self-concept’, predominantly comprising “positive beliefs about personal 
competence in internal regulation of emotions” (MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & 
Roberts, 2004, p.39). Indeed, where sub-factor analyses have been conducted between 
the TEIQue and adaptive coping styles, most suggest that this can be attributed to 
increased perception of competency in emotional self-control (e.g., Mikolajczak et al., 
2008). Moreover, it is notable that whilst AEI does not appear to relate to adaptive use of 
self-reported emotion regulation strategies (Beblo et al., 2010) TEI does (Schutte, Manes, 
& Malouff, 2009) - something which is especially significant here given the link to 
internalising disorders (e.g., Aldao et al., 2010).  The notion that TEI represents emotional 
self-concept is further borne out by the high associations documented between TEI and 
self-esteem, which in youth have ranged, for example, between r =.36 and r = .63 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Ferrando et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2009, 2010a).  Furthermore, 
with statistical control for this  relationship, some previously significant associations are 
rendered non-significant, e.g., parental warmth (Ciarrochi et al., 2001) though elsewhere 
they persist, e.g., depression and anxiety (Fernandez-Berrocal et al., 2006). Additionally, 
as noted previously, it has been shown that the TEIQue ‘wellbeing’ factor (comprising 
trait optimism; happiness; self–esteem; self-motivation) is the only significant factor-level 
predictor of general mental health in adults with personality controlled (Zeidner et al., 
2011).  That said, it would appear that with ‘wellbeing’ removed, TEI still contributes 
incrementally to the prediction of rational and emotional coping (but not detached) 
beyond the influence of the Big Five (Petrides, Pita et al., 2007).  Whilst the predictive 
utility of TEI in adolescents with extension to the role of self-concept remains unexplored 
(and clearly warrants attention) for the purposes of the current discussion this research 
provides a strong indication that, in addition to personality, TEI represents emotional self-
concept which, as a self-system belief (Sandler, 2001), clearly illustrates why TEI might be 
a powerful driver of coping efficacy.   
 
Self-system processes are internal beliefs sets (e.g., perceived competence, 
positive self-evaluation, self-efficacy) which are actively constructed by individuals with 
reference to their wider social environment (Prelow, Weaver, & Swenson, 2006; Sandler, 
2001).  Consequently, these are considered central to the resilience process; the 
experience of perceived or actual psychosocial adversity can impact self-system beliefs 
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(e.g., via disruption of salient interpersonal relationships or restricting opportunities to 
experience rewarding activities) which can, in turn, influence future appraisal of stressors 
and subsequent behaviour under adversity.  Conversely, advantageous experiences that 
satisfy basic needs of competence (self-worth), social relatedness, autonomy (control) and 
safety (e.g., through the experience of quality relationships/care-giving etc) can 
strengthen self-systems and help to buffer later adversity (Sandler, 2001).  For instance, 
positive self-esteem (at age 18 years) was found to be a moderator of the link between 
early childhood adversity and positive outcomes to predict better adjustment in 
adulthood (age 32) (Werner, 1993). Yet as well as operating directly to attenuate 
stressors, self-worth is assumed to play a crucial, cyclical role in coping processes; 
successful coping experiences (e.g., resulting in a reduction of negative emotion, 
improvement in stressful situation) attenuate adversity but they also serve to maintain 
positive self-worth and motivate persistence in further (e.g., active) efforts in the future - 
lower self-worth may limit coping persistence under stress and consequently leave 
individuals vulnerable to further declines in self-worth (Sandler, 2001). In other words, 
adaptive coping should satisfy the need to main positive (emotional) self-concept (i.e., 
feeling of control; capacity to react to stressors to positively change the situation), 
simultaneously fostering the development of coping efficacy and better adaptational 
outcomes.  Indeed, research with adolescents suggests that higher self-esteem and active 
coping are linked to lower levels of disorder (Dumont & Provost, 1999) and greater coping 
efficacy explains the association between increased active yet reduced avoidant coping 
and fewer internalising symptoms (Sandler, Tein, Mehta, Wolchik, & Ayers, 2000).  
However, there may be some variability in the form of this beneficial relationship as a 
function of contextual factors; whilst replicating the above findings with respect to active 
coping, Mosher and Prelow (2007) found that higher levels of coping efficacy related to 
avoidant coping and this still resulted in fewer depressive symptoms, but for African 
American not European American adolescents (where, for this group, the relation 
between coping efficacy and avoidance did not reach significance). 
 
It is apparent, therefore, that personality and self-system processes are equally 
pivotal to successful coping.  Yet importantly, both are inherently interlinked - appraisal 
processes are central to the evaluation of threat to the self-system (e.g., identifying 
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nature of threat and perceived impact on relevant self-system e.g., possible diminishment 
of self-worth) and, as noted earlier, traits govern the appraisal process through early 
perceptual/attentional biases which influence interaction with the environment 
(Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993).  Hence, early temperamental traits support 
construction and evolution of the self-system and directly influence perception of coping 
resources and competency (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart, 2007).  For instance, individuals 
with lower levels of trait Neuroticism (less avoidant) and higher levels of Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness (novelty, reward, persistence) would be 
more likely to approach and engage with their social environment which optimises 
chances for reward/reinforcement of positive self-evaluation, and, as a corollary of this, 
the likelihood of engaging and persisting in adaptive coping. Indeed, research with adults 
suggests that Extraversion is associated with greater self-concept which, in turn, predicts 
more problem-focussed coping (Hudek-Knezevic & Kardum, 1996). Thus, as an 
amalgamation of self-system processes (i.e., self-concept) and personality, we should 
expect high levels of TEI (representing pro-social traits and high levels of emotional self-
concept) to support persistent active coping efforts, as per the current findings.  
Nevertheless, the specificity of this effect appears perplexing at first; as the proximal 
family environment (e.g., high quality parental relationships, discipline, overall cohesion 
etc) represents a key resource known to foster coping engagement (Power, 2004) and the 
self-system process of coping efficacy (Vélez, Wolchik, Tein, & Sandler, 2011)  it would 
seem unusual for TEI to proposer (and then contribute to stress protection) within a 
context of family dysfunction.  However, a recent review of behavioural-genetic research 
concluded that, similar to the Big 5 personality traits (e.g., Vernon, Villani et al., 2008), 
additive genetic and non-shared environmental factors (as influences outside the 
family/unique to individuals e.g., peer relations, etc) are the major contributors to self-
esteem (approximately 30-50% and 50% respectively), with shared environmental effects 
negligible (Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2002). Indeed, this composition is remarkably 
similar to TEI; approximately 40% of global TEI can be attributed to genetic influences, 
with the remaining 60% to non-shared environmental factors (Vernon, Petrides et al., 
2008).  Hence, given factors external to the family play a role in the development and 
maintenance of TEI, and the allied constructs of self-esteem and personality, the 
influence of TEI in this context remains plausible theoretically.    
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Nevertheless, this does not help to clarify why TEI did not underscore the stress-
buffering coping process in the context of negative life events or socio-economic 
adversity.  It must be remembered, however, that TEI is not identical to generalist self-
esteem and represents a more nuanced emotional self-concept and personality.  There is 
evidence that negative life events and socio-economic adversity impact depression 
differentially via self-system processes and this may be further complicated by pre-
existing experience of stressors.  For instance, Prelow et al., (2006) found that cumulative 
risk did not directly affect social competence but led to significantly lower levels of self-
esteem and coping-efficacy (which both then explained the association between risk and 
depression) in a community sample of adolescents aged 13-19 years.  Moreover, Sandler 
(2001) found that academic competence was directly associated with cumulative 
adversity in children of divorce (aged 9-12 years) but not in those who had experienced 
bereavement (8-16 years) and hence, mediated the effects of adversity on depression in 
the former group only.  Indeed both studies suggest that general self-worth/self-esteem 
may be more central than domain-specific perceived competencies in explaining the 
effects of life events and socio-economic adversity on depression; in both cases, 
associations between competence and depression could be explained by self-worth 
(Prelow et al., 2006; Sandler, 2001).  Additionally, it has been postulated that the 
moderating effects associated with developmentally-sensitive, self-perceived 
competencies are likely to be inconsistent and/or weak until they become fully 
established as cognitive diatheses in late adolescence or early adulthood (Tram & Cole, 
2000).  
 
Altogether, therefore, it is likely that both the nature of the stressors studied and 
the characteristics of the adolescents included in the current research (age range 11-16 
years; general community sample) both contributed to the specificity of effects obtained.  
It is possible that socio-economic adversity (lack of material resources) and cumulative 
negative life events (including interpersonal and uncontrollable, environmental events, 
e.g., daily hassles versus parental job loss) were too far removed from the individual-level 
resources of coping and TEI to make an impact on proximal mediating and moderating 
processes contributing to depression.  To establish the importance of contextual factors, 
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it will be necessary to conduct finer-grained analysis of life events by subtype (i.e., 
representative of domains most closely associated with emotional self-competence, e.g., 
loss events) and also conduct person-centred analyses of these pathways within groups of 
at-risk youth (e.g., those exposed to chronic poverty/neglect, divorce, bereavement). 
Conducting developmentally-sensitive analyses will also be an important next step; as 
discussed earlier, the developmental trajectory of ‘typical’ TEI is still largely unknown and 
it will be important to understand how prolonged experience of risk affects this, e.g., 
given the bi-directional impact of adversity on the development of self-system beliefs, TEI 
may only be operational as part of protective mechanisms in those experiencing transient 
rather than chronic family dysfunction. Additionally, in order to fully understand why TEI 
operates in this specific manner it will be necessary to deconstruct the essence of TEI in 
adolescence to clarify theoretical and empirical associations with allied self-system 
processes – presently it is unclear whether TEI is best construed as emotional self-
concept, perceived emotional competence, emotional personality or as some hybrid 
combination of all three.  Until this is resolved, understanding the role of TEI in resilience 
remains problematic. 
 
Despite these ambiguities and the lack of sensitivity of the current design, 
analyses detected remarkably clear divergence in the protective role of TEI according to 
disorder type.  Rather than operating indirectly via coping, higher TEI directly interacted 
with all three types of stressors (particularly socio-economic adversity and family 
dysfunction) to reduce disruptive behaviour.  There are two possible interpretations for 
this finding; TEI may operate at an early stage, influencing initial exposure to the stressor 
through selection/interpretation of environmental cues, and/or reactivity via the 
management of emotional repercussions, or, TEI might influence protective 
mechanism(s), other than coping, that are more pertinent to disruptive behaviour and 
were unmeasured here.   
 
The first possibility is theoretically plausible given the established influence traits 
have on emotion regulatory processes.  As noted earlier, it has been suggested that 
deficits in identifying and understanding emotions may lead to misinterpretation of socio-
emotional cues, thus contributing to/perpetuating reactive aggression in individuals 
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diagnosed with early-onset conduct disorder (Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007).  Moreover, 
longitudinal research confirms that risky behaviours are linked to deficits in emotional 
awareness and the expression of anger (Hessler & Katz, 2010) and a recent meta analysis 
found externalising disorders related to a lack of discrete emotional knowledge 
(Trentacosta & Fine, 2010).  Whilst this research describes deficits in abilities rather than 
traits or self-perceptions, connective ‘risk’ pathways between temperamental traits and 
these abilities have been posited.  Specifically, (negative) emotional reactivity  and poor 
effortful control are thought to underscore difficulties in emotion regulation and, as a 
result of the ensuing unmanaged negative affect (particularly aggression), social 
relationships can be impaired along with further learning opportunities to interpret, 
attend to and encode emotional cues (Frick & Morris, 2004).  Lower levels of (fearful) 
inhibitory control might also place individuals at heightened risk for developing conduct 
problems – individuals with this trait profile may be predisposed to engage in novel, risky 
behaviours and/or the development of qualities necessary for a moral ‘conscience’ may 
be thwarted, e.g.,  guilt and empathy (Frick & Morris, 2004). Indeed, much research has 
corroborated the involvement of traits in behavioural disorders. For instance, trait 
Agreeableness moderated the effects of adversity (cumulative negative life events) to 
predict rule-abiding versus antisocial conduct such that in those with a history of low 
levels of Agreeableness (measured at age 10 and 20 years of age), high levels of adversity 
predicted poorer conduct in early adulthood (age 20) (Shiner & Masten, 2012).   
Moreover, along with access to cognitive enhancing resources and parental warmth, an 
‘outgoing temperament’ (as adjustment to new situations, social competence, self-
confidence) in 5 year old twins buffered the effects of socio-economic deprivation on 
antisocial behaviour (Kim-Cohen, Moffitt, Caspi, & Taylor, 2004) and temperament is 
considered to be a key individual-level protective factor against the effects of 
experiencing interpersonal violence (Howell, 2011). 
 
Hence, the current findings would appear consistent with existing personality 
theory and research (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995) -  TEI, considered as emotional 
personality, should represent  a broadband vulnerability marker for disruptive behaviour, 
directly influencing exposure (modification of environment) and/or reactivity (perception 
and understanding of emotional cues) to stressors which might lead indirectly to further 
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downstream difficulties in emotional processing.  Importantly, this concurs with evidence 
that TEI influences stress reactivity.  The majority of passive, mood induction studies have 
suggested that high levels of TEI might underscore heightened reactivity to negative 
emotional stimuli (Fernandez-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Petrides & Furnham, 2003, 
study 2; Sevdalis et al., 2007, study 1), though there are some exceptions to this (Ramos 
et al., 2007). Whether TEI exerts changes to positive affect  following negative mood 
induction is less clear; some studies have reported less of a decrease in those with high 
TEI (Schutte et al., 2002, study 3), more of a decrease (Sevdalis et al., 2007, study 1) or 
found no difference between individuals on the basis of TEI level (Fernandez-Berrocal & 
Extremera, 2006). However, perhaps more importantly, when faced with situational 
stressors higher TEI appears to confer a protective effect; smaller increases in negative 
affect (less mood deterioration) been found consistently across stressor types (e.g., 
failure experience, social evaluation) and outcome indices (e.g., measures of PA/NA; self-
reported reactivity symptoms) and these effects appear to hold with control for 
personality (Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007; Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans et al., 
2009; Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2009).  Yet, converging with the mood induction literature, 
it remains unclear whether high TEI serves to modify positive affect under situational 
stress (Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans et al., 2009).  However, objective indicators of 
stress reactivity confirm this protective effect beyond subjective reports of improved 
mood/stress symptoms; those high in TEI secrete less salivary cortisol (Mikolajczak, Roy et 
al., 2007; Salovey et al., 2002, study 2), show less of an increase in systolic blood pressure 
(Salovey et al., 2002, study 3) and evidence less heart rate variability (Laborde et al., 
2011) when faced with acute lab-based stressors.  Studies examining cortisol secretion 
found that baseline differences might account for this effect; those with lower TEI 
secreted more cortisol in anticipation of stress, which importantly, suggests a 
vulnerability to perceived as well as actual stress. 
 
Attempts to further deconstruct the mechanisms of this protective stress 
reactivity effect have provided preliminary evidence that TEI could promote differences in 
early perceptual processes.  In non-stressful conditions, TEI is positively related to 
accuracy in perceiving dynamic verbal and non-verbal behaviour within social situations 
(SREIT, r = .27)  (Farrelly & Austin, 2007, study 1) and adults with higher levels of TEI are 
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able to provide accurate perceptions of morphed expressions more quickly than their 
lower TEI counterparts, particularly positive expressions such as happiness and surprise 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003).  Using an inspection time paradigm to gauge speeded 
emotional perception, Austin (2004) found that self-perceived ability to appraise emotion 
(SREIT) was significantly related to accuracy in discriminating both positive and negative 
stimuli (from neutral expressions), although, with the effect of ‘general processing speed’ 
(skill in symbolic, non-emotional processing) controlled, only the association between 
appraisal and speeded accuracy in discriminating negative stimuli held, thus diverging 
somewhat from Petrides & Furnham (2003).   
 
Importantly, TEI also illuminates differences in the processing of emotional 
information more generally.  Using the emotional Stroop paradigm with the TMMS, 
Coffey, Berenbaum, & Kerns (2003) found that higher self-reported ‘attention’ to emotion 
was significantly related to slower response latencies across both positive and negative 
stimuli, indicating an attentional bias towards emotional information, whilst the ‘clarity’ 
factor showed the reverse pattern, indicating limited interference from emotional 
content (though this did not reach statistical significance).  In a recent replication, TMMS 
‘attention’ was once again found related (albeit marginally) to an attentional bias for 
negative (r = -.22, p = .09) and this time neutral (r = -.24, p = .06) stimuli and data from 
event related potentials (recorded as the task progressed) confirmed that this was driven 
by a preference for heightened early perception of all stimuli (irrespective of valence) – a 
trend that was also found for those with high levels of anxious arousal (Fisher et al., 
2010).  Nevertheless, as per Coffey et al. (2003), higher levels of ‘clarity’ related to a more 
adaptive pattern of reduced extended processing of negative stimuli, where those high on 
anxious arousal symptomotology displayed the reverse profile - increased engagement 
with negative material - a trend associated with anxiety disorders (Cisler et al., 2011). 
Importantly, early perceptual differences also manifest when exposed to situational 
stressors in the laboratory; those with high TEI (TEIQue ‘self-control’)  devote more 
attention to emotive material per se when stressed, but not in non-stressful conditions, 
which is considered ‘adaptive’ for setting in motion downstream regulatory processes 
(Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2009, study 2). Whilst this latter finding appears to contrast with 
earlier findings of a non-specific vigilance bias for environmental information under 
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neutral conditions, the aforementioned shortcomings of the TMMS content domain limit 
generalisability to the mainstream TEI research base - for example, further assimilation of 
this evidence is precluded given that TMMS ‘attention’ and ‘clarity’ together assess self-
perceived ability to notice, think about and understand one’s own feelings vs. the SREIT 
‘appraisal’ which is concerned with the perception, expression and understanding of 
emotion in oneself and others.  Replication is warranted in order to reliably confirm or 
refute the direction of this effect. 
 
Altogether, it appears quite plausible that early perceptual differences in emotion-
related processing may drive the protective-reactivity effects observed subjectively and 
physiologically in experimental work.  Total TEI appears related to accurate perception of 
static facial expressions and superior processing of dynamic non-verbal and verbal cues, 
with evidence from two experimental paradigms hinting at the possibility that elements 
of TEI might be differentially related to early cognitive-emotional processing.  The 
implication that some TEI facets might not be wholly advantageous across all contexts 
(i.e., high TMMS ‘attention’) also offers a glimpse of why ‘maladaptive’ biases in these 
perceptual processes could lead to disruptive behaviour. For instance, a lack of 
inhibition/‘filtering’ (protracted processing) may lead to similar processing of neutral and 
emotive material, hence false detection (misinterpretation) of threat and more frequent 
adverse stress reactions manifest as aggression/anger etc (Fisher et al., 2010).  Yet, as 
well as effecting changes in early perceptual processing, evidence points to individual 
differences in (automatic) mood regulation which could also directly attenuate reactivity 
to stressors.   
 
Proficiency in mood repair has been measured and manipulated using the two 
experimental methods detailed previously - mood induction and exposure to situational 
stressors.  However in this case, rather than assessing immediate reactivity, a measure of 
emotional state is obtained after a substantial period of time has elapsed post-
intervention (in most studies this time is filled by an intervening activity to facilitate  
mood management ‘behaviour’, such as memory recall or story generation), thus allowing 
individuals time to manage any adverse emotional effects. Ciarrochi et al., (2001) found 
that adolescents with higher levels of ‘managing self relevant emotions’ (SREIT) 
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generated more positively valenced stories following exposure to positive vs. neutral 
mood induction, compared to their lower TEI counterparts (who generated more negative 
stories following negative vs. neutral mood induction).  However, by contrast, levels of 
subjective emotional reactivity measured post-story recall did not differ according to 
whether individuals were high or low ‘regulators’ (i.e., extent of positive and negative 
emotional reactivity was the same).  Hence, this suggests that whilst differences in mood 
management behaviour might be influenced by TEI, these behaviours do not directly 
translate to better mood recovery post-induction.  Furthermore, without adequate 
control and measurement of pre-existing mood state, it is also probable that differences 
in the affective quality of the stories generated was simply a manifestation of positive 
mood which is represented by high EI generally  (see e.g., Schutte et al., 2002).   However, 
a significant moderating effect was detected by Fernandez-Berrocal et al., (2006) who 
measured emotional reactivity in a group of adults fifteen minutes post positive or 
negative mood induction (with no assisted mood regulation). Controlling for baseline 
mood states, those with higher levels of TMMS ‘clarity’ showed a greater increase in PA 
post negative induction (for induced sadness but not anger) compared to those with 
lower clarity.  However, there were no changes in NA according to level of TEI following 
negative or positive induction which suggests that those who report a better 
understanding of emotion are able to use this to enact mood recovery, although this 
operates via up-regulation of positive, rather than down-regulation of negative 
emotionality.  
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that beneficial regulatory effects can be 
detected with reference to discrete emotional responses; Sevdalis et al., (2007, study 2) 
exposed a small group of adults to a failure experience (negotiation task) and found that 
whilst there was no significant relationship between total TEI (TEIQue) and feelings of 
regret and disappointment immediately post-stressor (which stands in contrast to 
previous findings, e.g., Mikolajczak, Luminet et al., 2007 etc), those with higher TEI 
reported reduced levels of these negative emotions (regret: r = -.62, p < .01; 
disappointment: r = -.49, p < .05) five days after the failure experience.  Similarly, after 
viewing a negatively valenced film (depicting a sexual assault) twice across consecutive 
days, Ramos et al., (2007) found that higher self-perceived ability in mood repair was 
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significantly related to lower levels of depression, anger and anxiety in a group of adult 
females.   Clearly however, both of these latter studies are extremely limited 
methodologically; there was no measure of/subsequent control for dispositional mood 
state, or even comparison to a control group – hence in both cases these might just 
reflect a ‘typical’ recovery effect (habituation to the video content and negative 
outcome).  
 
Indeed, the importance of controlling for pre-existing mood was reinforced again 
more recently in work by Mikolajczak, Roy et al.,(2009, study 1) who found that, following 
participation in a non-threatening control condition, those with higher levels of TEI ‘self-
control’ (TEIQue), were more likely to generate positive memories compared to those 
with lower levels of self-control who generated mood-congruent memories (i.e., of 
neutral valence) – thereby reflecting the propensity to experience positive dispositional 
mood states.  However, in contrast to the earlier findings of Ciarrochi et al., (2001) after 
exposure to a stressor (failure experience) those with lower self-control generated more 
positively toned memories vs. higher self-regulators who produced more negative 
memories.  Whilst the authors postulate that this signals ‘adaptive’, stress-combative 
behaviour for high TEI, such that the recall of mood-congruent (negative) memories 
should trigger memories of similar past negative events and facilitate optimal strategies 
for managing the stress (e.g., choose to disengage when uncontrollable, insurmountable 
etc), clearly, there are situations in which concentration upon negative information 
becomes problematic, for example a ruminative focus on negative internal or external 
events and feelings is considered a maladaptive coping strategy contributing to mental ill-
health (Aldao et al., 2010). Furthermore, since higher regulators reported less mood 
deterioration prior to memory recall, it is equally plausible that those with lower self-
control engaged in positive memory recall in an attempt to up-regulate their, more 
heavily impacted, mood following stress. However, given there was no measure of final 
mood state post-memory recall to gauge overall effectiveness, conclusive support for 
either interpretation is precluded. Clearly, there is considerable variation across the 
research designs employed within this small body of literature, which undoubtedly limits 
the extent of comparisons that can be drawn, however it would appear that TEI most 
likely exerts impact on early regulatory proficiency via positive mood maintenance 
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(though the up-regulation of positive affect) rather than to negative mood repair (down-
regulation of negative affect), though this conclusion lacks consistent replication at 
present. 
 
From this review, it is clear that emotional reactivity differs according to trait EI 
and, more specifically, differences in early perception or later regulatory mechanisms are 
likely responsible for the protective effect observed in experimental studies and, by 
extension, the driver of adaptation found in the current study.  Importantly, the stress-
buffering effect also appears to translate to the experience of selected (naturalistic) 
chronic stressors which lends further credence to the current analysis; higher TEI 
predicted reduced psychological and physical distress during an examination period 
(Mikolajczak et al., 2006, study 2) and reduced suicidal ideation in those experiencing high 
levels of daily hassles (Ciarrochi et al., 2002).  Whilst null findings have also been reported 
– TEI did not directly interact with major life events to predict internalising symptoms 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2002) or with daily hassles to predict non-clinical health outcomes (Day 
et al., 2005)  and failed to predict change in psychopathological symptoms across the 
school transition (Williams et al., 2010a) – these differences may have arisen in part due 
to measurement and design inconsistencies across studies.  There is considerable 
variability in TEI instrumentation and the level of analysis conducted across studies (e.g., a 
focus on specific facets e.g., ‘self-control’, ‘managing emotion in others’ has been the 
norm), measures of ‘outcome’ (non-clinical versus clinical) and stressors (implied versus 
direct assessment).   Additionally, all bar one of these studies focussed upon adults.  
Consequently, in finding that TEI might act as a widespread protective marker for 
disruptive behaviour in adolescents the current analysis both converges with and extends 
extant TEI research and offers an important contribution to knowledge.  However, in 
order to further corroborate the tenets of personality theory and the predictions from 
adult TEI research, it will now be important to examine whether stress-elicited, early 
perception and regulatory processes differ as a function of TEI in adolescents with a 
diagnosis of disruptive behaviour disorder. 
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Whilst the direct TEI x stressor interactions documented here appear to fit with 
theory and research it is quite plausible that the models (via coping) tested here did not 
adequately capture processes central to the mitigation of externalising symptomotology.  
In contrast to depression where direct connections between temperament and effortful 
coping have been postulated (e.g., Compas et al., 2004) (and confirmed in the current 
analysis), literature concerning externalising disorder makes only indirect links between 
temperament and coping, for instance via impairments in social relationships (e.g., Frick 
& Morris, 2004).   Indeed, disruptive behaviour (anti-social personality and conduct 
disorder) appears somewhat unique from other psychiatric syndromes (including 
depression, anxiety and substance disorders) in that this is more strongly determined by 
shared environmental effects (Kendler, Prescott, Myers, & Neale, 2003).  Thus, family-
level factors, e.g., maternal characteristics (mental health; lifestyle factors: smoking, low 
level of education etc), maternal parenting (hostile-coercive) and family dysfunction are 
thought to make pivotal environmental contributions to risk trajectories, alongside 
individual-level qualities of the child (Howell, 2011; Moffitt, 2005; Tremblay, 2010).  
Hence, it is possible that in more complex pathways involving additional intervening 
variables, TEI might be better understood as a downstream protective resource exerting 
an effect on more specific family-level influences i.e., aspects of perceived family 
dysfunction such as parenting, conflict, dysfunctional affect etc.  Indeed, within a context 
of risk, maternal factors (high levels of warmth, low over-involvement and control) 
appear to promote pro-social behaviour (Brennan, Le Brocque, & Hammen, 2003) which, 
as the polar opposite of externalising disorder, has been associated with high TEI in youth 
(Frederickson et al., 2012; Mavroveli et al., 2007; Mavroveli et al., 2009; Petrides, 
Sangareau, Furnham, & Frederickson, 2006).  Furthermore, as noted earlier, preliminary 
links between TEI and specific aspects of adaptive family functioning have been 
uncovered, e.g., conversation orientation (not conformity), parental warmth and 
affection (not discipline), together with negative links to  ‘maladaptive’ aspects, e.g., 
harsh punishment (Alegre & Benson, 2010; Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Keaten & Kelly, 2008).   
 
Additionally, in sharp contrast with mood disorder research, self-beliefs appear 
inconsistently associated with behavioural symptoms, thus further hinting at the 
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possibility that TEI, considered emotional self-concept, may be implicated further 
downstream perhaps driving changes in family-level factors.  For instance, Pargas, 
Brennan, Hammen & Le Brocque (2010) found that high self-esteem at age 15 years had a 
widespread protective effect predicting better mental health (composite indicator 
including mood and behavioural symptoms) at age 20 in those individuals with a family 
history of (maternal) depression and a normative comparison sample.  However, in the 
at-risk group, parental relationship quality was also a robust predictor of resilience.  
Nevertheless, using more specific risk and outcome measures, self-esteem did not explain 
the effects of negative life events on externalising symptoms in bereaved youth (Haine, 
Ayers, Sandler, Wolchik, & Weyer, 2003) or in a adolescent community sample (Dubois, 
Felner, Meares, & Krier, 1994) although both studies found significant effects for 
internalising symptoms. By contrast, self-worth was found to be a significant mediator of 
the effects of cumulative life events and socio-economic adversity on externalising 
disorder in bereaved children (though intriguingly predicted more behavioural problems), 
but not in children of divorce, with academic competence showing the opposite pattern 
(Sandler, 2001).  This evidence confirms that maintenance of positive self-evaluation 
(perhaps serving to stave off depressogenic cognitions such as hopelessness) is more 
central to protective mechanisms involving internalising symptoms and effects associated 
with externalising behaviours are variable, contingent on context and type of belief. 
Altogether, therefore, it will be important for future research to build on the current 
findings to further rule out or confirm the involvement of TEI (conceived as either 
emotional personality or self-concept) in additional proximal psychosocial processes 
known to contribute to the development and maintenance of externalising disorder. 
 
Summary: TEI is useful for mitigating the effects of stressors on disorder although 
its mechanism of action varies in response to the type of stressor encountered and with 
respect to symptom outcome.  High levels of TEI not only ensure more effective active 
coping in the face of family dysfunction to reduce depression, but can also directly buffer 
the impact of negative life events, socio-economic adversity and family dysfunction to 
reduce disruptive behaviour. Studying complex interactions between TEI and multiple 
coping styles in the context of psychosocial stressors and depression extends existing 
205 
 
research (e.g., Downey et al., 2010; Mikolajczak, Petrides, & Hurry, 2009) to show that it 
is through the implementation of active coping, rather than a reduced propensity to select 
maladaptive forms of coping (i.e., emotional or avoidant), that TEI makes a difference to 
mental health outcomes in adolescence. With TEI construed as emotional personality, this 
finding fully converges with prior literature examining the role of traits in coping 
processes (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Connor-Smith & 
Compas, 2004; Dunkley et al., 2003; Vollrath, 2001). Both the content (a ‘pro-socio-
emotional’ trait profile) and intensity (high versus low level) of TEI would appear to offer 
an explanation for the specificity of the coping process observed.   Additionally, viewed as 
emotional self-concept, TEI should influence willingness to persist in active coping efforts 
to maintain positive self-worth, as predicted by self-system research (Dumont & Provost, 
1999; Mosher & Prelow, 2007; Sandler, 2001; Sandler et al., 2000).  Compared to general 
self-worth, domain-specific perceived competencies appear less influential in buffering 
the effects of distal stressors on depression which might further illuminate why TEI did 
not act in pathways involving socio-economic adversity and negative life events.  
Nevertheless, to establish the importance of contextual factors developmentally-
sensitive, person-centred analyses of at-risk youth are now required. That TEI acted as a 
direct buffer of stressors for disruptive behaviour concurs with both personality theory 
(Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; John et al., 2008) and previous adult TEI research.   High TEI 
confers a protective effect when facing situational and chronic stressors (e.g., Ciarrochi et 
al., 2002; Mikolajczak et al., 2006; Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2007; Salovey et al., 2002) and 
experimental evidence hints that perceptual differences in emotion-related processing 
(e.g., Fisher et al., 2010; Mikolajczak, Roy et al., 2009) and automatic mood recovery 
capacity (e.g., Fernandez-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Ramos et al., 2007; Sevdalis et al., 
2007, study 2) could be drivers of this process. Nevertheless, insights from behavioural-
genetic and self-belief research (e.g., Kendler et al., 2003; Pargas et al., 2010) suggest that 
additional family-level influences, not captured by the current study, may have a role to 
play, such that TEI may impact further ‘downstream’ in the modelling of more complex 
pathways.   In order to confirm or deny these inferences, it will be important to examine 
whether stress-elicited reactivity processes differ as a function of TEI in clinically 
diagnosed adolescents and extend naturalistic study to examine specific proximal 
processes assumed more central to disruptive behaviour.  
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15.3.2 Pathways to disorder: The role of ability EI 
 
 
Modelling the direct and indirect influences of stressors on disorder also implied a 
protective role for ability EI, yet once again this function differed according to the type of 
stressor and disorder under scrutiny.   Converging with the TEI analysis, an EI-driven 
coping process appeared central to explaining the effects of stressors on internalising but 
not externalising disorder.   However, the protective effect conferred by emotional skill 
operated at an earlier, upstream stage in the process; AEI directly interacted with 
stressors to mobilise an ‘adaptive’ (i.e., less avoidant) coping choice in adolescents to 
reduce depression. Like TEI, this effect was similarly stressor-specific (operating only in 
the context of family dysfunction and negative life events), however, in contrast to TEI, 
manifest in those with lower levels of ability (scores below +2 SD from the mean; 127.06).  
Nevertheless, this could be applied to 87% of the adolescents in the current sample and 
thus in actuality represented a more widespread protective effect than that found for TEI.  
AEI assumed a similar upstream role to attenuate disruptive behaviour in the face of 
stressors; this time better outcomes were associated with higher levels of emotional 
ability, however, this beneficial effect was restricted to the experience of socio-economic 
adversity only (although significant interactions involving active and avoidant coping were 
detected in other models, conditional indirect effects were not detectably different from 
zero).  Notably, the pattern of this direct effect interaction again supports a ‘diathesis-
stress’ account (contrastive; ordinal within the range of data) (Roisman et al., 2012). At 
this juncture, it is worth emphasising that these analyses illustrate the importance of 
specifying more complex models to better capture the relationship between EI and 
health.  Even though basic, bivariate analyses found no direct relationship between AEI 
and depression, this work has shown that emotional skill makes an important 
contribution when multiple, intervening influences (of opposing directions) are 
appropriately modelled.   
 
Thus, the chief role of AEI was to underscore individual differences in the 
experience of stressors to lead to the reduction of symptoms either indirectly (through 
adaptive effortful coping selection for proximal stressors and depression) or directly (i.e., 
not via coping for distal, chronic stress and disruptive behaviour).  Notably, this trend is 
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consistent with the predictions derived from earlier theoretical discussion; as a pre-
requisite skill-set for supporting general affect regulation yet most strongly determined 
by emotional knowledge (Wranik et al., 2007), a more direct role in pathways to 
externalising disorder was anticipated given the centrality of deficiencies in emotional 
understanding in conduct disorders (Hessler & Katz, 2010; Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007). 
Conversely, the nature of AEI (as emotional knowledge versus action) made indirect links 
to depression – a disorder closely associated with emotion regulatory activity (see e.g., 
Aldao et al., 2010; Compas et al., 2004) - more likely.  That said, findings only partially 
concur with the early writings of AEI proponents.  Whilst converging with the suggestion 
that ability EI underpins and precedes adaptive coping under stress (Salovey et al., 1999), 
that individuals “with emotional intelligence can be thought of as having attained at least 
a limited form of positive mental health” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p.201) requires 
qualification in light of the current findings.  Here, very high levels of skill were not 
universally advantageous (i.e., only beneficial for disruptive behaviour but not 
depression) in adolescents.  Whilst the AEI-stressor literature base is far smaller than for 
TEI, and exclusively focussed upon internalising outcomes, existing research offers some 
hints as to why these effects were observed. 
 
   The current analyses collectively suggests that (up to a point) those who are 
better able to identify and decode emotional cues, understand emotional consequences 
and manage reactivity once stressors are encountered, experience reduced levels of both 
internalising and externalising symptoms.  Some evidence has examined whether AEI 
underscores differences in (protracted) mood management behaviour or immediate 
emotional reactivity to stressors.  Ciarrochi, Chan and Caputi (2000) found that individuals 
with high levels of total AEI (MEIS) were more likely to recall positive (school-associated) 
memories following both positive and negative mood induction compared to their low 
AEI counterparts (who in fact showed no differences in the valence of memory recall 
across induction conditions).  However, following this activity, differences in post-memory 
recall mood state were only found for positive affect following positive induction (i.e., 
higher AEI, specifically ‘emotion management’, related to higher levels of PA following 
positive induction but not lower levels of negative affect following negative induction 
when compared to low AEI individuals).  Hence, this suggested that AEI might only be 
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useful for positive mood maintenance but not negative mood repair.  To ensure this was 
reflective of mood management ability rather than differences in early reactivity, a 
follow-up study measured self-reported mood immediately following mood induction. No 
significant difference in immediate emotional state as a function of AEI was found, 
indicating that the effect reported by the original study (i.e., detectable differences in 
mood when given adequate time to ‘manage’ this) was robust.   Nevertheless, the 
adaptive utility of this behaviour is unclear.  Proficiency in mood repair, as self-regulatory 
responses to attenuate sadness, dysphoria is considered central to depression (Kovacs & 
Lopez-Duran, 2010) whilst the self-regulation of anger is also indirectly related to conduct 
problems (Frick & Morris, 2004), yet the management of such negative affect was not 
demonstrated here; positive mood maintenance did not operate in the presence of 
‘stress’ (i.e., negative mood induction). 
 
Work examining the relationship between AEI and experimentally-induced 
stressor reactivity is similarly equivocal.  Matthews et al.,  (2006) found that total AEI 
predicted reduced pre-task distress and worry over the effects of personality (adding 
2.5% and 5.2% incremental variance respectively) suggesting that those with higher AEI 
came to the experimental session in a more positive mood state than those with lower 
AEI.  However, controlling for this pre-task state, higher levels of both AEI and trait 
Neuroticism were predictive of increased post-task distress and, in contrast to TEI, AEI did 
not modify the effect of stress (condition) on emotional reactivity (distress or worry).   
Therefore, converging with Ciarrochi et al., (2000) any benefits of higher AEI would seem 
to be restricted to positive rather than negative affectivity and this may have limited 
applicability within a stress context.  Despite those with higher AEI reporting a better 
subjective mood state initially (less distress, worry) this did not confer any advantage in 
the face of stressors.  AEI predicted increased reactivity and did not offer protection 
against a situational stressor. Taken together, these studies offer a perplexing picture; 
both converge in suggesting that AEI might represent differences in the capacity to 
experience (more) positive affect, with the work of Ciarrochi et al., (2000) indicating that 
individuals with higher emotional skill are able to utilise this ‘hedonic’ capacity for mood 
management (use their enhanced positive cognitive bias to generate positive memories 
to maintain a positive mood).  This is important since low positive emotionality is thought 
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to be a precursor to the development of internalising disorder (Durbin, Klein, Hayden, 
Buckley, & Moerk, 2005; Kovacs & Lopez-Duran, 2010).  However, this does not appear to 
translate into an effective strategy when facing passive or experimental stressors.  
Clearly, the reactivity and mood management capabilities associated with AEI require 
further concentrated investigation (and extension to physiological-level changes) but 
early indications are that AEI does not exert a protective advantage through mood repair.  
 
Another potential mechanism through which AEI may afford an upstream 
advantage is through enhanced detection and filtering of emotional cues from the 
environment. Indeed, proponents of AEI theory argue that emotionally ‘intelligent’ 
responding should equate to efficient performance, as faster accurate responding, in 
experimental paradigms assessing early emotional-information processing (Matthews et 
al., 2002; Mayer, Roberts et al., 2008).  In line with this, Farrelly and Austin (2007, study 2) 
found proficiency in perceiving, using and understanding emotion was associated with 
negative expression discrimination on a speeded inspection time task (total MSCEIT: r = 
.23, p < .01), whilst ability to perceive and use emotion was linked to accurate decoding of 
dynamic verbal and non-verbal cues (total MSCEIT: r = .29, p < .01) (Farrelly & Austin, 
2007, study 1 though not study 2).  Moreover, Martin and Thomas (2011) found that total 
AEI was associated with better performance on the Emotional Stroop task, i.e., reduced 
response latencies/less interference from negative emotional content (r = -.27, p < .01), 
though this effect appears more strongly related to enhanced emotion management and 
perception rather than the ability to use emotion to facilitate thought (i.e., in this case, 
protect though processes from interference), running contrary to predictions in the 
literature (Roberts et al., 2006).  However, this latter research can only be considered 
exploratory given that the participants involved were non-native English speakers and, 
most likely as a result of cross-linguistic transferability issues, scored well below the 
normative MSCEIT mean performance.  Nevertheless, very recent work reports only 
negligible relationships between AEI and improved performance on a primed lexical 
decision task designed to tap selective attention to emotional information (e.g., latent 
correlation with emotion management = -.09)  (Fiori & Antonakis, 2012).  Indeed, 
structural equation modelling found only trait Openness and IQ to be significant 
predictors of faster correct performance.  Nevertheless, cross-task methodological 
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differences may account for these anomalies, e.g., as well as differences in task 
complexity (inclusion of a lexical decision task), stimuli in Fiori & Antonakis (2012) were 
presented at a flat rate of 350 milliseconds whilst Farrelly & Austin (2007) varied stimulus 
presentation in increments up to 400 milliseconds. Clearly these divergences together 
with the fact that these processing differences have not been investigated in the context 
of lab-induced stress limit the interpretations that can be drawn from this small body of 
research.  Nevertheless, on balance, they do hint that high AEI might be linked to faster 
detection and enhanced filtering/inhibition of emotional cues (particularly those of a 
negative valence).   
 
This would appear to offer a plausible explanation for both of the upstream 
protective effects found in the current research.  As noted across the opening chapters, 
attentional deployment and re-orienting are capacities considered central to emotion 
regulation processes (Gross & Thompson, 2007) and when these go awry can manifest as 
maladaptive regulatory practices (e.g., rumination, passivity) that are linked to disorder 
(Aldao et al., 2010; Garnefski et al., 2005; Neumann et al., 2009).  Moreover, attentional 
processes (appraisal) are also pivotal to effortful coping, governing threat evaluation 
(detection; controllability) and ensuing strategy selection, e.g., engagement or 
disengagement (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010; Compas et al., 2001; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Hence early identification and attentional control of socio-emotional cues from the 
environment when under stress could be directly and indirectly advantageous.  This 
interpretation would appear partially consistent with conclusions drawn from 
aforementioned adult research where elements of AEI are reportedly enhanced in 
individuals with a history of exposure to chronic stress i.e.,  physical/psychological 
maltreatment, sexual abuse and poverty (Goldenberg, 2004; Kraus et al., 2010, study 1). 
Interestingly, the same effect was not found between AEI and retrospective reports of 
early family dysfunction in adults (Gardner et al., 2011). Although both of the former 
analyses did not explicitly link these associations to measures of adaptation and relied on 
retrospective reports of childhood adversity, they imply that AEI might be especially 
useful (and thus become honed with practice) in chronically under-resourced and 
neglectful environments.  Within these settings, being externally-orientated towards 
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environmental cues might mitigate the chance of exposure to further uncontrollable 
stressors (Kraus et al., 2010).  Work by Cha and Nock (2009) with ‘at-risk’ adolescent 
females further corroborates this notion in finding that emotional abilities (particularly 
managing and understanding emotion) moderated the impact of concurrently reported 
sexual abuse on suicidal behaviour (frequency of suicidal ideation and actual attempts 
within past year).  The potential specificity of this effect to chronic (uncontrollable) rather 
than interpersonal (controllable) stressors is further highlighted by research that failed to 
detect a protective effect for AEI (perceiving emotion) against negative life events and 
finding instead that high levels of AEI may even constitute vulnerability in the face of daily 
hassles  (Ciarrochi et al., 2002).  Hence, this small body of research not only provides 
some indication as to why AEI might confer protection under stress but is also consistent 
with the specificity of the effects observed in the present analysis (i.e., that higher 
emotional skill directly mitigates the effects of chronic socio-economic adversity on 
disorder).   
 
Taken together, this evidence supports the notion that an AEI-driven buffering 
mechanism, perhaps best attributed to differences in early emotional processing, may 
only have a beneficial direct effect on disorder in the context of chronic stress. Whilst the 
nature of the current, cross-sectional design precludes inferences as to whether this 
protective mechanism arises from the ‘developmental honing’ of AEI under conditions of 
chronic adversity, these findings nevertheless offer an intriguing platform upon which 
base future longitudinal research that will be better positioned to explore this hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to existing research, the current effect was found to apply to 
externalising but not internalising disorder. Firm inferences as to why this might be the 
case are not possible given this is the first study to examine how AEI relates to disruptive 
behaviour and stressors.  Although some evidence indicates that lower socio-economic 
status may be a stronger distal correlate of externalising rather than internalising disorder 
(e.g., Amone-P'Olack et al., 2009) a recent review of the literature failed to conclusively 
substantiate this trend (McMahon et al., 2003).  Additionally, as per the earlier TEI 
discussion, it cannot be ruled out that AEI could act through additional intervening, 
family-level variables, not captured by the current research, to mitigate behaviour 
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problems in adolescents.   Indeed, a growing body of research emphasises the ‘social’ 
advantages of high levels of emotional skill, e.g., increased positive relations with others, 
satisfaction with relationships, quality of interaction, pro-social behaviour and 
interpersonal sensitivity (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes et al., 2005; Lopes et al., 2003; Rossen 
& Kranzler, 2009), though again, this has not yet been explored in adolescents. 
Replication of this analysis with extension to the inclusion of social, family-level factors 
will be warranted to affirm the distinct mood/behavioural disorder pathways found here. 
However, the aforementioned findings that reported inconsistent and/or ambiguous 
buffering effects associated with interpersonal stressors (i.e., daily hassles, major 
negative life events) could be considered inadvertent support for the fact that AEI 
operates indirectly to exert an effect on internalising symptoms.  
 
The present discussion makes a case that the benefits of AEI (as superior early 
emotion processing) are channelled via effortful coping to impact depression, such that 
socio-emotional skill extrinsically powers the selection of adaptive coping strategies when 
faced with stressors of an interpersonal nature.  Importantly, the preference for less 
frequent use of a traditionally ‘maladaptive’ avoidant style of coping found here is in line 
with the small pool of existing studies that have examined isolated links between AEI and 
coping strategies; the most consistent associations have been found for reduced use of 
avoidant or emotional styles rather than increased active approaches (Gohm et al., 2005; 
Goldenberg et al., 2006; MacCann et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2009) and AEI would appear 
to be a significant moderator of the effects of occupational stress on emotional coping 
style to impact physical health (Peng et al., 2010).  Moreover, in an experimental setting, 
AEI again predicted less avoidant and emotional coping (not more problem-focussed) 
coping with task-induced stress but, diverging from the current findings, did not 
moderate the effects of stress to predict coping choice (Matthews et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, this conflicting finding may arise from differences in the stressor experience 
measured (i.e., an acute, performance-based lab stressor versus broad, naturalistic 
interpersonal stressors) which clearly differ according to intensity and duration. Instead, it 
is suggested here that in response to ecologically-valid stressors AEI can be useful in 
mobilising these forms of coping.  That AEI related to less frequent selection of avoidant 
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coping when faced with family dysfunction and negative life events can be seen as 
‘adaptive’ given that increased use of avoidant strategies (here comprising distracting 
actions, avoidant actions, wishful thinking and repression) in the face of controllable 
stressors is typically associated with poorer outcomes (Compas et al., 2001; Seiffge-
Krenke, 2011).  Both the measure of family dysfunction (i.e., tapping perceived roles, 
communication etc) and negative life events (network, romantic, academic etc) assume 
aspects of ‘controllability’ consistent with this interpretation, however, future fine-
grained analysis of  life events by subtype together with isolated elements of the family 
environment are required in order for this conclusion to be verified.   
 
Yet since analyses show that AEI does not alternatively promote an active or 
support seeking approach that would help to tackle the problem head-on (perhaps by 
changing interpersonal relationships to avoid repeated conflict or by addressing the 
negative affect arising from these encounters) it can only be speculated at this stage why 
merely being less avoidant results in successful adaptation.  The tentative proposal made 
here is that by representing individual differences in early emotional processing 
(particularly attentional deployment/control and speed in identifying negative affect), 
individuals with higher levels of AEI rely less on effortful, downstream avoidant strategies 
because they are more adept at early selection of appropriate situations (choosing 
whether to enter and engage in stressful situations) and, once within a setting, engage in 
effective modification of the internal and external environment  (i.e., use attentional 
control to filter/inhibit emotional information and redirect internal focus).    Notably, 
these features correspond to antecedent strategies within the framework of the Process 
Model of emotion regulation, occurring before the emotion response arises along with 
the need for up or down-regulation  (Gross & Thompson, 2007) and have been linked to 
lower levels of distress in young children, adolescents and adults (for review see Kovacs & 
Lopez-Duran, 2010).  However, the present findings also indicate that very high levels of 
emotional proficiency are ineffective in reducing depressive symptoms, partially 
concurring therefore with the earlier findings of enhanced post-stressor reactivity 
(Matthews et al., 2006) and amplified internalising symptomotology with daily hassles 
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(Ciarrochi et al., 2002).  This would imply that being less avoidant is unhelpful for those 
with extremely high levels of emotional awareness and knowledge.   
 
Speculatively, it is possible that heightened early perception of emotional cues 
contributes to an ‘over-vigilant’ state in these individuals, in that they are hyperaware of 
negative emotional content which becomes overwhelming and (in light of the earlier 
discussion) triggers unmanageable levels of negative affect. Hence, for these individuals 
being more avoidant would be the optimal effortful coping strategy under stress. Indeed, 
evidence confirms that heightened physiological arousal interferes with mood repair and 
may produce a bias towards negative emotional memory recall (ruminative focus) which 
contributes to depression (Kovacs & Lopez-Duran, 2010).  In order to verify whether this 
is a plausible account of the effects found here, investigation into how the physiological 
reactivity of individuals under stress varies as a function of AEI requires urgent attention.  
Establishing the relative protection and/or physiological vulnerability afforded by AEI is 
especially critical for adolescents given that this age group are characterised by 
heightened sensitivity to stressors (particularly those of a social nature) (e.g., Stroud et 
al., 2009).  Additionally, this ‘early-regulatory’ interpretation could be further examined 
using self-report data to statistically probe whether a better fitting model encompasses 
significant paths from AEI-stressor interactions on to depression direct and also on to 
avoidant coping (i.e., as an indirect influence).  Empirically, work might be extended to 
examine whether AEI links to the self-reported use of these antecedent-focussed 
strategies and how this in turn fits within the stressor-health process – whilst a basic 
correspondence between antecedent and response focussed strategies has been 
investigated with reference to TEI in adults (Schutte et al., 2009) this has not yet received 
attention in the AEI arena. Moving away from this early-regulatory explanation, it is also 
possible that AEI did promote active and support seeking approaches but that these 
associations were obscured through aggregation in the current dimensional analyses. For 
instance, ‘active’ coping reflected a composite of problem-solving and positive cognitive 
restructuring strategies, the latter of which are ‘meaning focussed’ and represent a way 
that positive affect may be generated and harnessed within stress process (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2000). Given the earlier discussed links to positive affectivity, higher AEI could 
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reasonably be expected to relate to this latter cluster of strategies (e.g., positive 
reframing, control, optimism etc).  Future work could rule out this possibility by 
conducting strategy or cluster-specific coping analyses.   
 
Summary: The importance of examining how AEI influences wider stressor-health 
processes was underscored by the present work where emotional skill was found to 
confer a protective effect in pathways to both externalising and internalising symptoms 
(despite the lack of a direct effect linking AEI to the latter).  Contrary to TEI, emotional 
skill was found to operate at an earlier, upstream stage in proceedings – for depression, 
AEI interacted with family dysfunction and negative life events to mobilise adaptive 
coping, whilst for disruptive behaviour AEI attenuated the effects of socio-economic 
adversity directly. However, contrasting with AEI theory (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) very 
high levels of emotional skill were not beneficial for mitigating the effects of interpersonal 
stressors on depression. Whilst the dearth of research examining the role of AEI under 
stress makes extrapolations from existing evidence tentative, a review of available 
literature suggests that AEI does not reflect superiority in mood repair skills (Ciarrochi et 
al., 2000; Matthews et al., 2006) but may confer an advantage through enhanced early 
detection and filtering of emotional cues (Martin & Thomas, Farrelly & Austin, 2007; 
2011) -  processes pivotal to both early emotion regulation (attention deployment, 
orienting etc) and later effortful coping (threat evaluation; strategy selection) (Carver & 
Connor-Smith, 2010; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Evidence suggests that these skills (as 
represented by AEI) might thrive within and protect against exposure to chronic stressors 
directly (Cha & Nock, 2009; Goldenberg, 2004; Kraus et al., 2010) and that poverty may be 
a more robust correlate of externalising rather than internalising symptomotology 
(Amone-P'Olack et al., 2009) thereby supporting the pathway detected for disruptive 
behaviour.  That emotional skill interacted with stressors to power coping strategies is 
consistent with prior AEI research examining interpersonal (Peng et al., 2010)  but not 
performance based stressors (Matthews et al., 2006) thus corroborating the nature of the 
indirect mechanism found in the current analysis. Crucially, less frequent use of avoidant 
coping in the face of interpersonal (controllable) stressors can be considered ‘adaptive’ 
(Compas et al., 2001).  It is speculated that superiority in emotion-focussed attentional 
deployment (influencing situation selection; modification etc) would engender less 
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reliance on later effortful avoidant coping but at the same time very high levels of 
proficiency might represent a hyper-vigilance or over-awareness of negative emotional 
cues.  This could explain why less avoidant coping was ineffective in reducing depression 
at very high levels of ability EI.   Nevertheless, these interpretations require empirical 
corroboration; in particular, work must now examine whether underlying physiological 
reactivity and recovery to stressors differs in adolescents as a function of AEI and how AEI 
maps to specific antecedent emotion regulatory processes. 
 
 
15.3.3 Emotional skill and personality: Dual influences on adaptation 
 
Rather than viewing AEI and TEI as competing, mutually exclusive perspectives 
(see e.g., Mayer, Roberts et al., 2008; Petrides, 2011a), this work adopted the position 
that they represent complementary approaches to the study of EI and both have the 
potential to offer valuable insight into adaptational behaviours - after all, emotional skill, 
as indexed via AEI, indicates maximal potential (i.e., what we could do given optimal 
circumstances) but not necessarily what we typically do in practice, which could be 
influenced by a variety of implicit factors, some aspects of which are captured by TEI 
(Gohm et al., 2005; Mikolajczak, 2009). Indeed, earlier discussion has already emphasised 
how traits influence perception and  action; specifically, the manifestation of key 
adaptational processes -  emotion regulation and coping (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; 
Rothbart & Sheese, 2007).  Corroborating this position, latent variable modelling found 
that whilst both emotional skill and personality supported the coping process, they 
assumed distinctive roles, either as a ‘mobiliser’ or ‘implementer’ of coping styles, raising 
the possibility that a specific skill/trait profile exists to collectively underscore optimal 
adaptation under stress.    Importantly, the present work differs from the uni-directional/ 
co-varying stance taken by other EI researchers who suggest that “higher levels of ability 
emotional intelligence may predispose individuals to display more often emotionally 
intelligent characteristics [that] will tend to result in higher trait emotional intelligence” 
(Schutte et al., 2011, p.261).  The previous analysis found that high levels of emotional 
skill were not universally beneficial but that high levels of competency could be.  Hence it 
follows that there might be instances where individuals may possess high levels of actual 
skill but have lower self-perceptions of their abilities and therefore lack the emotional 
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confidence to translate this (coping) knowledge into practice.  Importantly, prior research 
also hints at this possibility.  For instance, Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews & Roberts 
(2005) found that academically gifted individuals had higher levels of emotional skill but 
lower levels of perceived emotional competency compared with non-gifted students 
(who intriguingly showed the reverse trend). Moreover, in adults, high levels of AEI 
differentially related to lower levels of perceived stress as a function of TEI (TMMS facets: 
‘intensity’, ‘clarity’); AEI  appeared advantageous when ‘clarity’ and ‘intensity’ were either 
uniformly high or low, but was not beneficial for those who were potentially most 
vulnerable – individuals experiencing intense emotions and a lack of perceived emotional 
understanding (Gohm et al., 2005).  
 
In the present research, supplementary path analyses provided further support for 
this idea. Trait and ability EI were found to work conjointly, influencing the effect of all 
three stressors on disorder through coping (although this effect was specific to 
depression only).  Converging with earlier latent variable modelling, AEI mobilised the 
selection of avoidant coping whilst TEI modified the effectiveness of this approach under 
stress (TEI also amplified the effects of active coping on depression, as per earlier 
analyses, but this was not conditional on both AEI and TEI).  Importantly, effects were 
found to be significant at above average levels of AEI and thus shed light on why coping 
processes appeared less effective in mitigating the effects of stressors on depression at 
high levels of emotional skill in earlier analyses.   Across all contexts (but particularly 
family dysfunction), the most deleterious effects were found for adolescents with above 
average levels of AEI yet below average levels of TEI; higher levels of emotional skill 
interacted with stressors to trigger avoidant coping but with lower levels of emotional 
self-concept, depression increased.  As a rejoinder to the previous discussion, it would 
seem that with increasing emotional skill there is a tendency to activate avoidant coping 
under stress, perhaps in an effort to minimise any negative emotional reactivity arising as 
a consequence of the emotional hyper-acuity associated with high levels of skill.  Yet 
critically, this defence can fail to protect individuals with low levels of TEI; these self-
effacing individuals lack confidence in their abilities and cannot (or are unwilling to) 
implement avoidant strategies appropriately to circumvent the negative emotionality 
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arising from stress.  However, better outcomes were found with increasing levels of 
emotional confidence and, at very high levels of TEI, the effects of family dysfunction on 
depression were significantly attenuated (conditional indirect effect becomes negative).  
These individuals have good levels of actual emotional ability yet crucially, also possess 
accurate perceptions and confidence in their skills (i.e., believe they can identify, control, 
express emotions and make a positive impact on their situation).  This positive self-
belief/pro-social personality profile confers protection against any negative emotion 
arising from cognitive/behavioural avoidance to reduce depression.  Whilst effects 
appeared small in magnitude, the proportion of adolescents adversely affected by family 
dysfunction and poverty as a function of this ‘maladaptive’ EI profile equated to 8% (n = 
92), whilst for negative life events this was greater, affecting 16% of adolescents (n = 
186).  Conversely, 12% (n = 138) of adolescents benefitted from having very high levels of 
TEI and AEI when facing family dysfunction. 
 
As well as demonstrating that high levels of AEI could be harmful when coupled 
with very low emotional self-competency, analyses illustrated that there may also be 
occasions where high levels of TEI are counter-productive.  Although not reaching 
statistical significance, the trend across all three models suggested that adolescents with 
low levels of actual emotional skill yet extremely high levels of emotional self-
competence do more poorly relative to those with lower levels of TEI and AEI.  Hence it 
would appear that this group inaccurately perceive and overestimate their abilities, 
wrongly believing that they have exemplary emotional skill, and a corollary of this is 
increased depression through avoidant coping.  In fact proponents of TEI anticipate this 
scenario; Petrides (2011) postulated that high TEI scores may actually be “indicative of 
hubris and self-promotion” adding that “low trait EI scorers are more likely than their 
high-scoring counterparts to be straightforward and less likely to be afflicted by a need 
for self-verification and image management” (p. 661).  The idea that self-aggrandisement 
leads to negative outcomes has a rich history and applicability here given that TEI reflects 
both a self-system belief (as emotional self-concept) as well as emotional personality.  
Whist, as noted in the previous discussion, maintaining positive self-worth can have 
benefits for mental health (e.g., Noble, Heath, & Toste, 2011; Prelow et al., 2006) there is 
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also ample evidence that highly inflated (and unstable) levels of self-esteem can lead to 
negative consequences, including aggression (for review see Baumeister, Campbell, 
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003) - particularly when “such beliefs are bought at the cost of gross 
distortions of reality, have to be constantly defended against evidence from the 
environment, or require foregoing the development of competence in socially valued 
roles” (Sandler, 2001, pp. 30-31).  Indeed, very recent research reported a positive 
association between TEI and subclinical narcissism (Petrides, Vernon, Schermer, & 
Veselka, 2011) which, as one of the ‘Dark Triad’ traits reflecting grandiose self-regard and 
superiority has also been linked to externalising behaviours (Baumeister, Bushman, & 
Campbell, 2000). Self-regulation failure may contribute to this effect; Baumeister, 
Heatherton, and Tice (1993) found that when threatened, individuals with inflated 
‘egotistical’ illusions were found to set unrealistic, unattainable goals which actually 
increased the likelihood of failure on a performance-based lab task compared to those 
with lower self-esteem. However, it would appear that underestimating ones 
performance can be similarly detrimental. Corroborating the current findings, evidence 
suggests that both embellished and diminished perceptions of abilities can have 
deleterious health consequences; in students, both self-effacement (less favourable 
perception relative to actual cognitive ability) and self-enhancement (more favourable 
perception of cognitive ability relative to actual performance) were related to increased 
depression and to higher levels of dejection-related emotion following experimentally-
induced (inconsistent) performance feedback (Kim & Chiu, 2011).  This provides support 
for the idea that there is an optimal level for positive illusions (e.g., Baumeister, 1989) but 
that accuracy of self-perceptions is most advantageous. 
 
 
Summary: Building on earlier latent variable modelling, path analyses explored 
how ability and trait EI work together to influence coping processes and promote 
adaptation.  Converging with earlier analyses, results suggested that the EI-driven coping 
process is more central to depression rather than disruptive behaviour where there may 
be other mechanisms at play.  However, it would seem that having high levels of 
emotional skill are not universally advantageous for reducing depression; individuals who 
know what to do when faced with stressors (i.e., apply emotional knowledge and skill to 
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set in motion an appropriate coping strategy) do not always have the optimal levels of 
emotional self-confidence to implement this course of action effectively.  It would seem 
any deleterious effects arising from behavioural or cognitive avoidance can be overridden 
by high levels of TEI - these individuals have confidence in their emotional skills and make 
an avoidant style work for them, although this effect only reached significance when 
facing family dysfunction.  Data suggested that inaccuracies in self-reports (i.e., 
mismatches between perceived and actual emotional competency - both self-
enhancement and self-effacement) might perpetuate mental ill-health through the coping 
process. Whilst results require replication with control for measurement error (currently 
precluded by the complexity of non-linear modelling required) they nevertheless carry 
important implications for EI-based interventions.  
 
15.4 Implications for policy and practice  
 
Early identification of mental health problems in young people together with the 
development of effective prevention and intervention programmes is of vital importance. 
As noted earlier, prevalence rates for clinically recognisable mental disorders amongst UK 
adolescents aged 11-16 years are estimated at 11% (13% for boys and 10% for girls) of 
which 6.6% of young people have been identified as having externalising disorders and 
5% emotional problems (Green et al., 2005).   Moreover, there has been an incremental 
rise in the prevalence of childhood conduct and emotional disorders over the last quarter 
of a century (Maughan, Collishaw, Meltzer, & Goodman, 2008), the significance of which 
is heightened  given the enduring and often debilitating trajectories associated with child-
onset mental health problems (Kim-Cohen et al., 2003; Rutter, Kim-Cohen, & Maughan, 
2006).  For instance, high self-reported conduct problems in adolescence are strongly 
associated with poorer long-term outcomes, e.g., unemployment, less stable 
relationships and poorer self-reported health (Collishaw et al., 2004).  Schools are 
regarded as central to the promotion of positive wellbeing in children and adolescents; 
they offer a protective, supportive environment (which may in itself act as a key resource 
in the stress-buffering process) and are key settings for the delivery of universal, targeted 
and indicative prevention and intervention programmes (Weare & Nind, 2011).  Indeed, 
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in the UK, the ‘emotionally healthy’ school has been at the heart of recent educational 
strategy which recognises a link between health behaviours and achievement; promoting 
emotional health and wellbeing was one of eight key areas of activity prioritised by the 
National Healthy School Standard (Department for Education and Employment, 1999), 
contextualised by the Every Child Matters framework which advocated the need for 
national services to ensure that young people are healthy, enjoy and achieve, stay safe, 
make a positive contribution and have economic wellbeing (Department for Education 
and Skills, 2003).  The development of social and emotional competencies in youth is 
viewed as integral to achieving this standard and government-endorsed, whole-school 
based Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) programmes have been developed to try to 
meet this need (e.g., Department for Education and Skills, 2005; Department for 
Education and Skills, 2007).  This trend parallels SEL programming in other countries (see 
e.g., Collaborative for Social and Emotional Learning, 2003) where the goals are to build 
competency in emotion recognition and management, problem-solving, self-regulation 
(for setting and achieving positive goals) and skills for establishing/maintaining positive 
relationships (Zins & Elias, 2007).   
 
Whilst commentators here (e.g., Craig, 2007) and in the US (e.g., Mayer & Cobb, 
2000) cautioned that  full-scale integration of  a ‘feelings’ curriculum had been too readily 
adopted in the wake of the journalistic popularisation of EI (i.e., Goleman, 1995) and 
lacked an informed evidence base, latterly, research supporting the effectiveness of 
universal (i.e., non-targeted) SEL programmes has begun to emerge.  A recent meta-
analysis of 207 intervention effects found that well-implemented SEL programmes can 
reduce internalising and externalising symptoms (mean post effect sizes = .22; .24) and 
impact positively on social and emotional skills (.57), pro-social behaviour (.24), attitudes 
towards self and others (.23) and academic achievement (.27)  in youth aged 5-18 years 
(Durlak et al., 2011).  Whilst these effects were of small to moderate magnitude and 
potentially lacked longevity (remaining significant but reducing markedly in 6-month 
follow-up data involving 15% of the studies reviewed), findings do suggest that there is 
value in promoting SEL competencies in school and, importantly, that these skills can be 
‘taught’ to some extent.  However, the most appropriate method of programme delivery 
is still debated; compared to universal prevention (i.e., positive health promotion for all, 
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including youth without difficulties), effects of interventions (i.e., targeted approaches for 
‘at risk’ youth) have often been found to have greater impact (Weare & Nind, 2011).  
Indeed, following their review of reviews of the efficacy of both types of programmes, 
these authors concluded that a combined approach may be optimal advancing the notion 
that, “It may well be that mental health promotion in schools needs to redress the 
balance somewhat in favour of more work on targeted approaches, while continuing to 
embed and integrate them within a robust universal approach” (Weare & Nind, 2011, 
p.64). 
 
The current research both converges with and extends the evidence base 
pertaining to SEL.  Whilst SEL programmes are focussed on teaching integrated socio-
emotional skills which clearly encompass more than just the nuanced components of trait 
or ability EI (e.g., responsible decision making, setting realistic goals etc, in addition to 
empathy, emotional awareness) the collective importance of EI for mental health 
outcomes is nevertheless emphasised by the SEL efficacy literature and in the current 
findings – both emotional self-concept/personality and skills can have an impact in 
mitigating disorder and are mutually beneficial in working towards better health.  
However, by situating T/AEI in the wider stress context, the current work extends existing 
EI evidence pertaining to youth (which has so far largely focussed on examining isolated 
connections to related variables) by uncovering how each of these resources might 
operate in pathways to adjustment.  This also goes beyond the SEL literature and 
represents an important contribution to knowledge of import to practitioners and policy-
makers.  Specifically, the impact of teaching the component parts of SEL (i.e., discrete 
emotional skills or perceived competency) has not been investigated despite the fact that 
determining how these skills, or combinations thereof, contribute to different outcomes 
is considered key for the optimisation of intervention and prevention programmes 
(Collins, Murphy, Nair, & Strecher, 2005; Durlak et al., 2011).  Hence, finding that the 
mechanism of action for perceived versus actual emotional skill differs in terms of 
outcome (internalising versus externalising symptoms) and as a function of stress context 
(proximal versus chronic) represents an important advancement of knowledge and one 
which converges with Weare and Nind (2011) - a ‘one size fits all’, blanket-style approach 
to SEL promotion may be missing the mark for youth who would benefit the most.   
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Moreover, in addition to understanding more about who might benefit most from 
SEL programming and when (i.e., under which circumstances), these findings also 
emphasise what should be taught in order to optimise the content of preventions for 
maximal gains.   The current findings indicate that it is important to boost emotional 
knowledge/skills in tandem with emotional self-concept to bolster coping processes, 
particularly for those exposed to family dysfunction who are at-risk for depression.  
However, it is notable that, to date, programme effects on improving social and 
emotional ‘skills’ have been predominantly evaluated by measuring changes in SEL 
components via self-report/questionnaire methods (e.g., akin to TEI) rather than ability 
based approaches (see e.g., Durlak et al., 2011).  Hence, it remains quite plausible that, in 
their current format, the effectiveness of SEL programmes may be restricted to raising 
self-efficacy or perceived competencies rather than actual ability.  Indeed, a recent 
national evaluation of a government-sponsored, small group work intervention in UK 
schools found improvements in aspects of self-reported emotional competency, however 
effects on component emotional abilities (understanding and identifying emotion) were 
non-significant (Humphrey et al., 2008).   This is clearly something that needs to be 
addressed in future programme efficacy evaluations. Programmes must be able to 
demonstrate measureable impact in both domains - if it is found that this is not the case, 
steps must be taken to further tailor teaching delivery and/or programme content to 
redress the balance between skills and self-efficacy.  However, whilst the current findings 
highlight the importance of both facets of EI by suggesting that emotional knowledge 
alone is not enough to achieve beneficial outcomes and that youth should be given 
opportunities to practice using emotional competencies in a safe environment to build 
emotional self-efficacy, there is an important caveat to this message.  Programmes should 
not focus on boosting emotional self-concept arbitrarily; this should be performance 
related with opportunities for reflective practice to facilitate accurate self-perceptions. 
 
Importantly, these themes are echoed in a parallel body of research examining 
whether it is possible to train EI in adults. Nelis, Quiodbach, Mikolajczak and Hansenne  
(2009) devised a short (10 hour) training programme which exposed an intervention 
group (19 adults; mean age 21 years) to four sessions of targeted teaching of theory 
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underpinning each of the four-branch skills of the AEI model.  As part of this process, 
participants attended lectures, engaged in role plays, and applied taught knowledge to 
the analysis of personal emotional experiences. Compared to controls (n = 18) 
intervention participants evidenced significant improvements, sustained over a 6 month 
follow-up period, in perceived emotional awareness, self and other related emotion 
management and global TEI (though not emotional understanding; perceiving emotion 
not assessed).  Thus, as hinted at by the youth prevention literature, there appears to be 
yet further divergence between trait and ability EI; as well as operating differentially as 
protective resources, it would seem that not all facets of EI may be similarly enhanced in 
adulthood (i.e., predominantly trait and not ability EI).  However, caution is warranted 
given the small sample size, limited follow-up period and the fact that only two 
component ‘skills’ of global AEI were assessed (and performance was not indexed via the 
MSCEIT).  Additionally, the use of only self-reported assessment represents a further 
methodological confound. Nevertheless, the same research group have more recently 
corroborated these findings in larger adult samples (intervention N ranging between 29 to 
72) using a mixture of self, other report and objective measures of improvement (Kotsou, 
Nelis, Gregoire, & Mikolajczak, 2011; Nelis et al., 2011). As well as enhancement in global 
TEI, emotional understanding and management, improvements in a range of additional 
adaptive outcomes have been found including, increased life satisfaction, happiness, 
social functioning and decreased perceived stress symptoms, somatic complaints, mental 
ill-health and salivary cortisol levels (measured immediately post-intervention). 
Importantly, Kotsou et al., (2011) found that improvements can be maintained up to a 
year post intervention but that pre-existing level of TEI may moderate outcomes; those 
with lower TEI at baseline improved to a greater extent than those with higher baseline 
levels.  This converges with youth-focussed prevention literature to reinforce the notion 
that a targeted training approach, perhaps focussing on those most ‘at-risk’ (i.e., with 
lower levels of competency), may be optimal.  Nevertheless, this literature is collectively 
limited by its focus on typically functioning adult volunteers – in fact only adults who 
demonstrated a motivation to change or improve their emotional functioning were 
included in the above studies which clearly differs from the universal (obligatory) school-
based approaches for youth attending school.     
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Summary:  Given that both trait and ability EI are differentially involved in 
buffering the effects of stressors on depression and disruptive behaviour there is now 
clear impetus to promote these competencies in young people. Evidence suggesting that 
emotional skills and self-competencies can be improved in young people via school-based 
universal prevention programmes (and in adults via targeted training) serves to amplify 
the importance of the findings of the current research.  Indeed, demonstrating the 
‘trainability’ of TEI (i.e., as emotional personality) is particularly important - this 
challenges the notion that traits are fixed entities, impervious to change, and converges 
with recent research charting the relative instability of the Big Five until late adulthood 
(e.g., Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). Evidence suggests that environmental input can 
trigger some change even in typically functioning adults.  Nevertheless, much work 
remains to be done to establish the timing and sensitivity of these effects on adjustment 
in typical populations and in ‘at-risk’ or ‘indicated’ groups (e.g., adolescents exposed to 
chronic disadvantage/facing family dysfunction or those exhibiting prodromal symptoms 
of depression/disruptive behaviour). Additionally, it will be important to establish the 
longevity of prevention efforts at programme level but also with respect to components 
of EI (e.g., understanding emotion, managing emotion etc as embedded within SEL 
programmes) to ensure optimised programme content and delivery.  Prevention evidence 
and targeted EI training in adult groups hints that programmes tailored to the needs of 
young people may have the greatest impact but that not all facets of EI may be similarly 
enhanced. 
 
15.5 Limitations and future directions 
 
This research has shown that TEI and AEI can predict adolescent mental health 
beyond the effects of higher-order personality dimensions and general cognitive ability 
and, more importantly, both serve ‘adaptive’ protective functions in pathways to 
disorder.  Nevertheless, each construct operates differentially and with limited 
applicability within the stress-buffering process – high levels of EI are not universally 
advantageous across all contexts or outcomes.  EI directly buffers the effects of stressors 
on externalising disorder but exerts an indirect effect through coping (with AEI interacting 
with stressors to mobilise coping choice and TEI influencing coping implementation) to 
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mitigate internalising symptoms. However, these effects were stressor-specific; 
collectively, EI was most influential in models predicting disorder from the proximal 
stressor, family dysfunction (all significant bar disruptive behaviour/AEI). Nevertheless, 
this is particularly significant for the potential utility of the EI construct given research 
suggests that 46% to 82% of all daily stressors reported by adolescents are of an 
interpersonal nature, i.e., problematic relationships with peers, parents and romantic 
partners (Seiffge-Krenke, 2011; Seiffge-Krenke, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2009).  Supplementary 
path analyses emphasised the importance of both AEI and TEI in buffering the effects of 
stressors on depression via coping – above average/competent levels of emotional skill 
are ineffective if not coupled with high levels of emotional self-confidence, though the 
latter could be detrimental in the absence of emotional skill.  In all cases, adolescents 
with accurate self-perceptions (i.e., realists) appear to fare better.  Thus, by situating EI in 
a wider stressor-health context, these findings simultaneously extend the embryonic EI 
research base in adolescence and provide theoretical grounding for the importance of 
SEL-based prevention programmes in schools.  
 
However, several design limitations mean that these findings can only be 
considered preliminary evidence for the involvement of EI in pathways to disorder.  
Firstly, significant effects (i.e., conditional indirect, direct and incremental) were small.  
Whilst this is anticipated in non-experimental studies (e.g., Hunsley & Meyer, 2003; 
McClelland & Judd, 1993) and the magnitude of conditional effects were in line with 
similar studies, e.g.,  examining the impact of stressors on disorder via the moderating 
and mediating influence of personality (Spinhoven et al., 2011), it is clear that the current 
analyses require replication in order to lend credence to the trends found.  This is 
particularly important given the relatively new distribution analytic method of estimation 
(Latent Moderated Structural Equations: LMS) utilised for examining nonlinear latent 
effects in the main analysis.   As noted in section 14.3.1, LMS has many advantages over 
traditional ‘constrained’ and ‘unconstrained’ product indicator approaches given its 
simplicity, distributional assumptions, estimation efficiency and power to detect effects in 
complex models with correlated linear predictors (Kelava et al., 2008; Kelava et al., 2011; 
Moosbrugger et al., 2009) all of which made it the methodology of choice for conducting 
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the current analyses. However, this is a computationally demanding technique and thus 
nested model comparisons together with additional testing for the presence of quadratic 
and interaction effects simultaneously were precluded. It is quite possible, for instance, 
that stressor effects could be curvilinear, such that adolescents may benefit more from a 
single unit decrease in stressors when stress is high rather than low (e.g., high socio-
economic adversity might become increasingly harmful under conditions of high adversity 
and this might be more likely in adolescents with low EI).  Thus, it will be important for 
future analyses to demonstrate that these interaction effects remain significant with 
control for quadratic terms (Roisman et al., 2012). To achieve this in the near future, it 
may be possible to utilise an alternative distribution analytic method – the Quasi 
Maximum Likelihood (QML) approach (Klein & Muthen, 2007) – which has shown promise 
for more complex modelling,  although there is a speed/accuracy trade-off in terms of the 
numerical precision afforded by this technique (i.e., as an approximation of the true 
likelihood function) (for an overview see Kelava et al., 2011).      
 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the cross-sectional design utilised in the 
current research limits definitive interpretations regarding the nature of effects obtained.  
In particular, the possibility of reverse causality (i.e., that the presence of disorder elicits 
changes in EI, prolonging poor coping and/or increases the likelihood of experiencing 
stressors) cannot be ruled out – indeed, previous research with adolescents has found 
that psychopathology can lead to deficits in coping skills through a negative feedback loop 
(Seiffge-Krenke, 2000).  Moreover, cross-sectional data only affords a snapshot of the 
developmental processes at work which restricts inferences regarding the longevity and 
stability of the EI-contingent effects demonstrated.  As noted at earlier points in this 
discussion, it is likely that there will be developmentally sensitive time points within such 
pathways to adjustment; in addition to the predicted increases in both trait and ability EI 
across development (Mayer et al., 1999; Petrides, Furnham et al., 2007), literature 
suggests the use of specific coping styles changes with age (Amirkhan & Auyeung, 2007), 
potentially paralleling increases or decreases in the experience of stressors in mid 
adolescence (Sanchez et al., 2012; Seiffge-Krenke, 2000).  Moreover, these changes are 
likely to be population, stressor and disorder specific.  For instance, Sanchez et al., (2012) 
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found that over time, the effect of network events on depression differed according to 
type of event (e.g., family, peer etc) and these effects showed specificity according to 
gender. Similarly, Sternberg et al., (2006)  reported that the timing of exposure to 
violence results in differential effects for dimensional disorders; experiencing violence 
increases the likelihood of developing severe externalising symptoms in younger children 
(ages 4-6 years) yet poses a greater risk for developing internalising disorder in 
adolescence (10-14 years).  Consequently, using the current findings as a platform, 
research must now examine these associations prospectively via longitudinal designs that 
can model developmental change.  Considered as the ‘litmus test’ for examining stressor-
health relations (Grant et al., 2004) prospective designs circumvent the issue of reverse 
causality by tracking changes in symptoms (i.e., time 2) stemming from earlier-occurring 
or concurrent stressors with control for prior levels of symptomotology (i.e., time 1).   
Collecting outcome data across the developmental trajectory also affords statistical 
advantageous in that the familywise Type 1 error rate (i.e., falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis) is also significantly reduced.   
 
Whilst this work has taken an exploratory, variable-focussed approach to 
examining relations within a ‘universal’ sub-clinical sample of adolescents, it will be of 
interest to develop this line of investigation by conducting person-centred, longitudinal 
analyses of particular groups of ‘at-risk’ adolescents in relation to specific stressors. For 
instance, the current findings hint that youth exposed to broadband, interpersonal 
stressors (particularly family dysfunction but also negative life events) may most 
consistently benefit from the protective effects of EI. Thus, conducting fine-grained 
analyses to deconstruct if/how different forms of interpersonal stress (e.g., aspects of 
family dysfunction: discipline, roles, communication etc, or types of negative events: 
romantic, academic, peer etc) impact disorder via EI will represent a valuable extension to 
the current findings -  particularly for understanding the protective function of EI in 
pathways to disruptive behaviour, where it remains plausible that many key, family-level 
variables were not captured by the present modelling.  Gathering other-informant reports 
of stressors (e.g., parental data) to complement the adolescent (i.e., self-report) 
perspective will serve to strengthen enquiry in this regard; indeed, the use of stressor 
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interviews, which are suited to detailed probing of the timing and nature of more specific 
events (and are hence potentially more sensitive to tracking changes in symptoms) would 
appear most appropriate for this purpose (Grant et al., 2004).  Moreover, examining 
whether the indirect (depression) and direct (disruptive behaviour) protective 
mechanisms uncovered in the current data hold in groups of adolescents exposed to high 
levels of socio-economic adversity will also be a necessary next step for research given 
previous studies indicate that this distal, chronic stressor may contribute to disorder via 
multiplicative intervening variables (e.g., Wadsworth et al., 2005).  Indeed, this may well 
account for the apparent lack of association in models predicting depression from socio-
economic adversity via the EI-coping process (i.e., poverty may relate to negative life 
events which in turn impacts this mechanism).  It will also be of import to examine 
whether EI confers the same benefits to clinical groups and/or adolescents reporting a 
wider diversity of sub-clinical symptomotology.  As noted earlier, modelling EI-influenced 
stress-resistance processes across a broader range of symptoms is particularly pertinent 
for establishing the ‘diagnostic’ utility of TEI given that the sampling domain (tapping 
aspects of negative and positive affect) dictates a strong association to mood disorders 
and depression in particular. Beyond this, integrated analyses accounting for the effects 
of co-morbidity (i.e., between internalising and externalising disorder) in stressor-
symptomotology pathways will represent an important empirical development; this 
analysis has demonstrated that stressors may have common and distinct effects on 
dimensional disorders but that there is correspondence between the two clusters of 
symptoms (r = .48, p < .001) which could stem from a common casual factor (e.g., 
negative affect; temperamental self-control) (Lilienfeld, 2003) represented by EI and 
associated protective processes. 
 
However, in order to further deconstruct exactly how EI confers protection it will 
be necessary to extend the findings of this self-report study to lab-based exploration of 
the attentional, regulatory and biological processes underpinning stress reactivity in 
adolescence.  Extrapolating from the adult EI evidence base, earlier discussion speculated 
that EI may confer a protective effect by underscoring individual differences in emotional 
information processing (AEI/TEI) and/or automatic mood recovery under stress (TEI), 
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which, in turn, may directly or indirectly influence disorder – however, this remains 
unexplored in adolescents.  Linking self-reported to objective markers of EI-influenced 
adaptive change in adolescents will not only help to combat the issue of common method 
variance – a limitation of the current research – but will also serve to link EI to the 
broader biopsychosocial processes known to be implicated in the onset and maintenance 
of disorder. It is widely held that there is a complex interplay between stressor-exposure, 
genetic, hormonal and developmental processes which  can collectively increase the risk 
of disorder (Thapar et al., 2012) and impact resilience mechanisms (Luthar & Brown, 
2007), for instance, stressors occurring in a context of poverty can affect the 
development of early self-regulatory skills through physiological changes (Blair, 2010). 
Hence, it will be necessary to examine whether EI represents individual differences in 
adolescent physiological reactivity and ultimately, whether this differs as a function of 
early stressor exposure in young people.   
 
Moreover, there would appear to be much value in pursuing the role of positive 
affectivity in the stress-buffering process from both an objective/physiological and 
subjective/self-report perspective with reference to EI.  A theme emerging from earlier 
discussion suggested that, in adults at least, both trait and ability EI might represent 
individual differences in dispositional positive affect and positive affect regulation (e.g., 
Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Schutte et al., 2002).  This, taken in concert 
with evidence that positive affect is linked to specific forms of (problem-focussed) coping 
(Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000, 2004) and that positive life events may independently 
contribute to the course of symptomotology (e.g., Overbeek et al., 2010; Spinhoven et al., 
2011), would suggest an exclusive focus on stressful (i.e., negatively valenced) events may 
not fully capture how EI operates to promote adaptation.  It may be that EI exerts an 
effect on both the experience of stressful and positive life events and this may be 
particularly pronounced for TEI. For instance, evidence suggests that whilst negative 
events increase depression over time, the reverse is true for positive events but both of 
these effects are influenced by personality characteristics; higher levels of trait 
Neuroticism amplify the effects of positive but not negative life events whilst those with 
high levels of Extraversion appear more likely to engage in positive life events (Spinhoven 
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et al., 2011).   Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether considered collectively, the 
experience of multiple positive events outweighs or mitigates the adverse effects of 
negative life events on disorder (Overbeek et al., 2010).   It will be important to establish 
whether/how EI influences these processes. Examining stress reactivity in controlled lab 
conditions should also help to disentangle links between positive affect and stress 
processes in adolescents (i.e., whether high EI represents enhanced capacity for hedonic 
mood regulation versus negative mood repair as in adults, etc) which will be vital for 
confirming that the relationship between TEI, active coping (which includes problem-
focussed and positive cognitive restructuring styles) and depression is not simply a 
manifestation of pre-existing (positive) emotional state represented by high levels of TEI.   
 
This latter point also, in part, relates to ongoing issues of conceptual clarity that 
have dogged the construct since inception (see e.g., Matthews et al., 2004).  The focus of 
this research was to examine the predictive and explanatory validity of EI with reference 
to mental health and analyses did not permit rigorous investigation of construct-specific 
measurement issues as introduced in section 10.1 (e.g., the extent to which AEI measures 
emotional knowledge versus actual skill/represents crystallised versus fluid IQ/scoring 
issues or how self-report response bias affects TEI).  Nevertheless, the current findings, in 
concert with the accompanying discussion, imply that whilst EI (in both guises) may be 
useful as an explanatory construct in stressor-health processes, its relative ‘novelty’ is 
questionable. Statistically, this research demonstrated that although both ability and trait 
constructs contribute to the prediction of health outcomes, with allied variables 
controlled (personality and general cognitive ability) predictive power is substantially 
reduced. Despite the fact that TEI remained a stronger incremental predictor of disorder 
than AEI, the nature of the protective role assumed by TEI in explanatory pathways 
together with the high correlations reported between TEI and self-esteem/concept (e.g., 
Williams et al., 2009, 2010a) serve to reinforce the notion that what is ‘distinctive’ about 
TEI (i.e., beyond personality) might essentially represent emotional self-concept  - 
specifically, perceived capacity for emotional self-regulation (MacCann, Matthews et al., 
2004; Zeidner et al., 2009) -  facets of which are already subsumed within existing self-
system belief constructs (e.g., perceived social competence, self-efficacy, self-esteem etc) 
232 
 
(Sandler, 2001).  However, it should be noted that these inferences (together with the 
implications drawn from the current analysis) pertain only to the TEIQue as the key 
measurement vehicle of TEI theory – the sampling domains of other self-report EI 
instruments (e.g., TMMS, EQi) diverge significantly from this and may represent quite 
different conceptual mixtures.  Tests of incremental capacity were particularly 
detrimental for AEI which commentators have often regarded as offering the most viable 
and ‘unique’ form of EI (e.g., Matthews et al., 2004). Indeed, the fact that the verbally-
loaded sub-branches of the MSCEIT-YVR correlated most robustly with proxy IQ supports 
the notion that AEI may ultimately represent a form of crystallised knowledge specialised 
for emotional functioning (MacCann, 2010; Wilhelm, 2005).  Nevertheless, such 
acculturated emotion knowledge does appear useful for directly buffering stressors in an 
upstream protective role which is not inconsistent with the notion that this may underpin 
adaptive regulatory proficiency (Wranik et al., 2007).  Clearly, much more research is 
needed to examine the processing bases of the MSCEIT in adolescents in order to 
ascertain exactly how high and low scorers differ - either at an implicit or explicit level of 
emotional information processing (Fiori, 2009) – together with continued examination of 
the construct differentiation of the TEIQue (from allied variables e.g., self-beliefs) to 
enable future progression of the field.   It is the view of this author that conceptual clarity 
will only be achieved in TEI research if there is significant streamlining of self-report 
instruments and/or relabeling of existing measures. Currently, the difficulty of pinpointing 
with any certainty exactly what EI (in either form) represents, limits the interpretations 
that can be drawn from research and any diagnostic applications A/TEI may have in 
clinical settings.  Additionally, whilst the complexity of the main analysis in the current 
research meant that the influence of higher-order personality dimensions and proxy IQ 
were not controlled, to be certain that EI represents a clinically significant diagnostic tool 
and/or intervention marker, this will need to be investigated in future research.   
 
As an addendum to this, it should be noted that the current work treated both 
forms of EI has holistic constructs (i.e., representing general individual-level markers of 
vulnerability/protection) with analyses focussed on global level scores.  This approach has 
been recommended in the literature for exploratory analyses of new constructs 
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(particularly when structural analyses are the focus), when the need for parsimony and 
generalisability are of paramount concern to ensure future replication (Petrides & 
Furnham, 2001, 2006).  Going forward, however, sub-branch/factor level analyses of both 
EI constructs will permit us to resolve some of the conceptual questions noted above.  For 
instance, it would be of interest to establish whether the MSCEIT branches of 
understanding and managing emotion are the most influential direct buffers of stressors 
and whether the incremental prediction of disruptive behaviour can be attributed to 
these branches.  Alternatively, it is quite plausible that exemplary performance in certain 
branch skills (e.g., perceiving emotion) coupled with lower levels of proficiency in other 
areas (e.g., management) leads to a ‘vulnerable’ AEI profile that perhaps amplifies 
stressor reactivity and poor coping choices – where such incongruence may be 
particularly pronounced in clinical groups  (Zeidner et al., 2011).  Similarly, determining 
whether the TEIQue wellbeing factor (including self-esteem, optimism etc) is the driver of 
coping efficacy and the sole incremental predictor (beyond personality) of depression and 
disruptive behaviour would carry important connotations for the theoretical mapping of 
TEI.  This could be profitably explored in future research using a long form measure of 
adolescent TEI.  However, conducting fine-grained analyses would appear especially 
pivotal to the future of the EI construct in adolescence (as assessed via the MSCEIT-YVR 
and predicted on the four-branch model).  Although the youth measure is still under 
validation, this research has hinted that the coherency of the MSCEIT-YVR (and hence 
global AEI in adolescence) is questionable in its present form.  The sub-branch ‘perceiving 
emotion’ was unrelated to allied constructs, age or gender and shared only moderate 
relations with the remaining branches – the latter being consistent with other research 
that has utilised this tool (Qualter et al., 2012; Windingstad et al., 2011). At best, it is 
plausible that there may be shortcomings in the sampling domain of the tool (i.e., 
developmental insensitivity to age-appropriate performance) that may be refined by the 
test developers.  At worst, this may signal the unfeasibility of attempting to gather 
together a mixture of non-verbal/verbally-based emotional ‘skills’ to be labelled as 
cohesive ‘AEI’.  Careful psychometric examination of the instrument across the adolescent 
period will help to shed light on these issues.    Nevertheless, Matthews, Zeidner and 
Roberts (2012) now caution that we should consider abandoning the search for a ‘global’ 
EI (tapped by any single ‘omnibus’ instrument and theory) and instead advocate the use 
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of a range of alternative paradigms to better capture potentially disparate aspects of 
emotional competence.  For instance, whilst TEI questionnaires may be uniquely suited to 
examine emotional personality, speeded emotional information processing tasks can tap 
elements of emotion recognition (e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007),  the emotional Stroop 
captures individual differences in emotion-related attentional control (e.g., Martin & 
Thomas, 2011) and the vignette-based Situational Test of Emotional Understanding 
(STEU) and Management (STEM) have shown promise as alternatives to the MSCEIT 
(Austin, 2010) with extension to dynamic presentation (i.e., video-based scenarios) a 
further avenue for development (see e.g., Farrelly & Austin, 2007).  However, as with 
many other areas of investigation, the application of these methods to the adolescent EI 
domain is awaited. 
 
Concluding summary: The current work contributes significantly to the existing 
body of knowledge and ongoing research efforts within the field of EI.   Firstly, by 
establishing that both TEI and AEI can predict adolescent mental health beyond the 
effects of higher-order personality dimensions and general cognitive ability, this research 
has ‘plugged a gap’ in the field and provided key evidence for the validity of the construct 
(in both guises).   Secondly, as the first comprehensive investigation to situate ability and 
trait EI in wider stressor-health processes in adolescence, this work moved beyond 
investigation of simple, descriptive associations to begin to uncover how these processes 
are linked and in which circumstances (when).  Analyses found that both forms of EI are 
implicated in adaptive processes that mitigate the effects of stressors on disorder.  
However, effects varied according to type of stressor, outcome and level of competency, 
suggesting that EI may not be universally beneficial across all contexts.  This departs from 
the perspective of some proponents of EI (Bar-On, 2006; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) yet 
offers vital evidence that could inform the optimisation of school-based intervention 
programmes which are beginning to successfully train elements of EI under the broader 
banner of social and emotional competencies (Durlak et al., 2011). Whilst findings are 
undoubtedly limited by elements of the design (i.e., cross-sectional; shared method 
variance) which restrict the scope of interpretations, they do offer a promising platform 
upon which to base future research.   It will be particularly important for future research 
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to model developmental changes in these protective mechanisms via prospective designs 
with extension to at-risk and indicated groups of adolescents (perhaps with reference to 
more specific interpersonal stressors). Additionally, researchers much now begin to 
examine whether EI influences the psychobiological processes underpinning stress 
reactivity in adolescents under controlled conditions.  However, in order for the field to 
move forward, more attention must be given to charting the developmental foundations 
of EI in youth and to tackling outstanding construct-specific measurement issues. In 
particular, potential measurement inadequacies of the MSCEIT-YVR may mean that it has 
limited use as a coherent diagnostic tool for adolescents at present.  Ultimately, the 
current research suggests that whilst both trait and ability EI have utility as explanatory 
constructs, the conceptual overlap with allied literatures (i.e., personality, self-system 
beliefs, emotion regulation) is such that they may not be unique or critical for the 
prediction of/influence over adaptational outcomes.  Echoing the sentiments of other 
commentators (e.g., Zeidner et al., 2011), the current evidence and research review 
would suggest that it is only the sampling and re-branding of select elements of existing 
constructs under the label ‘EI’ that is new - not the content itself.  However, in the drive 
to understand the complex aetiology and maintenance of disorders, locating EI as a 
malleable, individual-level resource within multidimensional pathways to adolescent 
resilience represents a positive step forward for prevention research. 
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Appendix A: Letter to Schools 
 
 
«Title» «First_Name» «Last_Name»  
 «Job_Title» 
 «School» 
 «Address_line_1» 
 «Address_line_2» 
 «Address_line_3» 
 «County» 
 «Postcode» 
April 2010 
 
Dear «Title» «Last_Name» 
 
ALL ABOUT ME 
 
I am writing to offer your school the opportunity to take part in a doctoral research project entitled ‘All About Me’ 
which is taking place in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester area.  The aim of the project is to explore the 
different factors that affect how young people (aged 11-16 years) feel & behave. Knowing this will help us to determine 
how best to help those who might be at risk for experiencing mental health problems. Of particular interest is whether 
differences in the way young people recognise, understand & use information about emotions (their own and others) 
can have an impact on their wellbeing. 
 
The research will involve young people completing an anonymous tick-box, paper-based survey which asks questions 
about their family, personality, health, life events, coping strategies and emotions. In total this should take around an 
hour to complete but this can be done across multiple sessions at times convenient to staff, young people and your 
school timetable (for instance, it could be completed during form-time over a couple of days).  The aim is to include up 
to 1,500 young people in the research overall and I would like to work with at least one form group from Years 7, 8, 
9, 10 and 11 in your school.  
 
Should your school participate in the study, I will be able to provide bespoke, aggregated feedback following collation 
of the data from your students, something which could be extremely useful in illuminating general health/well-being 
issues in your school & identifying areas for potential intervention (information detailing how your school data 
compares to other participating schools will also be provided).  I will also be happy to discuss doing some voluntary 
work at your school in recognition of your commitment to my research.  Data collected in the research will be analysed 
and the findings presented in a PhD research report. It is also likely that articles for academic journals will be written.  
Anonymity and confidentiality will be strictly adhered to at all times – the names of young people or individual schools 
will not be used in any of the reports written.   I have undergone a full CRB check at the Enhanced Disclosure level (copy 
available on request) and the project has been granted full ethical approval by the University of Manchester Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
I will follow up this letter with a telephone call in around 10 days.  In the meantime, if you are interested in 
discussing the project further, please do get in touch via phone (0161 275 3534) or email 
(sarah.k.davis@manchester.ac.uk). 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Sarah Davis 
BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes Psychology 
School of Education: Ellen Wilkinson Building 
University of Manchester 
Oxford Road 
MANCHESTER M13 9PL 
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Appendix B: Study information sheets and parental consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Student Information Sheet 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study, ‘All About Me’, which is taking place at your school.  Please keep 
this information sheet, it has your ID number in the top right hand corner and the contact details of the researcher from 
the University of Manchester, which you will need if you think of any questions you want to ask later or want to contact 
us about the information you have given in the survey. 
What is this research about? 
We are trying to find out about some of the different things that could affect how young people feel & behave so that 
we can learn more about how best to help those who might feel sad, worried or angry. We are interested in seeing 
whether the way young people use information about feelings (their own feelings and the feelings of others) can affect 
health and wellbeing. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being asked to take part in this research because you are aged between 11 and 16 years old and attend a school 
in either the West Midlands or Greater Manchester area.  In total, 1500 young people are being invited to take part.  
 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
You will be asked to fill out a tick box survey which asks some questions about your family, personality, health, things 
that may have happened to you, how you cope with problems and how you feel.  This should take about an hour to do 
during class.   
 
What happens to the information I give in the survey? 
The information you give will be added to other people’s information and analysed by a computer programme so that 
we can make a report of the findings for the University. Your information will be treated as private and confidential and 
will be completely anonymous – that means no-one will be able to tell who has answered the survey and only the 
researchers will see what has been written. If, though, you tell me something that indicates that you, or another 
student, are at risk of quite serious harm then I may need to tell somebody else to keep you safe.  
Do I have to take part?   
Your parent(s)/carer(s) have agreed that you can take part in this research.  However, if you do not want to take part 
you do not have to.   Also, if you decide to take part now by filling out the survey and then later change your mind, just 
tell the researcher (contact email: sarah.k.davis@manchester.ac.uk) and your information will be withdrawn from the 
study.  You do not have to give a reason for this. 
 
What if something goes wrong?  
To answer the questions, you will have to think about yourself and any recent events that might have happened to you. 
For some people this might be upsetting.  If you feel upset and would like some help with how you feel, please read the 
information sheet called ‘coping with stress’ which includes advice on where to get help and provides contact details for 
useful websites and support groups.   
 
Any questions about the research? 
Please contact: Sarah Davis, School of Education, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL.  Tel: 
0161 275 3534 or Email: sarah.k.davis@manchester.ac.uk 
  
 
 
 
 
ID number here 
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Caregiver Information Sheet 
 
Your child is being invited to take part in a research study taking place at school.  Before you decide whether or 
not you agree for your child to be involved, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. If there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information, please contact Sarah 
Davis on 0161 275 3534 or email sarah.k.davis@manchester.ac.uk. Thank you for reading this.  
Who will conduct the research? Sarah Davis, School of Education, Ellen Wilkinson Building, University of Manchester, 
Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL. Email: sarah.k.davis@manchester.ac.uk Tel: 0161 275 3534. 
 
Title of the Research: All about Me 
 
What is the aim of the research? Young people (aged between 11 and 16 years) living in the West Midlands and North 
Yorkshire area are being asked to complete a survey on health and well-being.  Researchers at the University of 
Manchester are trying to find out about some of the different things that could affect how young people feel & behave 
in an effort to learn more about how best to help those who might be at risk for experiencing mental health problems. 
We are particularly interested in seeing whether the way young people use  information about feelings (their own and 
others) can have an impact on wellbeing. 
 
Why has my child been chosen? Your child is being invited to participate in this research as they are aged between 11 
and 16 years and attend a school in either the West Midlands or Greater Manchester area.  In total, 1500 young people 
are being invited to take part.  
 
What would my child be asked to do if they took part? Your child would be asked to complete a tick box, paper-survey 
which asks questions about their family, personality, health, life events, coping strategies and how they process 
emotions and emotional information.  This should take about an hour to complete during form periods at school.  We 
may also access school records held about your child.  Completing the survey should not cause any physical pain or 
discomfort to those taking part. However, in answering the questions, young people will be required to think about 
themselves and recent events that might have happened to them which, for some, may have the potential to be 
upsetting.  In order to minimise the risks associated with this, the researcher will be giving all participants an 
information sheet (from the Royal College of Psychiatrists) entitled ‘coping with stress’ which includes advice on where 
to get help and provides contact details for specialist sources of help and support.  In addition, young people will be 
encouraged to contact the researcher if they have any queries about the research.   
 
What happens to the data collected? The data collected from the survey will be analysed by the researcher at the 
University of Manchester and the findings will be presented in a PhD research report (your child’s school will receive a 
summary of this report).  It is likely that articles for academic journals will also be written based on what we find out 
from the study.  Your child’s name will not be used in any of the reports written.    
 
How is confidentiality maintained? All information provided by your child will be treated as confidential and will be 
completely anonymous (no-one will be able to match the information your child provides with their identity).  However, 
in exceptional circumstances, where there is sufficient evidence to raise serious concern about the health, welfare or 
safety of your child, appropriate third parties may be informed without prior consent.  Completed paper copies of the 
questionnaires will be stored in a secure filing cabinet within the department of Education at the University.  All 
electronic survey data will be stored on a secure, password protected computer system to which only the researcher 
will have access.   
 
Does my child have to take part?  Participation is entirely voluntary.  If you would like your child to take part you do not 
need to do anything – we will be in contact with the school shortly to arrange a time to deliver the surveys. However, if 
you do not want your child to take part then please complete the enclosed opt-out consent sheet and return it to your 
child’s form tutor.  If you and your child decide to take part and then later change your mind, either before or during 
the study, you can withdraw your consent without giving any reason, and, if you wish, your child’s data will be 
destroyed. 
 
Will I be paid for participating in the research? We are not able to offer any payment or incentive for taking part in this 
survey. 
 
Criminal Records Check The researcher has undergone a Criminal Records Bureau check at the Enhanced Disclosure 
level.   
 
What if something goes wrong? If you have any queries please contact the researcher in the first instance (details 
above).  If you wish to make a formal complaint about the conduct of this research you should contact the Head of the 
Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL. 
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                 School of Education 
 
 
ALL ABOUT ME 
 
OPT-OUT/ REFUSAL FORM 
 
 
I have read the enclosed information sheet and do not wish my child to take part in the project entitled ‘All about me’ 
beginning __________________ 2010. 
 
SIGNATURE (Parent/Guardian/Caregiver):.........................……………………....................... 
 
CHILD’S NAME: …………………………………………………………………........................................... 
 
CHILD’S D.O.B (day/month/year): ____  /____  /_____ 
 
NAME OF SCHOOL: ......................................................................................................... 
 
YEAR GROUP (please circle):           Y7               Y8               Y9                Y10                 Y11 
 
 
Please return this sheet to ..........................................................., as soon as possible. 
 
 
 
If this refusal form is not returned to the school before the start date of the study we will assume that you agree to 
your child taking part. 
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Appendix C: Study measures (CCSC-R1; TEIQue-ASF; BFI-44-A; APES-SF; FAD-GF) 
ABOUT HOW I COPE WITH PROBLEMS (CCSC-R1) 
Sometimes young people have problems or feel upset about things.  When this happens they may do different things to solve the 
problem or to make themselves feel better.  For each item below, choose the answer that best describes how often you usually did this 
to solve your problems or make yourself feel better during the past month.   
  Never Sometimes Often Most of 
the time 
Don’t 
know 
1 When I had problems, I thought about what I could do before I did 
something 
     
2 I told myself that I could handle this problem      
3 I went bicycle riding      
4 I daydreamed that everything was ok      
5 I asked my mother or father for help in working out what to do      
6 I did something to make things better      
7 When I had problems, I sought God’s help      
8 I told myself that things would get better      
9 I tried to ignore it      
10 I told my mother or father how I felt about the problem      
11 I thought about why it happened      
12 I tried to notice or think about only the good things in my life      
13 I listened to music      
14 I tried to stay away from the problem      
15 I told adults (other than my mother or father) what I wanted to do      
16 When I had problems, I thought about what would happen before I 
decided what to do 
     
17 I told myself I have taken care of things like this before      
18 I put my trust in God      
19 I played sports      
20 I talked about my feelings with an adult other than my mother or 
father 
     
21 I imagined how I’d like things to be      
22 I told my mother or father how I would like to solve the problem      
23 When I had problems, I tried to make things better by changing 
what I did 
     
24 I told myself that it would be ok      
25 I went for a walk      
26 I tried to put it out of my mind      
27 I told my friends about what made me feel the way I did      
28 I tried to understand it better by thinking more about it      
29 I reminded myself that I was better off than a lot of other young 
people 
     
30 I went skateboarding, roller blading or roller skating      
31 When I had problems, I tried to stay away from things that made 
me feel upset 
     
32 I talked with friends about what I would like to happen      
33 I tried to find comfort in my religion      
34 I thought about which things are best to do to handle the problem      
35 I told myself I could handle whatever happens      
36 I read a book or a magazine      
37 I wished that bad things wouldn’t happen      
38 I told my mother or father how I felt      
39 When I had problems, I did something to solve the problem      
40 I told myself that in the long run, things would work out for the 
best 
     
41 I did some exercise      
42 I didn’t think about it      
43 I talked to an adult (other than my mother or father) who could 
help me solve the problem 
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  Never Sometimes Often Most of 
the time 
Don’t 
know 
44 I thought about what I could learn from the problem      
45 I reminded myself that overall things are pretty good for me      
46 I watched TV      
47 When I had problems, I avoided the people who made me feel bad      
48 I told an adult (other than my mother or father) how I felt      
49 I thought about what I needed to know so I could solve the 
problem 
     
50 I reminded myself that I knew what to do      
51 I prayed more than usual      
52 I did something like video games or a hobby      
53 I wished that things were better      
54 I worked out what I could do by talking with one of my friends      
55 When I had problems, I did something in order to get the most I 
could out of the situation 
     
56 I told myself that it would work itself out      
57 I just forgot about it      
58 I talked with my brother or sister about my feelings      
59 I tried to figure out why things like this happen      
60 I reminded myself about all the good things I have going for me      
61 I talked with my friends about my feelings      
62 I avoided it by going to my room      
63 I went for a run      
64 I talked to my brother or sister about how to make things better      
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ABOUT MY EMOTIONS (TEIQue_ASF) 
In this section, please answer by putting a circle around the number that best shows how much you agree or disagree with each sentence 
below. If you strongly disagree with a sentence, circle a number close to 1.  If you strongly agree with a sentence, circle a number close to 
7.  If you’re not too sure if you agree or disagree, circle a number close to 4.  Work quickly, but carefully – once again, there are no right 
or wrong answers. 
  Disagree                                         Agree 
1 It’s easy for me to talk about my feelings to other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I often find it hard to see things from someone else’s point of view 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I’m a very motivated person 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I find it hard to control my feelings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 My life is not enjoyable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I’m good at getting along with my classmates 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I change my mind often 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 I find it hard to know exactly what emotion I’m feeling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I’m comfortable with the way I look 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 I find it hard to stand up for my rights 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 I can make other people feel better when I want to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Sometimes, I think my whole life is going to be miserable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Sometimes, others complain that I treat them badly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 I find it hard to cope when things change in my life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 I’m able to deal with stress 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 I don’t know how to show the people close to me that I care about them 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 I’m able to “get into someone’s shoes” and feel their emotions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 I find it hard to keep myself motivated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 I can control my anger when I want to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 I’m happy with my life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 I would describe myself as a good negotiator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22 Sometimes, I get involved in things which I later wish I could get out of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23 I pay a lot of attention to my feelings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 I feel good about myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25 I tend to “back down” even if I know I’m right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26 I’m unable to change the way other people feel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27 I believe that things will work out fine in my life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28 Sometimes, I wish I had a better relationship with my parents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29 I’m able to cope well in new environments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30 I try to control my thoughts and not worry too much about things 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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ABOUT MY PERSONALITY (BFI-44-A) 
Here are some statements that may or may not describe what you are like.  For each statement, please tick the box which shows how 
much you agree or disagree that it describes you.  For example, do you agree that you are someone who is bossy?  If you think this is a 
lot like you, put a tick in the box for ‘agree strongly’; if you think it’s a little bit like you tick ‘agree a little’; if you are unsure, tick ‘neither 
agree or disagree’; if this is not really like you tick ‘disagree a little’, or, if it is not at all like you tick ‘disagree strongly’. 
 
 
 
I see myself as someone who... 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree a 
little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Agree 
strongly 
1 Is talkative      
2 Tends to find fault with others      
3 Does things carefully and completely      
4 Is depressed, blue      
5 Is original, comes up with new ideas      
6 Is reserved – keeps thoughts and feelings to self      
7 Is helpful and unselfish with others      
8 Can be somewhat careless      
9 Is relaxed, handles stress well      
10 Is curious about many different things      
11 Is full of energy      
12 Starts quarrels with others      
13 Is a reliable worker      
14 Can be tense      
15 Is clever, thinks a lot      
16 Generates a lot of enthusiasm      
17 Has a forgiving nature      
18 Tends to be disorganised      
19 Worries a lot      
20 Has an active imagination      
21 Tends to be quiet      
22 Is generally trusting      
23 Tends to be lazy      
24 Doesn’t get easily upset – emotionally stable      
25 Is creative and inventive      
26 Takes charge, has an assertive personality      
27 Can be cold and distant with others      
28 Keeps working until things are done      
29 Can be moody      
30 Likes artistic and creative experiences      
31 Is sometimes shy, inhibited      
32 Is considerate and kind to almost everyone      
33 Does things efficiently (quickly and correctly)      
34 Stays calm in tense situations      
35 Likes work that is the same every time (routine)      
36 Is outgoing, sociable      
37 Is sometimes rude to others      
38 Makes plans and sticks to them      
39 Gets nervous easily      
40 Likes to think and play with ideas      
41 Doesn’t like artistic things (plays, music)      
42 Likes to co-operate; goes along with others      
43 Is easily distracted; has trouble paying attention      
44 Knows a lot about art, music or books      
45 Is the kind of person almost everyone likes      
46 People really enjoy spending time with      
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ABOUT THINGS THAT HAVE HAPPENED TO ME (APES-SF) 
The following is a list of events which may or may not have happened to you.  Some of these are events which have happened to nearly everybody, others are events which only happen once in a while and not to everybody.   
Please decide whether you have had each of these experiences in the past six months.  If the event has happened, please put a cross (X) in the box next to the statement where it says ‘Event has happened’.  Then, for each event that 
has happened please decide how desirable the event was – that is, how good or bad it was when it happened to you.   Good (desirable) events are ones which are pleasant or make us happy, while bad (undesirable) events are ones that 
upset us or make us feel scared, sad or angry.  For each event tick the box which best describes how desirable (good or bad) each event was when it happened to you. 
  Event has 
happened in 
last 6 months 
(X) 
How bad or good was this? 
 
Extremely 
bad 
  
 
Very 
bad 
 
 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
 
Slightly 
bad 
 
 
Neither 
good or 
bad  
 
Slightly 
good 
 
 
Somewhat 
good 
 
 
Very 
good 
 
 
Extremely 
good 
 
1 Hobbies or activities (watching TV, reading, playing an instrument, etc)           
2 Doing things/spending time with family members           
3 Spending time talking with a boyfriend/girlfriend           
4 Dating or doing things with people of the opposite sex           
5 Feeling pressured by friends (friends expecting you to do things or be a 
certain way) 
          
6 Family members, relatives, step parents moving in or out of the house           
7 Helping other people           
8 Fight or problems with a friend           
9 Restrictions at home (not being allowed at home to do something you 
wanted to do, e.g. having to be in at a certain time, etc) 
          
10 Death of a family member           
11 Family member becoming pregnant or having a baby           
12 Attending school           
13 Hospitalisation of a family member or relative           
14 Falling in love or beginning a relationship with a boyfriend/girlfriend           
15 Poor relationship between family members and friends (don’t get along)           
16 Doing poorly on a test or exam             
17 Talking or sharing feelings with friends           
18 Being around people who are inconsiderate or offensive (rude, selfish)           
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19 Arrest of a family member           
20 Getting into trouble or being suspended from school           
21 Hassles, arguments or fights with other students at school           
22 Financial troubles or worries about money           
23 Getting bad grades or progress reports at school           
24 Having bad classes or teachers           
25 Meeting new people           
26 Parent getting married           
27 Having few or no friends           
28 Arguments or fights between parents           
29 Getting good grades or progress reports at school           
30 Having good classes or teachers           
31 Understanding classes or homework           
32 Change in relationship with boyfriend/girlfriend           
33 Change in relationship(s) with family member(s)           
34 Change in relationship(s) with friend(s)           
35 Pressures or expectation from parents            
36 Visiting a parent who doesn’t live with you           
37 Having plans fall through            
38 Visiting relatives           
39 Going to parties, dances, concerts           
40 Friends getting drunk or using drugs           
41 Death of a relative           
42 Obligations at home (things you have to do)           
43 Family member or relative having emotional problems (being really sad)           
44 Friend or family member recovering from being sick or injured           
45 Arguments or problems with boyfriend/girlfriend           
46 Something bad happens to a friend           
47 Changes in privileges or responsibilities at home (changes in what you are 
allowed to do or have to do) 
          
48 Change in health of a family member or relative           
49 Change in health or a friend           
50 Change in number of friends (make new friends or lose friends)           
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51 Parents discover something you didn’t want them to know           
52 Brother or sister getting engaged or married           
53 Brother or sister getting separated or divorced           
54 Not spending enough time with family members or friends           
55 School or job change of a family member (drops out of school, gets a job etc)           
56 Advancing a year in school (starting a new year group)           
57 Living with only one parent           
58 Talking on the phone           
59 Discussions or long talks with parents           
60 Homework or studying           
61 Taking care of younger brother(s) or sister(s)           
62 Problems or arguments with parents, siblings or family members           
63 Problems or arguments with teachers or headteacher           
64 Spending time at home           
65 Achieving something at school           
66 Doing household chores           
67 Something good happens to a friend           
68 Alcohol or drug use by family members or relatives           
69 Breaking up with or being rejected by boyfriend/girlfriend           
70 Death of a friend           
71 Family moves (to a new home)           
72 Parent loses job           
73 Returning to school after time off           
74 Parents getting divorced           
75 Not getting along with the parents of your friends           
76 Doing well on an exam or test           
77 Spending time (relaxing or going out) with friends           
78 Friend(s) move away or you move away from  friends           
79 Getting punished by parents           
80 Being in love or having a relationship with a boyfriend/girlfriend           
81 Not having a boyfriend/girlfriend           
82 Friend having emotional problems (being really upset, sad, etc)           
83 Friend becoming pregnant or having a child           
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ABOUT MY FAMILY (FAD-GF) 
The following are a list of statements about families.  Read each statement carefully and decide how well it describes your own family.  
This time there are four possible choices – tick ‘agree strongly ’ if you think the statement describes you family very well; tick ‘agree’ if 
the statement describes your family for the most part; ‘disagree’ if the statement does not describe your family for the most part; 
‘disagree strongly’ if you feel the statement does not describe your family at all. 
  Agree 
strongly 
Agree Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
1 Planning family activities is difficult because we misunderstand each 
other 
    
2 In times of crisis we can turn to each other for support     
3 We cannot talk to each other about the sadness we feel     
4 Individuals are accepted for what they are     
5 We avoid discussing our fears and concerns     
6 We can express feelings to each other     
7 There are lots of bad feelings in the family     
8 We feel accepted for what we are     
9 Making decisions is a problem for our family     
10 We are able to make decisions about how to solve problems     
11 We don’t get along well together     
12 We confide in each other     
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Appendix D: Confirmatory factor analyses (coping; AEI; TEI; family dysfunction; depression; 
disruptive behaviour; negative life events)  
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ACTIVE 
 
AVOIDANT 
 
SUPPORT SEEKING 
CDM (M = 2.40; SD = .71) 
DPS (M = 2.43; SD = .68) 
SU (M = 2.29; SD = .69) 
CON (M = 2.40; SD = .68) 
POS (M = 2.35; SD = .71) 
OPT (M = 2.40; SD = .71) 
AA (M = 2.32; SD = .68) 
REP (M = 2.20; SD = .68) 
WT (M = 2.46; SD = .77) 
DA (M = 2.54; SD = .64) 
SF (M = 2.01; SD = .65) 
SPS (M = 2.02; SD = .66) 
Figure 2:  Confirmatory factor analysis of the final three-factor coping model (CCSC-R1). 
Note: Latent variance set to 1 to establish scaling. Standardised parameter estimates are 
displayed with indicator M and SD shown in brackets next to label. Curved arrows represent 
covariances. CDM = cognitive decision-making (skew (s) = .13; kurtosis (k) = -.35); DPS = 
direct problem-solving (s = .09; k =-.39); SU = seeking understanding (s = .20; k =-.37); CON = 
control (s = .11; k =-.09); OPT = optimism (s = .13; k =-.44); POS = positivity (s = .21; k =-.40); 
AA = avoidant actions (s = .10; k =-.38); REP = repression (s = .40; k =-.11); WT = wishful 
thinking (s = .05; k =-.73); DA = distracting actions (s = .01; k =-.25); SF = support for feelings 
(s = .52; k =-.-03); SPS = support for problem-solving (s = .46; k =-.29). 
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SOC (M = 4.74; SD = .94) 
 
EMOTION (M = 4.44; SD = .85) 
 
SELF (M = 4.20; SD = .98) 
 
Figure 4: Confirmatory factor analysis of global TEI (TEIQue-ASF).    
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates are displayed with indicator M and SD shown in brackets next to label. WELL 
= wellbeing (skew (s) = -.42; kurtosis (k) = -.29); SOC = sociability (s = .09; k =-.09); 
EMOTION = emotionality (s = .14; k =.31); SELF = self-control (s = -.05; k =.39).  
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ABILITY EI 
PERCEIVE (M= 89.66; SD= 17.16) 
USE (M= 101.48; SD= 16.68) 
UND (M= 100.58; SD= 14.54) 
MANAGE (M= 95.04; SD= 14.55) 
Figure 3: Confirmatory factor analysis of ability EI (MSCEIT-YVR).   
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates shown with indicator M and SD shown in brackets next to label. PERCEIVE = 
ability to perceive and identify emotion (skew (s) = -.67; kurtosis (k) = .52); USE = ability 
to use emotion to facilitate thought (s = -.31; k =-.34); UND = ability to understand 
emotion (s = -.55; k =-.41); MANAGE = ability to regulate emotion in oneself and others 
(s = -.20; k =-.98).  
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FAMILY 
DYSFUNCTION 
FAD1 (M = 1.86; SD = .57) 
FAD2 (M = 1.92; SD = .59) 
FAD3 (M = 1.91; SD = .59) 
FAD4 (M = 2.05; SD = .66) 
Figure 5: Confirmatory factor analysis of the FAD-GF scale with item parcels.   
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates are shown with indicator M and SD in brackets next to label. FAD1: skew (s) = .32; 
kurtosis (k) = -.21; FAD 2: s = .40; k =.14; FAD3: s = .44; k =.25; FAD4: s =.49; k =.13.  
 
.81 
.92 
.88 
.16 
.35 
.23 
.38 
.79 
 
DEPRESSION 
DEP1 (M = 2.86; SD = 2.56) 
DEP2 (M = 2.78; SD = 2.58) 
DEP3 (M = 2.83; SD = 2.84) 
DEP4 (M = 2.94; SD = 2.76) 
Figure 6: Confirmatory factor analysis of the BYI II depression scale with item parcels.   
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates are shown with indicator M and SD in brackets next to label. DEP1: skew (s) = 
1.18; kurtosis (k) = 1.74; DEP 2: s = 1.02; k = 1.02; DEP3: s = 1.25; k =1.68; DEP4: s =1.17; k 
=1.82. 
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DISRUPTIVE 
BEHAVIOUR 
DRB1 (M = 1.77; SD = 1.79) 
DRB2 (M = 2.42; SD = 2.42) 
DRB3 (M = 1.39; SD = 1.66) 
DRB4 (M = 1.57; SD = 2.16) 
Figure 7: Confirmatory factor analysis of the BYI II disruptive behaviour scale with item 
parcels.   
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates are shown with indicator M and SD in brackets next to label. DRB1: skew (s) = 
1.40; kurtosis (k) = 2.60; DRB2: s = 1.37; k = 2.63; DRB3: s = 1.89; k =4.82; DRB4: s =2.08; k = 
5.80. 
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NEGATIVE LIFE 
EVENTS 
NET (M = 11.48; SD = 13.22) 
ROM (M = 4.53; SD = 6.90) 
FAM (M = 7.06; SD = 8.73) 
PEER (M = 5.41; SD = 6.06) 
AC (M = 5.38; SD = 6.05) 
Figure 8: Confirmatory factor analysis of negative life events (APES-SF).   
Note: Latent variance fixed to 1 for identification purposes. Standardised parameter 
estimates are displayed with indicator M and SD shown in brackets next to label. NET = 
network events (skew (s) = 2.03; kurtosis (k) = 5.26); ROM =romantic events (s = 2.28; k =-
6.18); FAM = family events (s = 2.11; k =6.54); PEER = peer events (s = 2.09; k =8.67); AC = 
academic events (s = 1.79; k =6.12). 
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Appendix E: Debrief material - Coping with stress factsheet issued by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (p.1/2 only) 
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Appendix F: Ethical approval - University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee 
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Appendix G: Supplementary hierarchical regression analyses 
Table 9b: Hierarchical regression of mental health on sex, age, general cognitive ability, personality and emotional intelligence with complete cases only (N = 400 – 442) 
 Depression  Disruptive behaviour 
Variable  SE t R
2
 ΔR
2
 ΔF   SE t R
2
 ΔR
2
 ΔF 
Step 1    .02 .02 3.45*     .03 .03 7.37** 
Sex .12 .93 2.60*     -.17 .65 -3.55***    
Age  -.02 .39 -.44     .08 .28 1.54    
Step 2    .04 .03 11.81**     .05 .01 5.80* 
GCA -.16 .14 -3.44**     -.11 .10 -2.41*    
Step 3    .26 .22 25.45***     .25 .21 23.78*** 
Extraversion -.04 .74 -.86     -.02 .53 -.49    
Agreeableness -.02 .81 -.37     -.37 .57 -7.39***    
Conscientiousness -.12 .78 -2.41*     -.12 .55 -2.31*    
Neuroticism .41 .77 8.29***     .08 .54 1.65    
Openness .11 .77 2.25**     .18 .55 3.54***    
Step 4    .24 .00 1.43     .26 .01 5.65* 
Ability EI -.07 .04 -1.20     -.13 .03 -2.38*    
Step 4    .32 .06 40.50***     .26 .01 6.03* 
Trait EI -.33 .02 -6.36***     -.13 .02 -2.46*    
Notes: For each model, variables across steps 1-3 remain the same with only variables on Step 4 changing (i.e., type of EI). Thus, results for Steps 1-3 are presented for each outcome only once. Models 
predicting depression were significant: AEI: F (9, 399) = 13.90, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .23; TEI: F (9, 443) = 22.84, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .31 but only TEI significantly contributed to the final step of the model, accounting 
for 6.3% of the variance in depression. Models for disruptive behaviour were also significant: AEI: F (9, 400) = 14.92, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .24, and TEI: F (9, 441) = 16.97, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .26. Both AEI and TEI 
made significant incremental contributions to the prediction of externalising symptoms on the final step of the model, adding 1% respectively.  
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 
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Table 9c: Hierarchical regression of mental health on sex, age, general cognitive ability, personality and emotional intelligence with square root transformed health 
variables 
 Depression  Disruptive behaviour 
Variable  SE t R
2
 ΔR
2
 ΔF   SE t R
2
 ΔR
2
 ΔF 
Step 1    .02 .02 5.52**     .03 .04 6.98** 
Sex .16 .15 3.32**     -.16 .13 -3.33**    
Age  -.01 .06 -.210     .08 .05 1.76    
Step 2    .04 .02 7.86**     .04 .01 3.59 
GCA -.13 .02 -2.80**     -.11 .09 -2.44*    
Step 3    .28 .24 29.45***     .27 .23 27.81*** 
Extraversion -.09 .12 -1.87     .01 .10 .16    
Agreeableness -.05 .13 -.90     -.37 .11 -7.40***    
Conscientiousness -.10 .13 -2.04*     -.13 .11 -2.70**    
Neuroticism .42 .12 8.68***     .13 .11 2.86**    
Openness .13 .13 2.67**     .15 .11 3.11**    
Step 4    .28 .00 2.69     .28 .01 1.74* 
Ability EI -.04 .01 -.60     -.11 .01 -2.05*    
Step 4    .34 .06 37.59***     .29 .01 8.69** 
Trait EI -.31 .01 -6.13***     -.16 .00 -2.95**    
Note: For each model, variables across steps 1-3 remain the same with only variables on Step 4 changing (i.e., type of EI) - results for Steps 1-3 are presented for each outcome only once. Models predicting 
depression were significant: AEI: F (9, 399) = 15.84, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .25; TEI: F (9, 443) = 24.95, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .33. Again, only TEI significantly contributed to the final step of the model, accounting for 
5.7% of the variance in depression. Models for disruptive behaviour were also significant: AEI: F (9, 400) = 15.85, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .25, and TEI: F (9, 441) = 19.30, p < 0.001; R
2
adj = .27, with AEI and TEI 
significantly contributing to the final step of the model, adding 1% and 1.4% respectively.  
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p< 0.001 
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Appendix H: Path diagrams for significant conditional indirect effects models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                     
Figure 11: The effect of family dysfunction on depression through coping moderated by TEI acting on the ‘b’ pathways (coping x TEI).  
Notes: Unstandardised estimates shown.  Interactions denoted by filled circles; double headed arrows represent covariances. All latent variables were regressed onto 
control variables age, sex; significant parameters involving age: active coping =.05**, support seeking = -.10***; significant parameters for sex: avoidant coping = .24**, 
support seeking = .34***.      
 *** p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05  
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Figure 13: The effect of family dysfunction on depression through coping moderated by AEI acting on the ‘a’ pathways (stressor x AEI).  
Notes: Unstandardised estimates shown.  Interactions denoted by filled circles; double headed arrows represent covariances. All latent variables were regressed onto control 
variables age, sex; significant parameters involving age: family dysfunction =.05*, AEI = .31***; significant parameters for sex: depression = .40**, avoid = .24**, support 
seeking = .44***, AEI = .38*** 
 *** p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05  
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Figure 14: The effect of negative life events on depression through coping moderated by AEI acting on the ‘a’ pathways (stressor x AEI).  
Notes: Unstandardised estimates shown.  Interactions denoted by filled circles; double headed arrows represent covariances. All latent variables were regressed onto control 
variables age, sex; significant parameters involving age: depression = .14*, avoidant coping = -.08*, negative life events =.09**, AEI = .33***; significant parameters for sex: 
depression = .39**, avoid = .24**, support seeking = .42***, AEI = .34*** 
 *** p < .001, **p < .01, * p < .05  
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